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Was die einddatum van die Sowjet-Japannese grensoorlog die direkte rede waarom die Sowjet-inval in 1939 op Pole begin het?

Was die einddatum van die Sowjet-Japannese grensoorlog die direkte rede waarom die Sowjet-inval in 1939 op Pole begin het?

Die einddatum van die Sowjet-Japannese grensoorlog val vreemd saam met die begindatum van die Sowjet-inval in Pole in 1939. Was die einddatum van die Sowjet-Japannese grensoorlog die direkte rede waarom die Sowjet-inval op Pole op 17 September begin is 1939?

(Met ander woorde, as die Japannese leër langer gestaan ​​het, sou die Sowjet -inval in Pole vertraag gewees het en moontlik 'n invloed gehad het op hoe die inval in Pole beweeg het.)


Die vraag is agteruit: dit was die beplande inval in Pole wat veroorsaak het dat die vredesooreenkoms plaasgevind het, nie andersom nie.

Hierdie oorlog is nooit amptelik verklaar nie, en dit het plaasgevind op die grens van Mongolië en Manchukuo ('n Japannese marionetstaat) weens die onenigheid oor die ligging van die grens. Militêr het die Sowjette (en Mongole) die oorhand gekry. Maar hulle moes ooreenkom oor die skietstilstand omdat hul beplande inval in Pole belangriker was as die grensgeskil tussen Mongolië en Mantsjoekoe. Die skietstilstand is 2 dae voor die aanval op Pole onderteken.

Die Molotov Ribbentrop -verdrag, wat die inval in Pole moontlik en uitvoerbaar gemaak het, is op 23 Augustus 1939 onderteken, terwyl die beslissende Sowjet -oortreding in Mongolië op 20 Augustus begin het. inval Pole gemaak is. Hierdie Sowjet-Duitse verdrag was 'n skielike geleentheid vir die Sowjets, en dit het gebeur te midde van 'n minder belangrike konflik in Mongolië. Hulle het dus alles gedoen om hierdie geringe konflik te beëindig.

In 13 April 1941 is 'n Sowjet-Japannese neutraliteitsverdrag onderteken (dit het die kwessie van die grens tussen Mongolië en Mantsjoekoe oopgelaat).

Die ooreenkoms oor die grens is eers in Mei 1942 onderteken, en die Sowjetunie het in wese toegegee aan die Japannese eise (ondanks hul militêre oorwinning). Die rede hiervoor is natuurlik dat die Sowjets in 1942 baie belangriker dinge gehad het.

Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die oorsaaklike verband tussen die aanval op Pole en die Sowjet-Japannese wapenstilstand net die teenoorgestelde was van u voorstel. Die Sowjets moes 'n skietstilstand teken, omdat hulle daartoe in staat was om dit te doen (hulle het militêr voorgekom) en omdat die inval in Pole baie hoër prioriteit gehad het.

(Die datums van die verdrae is gebaseer op die Russiese Wikipedia).

Opmerking: die Sowjette het in hierdie oorlog teen die Kuantung -leër geveg. Die Kuantung -leër was formeel deel van die Japannese keiserlike magte, maar dit was nie heeltemal deur die sentrale regering beheer nie. Volgens die (Engelse) Wikipedia was die hele skepping van die Manchukuo -staat 'n inisiatief van die Kwantung -leër, nie van die Japannese regering nie. Uiteindelik het die Japannese regering dit goedgekeur.


REDES DIE Geallieerdes WEN

Die ou aksioma & ldquoGod is altyd aan die kant met die grootste bataljons, en rdquo het 'n aantreklike eenvoud. Maar die geskiedenis is vol voorbeelde waar die grootste leër nie die oorhand gekry het nie: die Amerikaanse rewolusie, die Chinese rewolusie en die Koreaanse oorlog, om maar net 'n paar te noem.

Elke gebeurtenis bevat 'n samespel van oneindige veranderlikes, soos geïllustreer deur die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Miskien is die beste wat gedoen kan word om te ondersoek waarom die een kant daarin geslaag het en die ander misluk het, om te onderskei wat die belangrikste verskille was en te bepaal watter van die verskille 'n belangrike rol gespeel het in die vordering van die konflik.

