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Hoe het die stigmatisering van nasionalisme begin?

Hoe het die stigmatisering van nasionalisme begin?

Dit is ongetwyfeld dat in die moderne wêreld die idee van nasionalisme deur baie mense verval, veral op die linkervleuel, en ek is nuuskierig oor hoe dit histories ontwikkel het.

Kan iemand dit help om idees voor te stel oor hoe nasionalisme negatief beskou kan word, is dit die gevolg van Nazisme?


WW1.

WW1 begin te midde van 'n wilde entoesiasme in alle Europese lande (vgl. Lesing 5 "August Madness"). Die golf van nasionalisme het selfs die SDP gevee!

Die oorlog was 'n groot teleurstelling vir almal wat betrokke was. Dit het daartoe gelei dat sommige intellektuele nasionalisme bevraagteken het. Die oorlog lei egter ook tot die eerste stappe van dekolonisering en die skepping van nasiestate in Oos-Europa.

WW2 was die tweede fase van die proses: nog meer mense het nasionalisme bevraagteken, maar nog meer mense het dit aangeneem omdat hulle nou die hoop gehad het om 'n nasionale tuisland te hê.


Ek stem saam met die vorige antwoord, maar soos u die linkses genoem het, sal ek 'n paar punte oor die perspektief byvoeg.

Dit lyk asof Marx se werk geïnterpreteer word om nasionalisme te beskou as die belange van die rewolusionêr - hoewel hy nasionalisme in sommige lande ondersteun het, waar dit as 'progressief' beskou word, in plaas van 'n burgerlike uitvinding, sien hierdie afdeling byvoorbeeld.

Om soortgelyke redes verdedig die Trotskyiste ook die skepping van 'n internasionale sosialisme.

Dan dink ek dat oorloë nog altyd 'n rol gespeel het in hierdie beweging, soos uiteengesit in hierdie antwoord.


Nasionalisme het grootliks sy oorsprong by Lodewyk XIV. Politieke struktuur hiervoor was die plaaslike regering deur adel, met die edeles wat getrou was aan Royalty. Daar was min konsep van 'n nasie as sodanig. Lodewyk XIV verlei die adel na Versailles en vervang die plaaslike administrasie met opgeleide amptenare van derde boedel onder direkte beheer van die koning. So die Sonkoning, waar al die kragstrale bymekaarkom. Alhoewel dit baie effektief was vir Lodewyk IV en sy oorloë, was Louis XVI oorbodig, aangesien die derde landgoed oorgeskakel het na die Franse nasionalisme eerder as die Franse koninklikes. Dit word bespreek deur Jacques Barzun In From Dawn to Decadence, The Monarch's Revolution -hoofstuk.

Nasionalisme het gebots met kolonialisme en invloedsgebiede deur buitelandse moondhede, soos toe Oostenryk die heerskappy oor sy ryk beweer het. Verskeie nasionalismes, wat dikwels godsdienstig gebaseer is, is steeds in konflik.


Die oorsprong van nasionalisme

Wat is die oorsprong van nasionalisme? Die kiem daarvan was moontlik al lankal by mense. Kom ons kyk na die geskiedenis van die nasie wat ons 'n spesiale woord daarvoor gegee het: chauvinisme.

Teen die einde van die twaalfde eeu het die koning van Frankryk, toe 'n klein land in die middel van Parys, die kruistog geloods teen die Katare in die suide, waar hulle 'n ander taal gepraat het (die "langue d'oc", so genoem omdat oc was hulle woord vir ja.) Dit was beslis om sy koninkryk te vergroot en oënskynlik om ketters (wat inderdaad vermoor is) te beveg, maar dit het nie begin uit 'n gevoel van nasionale superioriteit nie. Net so, toe 'n ander Lodewyk, Lodewyk XIV Elsass geannekseer het, was dit om die gebied van sy koninkryk uit te brei. Maar nasionalisme soos ons dit uit ons tyd leer ken het, het toe nie bestaan ​​nie, en hierdie oorloë was vir mag en persoonlike eer. Diegene wat geveg het, het ander motiewe as die bewering van die superioriteit van Frankryk teenoor ander nasies.

Dit is wanneer ons by Napoleon kom dat ons iets anders kan ruik. Die bedwelmende slagspreuk van die rewolusie- "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité"- is gevolg deur die 'Terror', en dan deur die avonture van die Korsikaanse opstart wat aanvanklik deur baie van die goedgelowige 'intelligentsia' bewonder is toe hy byna die hele wêreld neergeslaan het. van Europa in oorlog. Daar was toe geen 'Duitsland' nie; daar was 'n aantal groot en klein koninkryke en letterlik honderde onafhanklike klein hertogdomme, elk met sy eie hof, wette, gebruike en plaaslike tradisies, terwyl hulle die kultuur van die Duitssprekende mense gedeel het. In Sentraal -Europa is die Slag om Leipzig (1813) die bekendste slag van hierdie verskriklike tyd, toe Rusland, Pruise en Oostenryk Napoleon vir die eerste keer verslaan het. Dit was vanaf hierdie tyd dat die idee van 'n 'Duitse nasie' versprei het, versterk deur Blücher se legendariese kruising van die Ryn om die staatskaping by Waterloo te gee.

Die eenwording en sterkte van Duitsland het ontstaan ​​deur die militêre mag van Pruise, maar terselfdertyd was dit 'n tydperk waarin Duitse letterkunde, musiek, filosofie, kuns en later die wetenskap daar floreer soos nog nooit tevore nie. Sy bekende universiteite het geleerdes en talle noemenswaardige studente uit ander lande aangetrek, waaronder Turke en Armeniërs, wat besmet geraak het met die virusse van die Europese politiek: die idees van "regte", van sosialisme, van "links" en "regs", en nasionalisme, almal het hul oorsprong in die idee dat ons beskawing die gevolg is van die ontwikkeling van 'n rede wat nog nooit op ons planeet bestaan ​​het nie.

Nadat ek die bogenoemde geskryf het, het ek na Chauvinisme gekyk. Dit word gedefinieer as 'oordrewe (sic) nasionalisme'. Die woord kom van die naam van 'n Franse soldaat, Nicholas Chauvin, 'n veteraan uit die veldtogte van Napoleon, bekend vir sy patriotiese ywer.

Ek is geen historikus nie en my siening en gevoel van geskiedenis het baie verander sedert ek in my eerste jaar aan die Universiteit gesukkel het met E. H. Carr ’s - Wat is geskiedenis - en vandag voel ek nie meer nodig om terug te gaan en dit te lees nie.

Ek weet nie die oorsprong van nasionalisme nie. Wat was die Romeine in hierdie verband? Maar dit is 'n eenkant.

By die lees van die artikel oor nasionalisme dink ek dat dit 'n te groot sprong is om van Louis XIV na Napoleon te gaan, tussenin is daar Engeland met sy unieke geskiedenis en veral sy groeiende gevoel van Engels onder die Tudors, veral Elizabeth, en natuurlik in dit is die opkoms van Protestantisme. Ek het dit nog nooit ondersoek nie, maar die artikel oor nasionalisme het my laat twyfel: is daar 'n verband tussen protestantisme en nasionalisme? Miskien is daar iets hierin as u die opkoms van Nederland en die samesmelting van die Engelse nasie/staat beskou.

Napoleon, soos met Hitler. Kan hulle as nasionalisties of iets anders beskou word?

Verder het die artikel my aangeraak om te vra vir wie skryf ons in ons internetblad? Alhoewel ek met die meeste van die artikels saamstem, sou ek dit anders geskryf het op 'n manier wat diegene wat reeds 'die geskiedenis' bevraagteken, kan aanraak en al voel ek dat Napoleon 'n beter man sou gewees het as hy tuis was en met sy eie sake bedoel, is hulle moontlik nog nie heeltemal gereed om te hoor dat soveel van ons 'sogenaamde geskiedenis niks anders is as die geskiedenis van misdaad' of dat die beskawing (sogenaamde) in stryd met 'vorder' in werklikheid daal nie .

Miskien het nasionalisme, in 'n vorm wat vir ons herkenbaar was, in Napoleontiese tye na vore gekom. As dit die geval is, moes sy wortels reeds daar gewees het, en die oorsake daarvan het lank voor ons in ons almal gesaai.

By nadenke wonder ek of nasionalisme 'n soort plaasvervanger vir godsdiens is. U kan sien dat die verenigende krag van die Christendom vanaf die Middeleeue verswak, noodlottig gewond word, miskien deur die pousdom se gehegtheid aan tydelike mag en die konflik met die Heilige Romeinse Ryk. Dit is verder verswak deur die opkoms van Protestantisme, die Dertigjarige Oorlog en die opkoms van "Rede" (die sogenaamde "Verligting"). Geloof in God en hoop op 'n ander lewe is ondermyn. Maar dit wil voorkom asof ons op iets moet glo en hoop-as dit nie in iets binne is nie, dan moet dit dalk iets van buite wees. Wat kan 'n volk dan bymekaar hou?

'N Goeie voorbeeld sou die manier wees waarop Elizabeth die 1ste haar as The Virgin Queen gevestig het, terwyl haar optogte in Engeland 'n plaasvervanger vorm vir die verwerking van standbeelde van die Maagd Maria. Haar doel was om die koninkryk te verenig en om die uitbreek van 'n burgeroorlog tussen die Katolieke en Protestante te voorkom.

Ek dink op nasionalisme op 'n ander manier. Dieselfde energie wat iemand ervaar as hy vandag nasionalisties is, of in die eerste nasiestate in Europa of elders, is waarskynlik ook deur mense ervaar, lank voordat 'n 'nasie' bestaan ​​het. Die vraag: 'Wat is die oorsprong van nasionalisme? is nie vir my so interessant soos, ‘Wat is die wortel -energie van nasionalisme? ’Is dit 'n gevoel? Of 'n emosie? 'N Hipnotisme? Self kalmerend? 'N Identifikasie? 'N Opvoeding?

In hierdie sin wil ek die sielkunde van nasionalisme verstaan. Ek wonder of ons die sielkunde daarvan goed genoeg kon verstaan, dan kan ons verder terugtrek of, meer presies, terug in die geskiedenis/oorsprong daarvan?


UW Tacoma Digital Commons

Wit nasionalisme was sedert die begin van die land 'n deel van die geskiedenis van die Verenigde State, maar bly 'n sekondêre kwessie in vergelyking met die blanke oppergesag. In die afgelope dertig jaar het blanke nasionalisme egter in die Verenigde State aan die toeneem, en word stadig die algemene retoriek binne die politiek, sowel as in sosiale en ekonomiese besprekings. Wat het hierdie styging in wit nasionalisme veroorsaak? Het die gewildheid van sosiale media en die internet sedert die negentigerjare die groei daarvan beïnvloed?

Met die gebruik van primêre bronne soos toesprake, boeke wat deur wit nasionaliste geskryf is en bronne van binne -internet, kan u sien dat die motivering agter wit nasionalisme wegbeweeg het van die onderdrukking van ander rasse, met onderliggende idees van wit superioriteit, na 'n siening van slagoffers, met die beskerming van rasse as 'n primêre regverdiging. Deur gebruik te maak van akademiese tydskrifte en wetenskaplike boeke wat die geskiedenis en ontwikkeling van wit nasionalisme ontleed, is dit duidelik dat wit nasionalisme deur die Amerikaanse geskiedenis gestyg en gedaal het, met die mees onlangse ontwikkeling die gevolg van sosiale media en meme -kultuur wat dit uit die die rand van die samelewing en tot die hoofstroom -samelewing en bespreking. Die belangrikheid van hierdie onderwerp word weerspieël in die feit dat wat vroeër as gevaarlike en ontstekende retoriek beskou is, iets meer aanvaarbaar en omhels geword het in 'n samelewing wat voorheen as post-rassig en kleurblind bestempel is.


Waar kom nasionalisme vandaan? 'N Historiese blik op pre-moderne revolusionêre nasionalisme

Nasionalisme is 'n verskynsel wat 'n lang geskiedenis het voor sy huidige vorm in die moderne tyd. Dit was nog altyd 'n model wat nasionale belange bo alle ander stel. Dit het ook gekant teen die eenheid van die Christendom wat God en sy wet bo alles gestel het.

Voor die nasionalistiese plaag was die politieke stelsels in die Christelike beskawing gebaseer op die bybeginsel van 'uitgestuurde soewereiniteit'. Hierdie gebalanseerde posisie bevoordeel tegelyk 'n gesonde lokalisme en 'n goeie waardering van universele ideale en instellings. Hierdie harmonieuse liefde vir die land en die hele mensdom is belig deur die Katolieke geloof, gegrond op God se genade en ondersteun deur die deugd van matigheid.

Die agteruitgang van die Christendom

Hierdie harmonieuse konsep van 'n nasie wat in die Christendom ingebring is, het ongelukkig ten tye van die Renaissance in duie gestort. So begin 'n proses van morele dekadensie waarin die liefde vir die liefde van God kwyn en geleidelik vervang word deur die sensuele en trotse liefde vir myself.

Soos beskryf in Plinio Correa de Oliveira's Revolusie en teenrevolusie, “die absolutisme van legiste, wat hulself versier het met 'n verwaande kennis van die Romeinse reg, is positief ontvang deur ambisieuse vorste. En die hele tyd, in groot en klein, het die wil van vroeër vervaag om die koninklike mag binne die regte grense te hou, soos in die dae van Saint Louis van Frankryk en Saint Ferdinand van Castilië. ”

Die absolutisme van Philip the Fair

Een ambisieuse koning wat die regte van die Kerk en sy feodale onderdane minag het, was koning Filips die Skone van Frankryk, ook bekend as The Iron King. Onder die dekmantel van die "verdediging van die koninkryk", bevestig hy 'n absolutistiese wanopvatting van wat die 'nasionale belang' beteken. So het hy die eersgebore dogter van die kerk van 'n gedesentraliseerde feodale land in 'n gesentraliseerde staat verander onder die maksimum “Rex est imperator in regno suo” (die koning is 'n keiser in sy eie koninkryk).

Om sy oorloë teen Engeland en Vlaandere te finansier, het hy groot belasting opgelê en die geldeenheid verneder deur die silwerinhoud daarvan te verminder en sodoende almal te verarm. Toe pous Bonifatius VIII sy stem verhef om die armes en die regte van die kerk te verdedig (die koning belas tot die helfte van die jaarlikse inkomste van die geestelikes!), Roep die Franse koning 'n vergadering van biskoppe, edelmanne en groothandelaars op om die pous te veroordeel .

Die verontwaardiging van Anagni

In reaksie hierop bevestig pous Boniface in die beroemde Bul Unam Sanctam, die hoogste mag van die pousdom in geestelike aangeleenthede en die indirekte mag daarvan ratione peccati (weens sonde) in tydelike aangeleenthede. Philip the Fair het die legis Guillaume de Nogaret as sy gesant gestuur om die pous in die tronk te sit. In die rusie wat gevolg het, het een van die in die geselskap die Pous in sy gesig geslaan.

10 Razones Por las Cuales el “Matrimonio” Homoseksuele es Dañino y tiene que Ser Desaprobado

Sommige historici glo dat hierdie episode - die Verontwaardiging van Anagni - was die einde van die Middeleeue. Deur hierdie handeling bevestig Philip 'n 'sekularistiese' opvatting van die staat wat hom bevry het van die toesig van die kerk. Hy het sy regering sentraliseer deur te vra vir noodmagte wat ver buite die ou grense strek en uiteindelik die uitgemaakte feodale mag van die adel ontbind het.

Kortom, die Franse volk was genoodsaak om dieselfde buitengewone opofferings vir die nasie te maak as wat hul voorouers gewilliglik vir die kerk en die kruistogte gedoen het. Dit verteenwoordig 'n eerste groot verskuiwing in die hiërargie van lojaliteit van die Westerse mens van kerk tot land.