Die volgende is tien belangrike onderskeidings tussen die bondgenote en die as. Sommige was eeue oud. Ander was onlangse verwikkelinge. Op sigself kon niemand die oorlog tot sy besondere gevolg laat beweeg het nie. In samewerking het hierdie fasette egter die kanse van die strydende partye baie beïnvloed.

1. DOELWITTE

Kortom gesê, die as moes meer as dertig lande verower terwyl die geallieerdes drie moes verslaan. Boonop het die as nie 'n definitiewe eindpunt vir sy militêre ambisies gehad nie, terwyl die geallieerdes dit wel gehad het.

Japan & rsquos & ldquo Groter mede-welvaartsfeer in Oos-Asië, en 'n swak poging om imperialisme te definieer as 'koningin' onder een monarg, en gerig op Manchurië en China. Maar die sfeer het gou uitgebrei tot Indochina, Birma, Nederlands -Indië en die Filippyne. Vroeë sukses het drome bevorder om Australië, Indië en dele van Noord- en Suid -Amerika op te neem. Vir Italië het il Duce met imperialisme gesukkel deur aanvalle en begin en kortliks geglo dat hy die grootste deel van Suid -Europa kan verower. 'N Deel van die vroeë sukses van Hitler en rsquos was die oortuiging van sy land en die grootste deel van Europa dat sy doelwitte beperk was. Maar soos blyk uit invalle van Tsjeggo -Slowakye, Pole, Frankryk en die Sowjetunie, het die doelwitte van Hitler en rsquos voortdurend gegroei.

In teenstelling hiermee, begin die Geallieerdes vanaf 1943 die oorlogsdoel van ONVOORWAARDELIKE OORGAWE, en beloof om op te hou veg onmiddellik nadat die regerings van Duitsland, Italië en Japan absoluut kapituleer.

Daar was baie openbare kritiek (wat tot op hede voortduur) op die doelwit van die Geallieerdes, en het aangevoer dat onvoorwaardelike oorgawe die as gedwing het om tot die dood te veg eerder as om te onderhandel, waardeur die oorlog onnodig verleng en verskerp word. Alhoewel daar geen manier is om te weet wat 'n alternatiewe plan moontlik opgelewer het nie, was die doel van die Geallieerdes waarskynlik 'n produktiewe stap. Eerstens sou toestemming vir onderhandelinge impliseer toegewings. Onderhandelinge het beslis in die vooroorlogse era misluk. Daarbenewens was daar min historiese bewyse dat onderhandelinge noodwendig enige oorlog ingekort het of baie na -oorlogse stabiliteit geskep het; die Versailles -debakel was slegs een voorbeeld.

Op die punt om die as te dwing om tot die einde te veg, het sowel die Japannese as die Duitsers voor 1943 openbare verklarings afgelê om die vyand uit te roei en te vernietig. , ongeag watter posisie die Geallieerdes ingeneem het.

Wat die Geallieerdes betref, het onvoorwaardelike oorgawe die kans verminder dat enige regering vir 'n aparte vrede sou kies. Dit het soldate en die tuisfront ook 'n duidelike rede vir hul opofferings gegee en die Geallieerde oorlogspoging 'n fokus gegee wat ander benaderings nie sou gee nie.

Franklin Roosevelt het die geallieerde doelwitte opgesom toe hy die verowering van Rome aankondig: & ldquoOne down. Twee om te gaan. & Rdquo

2. INDUSTRIËLE KAPASITEIT

In 'n sterk gemeganiseerde oorlog tussen geïndustrialiseerde lande, het die as die eerste punt gehad. Teen die toenemende mag van Duitsland en die nog onderontwikkelde Italië, kon Groot -Brittanje waarskynlik selfs in die vervaardiging gebly het. Maar met die freakish band tussen Hitler en Stalin in die NAZI-SOVIET PACT, was die Britte duidelik oortref. Hulle losstaande vennoot, China, alhoewel die tuiste van vierhonderd miljoen mense, het teen 1939 die meeste van sy fabrieke en gieterye verloor, en het 'n minder swaar nywerheid as België.