Protestantse bydrae tot nasionalisme

Na die dekadensie van die Middeleeue het die Protestantse Revolusie die opkoms van 'n opkomende jingoïstiese nasionalisme bevoordeel. Volgens Yoram Hazoni, in sy boek, Die deug van nasionalisme, Luther se '' N nuwe oproep tot vryheid om die Skrif te interpreteer sonder die gesag van die Katolieke Kerk, het nie alleen die godsdiensleer beïnvloed nie. … Protestantisme omhels en raak vinnig verbind met die unieke nasionale tradisies van mense wat teen idees en instellings wat hulle as vreemd vir hulle beskou, teister. 1

Protestantisme, georganiseer volgens nasionale lyne, was die ondergang vir die idee van 'n internasionale, trans-territoriale verenigde Christendom. Hierdie godsdienstige en sielkundige verandering het die eerste slag getref wat uiteindelik gelei het tot die ontbinding van die Heilige Romeinse Ryk wat in 1806 ineengestort het.

Helaas, die jingoïstiese nasionalisme was nie 'n eksklusiewe skepping van Protestantse heersers nie, soos Henry VIII, wat nasionale kerke geskep het waarvan hulle hulself as 'opperhoofde' verklaar het.

Die Franse nasionalisme

Frans-Katolieke monarge het ook 'n nasionalistiese stryd aangegaan, selfs voor die ontploffing van die Pseudo-Hervorming. Karel VII van Frankryk, wat die heilige Jeanne d'Arc troon, het die Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges uitgereik “wat die oppergesag van 'n raad oor die pous beweer en die 'vryhede' van die Gallican Church tot stand bring, wat die regte van die pous en in baie beperk sake wat sy jurisdiksie aan die wil van die koning onderwerp. ” 2

Lees alles oor die profesieë van ons vrou oor goeie sukses oor ons tyd

In sy stryd teen keiser Karel V, het koning Francis I van Frankryk 'n "heiligvereniging van die lelie en die halfmaan" in 1536 verseël. Carl Jacob Burckhardt gebruik hierdie uitdrukking om Francis se verbond met die sultan van die Ottomaanse Ryk, Suleiman the Magnificent, te beskryf. . Dit was die eerste nie-ideologiese alliansie tussen 'n Christelike en Moslemstaat wat gesamentlik 'n ander Christelike staat aanval op grond van suiwer "nasionale belang". Hierdie Frans-Turkse alliansie het meer as twee en 'n half eeue onderbroke voortgegaan.

Richelieu, argitek van koninklike absolutisme en nasionalisme

Kardinaal Richelieu, die eerste minister van koning Lodewyk XIII, het later 'n buitelandse beleid gevoer op grond van 'n soort Realpolitik wat Frankryk se geopolitieke belange onbeskaamd bo die hoogste belange van die Christendom geplaas het.

Hierdie kardinaal het die Hugenote in Frankryk verpletter omdat hulle 'n bedreiging vir die interne eenheid van Frankryk tydens die Dertigjarige Oorlog verteenwoordig het. Hy het egter ook Protestantse leërs gefinansier en die Protestantse koning Gustav Adolph van Swede ondersteun met die uitsluitlike doel om die Huis van Hapsburg wat in Spanje en die Heilige Romeinse Ryk geheers het, te verswak. Hierdie steun aan die Protestantse leërs verminder met 'n derde van die bevolking wat onder die Ryk woon. Katolisisme was dus die grootste slagoffer van sy beleid. Net soos koning Philip die Skone, het kardinaal Richelieu stomp en omvattende beleid ontwikkel om mag te sentraliseer, belasting te verhoog en die adel te beheer.

Destyds was Frankryk nog steeds grootliks 'n feodale samelewing waar die groot adellike gesinne groot boedels besit het, hul eie leërs gehad het en hul distrik bestuur het. Richelieu het Louis XIII oorreed om 'n kragtige "bedoeling”Of koninklike agent vir elke distrik. Hy het verder beveel dat alle kastele en vestings wat nie aan die grense van Frankryk geleë is nie, gesloop word. 'N Uitbreiding van die definisie van verraad of lèse-majesté is gebruik om weerstand te onderdruk. In kort word Richelieu beskou as die hoofargitek van koninklike absolutisme in Frankryk.

Soos Hilaire Belloc tereg uitwys in sy biografie van die kardinaal, was Richelieu se belangrikste nalatenskap sy beleid wat gebreek het "Die Christendom in 'n mosaïek van nasionaliteite, wat die aanbidding van nasionaliteit tot 'n godsdiens oprig om die antieke godsdiens waarmee Europa ontstaan ​​het, te vervang." 3 In plaas daarvan om God se belangstelling op aarde te bevorder (wat van 'n Katolieke kardinaal verwag moet word), het Richelieu sy belang toegepas "Oorweldigende genie vir die skepping van die moderne staat en, onbewustelik vir homself, tot die ondergang van die gemeenskaplike eenheid van die Christelike lewe." 4 & gt Belloc kom inderdaad tot die gevolgtrekking dat Richelieu die "Godsdiens van nasionalisme." 5

Die Verdrag van Westfalen

Die onbevooroordeelde Henry Kissinger het hom gekenmerk as "Die grafiese genie van 'n nuwe konsep van gesentraliseerde staatskaping en buitelandse beleid gebaseer op die magsbalans." 6 Richelieu -beleid het gelei tot die Verdrag van Westfalen, onderteken onder sy dissipel en opvolger kardinaal Jules Mazarin.

Wetenskap bevestig: Engele het die huis van Our Lady of Nazareth na Loreto geneem

Die Verdrag van Westfalen het inderdaad die Tagtigjarige Oorlog tussen Spanje en die Verenigde Provinsies van Nederland beëindig, en die Dertigjarige Oorlog tussen die Heilige Romeinse Ryk en ongeveer 300 Protestantse prinse wat oor klein lidstate geheers het. Die verdrag het die oorsaak van nasionalisme egter bevorder deur die volle territoriale soewereiniteit van die lidstate van die Ryk te erken, hulle te bevry van feodale verstrengelinge en die vorste toe te laat om onderling en met vreemde moondhede te onderhandel.

Die verdrag het soewereine magte selfs gegee om onderdane te dwing om die godsdiens van die heerser onder die monsteragtige maksimum te volg cujus regio ejus religio (godsdiens volg die soewerein)

Die Verligting en die Franse Revolusie

Die hoogtepunt van hierdie proses om die nasie te verdeel het tydens die Verligting en die Franse Revolusie plaasgevind. Soos David Bell in sy boek skryf Die kultus van die nasie in Frankryk: die uitvinding van nasionalisme, 1680-1800, “Die opkoms van die konsepte nasie en patrie het aanvanklik plaasgevind toe die Europeërs 'n radikale skeiding tussen God en die wêreld raakgesien het, na maniere gesoek het om aardse orde te onderskei en te handhaaf in die lig van God se afwesigheid, en gesukkel het om godsdiens na 'n nuut gedefinieerde privaat sfeer van menslike strewe te verplaas, los van politiek. ” [7]

Die Verligting het blinde nasionale patriotisme in 'n voorreg van die hoër klasse verander. Die Franse Revolusie het dit 'n gewilde gevoel van die mense gemaak: '' N Franse patriot, ' skryf Geoffrey Best, "Was 'n volwaardige nasionalis, stel sy eie nasie bo alle ander nasies en beskou dit met gevoelens wat grens aan aanbidding." 7

Hierdie toewyding aan die land kom tot uitdrukking in die massale opstel van soldate om die pasgebore Franse Republiek te verdedig: 'Die oproep was nasionalisme en die plig van elke burger om diens aan die nasie te lewer, 'n beginsel wat ter wille van hom deur revolusionêre militante verwelkom is, veral die leierskap van die Parys -afdelings en die Jacobin Club, waar dit onmiddellik verreikende ideologiese betekenis verkry het . ” 8

In teenstelling met die idee van die broederskap onder mense in die Christendom, was die Franse Revolusie die inspirasie vir moderne vreemdelingehaat, soos William Rogers Brubaker skryf:

'Dit was in die xenofobiese nasionalisme van sy radikale fase, nie in die kosmopolitisme van sy liberale fase nie, dat die rewolusie werklik revolusionêr was.

'Waarom hierdie skielike verskuiwing van xenofilie na xenofobie? Ek dink dit het te doen met die logika van die volkstaat. 'N Volkstaat is die volkstaat, die staat van en vir 'n bepaalde, begrensde, soewereine nasie, waartoe buitelanders per definisie nie behoort nie.