Alles verander in 1941. Duitsland se aanvalle op die Sowjetunie en Japan en die aanval op die Verenigde State het die slinger ten gunste van die Geallieerdes geswaai en die wêreld se drie industriële moondhede teen die as verenig. In 1942 het Brittanje byna agt keer die aantal tenks as die Japannese vervaardig, en die Sowjets het tienduisend meer vliegtuie gemaak as Nazi -Duitsland. Die Verenigde State alleen vervaardig meer oorlogsmateriaal as die hele as saam. Trouens, die Verenigde State het die as verbygesteek naby die tyd dat HERMANN G & OumlRING beweer het dat Amerikaners slegs motors en yskaste kan vervaardig. & Rdquo 131

Die Geallieerdes het ook 'n groter besparingsbesparing beoefen in vergelyking met die Derde Ryk. Terwyl die Sowjette gekonsentreer het op die vervaardiging van twee basiese soorte tenks met 'n relatief eenvoudige ontwerp, het die Duitsers met tientalle tenkweergawes geëksperimenteer, honderde prototipes gemaak en vir duisende aanpassings vir elkeen gesukkel. Terwyl Amerikaners die veelsydige jeep gehad het, het Duitsers honderd verskillende modelle van motorfietse gemaak. Teen die einde van die oorlog kon Amerikaners in minder manure vyftien B-17's vervaardig as wat die Duitsers geneem het om 'n enkele Tiger-tenk te bou. 132

Amerikaanse produksie het die hele as maklik oortref, wat hier bewys word deur die doeltreffende vervaardigingslyn van B-17-bomwerpers.

Van al die vervaardigde goedere wat in 1945 ter wêreld vervaardig is, is die helfte in die Verenigde State vervaardig.

3. KOORDINASIE TUSSEN LANDE

Die beeld van 'n verenigde Duits-Italiaans-Japannese oorlogsmasjien, wat uit propaganda uit beide die geallieerde en as-kampe gebore is, bevat eintlik 'n marginale basis. Afgesien van wedersydse vyandigheid teenoor die internasionale kommunisme en die Britse Ryk, het die drie belangrikste asstate in die loop van die oorlog min gedeel.

In die somer van 1939, terwyl Japan die Sowjetunie beveg het in 'n reeks toenemend bloedige gevegte langs die grens van Mantsjoerije-Mongolië, het die buitelandse kantoor van Hitler en rsquos die NAZI-SOVIET-PAK verseker. In 1941, weke voordat Hitler van plan was om Rusland binne te val, het Japan ingestem tot 'n vyf-jaar Sowjet-Japannese neutraliteitspakt. Japan het nooit die ooreenkoms van onderlinge hulp onderteken in Mei 1939 tussen Duitsland en Italië nie.

Dit is ook regverdig om te sê dat die Geallieerdes hul eie verdelende kwessies gehad het. Daar was persoonlikheidsbotsings, veral tussen die Britse bevelvoerder Bernard Montgomery en byna almal. Daar was strategiese meningsverskille, soos waar en wanneer om Wes -Europa binne te val. Tog het die Geallieerdes hul pogings oor die algemeen gekoördineer deur middel van talle militêre en politieke konferensies, plus verskeie groot beraadvergaderings, waaronder THERAN, YALTA en Potsdam. Churchill het self na vier afsonderlike kontinente gereis om met ander staatshoofde te vergader. Daarteenoor het Duitsland en Japan nooit 'n enkele uitruil op hoë vlak gedurende die oorlog uitgevoer nie.

As 'n aanduiding van hoe min hulle met mekaar oor groot kwessies kommunikeer, beskou die keiserlike Japan Hitler se aanval op die Sowjetunie op dieselfde manier as wat Hitler Japan en die aanval op Pearl Harbor met 'n volledige en totale verrassing beskou het.

4. TOEGANG TOT RAWMATERIAAL

Binne hul vredestydgrense beskik die asse oor beperkte hoeveelhede materiaal wat nodig is om oorlog te voer. Italië het die wêreld aangevoer met die verskaffing van kwik, wat gebruik word by die ontploffing van plofstof. Duitsland was nommer een in die produksie van potas, wat kunsmis gemaak het. Anders was die hulpbronne skaars. 133

Onder die leiers van die as het hierdie gebrek aan grondstowwe 'n gevoel van kwesbaarheid vererger en dit bygedra tot die aansporing vir plaaslike verowering. Destyds het Malaya byna die helfte van die wêreld se rubbervoorraad en 'n kwart van sy blik gehou. Die meeste titaniumerts kom uit Indië of Noorweë. China en Birma besit die grootste bekende afsettings van wolfram, 'n noodsaaklike legeringskomponent van pantser. Frankryk beskik oor aansienlike bauxiet vir die vervaardiging van aluminium.