'Die Revolusie het 'n wettige grens en 'n' morele 'grens tussen lede van verskillende nasiestate geskep. Deur morele en wetlike grense binne die nasiestaat af te skaf, het dit wettige en morele grense en verdeeldheid tussen nasiestate gekristalliseer. Dit het dus die moderne nasiestaat en die moderne nasionalisme veroorsaak. ” 9

Sedert die dekadensie van die Middeleeue tot die Franse Revolusie, was nasionalistiese ideologieë en beleide skeppings van progressiewe strome wat tradisionele politieke strukture gekant was.

Nasionalistiese ideale het egter met die moderne tyd verander. Dit het die punt van opposisie geword teen die rasionalistiese en individualistiese karakter van die Verligting en die Franse Revolusie. Daar verskyn 'n tradisionalistiese, regse weergawe van nasionalisme wat individuele vryheid ontken en gemeenskapsbande en die onderbewussyn beklemtoon het.

Die fondamente is egter gelê deur die absolutistiese beleid wat die Christendom van sy Christelike wortels geskei het.


Engelse nasionalisme: watter kragte het die historiese identiteit van Engeland gevorm?

Wat gebeur met die Verenigde Koninkryk, en binne wat gebeur dit met Engeland? In hierdie uittreksel uit sy nuwe boek kyk Jeremy Black na die verlede om die hede te probeer verstaan, naamlik watter kragte die historiese identiteit van Engeland gevorm het en hoe dit die Engelse nasionalisme vandag beïnvloed het.

Nasionalisme is soveel as 'n beginsel. Dit openbaar kragtige emosionele elemente sowel as die interaksie van die 'diepe geskiedenis' van spesifieke nasionale of toekomstige nasionale groepe met die kontekste en uitdrukkings van hierdie 'diep geskiedenis' in spesifieke omstandighede. Hierdie 'diep geskiedenis' is die begrip van die verlede wat sentraal staan ​​in identiteit sowel as 'n uitdrukking van hierdie idee. Die kontekste sluit in aardrykskunde, klimaat, kultuur, samelewing, ekonomie en politiek, en die ervarings en uitdrukkings hiervan.

Engelsheid is 'n identiteit, 'n bewussyn en tans 'n proto-nasionalisme. Dit is laasgenoemde omdat daar tans geen Engelse staat in die Verenigde Koninkryk is nie, dit is die Verenigde Koninkryk van Groot -Brittanje en Noord -Ierland. Groot -Brittanje (kortliks Brittanje) bestaan ​​self uit Engeland, Skotland en Wallis. Engeland is die grootste en verreweg die mees bevolkte deel van Brittanje en die Verenigde Koninkryk, maar dit is slegs 'n deel van die geheel. Daar is geen Engelse paspoort, parlement of geldeenheid nie, en ook geen onmiddellike vooruitsig daarvan nie. Boonop is daar relatief min wat vir Engeland kenmerkend is in Groot -Brittanje of die Verenigde Koninkryk, en veral sedert die relatiewe afname in die betekenis van die Church of England. Ondanks die Amerikaanse neiging om na die 'koningin van Engeland' te verwys, regeer die monarg die Verenigde Koninkryk.

Ingesluit uit Getty Images Dit beteken egter nie dat Engeland 'n identiteit of identiteit ontbreek nie. Boonop is nasionalisme, of ten minste 'n kenmerkende nasionalisme, aangevuur, en deels op Engeland afgedwing deur die ontwikkeling in die Britse Eilande van skerp nasionalismes wat die Britsheid betwis het, en met baie sukses. Ierse nasionalisme was die eerste, maar dit is gevolg deur die van Wallis en, meer prominent, Skotland.

Hierdie kristallisasie van identiteit laat die vraag ontstaan ​​hoe ver terug in die tyd 'n vorm van Engelse nasionalisme kan projekteer. As staatskaping die belangrikste kwessie is, is die skepping van die Ou -Engelse (Saksiese) monargie in die tiende eeu van kritieke belang, aangesien dit 'n Engelse staat veroorsaak het. Boonop het die Engelse staat vanaf 1066 (sowel as onder die Romeine en koning Cnut), as deel van 'n groter politieke koninkryk, voortgegaan totdat dit geëindig het met die samesmelting van die Engelse en Skotse parlement in 1707.

Dit is dus een geskiedenis van die Engelse nasionalisme, 'n geskiedenis wat ingewikkeld geraak het deur die behoefte om, voor en na 1707, die gevolge daarvan te bespreek om deel te wees van 'n groter koninkryk. Die tweede benadering is om na 'n meer onlangse grondslag te kyk, soos hierbo voorgestel, wat 'n afname in Britsheid weerspieël. Daar is geen eenparige korrekte antwoord nie. Elke benadering is relevant en het sy meriete.

'N Deel van die probleem, maar ook die antwoord, word voorgestel deur die aard en omvang van veelvuldige identiteite, die oortuigings en wense wat dit insluit, en die mate waarin hierdie faktore oor tyd heen wissel. Hierdie veelvoudige identiteite kan vandag maklik gesien word, en het ook in die verlede verskyn. Die Evening Standard van 10 Oktober 2017 publiseer die resultate van 'n studie deur Queen Mary College, Universiteit van Londen, gebaseer op 'n YouGov -peiling onder 1 044 Londenaars, wat aan die lig gebring het dat 46 persent van die ondervrae 'Londoner' genoem word as hul primêre identiteit 25 per sent Europees 17 persent Britte en slegs 12 persent Engels. Hierdie resultate is gekwalifiseer deur die vraag hoe sterk hulle elkeen van hierdie identiteite gevoel het op 'n skaal van nul tot tien - een wat tot dusver nie beskikbaar was vir historiese bespreking van verskeie identiteite nie. Die Londense was bo (7.7), gevolg deur Britte (7.4), Engels (6.6) en Europees (4.9). Mense in Londen wat in 2016 gestem het om die Europese Unie te verlaat, voel effens meer Brits as Londenaars, met 'n telling van 7,9 en 7,7 Europeërs wat 2,5 behaal het.

Embed from Getty Images Londen is egter 'n belangrike deel van Engeland, en tog is dit ook atipies in die mengsel van mense en politiek. Hoewel Engelsheid as 'n politieke idee in die 2010's deels 'n reaksie is op die opkoms van die Skotse Nationalist Party, is dit ook deels 'n opstand teen 'n in Londen gedomineerde verslag van Engelsheid. Dit word beklemtoon deur die rol van Brexit, aangesien Londen, atypies in Engeland anders as universiteitsdorpe, die oorsaak van Remain ondersteun het en sedertdien 'n sentrum van Remain -sentiment gebly het.

Veelvuldige identiteite bestaan ​​wyer as met betrekking tot nasionalisme, aardrykskunde en etnisiteit. Dit hou ook verband met 'n mens se posisie in die gesin, byvoorbeeld as ouer en kind. Hier word egter gefokus op geografie en nasionalisme, wat deel uitmaak van die totale identiteit van sowel Engeland as Brittanje. Parallel tot die argument dat daar 'n besonder sterk identiteit bestaan, is daar die werklikheid van veelvuldige en oorvleuelende identiteite, sonder dat 'veelvoud' of 'oorvleueling' baie leiding gee aan prioriteite in geval van spanning of botsings. Botsende identiteite bestaan ​​ook: 'n lid kan beide lid wees van die 'Church of England' in Skotland of Wallis, of 'n Skot wat onafhanklikheid van Brittanje soek.


Die onafhanklikheidsbewegings in die Amerikas, 1776-1825, was nie die hoogtepunt van 'n stygende nasionale bewussyn binne die kolonies nie. Die oorloë om onafhanklikheid en die daaropvolgende stryd om lewensvatbare nasionale grondwette en regerings te vestig, het ook nie onmiddellik geboorte gegee aan samehangende, duursame nasionale identiteite nie. In die hele Amerikas was die saak vir onafhanklikheid tipies gebaseer op die Verligtingsbeginsels van natuurlike regte en op konflik van belange, nie op aansprake op identiteit as 'n volk nie. Pas in 1810, nadat Napoleon se inval in Spanje en Portugal 'n krisis in die keiserlike heerskappy veroorsaak het, het die Latyns -Amerikaanse kolonies na onafhanklikheid begin beweeg. Die skepping van moderne nasiestate in die Amerikas bied 'n belangrike model vir nasionalistiese bewegings in die Amerikas. Nasionalisme in die Amerikas moet verstaan ​​word as deel van 'n breë trans-Atlantiese uitruil van idees, mense en staatsmodelle wat die eerste tydperk in die geskiedenis van moderne nasionalisme was.

Don H. Doyle, is die McCausland -professor in geskiedenis aan die Universiteit van Suid -Carolina en direkteur van ARENA, die Vereniging vir Navorsing oor etnisiteit en nasionalisme in die Amerikas. Saam met Marco Pamplona het hy 'n versameling opstelle geredigeer, Nasionalisme in die nuwe wêreld (Athene, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006. Sy publikasies sluit in Nasies verdeel: Amerika, Italië en die suidelike vraag (Athene, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2002). Hy redigeer tans 'n versameling opstelle oor Sessie as 'n internasionale verskynsel en 'n boek skryf oor die skepping van die Amerikaanse nasionalisme tussen die rewolusie en die burgeroorlog.

Eric Van Young, professor in geskiedenis aan die Universiteit van Kalifornië, San Diego. Sy boeke sluit in Hacienda en mark in die agttiende-eeuse Mexiko: die landelike ekonomie van die Guadalajara-streek, 1675-1810 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981 rev. Edn., 2006) La crisis del orden koloniale. Estructura agrarian y rebeliones populares en la Nueva España, 1750–1821 (Mexico -stad: Alianza Editorial, 1992) en The Other Rebellion: Popular Geweld, Ideologie en die stryd om Mexikaanse Onafhanklikheid, 1810–1821 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

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Die geboorte van Chinese nasionalisme

In China is 4 Mei die Jeugdag, 'n vakansie wat die Kommunistiese Party in 1949 gestig het en sedertdien aan en af ​​gevier het. Op hierdie dag in 1989 het meer as 100,000 studente betoog op die Tiananmen -plein in Beijing, 'n belangrike mylpaal op pad na die tragiese gebeure van 4 Junie, toe Chinese troepe op die burgers wat daar versamel is, losgebrand het.

Hierdie jaar het China se president en leier van die Kommunistiese Party, Xi Jinping, 'n beroep op studente gedoen om 'n baie spesiale Jeugdag te herdenk. But it’s not the 30th anniversary of 1989’s pro-democracy protests that he has in mind. Rather, it is the 100th anniversary of May 4, 1919, that he wants to commemorate. On that day a century ago, another group of students rallied in Tiananmen Square—demanding that the world respect the national dignity of China.

In China, May 4 is Youth Day, a holiday established by the Communist Party in 1949 and celebrated on and off ever since. On this day in 1989, more than 100,000 students demonstrated in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, a key milestone on road to the tragic events of June 4, when Chinese troops opened fire on the civilians amassed there.

This year, China’s president and Communist Party leader, Xi Jinping, has called on students to commemorate a very special Youth Day. But it’s not the 30th anniversary of 1989’s pro-democracy protests that he has in mind. Rather, it is the 100th anniversary of May 4, 1919, that he wants to commemorate. On that day a century ago, another group of students rallied in Tiananmen Square—demanding that the world respect the national dignity of China.

In May 1919, the leaders of World War I’s victorious allies were meeting in Paris to determine the shape of the postwar world. Most Westerners know that the resulting Treaty of Versailles profoundly influenced subsequent European history through the foundation of the League of Nations, the rise of Adolf Hitler, and eventually World War II. Some may even know how the peace treaty, the Balfour Declaration, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement created the modern Middle East. But Westerners are less aware that the Treaty of Versailles also helped set in motion the series of events that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Chinese Civil War, and today’s tensions between the United States and China over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

In 1919, China was one of the 32 victorious allies represented at the Paris Peace Conference. Like the United States, China joined the war late, but it had been providing moral and material support to the Allies from the beginning. China officially declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary on Aug. 14, 1917, but by that point several hundred thousand Chinese workers were already boosting the Allied cause in France, the Middle East, and Russia. The best remembered of these are the 94,146 members of the Chinese Labour Corps who served with the British Army, but perhaps twice as many are thought to have served on the eastern front.

China’s major aim in World War I was the return of Qingdao and the surrounding Shandong Peninsula. Germany had occupied the Chinese port city of Qingdao in 1897, negotiating a forced lease on the city and its surroundings that, like the British lease on Hong Kong’s New Territories, was due to run though 1997. But in 1911 and 1912, the Qing dynasty, which had signed those treaties, was overthrown. The new government in Beijing, known as the Beiyang government after the army corps that formed it, negotiated with foreign powers to restore China’s territorial integrity. It sought the restitution of lands given up by the Qing dynasty in the unequal treaties of the 19th century, starting with Qingdao and the Shandong Peninsula.

The problem for China was not that Germany refused to cooperate. It was that Germany’s territory in the Shandong Peninsula had already been taken—by Japan. At the beginning of World War I, the United Kingdom, desperate for Japanese naval support in the Pacific, had offered the country the German naval base at Qingdao in exchange for entering the war on the Allied side. Japanese forces took Qingdao in November 1914.

As it became clear that Japan would not hand over the territory, university students from throughout Beijing marched into Tiananmen Square in protest. The government warned them to disband, but they disobeyed. They set fire to the house of one pro-Japanese government minister and physically assaulted a second. As the government cracked down on the protesters, sympathy strikes broke out all across urban China. The Beiyang government was divided between nationalist and pro-Japan elements, but the protests led to the dismissal of three pro-Japanese officials and the resignation of the entire cabinet. In the end, 31 countries and territories signed the Treaty of Versailles. China did not.

The May 4, 1919, protests were the first large-scale student demonstrations in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Then as now, Beijing’s universities were run on a Western model. Many of them had started as missionary schools. Peking University, for example, traces its origins to the old Imperial University, which was established in 1898 to bring Western knowledge to the capital. Tsinghua University was founded by a grant from the U.S. government, which redirected a portion of the indemnity paid by China for the destruction of American property in the Boxer Rebellion to the endowment of the school. The nerve center of the protests was the now-defunct Yenching University, which was formed from the consolidation of four American missionary schools.

The Western-educated students who poured into Tiananmen Square in 1919 were taught that empires were a relic of the pre-modern past and nation-states were the way of the future.

These schools represented something new and foreign to China’s established ruling class. The Beiyang government’s generals, warlords, and factional leaders had grown in up a multiethnic empire—most of the territory the Qing Dynasty had ruled (or at least claimed) was populated by non-Chinese people—but the Western-educated students who poured into Tiananmen Square in 1919 were educated in a different political culture. They were taught that empires were a relic of the pre-modern past and nation-states were the way of the future. Witnessing the collapse of the multi-ethnic Russian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian empires in World War I, they were eager to build a powerful Chinese nation-state. And looking across the sea to Japan, they saw a new one rising to global prominence. They were especially concerned that a rising Japan would gobble up China itself.

And so the May 4 protests began, inspiring a surge of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. That led to a nationwide boycott of imported Japanese goods and scattered anti-Japanese violence. The ensuing May Fourth Movement centered on rising Chinese—specifically Han Chinese—nationalism. It flowed into but was distinct from the more intellectual New Culture Movement of the same period, which focused on the overthrow of Confucian traditions and the transition to modernity. The enlightenment values of the New Culture Movement were not incompatible with the rising nationalism of the May Fourth Movement, but Chinese nationalism didn’t require the overthrow of Confucian tradition. It would eventually require the overthrow of the Beiyang government, though. And it almost certainly meant war with Japan as well.

In the 20 years between 1919 and the outbreak of World War II in Europe, Japan steadily encroached on Chinese territory. The Beiyang government, which had tried to balance conflicting demands from Japan, the Soviet Union, and the West, was unable to hold back the rising tide of Chinese nationalism. Some of the leaders of the May 4 demonstrations went on to participate in the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921. Others joined Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Both the CCP and the KMT opposed the cosmopolitan Beiyang government, espousing alternative but nonetheless related ideologies of national liberation and renewal. The KMT ultimately defeated the Beiyang government on the battlefield and established a new national government for China in 1928.