Die meeste van die aarde se steenkool, koper, lood, nikkel, swael en sink was diep in die geallieerde gebiede. In een bron was die Geallieerdes heeltemal oorheersend, wat 'n uitdrukking onder die Japannese skep: 'n druppel petrol is 'n druppel bloed. & Rdquo 134

In 1940 was die Verenigde State verantwoordelik vir twee uit elke drie liter petrol wat in die wêreld vervaardig word. Van die asse het slegs Roemenië 'n groot aantal putte gehad, en die Duitsers het geen doeltreffende manier gehad om die olie wat die Roemeniërs geproduseer het, te vervoer of te verwerk nie. 135

Toe Japan se oliereserwes in 1943 begin opraak, het die weermag die opleiding van vlieëniers aansienlik verminder, wat hulle maklike doelwitte gemaak het teen goed beoefende Amerikaners. Teen 1944 het die keiserlike vloot hom ontkoppel of gevegte heeltemal vermy weens 'n gebrek aan brandstof. Vir die Wehrmacht het verslete tenks vyf keer vinniger olie begin drink as voorheen. In Februarie 1945 het die Luftwaffe net genoeg lugvaartbrandstof gehad om nog twee weke lank voluit te veg. 136

Teen die einde van die oorlog, toe die Verenigde State miljoene vate per dag produseer, het Duitsland slegs 'n paar duisend per week aangeskaf, waarvan die meeste ldquosintetiese olie stadig en duur uit steenkool onttrek is. Japan het motors, busse en ambulanse begin omskakel om op houtskool te werk, en sy weermag het geëksperimenteer met 'n brandstof gemaak van alkohol en terpentyn. 137

Petroleum het Axis -leiers tot die einde toe agtervolg. Die lyke van Mussolini en sy minnares is onderstebo gehang by 'n vulstasie in Milaan. Hitler wou na sy selfmoord veras word, maar daar was nie genoeg brandstof beskikbaar om die taak te voltooi nie.

5. TEGNOLOGIE

Aanvanklik agter op 'n aantal ingenieurswese, bereik die Geallieerdes uiteindelik meerderwaardigheid in lugvaart, radar, sonar, ballistiek, medisyne, voeding en radiokommunikasie. Onder hul innovasies was die nabyheidsversekering, gedemagnetiseerde skeepsrommels, gesintetiseerde kinien, 'n voorganger van die rekenaar, en termonucleaire wapens. Die Geallieerdes het eenvoudig meer geld, meer ingenieurs en veiliger werksfasiliteite as die Axis.

Daarteenoor het slegs Duitsland aansienlike vordering gemaak in tegnologie, waarvan sommige revolusionêr was. Tog is vooruitgang grotendeels ontken omdat die Derde Ryk nie die Geallieerdes kon navolg deur wetenskaplikes met soldate saam te werk nie.

Tradisioneel was die Duitse wetenskaplike gemeenskap meer afhanklik van individuele genie as spanwerk om sy deurbrake te bereik. Die Duitse weermag was eweneens konserwatief en was noukeurig beskerm teen indringing. Die grootste deel van die oorlog het hindernisse vir samewerking gebly, wat gelei het tot stadige reaksietye op ernstige probleme en indrukwekkende, maar onpraktiese innovasies.

Voorbeelde hiervan is eindeloos. Die Luftwaffe het nie 'n kwaliteit bomsig gehad nie. In plaas van om met ingenieurs te koördineer om 'n beter doelgerigtheidstoestel te maak, het die lugmag sterkere vleuelkonstruksie geëis sodat vliegtuie die druk van duikbomme kon weerstaan. Tegnici het die slanke en vinnige Messerschmitt 262-vliegtuig ontwerp met lae enjin-enjins wat vuil en puin by die opstyg opgesuig het. Dit was 'n bietjie probleem, aangesien die meeste gevegsvlakke nie verhard is nie. V-vuurpyle, hoewel indrukwekkend om na te kyk, was te onakkuraat vir enige taktiese toepassing. In die hele oorlog was daar slegs een gedokumenteerde geval van 'n direkte konferensie tussen 'n Duitse veldkommandant en 'n span wetenskaplikes. 138

Intussen vervolmaak die Geallieerdes & ldquoOperational Research, & rdquo waarin ingenieurs militêre toerusting in die veld bestudeer het om prestasie te meet en verbeterings te soek. Beide die Britse en Amerikaanse leierskap het wetenskaplike adviseurs gehad. Die toppunt van die geallieerde prestasie was ongetwyfeld die Manhattan -projek, waarin tienduisende individue wat in meer as 'n dosyn plekke in streng beheerde omgewings werk, binne drie jaar van abstrakte subatomiese teorie na 'n werkende toestel gegaan het. (Of dit 'n goeie ding was, is oop vir debat.)

Tydens die Slag om Brittanje kon RAF Spitfires die enjinverrigting met 25 persent verhoog deur die gebruik van 'n Amerikaanse uitvinding: 100-oktaan-petrol.

6. BEVOLKING

Voor die industriële revolusie was die bevolking gelyk aan mag. Daarna het geïndustrialiseerde lande 'n aansienlike voorsprong behaal in sake, diplomasie en militêre verbintenisse. Tog was daar steeds 'n getal in 'n uitputtingsoorlog.

Vir elke persoon in 'n as -uniform was daar byna drie bondgenote. Vir elke burger in 'n asstaat het die Geallieerdes vyf gehad. Die Sowjetunie alleen het meer mense as Duitsland, Italië en Japan saam.

Hierdie oppergesag in getalle het twee groot voordele gebied: die Geallieerdes kon militêre verliese vinniger vervang as die as, en die geallieerdes kon groter getalle tot logistiek en vervaardiging verbind. Waar daar ook al tekorte was, was die Geallieerdes oor die algemeen meer bereid om vroue in diens te neem, soos in die swaar nywerheid en landbou, as die meer geslagstradisjonalistiese asstate.

Een statistiek het veral geïllustreer watter kant meer in staat was om 'n stryd om uitputting te verduur. Oor die algemeen verloor die Geallieerdes twee keer die aantal vegters as die as en behaal steeds 'n oorwinning.

& ldquoProvidence is altyd aan die kant van die laaste reservaat. & rdquo & mdash Napoleon Bonaparte

7. INTELLIGENSIE

Kennis is mag, en deur spioenasienetwerke, verkennings- en versetsbewegings weet die Geallieerdes meer en gee hulle minder as die as weg.

Die grootste verskil is deur middel van kode. Die Verenigde State het aansienlike vordering gemaak met die dekodering van Japannese diplomatieke en vlootboodskappe. Die Britte, met aansienlike hulp van Poolse en Franse agente, kon groot dele Duitse kommunikasie ontsyfer, veral dié van die Luftwaffe.

Beide die Japannese en Duitsers het geglo dat hul stelsels onbreekbaar is, en as hulle die kompleksiteit van die opsette in ag neem, was hul aannames nie onredelik nie. Beide die belangrikste Japannese versleutelmasjien (gebaseer op telefoonskakelaars) en die Duitse & ldquoEnigma & rdquo -masjien (gebaseer op elektromagnetiese rotors) het nie -herhalende letterpatrone opgelewer met moontlike kombinasies wat in biljoene getalle was. Selfs wanneer letters korrek ontsyfer is, was die woorde wat hulle gevorm het in kode, en die betekenis daarvan verskil tussen agentskappe. Die Duitse kodering was ook gebaseer op veranderbare sleutelstelsels, wat maandeliks, weekliks en soms daagliks verander het. 139

Tog kon die Amerikaners 'n Japannese versleutelmasjien vervaardig sonder om dit ooit te sien, en die Britte het verskeie gevange of gekopieerde Enigma -masjiene aangeskaf. Met die werk van militêre personeel, vertalers, etimoloë, wiskundiges, statistici, skaakkampioene en ander, kon die Amerikaners en Britte talle belangrike inligting ontbloot. Die grootste deurbrake het Luftwaffe se gevegsterkte in die besette Frankryk gebied, die tyd en plek van Japan se aanval op Midway, die beskikking van U-boot-wolf-patrollies in die Noord-Atlantiese Oseaan en die vlugroete van die Japannese vlootbevelvoerder, adm. Yamamoto Isoroku, wie se vliegtuig later in 'n hinderlaag gelê is en Yamamoto dood is. 140

Om veiligheidsredes het die geallieerde regerings tot in die sewentigerjare gewag om te onthul dat hulle die as -kodes gebreek het. Die nuus het baie voormalige Axis -kriptoloë geskok.