The new Nationalist government faced Japanese aggression almost immediately: in northeast China’s Manchuria, in northern China’s Hebei province, and in Shanghai. In 1937, Japan invaded China outright, kicking off World War II in Asia more than two years before Hitler’s invasion of Poland. Although it is often forgotten now, the United States was then deeply involved in Asia. Responding to Japanese aggression against the United States’ ally, China, Washington placed restrictions on exports of aviation fuel, aircraft parts, and other war materiel to Japan. At first voluntary, these sanctions became ever tighter between 1938 and 1940. On July 26, 1941, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration froze all Japanese assets in the United States. In other words, Japan’s Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor was a direct consequence of U.S. support for an independent China.

After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the CCP renewed its civil war against the KMT government. The CCP pilloried the KMT as the tool of foreign imperialists, claiming the nationalist heritage of the May Fourth Movement. Although the Soviet Union cloaked itself in the mantle of communist internationalism, Mao Zedong unabashedly adopted the rhetoric of national liberation. After proclaiming the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1, 1949, the CCP set about the ordinary business of administering the country, and when it promulgated its first list of public holidays, May 4 was designated as Youth Day.

The CCP continues to portray itself as both a communist party and a nationalist party. Unlike the Soviet Union, which made a charade of maintaining nominally independent communist parties in each of its 15 constituent republics, there has only ever been one Chinese Communist. When those fake Soviet republics became real countries in 1991, the CCP doubled down on its vision of China as one nation. The Chinese government encourages Han Chinese migration to the majority-Muslim provinces of Western China. It spends enormous sums of money to integrate remote Tibet into nationwide transportation networks. It tries to stamp out Cantonese and other regional dialects in favor of Mandarin. And it uses its blanket control over all forms of news and entertainment media to promote Chinese nationalism.

Echoing 1919, the government still regularly whips up Chinese nationalist sentiments over Japan’s possession of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China). China has also revived historical claims to the reefs and rocks of the South China Sea, framing its military buildup there in the revanchist rhetoric of restoring the territorial integrity of China.

May 4 nationalism, in other words, is still very much alive. This May 4, Xi will be giving a special Youth Day speech in Beijing. He will surely be hoping that his audience thinks back to the 100th anniversary of 1919, not the 30th anniversary of 1989. Xi may be playing with fire in promoting the memory of student protests in Tiananmen Square, but as the CCP increasingly divorces itself from its communist roots, the nationalism of the May Fourth Movement may be all it has to fall back on.

Salvatore Babones is an adjunct scholar at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney. Twitter: @sbabones


How Did Nationalism Lead to WW1?

The rising nationalism that was apparent throughout Europe in the early twentieth century is often cited as one of the four longterm causes of World War One and with its natural links to both militarism and imperialism is considered by many historians to be the single biggest cause.

In this article, we shall attempt to define what nationalism was, in the context of nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, and have a look at how exactly nationalism contributed to the outbreak of World War I.

What is Nationalism?

Nationalism can be defined as a feeling of immense pride in one’s country or in one’s people. It is a fierce form of patriotism and at its most extreme can lead to negative attitudes towards other nations or even feelings of superiority over other peoples.

The Origins of Nationalism in Europe

A likely origin of the wave of nationalism that spread through Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century was the Spring of Nations, in 1848.

The Spring of Nations (also known as the Springtime of the Peoples) consisted of a series of political upheavals, although mostly democratic in nature, which had the aim of removing the old monarchical structures to create independent nation-states.

This national awakening grew out of a cultural revolution of nationhood and a national identity, where the notion of foreign rule began to be resented more and more by those citizens who were governed by a different nationality to their own and in the thirty years after the Spring of Nations, a total of seven new national states were created within Europe.

The June Uprising of 1848 in Prague

Examples of Nationalism Before WW1

Nationalism took many different forms within Europe, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As well as those nations still seeking their independence, there were also those newly created nations looking to forge a place for themselves on the world stage.

Finally, there was a different type of nationalism, seen in those countries that had enjoyed a sustained period of prosperity and influence, both at home and abroad, and where some nationalists felt a certain superiority over most other countries and peoples.

British Nationalism

By the end of the nineteenth century, Britain had enjoyed two hundred years as the richest and most powerful nation on the planet, with the greatest empire the world had ever seen. Perhaps not surprisingly, a feeling of nationalist pride swept through the country during this time and there were many in the country who believed the British to be superior to all other nations in Europe.

British Nationalism – Britannia Rules The Waves

This idea of nationalism was spurred on by the British press, who regularly published satirical cartoons of foreign countries and their monarchs, often depicting them as greedy, arrogant or lazy.

A particularly dangerous form of popular press in Britain, towards the end of the century, was the Invasion genre of literature, which scared their readers into believing that the enemy was just about to invade this Sceptred Isle. As well as fuelling the flames of militarism in the country, these serialised novellas depicted foreign nations such as Germany and France in the worst possible light.

Pan-Germanism

Nationalism and xenophobia were just as rife in Germany, although the root of this patriotism was not from centuries of world dominance, but rather the overzealous optimism of a new nation-state.

In order to consolidate the newly unified Germany and strengthen the national identity of the German people, the government employed various strategies to help create a nationalist sentiment.

1908 map of German dialects.

Pan-Germanism sought to unify all of the German-speaking people in Europe, and was very successful in building a German national identity. Unfortunately, Pan-Germanism at its most extreme, such as the Pan-German League, which was founded in 1891, led to openly ethnocentric and racist ideologies, which would really come to the fore in the nineteen thirties and forties, with diabolical consequences.

German nationalism in the late nineteenth century was also intrinsically linked with German militarism—it was believed that the strength of the nation was mirrored by the strength of its military. And when the young and ambitious Wilhelm II became Kaiser, in 1888, he became the epitome of a nationalistic and militaristic Germany.

The Kaiser’s policy of Weltpolitik, the aim of which was to transform Germany into a global power, led the country to be envious of the other more established empires, especially that of Great Britain. As a result, Britain became a target for the German press, where she was portrayed as selfish and greedy, thus encouraging anti-British sentiments throughout the country.

Austro-Slavism

A very different type of nationalism emerged within Central Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century. Austro-Slavism was a political concept that originated within the Czech lands, which sought to solve the problems that the Slavs faced with the Habsburg Monarchy at that time.

Seen as a more peaceful alternative to the concept of pan-Slavism, the policy of Austro-Slavism proposed a federation of eight national regions, with a degree of self-rule. Austro-Slavism gained support from Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats and Poles, but was ultimately dismissed following the formation of Austria-Hungary, in 1867, which honoured Hungarian demands, but not Slavic ones.

Distribution of Races in Austria-Hungary

The political concept of Austro-Slavism helped lay the foundations for the The First Czechoslovak Republic, in 1918, following the end of World War One and the collapse of Austria-Hungary.

Pan-Slavism

Pan-Slavic postcard depicting Cyril and Methodius
with the text “God/Our Lord, watch over our heritage/grandfatherland” in 9 Slavic languages.

The roots of Pan-Slavism were similar to Pan-Germanism in that they originated from the nationalism of an ethnic group who wished to unite—in this case the Slavic people.

Again originating in the Czech lands, Pan-Slavism was especially embraced by the Slovak people, following the creation of Austria-Hungrary, when it became clear the preferred concept of Austro-Slavism was not going to be accepted by Austrian Emperor, Franz Jozeph I.

Ľudovít Štúr, who codified the first official Slovak language, wrote in his book, Slavdom and the World of the Future, that Austro-Slavism was no longer possible and he looked towards Russia, the only Slavic nation-state, to one day annexe the land of the Slovaks.

Pan-Slavism also had some supporters amongst the Czech and Slovak politicians, especially the nationalistic and far-right parties.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Pan-Slavism had become especially popular amongst South Slavs, who often looked towards Russia for support. Here, the Pan-Slavism movement sought Slavs from both the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire to unite together.

The notion of a united nation of Southern Slavs was particular strong within the newly independent country of Serbia, who eventually sought to create a South Slav (Yugoslav) nation-state.

How Did Nationalism Lead to WW1?

The link between nationalism and WW1 is arguably the strongest of the 4 main longterm causes of World War One. But even then, certainly for the major European powers, nationalism was intrinsically linked with two of the other causes—imperialism and militarism. Meanwhile, the sense of nationalism for many of the smaller European countries, can be strongly linked to independence and self-rule.

Nationalism Linked to Imperialism

The link between nationalism and imperialism was twofold. While nationalists would take great pride from their nation’s empire building, they were also quick to condemn the other European powers as being greedy, cruel and insensitive for their imperial aspirations.

Meanwhile, imperialism had probably given the major powers a false idea of what war was really about. Apart from the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian war, there had not really been a major conflict between two of the European powers for almost a century.

With the exception of France, none of the major powers had experienced defeat in the half century prior to WW1 and victories against less equipped armies in Africa and Asia had no doubt led to a naive overconfidence in each nation’s ability to win a war in Europe.

France watches on as the other major powers
greedily carve up China

Nationalism Linked to Militarism

Another of the effects of the growing nationalism in Europe was an inflated confidence in one’s nation when it came to the country’s military power.

In the decades leading up to the First World War, there had been a strong link between nationalism and militarism, where the citizens of many European nations felt immense pride in how strong and powerful their country was in military terms.

This led to governments being pressured by their peoples and the popular press to build more and more battleships, stockpile more and more weapons and enlist more and more men, so as to whet this patriotic appetite running through the nation of needing to be the most powerful—not only to defend the country from would-be aggressors, but also as a source of national pride.

Such was this military fervour amongst the populace that by the time 1914 came around, and Europe found itself on the brink of war, many of the major European powers had almost a feeling of invincibility about them, completely certain in the belief that their nation could not possibly lose a war.

Nationalism Linked to Independence

While there was obviously no link between nationalism and imperialism or militarism for the smaller nations in Europe, there was a link to something that was perhaps more worth fighting for—namely, a national identity and for many, independence and self-rule.

Following the Spring of Nations, in 1848, more and more nations in Europe won their independence and became nation-states, including Germany, Italy, Serbia and Bulgaria.

However, by 1914, there were still many more nations with ambitions of self-rule on the continent, especially within Austria-Hungary.

Dividing Up the Ottoman Empire

In particular, this awakening of a national identity was causing tensions in the Balkans, where things were just about to come to a head.

Nationalism in WW1

There is no doubting the strong nationalistic feelings of patriotic citizens throughout Europe, which were also evident once the war had started as well. An example of nationalism in WW1 would be the numbers of young men in Britain from all classes, who clamoured to volunteer for king and country at the beginning of the war.

Example of Nationalism in WW1

Of course, it was a different time when honour and doing one’s duty was still very much a thing, but nonetheless there is no doubt that WW1 nationalism also played its part.

It is much easier to recruit an army of patriotic men, who are convinced they are fighting for the right cause and who believe they are going to fight in a war, which they can’t lose.

When the reality of war began to set in, however, and it became harder and harder to attract new recruits, the government turned to different methods to pull on the nationalistic heart strings of the British people.

Propaganda posters painted the enemy as almost subhuman, who had committed unspeakable war crimes against our innocent allies—an evil that only Britain could defeat.

Other examples of nationalism in WW1 involved those patriotic citizens back home, who although were not directly involved in the fighting, were still needed by their country to win the war.

Older men and especially women fought the good fight at home, working in factories to help arm and supply the young lions and even children and the elderly played their part by foregoing certain foodstuffs and other creature comforts, so that the men at the front had everything they needed to defeat the enemy.


Inhoud

National awakening also grew out of an intellectual reaction to the Enlightenment that emphasized national identity and developed an authentic view of cultural self-expression through nationhood. The key exponent of the modern idea of the nation-state was the German G. W. Friedrich Hegel. The French Revolution, although primarily a republican revolution, initiated a movement toward the modern nation-state and also played a key role in the birth of nationalism across Europe where radical intellectuals were influenced by Napoleon and the Napoleonic Code, an instrument for the political transformation of Europe. "Its twin ideological goals, nationalism and democracy, were given substance and form during the tumultuous events beginning at the end of the eighteenth century." [3] Revolutionary armies carried the slogan of "liberty, equality to brotherhood" and ideas of liberalism and national self-determinism. He argued that a sense of nationality was the cement that held modern societies together in the age when dynastic and religious allegiance was in decline. In 1815, at the end of the Napoleonic wars, the major powers of Europe met at the Congress of Vienna and tried to restore the old dynastic system as far as possible, ignoring the principle of nationality in favour of "legitimism", the assertion of traditional claims to royal authority. With most of Europe's peoples still loyal to their local province or city, nationalism was confined to small groups of intellectuals and political radicals. Furthermore, political repression, symbolized by the Carlsbad Decrees published in Austria in 1819, pushed nationalist agitation underground.

Pre-1848 revolutions Edit

  • 1789, French Revolution
  • 1797- Napoleon establishes Sister Republics in Italy
  • 1804–15, Serbian Revolution against the Ottoman Empire
  • 1814, Norwegian independence attempt against Denmark-Norway and future Sweden & Norway, aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (including War on independence)
  • 1821–29, Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire
  • 1830, Croatian national revival
  • 1830–31, Belgian Revolution
  • 1830–31, Revolution in Poland and Lithuania
  • 1846, Uprising in Greater Poland

A strong resentment of what came to be regarded as foreign rule began to develop. In Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Hungary, and Norway local hostility to alien dynastic authority started to take the form of nationalist agitation. [ wanneer? ] The first revolt in the Ottoman Empire to acquire a national character was the Serbian Revolution (1804–17), [4] which was the culmination of Serbian renaissance [5] which had begun in Habsburg territory, in Sremski Karlovci. [4] The eight-year Greek War of Independence (1821–29) against Ottoman rule led to an independent Greek state, although with major political influence of the great powers. [6] The Belgian Revolution (1830–31) led to the recognition of independence from the Netherlands in 1839. [7] Over the next two decades nationalism developed a more powerful voice, spurred by nationalist writers championing the cause of self-determination. The Poles attempted twice to overthrow Russian rule in 1831 and 1863. In 1848, revolutions broke out across Europe, sparked by severe famine and economic crisis and mounting popular demand for political change. In Italy, Giuseppe Mazzini used the opportunity to encourage a war mission: "A people destined to achieve great things for the welfare of humanity must one day or other be constituted a nation".

In Hungary, Lajos Kossuth led a national revolt against Habsburg rule in Transylvania, Avram Iancu led successful revolts in 1846. The 1848 crisis had given nationalism its first full public airing, and in the thirty years that followed no fewer than seven new national states were created in Europe. This was partly the result of the recognition by conservative forces that the old order could not continue in its existing form. Conservative reformers such as Cavour and Bismarck made common cause with liberal political modernizers to create a consensus for the creation of conservative nation-states in Italy and Germany. In the Habsburg Monarchy a compromise was reached with Hungarians in 1867 which led to the establishment of the Dual Monarchy. Native history and culture were rediscovered and appropriated for the national struggle. Following a conflict between Russia and Turkey, the Great Powers met at Berlin in 1878 and granted independence to Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and limited autonomy to Bulgaria.

The invention of a symbolic national identity became the concern of racial, ethnic or linguistic groups throughout Europe as they struggled to come to terms with the rise of mass politics, the decline of the traditional social elites, popular discrimination and xenophobia. Within the Habsburg Monarchy the different peoples developed a more mass-based, radical and exclusive form of nationalism. This developed even among the Germans and Magyars, who actually benefited from the power-structure of the empire. On the European periphery, especially in Ireland and Norway, campaigns for national independence became more strident. In 1905, Norway won independence from Sweden, but attempts to grant Ireland a kind of autonomy foundered on the national divisions on the island between the Catholic and Protestant populations. The Polish attempts to win independence from Russia had previously proved to be unsuccessful, with Poland being the only country in Europe whose autonomy was gradually limited rather than expanded throughout the 19th century, as a punishment for the failed uprisings in 1831 Poland lost its status as a formally independent state and was merged into Russia as a real union country and in 1867 she became nothing more than just another Russian province. Faced with internal and external resistance to assimilation, as well as increased xenophobic anti-Semitism, radical demands began to develop among the stateless Jewish population of eastern and central Europe for their own national home and refuge. In 1897, inspired by the Hungarian-born Jewish nationalist Theodor Herzl, the First Zionist Congress was held in Basle, and declared their national 'home' should be in Palestine. By the end of the period, the ideals of European nationalism had been exported worldwide and were now beginning to develop, and both compete and threaten the empires ruled by colonial European nation-states.

Now, within the modern era, nationalism continues to rise in Europe, but in the form of anti-globalization. In a study recently conducted, researchers found that Chinese import shock from globalization leads to uneven adjustment costs being spread across regions of Europe. In response, there has been an increase in support for nationalist and radical-right wing parties in Europe that promote anti-globalist policies. [8]


Inhoud

The United States traces its origins to the Thirteen Colonies founded by Britain in the 17th and early 18th century. Residents identified with Britain until the mid-18th century when the first sense of being "American" emerged. The Albany Plan proposed a union between the colonies in 1754. Although unsuccessful, it served as a reference for future discussions of independence.

Soon afterward, the colonies faced several common grievances over acts passed by the British Parliament, including taxation without representation. Americans were in general agreement that only their own colonial legislatures—and not Parliament in London—could pass taxes. Parliament vigorously insisted otherwise and no compromise was found. The London government punished Boston for the Boston Tea Party and the Thirteen Colonies united and formed the Continental Congress, which lasted from 1774 to 1789. Fighting broke out in 1775 and the sentiment swung to independence in early 1776, influenced especially by the appeal to American nationalism by Thomas Paine. His pamphlet Gesonde verstand was a runaway best seller in 1776. [5] Congress unanimously issued a Declaration of Independence announcing a new nation had formed, the United States of America. American Patriots won the American Revolutionary War and received generous peace terms from Britain in 1783. The minority of Loyalists (loyal to King George III) could remain or leave, but about 80% remained and became full American citizens. [6] Frequent parades along with new rituals and ceremonies—and a new flag—provided popular occasions for expressing a spirit of American nationalism. [7]

The new nation operated under the very weak national government set up by the Articles of Confederation and most Americans put loyalty to their state ahead of loyalty to the nation. Nationalists led by George Washington, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison had Congress call a constitutional convention in 1787. It produced the Constitution for a strong national government which was debated in every state and unanimously adopted. It went into effect in 1789 with Washington as the first President. [8]

In an 1858 speech, future President Abraham Lincoln alluded to a form of American civic nationalism originating from the tenets of the Declaration of Independence as a force for national unity in the United States, stating that it was a method for uniting diverse peoples of different ethnic ancestries into a common nationality:

If they look back through this history to trace their connection with those days by blood, they find they have none, they cannot carry themselves back into that glorious epoch and make themselves feel that they are part of us, but when they look through that old Verklaring van onafhanklikheid they find that those old men say that "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal", and then they feel that moral sentiment taught in that day evidences their relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote the Declaration, and so they are. That is the electric cord in that Declaration that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world.

Amerikaanse burgeroorlog wysig

White Southerners increasingly felt alienated—they saw themselves as becoming second-class citizens as aggressive anti-slavery Northerners tried to end their ability to take slaves to the fast-growing western territories. They questioned whether their loyalty to the nation trumped their loyalty to their state and their way of life since it was so intimately bound up with slavery, whether they owned any slaves or not. [10] A sense of Southern nationalism was starting to emerge, though it was inchoate as late as 1860 when the election of Lincoln was a signal for most of the slave states in the South to secede and form their own new nation. [11] The Confederate government insisted the nationalism was real and imposed increasing burdens on the population in the name of independence and nationalism. The fierce combat record of the Confederates demonstrates their commitment to the death for independence. The government and army refused to compromise and were militarily overwhelmed in 1865. [12] By the 1890s, the white South felt vindicated through its belief in the newly constructed memory of the Lost Cause of the Confederacy. The North came to accept or at least tolerate racial segregation and disfranchisement of black voters in the South. The spirit of American nationalism had returned to Dixie. [13]

The North's triumph in the American Civil War marked a significant transition in American national identity. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment settled the basic question of national identity, such as the criteria for becoming a citizen of the United States. Everyone born in the territorial boundaries of the United States or those areas and subject to its jurisdiction was an American citizen, regardless of ethnicity or social status (indigenous people on reservations became citizens in 1924 while indigenous people off reservations had always been citizens). [16]

With a very fast growing industrial economy, immigrants were welcome from Europe, Canada, Mexico and Cuba and millions came. Becoming a full citizen was an easy process of filling out paperwork over a five-year span. [17]

However, new Asian arrivals were not welcome. Restrictions were imposed on most Chinese immigrants in the 1880s and informal restrictions on most Japanese in 1907. By 1924, it was difficult for any Asian to enter the United States, but children born in the United States to Asian parents were full citizens. The restrictions were ended on the Chinese in the 1940s and on other Asians in 1965. [18]

Nationalism in the contemporary United States Edit

Nationalism and Americanism remain topics in the modern United States. Political scientist Paul McCartney, for instance, argues that as a nation defined by a creed and sense of mission Americans tend to equate their interests with those of humanity, which in turn informs their global posture. [19] In certain cases, it may be considered a form of ethnocentrism and American exceptionalism.

Due to the distinctive circumstances involved throughout history in American politics, its nationalism has developed in regards to both loyalty to a set of liberal, universal political ideals and a perceived accountability to propagate those principles globally. Acknowledging the conception of the United States as accountable for spreading liberal change and promoting democracy throughout the world's politics and governance has defined practically all of American foreign policy. Therefore, democracy promotion is not just another measure of foreign policy, but it is rather the fundamental characteristic of their national identity and political determination. [20]

The September 11 attacks of 2001 led to a wave of nationalist expression in the United States. This was accompanied by a rise in military enlistment that included not only lower-income Americans, but also middle-class and upper-class citizens. [21]

Varieties of American nationalism Edit

In a paper in the American Sociological Review, "Varieties of American Popular Nationalism", sociologists Bart Bonikowski and Paul DiMaggio report on research findings supporting the existence of at least four kinds of American nationalists, including, groups which range from the smallest to the largest: (1) the disengaged, (2) creedal or civic nationalists, (3) ardent nationalists, and (4) restrictive nationalists. [22]

Bonikowski and Dimaggio's analysis of these four groups found that ardent nationalists made up about 24% of their study, and they comprised the largest of the two groups which Bonikowski and Dimaggio consider "extreme". Members of this group closely identified with the United States, were very proud of their country, and strongly associated themselves with factors of national hubris. They felt that a "true American" must speak English, and live in the U.S. for most of his or her life. Fewer, but nonetheless 75%, believe that a "true American" must be a Christian and 86% believe a "true American" must be born in the country. Further, ardent nationalists believed that Jews, Muslims, agnostics and naturalized citizens were something less than truly American. The second class which Bonikowski and DiMaggio considered "extreme" was the smallest of the four classes, because its members made up 17% of their respondents. The disengaged showed low levels of pride in the institutions of government and they did not fully identify themselves with the United States. Their lack of pride extended to American democracy, American history, the political equality in the U.S., and the country's political influence in the world. This group was the least nationalistic of all of the four groups which they identified. [22]

The two remaining classes were less homogeneous in their responses than the ardent nationalists and disengaged were. Restrictive nationalists had low levels of pride in America and its institutions, but they defined a "true American" in ways that were markedly "exclusionary". This group was the largest of the four, because its members made up 38% of the study's respondents. While their levels of national identification and pride were moderate, they espoused beliefs which caused them to hold restrictive definitions of who "true Americans" were, for instance, their definitions excluded non-Christians." The final group to be identified were creedal nationalists, whose members made up 22% of the study's respondents who were studied. This group believed in liberal values, was proud of the United States, and its members held the fewest restrictions on who could be considered a true American. They closely identified with their country, which they felt "very close" to, and were proud of its achievements. Bonikowski and Dimaggio dubbed the group "creedal" because their beliefs most closely approximated the precepts of what is widely considered the American creed. [22]

As part of their findings, the authors report that the connection between religious belief and national identity is a significant one. The belief that being a Christian is an important part of what it means to be a "true American" is the most significant factor which separates the creedal nationalists and the disengaged from the restrictive and ardent nationalists. They also determined that their groupings cut across partisan boundaries, and they also help to explain what they perceive is the recent success of populist, nativist and racist rhetoric in American politics. [22]