8. AARDRYKSKUNDE

Alhoewel hul oorlogsoptredes baie verskil het, het die Sowjetunie en China 'n wapen gedeel wat hulle gehelp het om die nederlaag te voorkom: land. Beide state was aangeval uit een rigting en kon grondgebied prysgee en nie ingehaal word nie, albei kon 'n groot aantal mense en masjinerie na die binneland vervoer, en albei kon daarna 'n lang reeks verliese verduur sonder om heeltemal oorval te word. Sulke luukshede was nie beskikbaar vir minder groot lande soos België en Singapoer nie.

Japan en Groot -Brittanje het die voordeel dat dit groot eilandstate is wat beskerm word deur groot hoeveelhede water en funksioneer as reuse en oninkbare vliegdekskepe. Soos dit blyk, sou nie een tydens die oorlog binnegeval word nie. Maar hul natuurlike versperring het beide lande ook afhanklik gemaak van gestuur vir materiële oorlewing. In hierdie verband het Brittanje uiteindelik die hulp van die Verenigde State verkry, terwyl Japan heeltemal geïsoleer staan ​​van sy naaste advokaat, geskei deur oseane en landmassas in beide rigtings.

Italië was geskik vir die verdediging en het 'n beperkte aanvalspotensiaal, met sy vloot wat in die Middellandse See gebottel is deur die Suez-kanaal en Gibraltar en sy leër tegelyk beskerm en gevaarlik geskei is deur sy bergagtige terrein. Van al die groot moondhede was Duitsland waarskynlik die kwesbaarste tussen die verklaarde teëstanders. Afgesien van die Alpe in die suide, het dit ook byna geen natuurlike hindernisse gehad nie.

Geen land het meer baat by aardrykskunde as die Verenigde State nie. Die land grens aan twee uitgestrekte oseane en rus tussen twee koöperatiewe bure, en was effektief in sy eie wêreld. Die Verenigde State was veilig teen aanvalle deur land of lug en is te groot om deur amfibiese aanvalle aangeval te word, maar oorlog het plaasgevind, maar groot afstande het sy fabrieke en regering in relatiewe vrede laat funksioneer.

Die agt-en-veertig Verenigde State was nie heeltemal vry van vyandige vuur nie. In Februarie 1942 het 'n Japannese duikboot 'n olieraffinadery naby Santa Barbara, Kalifornië, beskadig. Laat in die oorlog het duisende Japannese en ldquoballoon -bomme na Noord -Amerika gedryf, met 'n paar honderd wat land bereik het en 'n dosyn mense doodgemaak het.

9. DIE BESLUITENDE GEVEL & rdquo

Oorloë word selde deur 'n enkele gebeurtenis beslis. Die meeste behels versagtende, roemryke aanvalle van verveling en uitputting, wat soms deur skerp stygings van gewapende betrokkenheid onderstreep word. Alhoewel die Tweede Wêreldoorlog hierdie patroon tot op die letter volg, ontwikkel Hitler en verskeie lede van die Japannese hoë bevel 'n teen -intuïtiewe geloof in 'n laaste en beslissende stryd. & Rdquo

Die geskiedenis het moontlik daartoe bygedra. Later in die oorlog het Hitler gewoonlik gebring hoe Pruise en Rsquos Frederik die Grote 'n onwaarskynlike elfde-uur-oorwinning behaal het tydens die sewejarige oorlog teen Oostenryk, Frankryk, Rusland en Swede. In Japan was die belangrikste seestryd van Tsushima in die RUSSO-JAPANSE OORLOG 'n gunsteling uit die verlede. Meer onlangse herinneringe roep gedagtes op van onmiddellike glorie, naamlik Hitler se duisende suksesse in 1939 en 1940, en Japan en rsquos vee in Desember 1941 die Stille Oseaan in. 141

Nostalgie het laat in die oorlog 'n militêre strategie geword. In 1944 het Japan uiters groot grondaanvalle in China en Indië geloods, 'n lugaanval by Saipan en vlootaanvalle in LEYTE GULF. In elke geval het die bevelvoerders die begeerte uitgespreek om die oorlog in 'n enkele slag te wen. Hitler & rsquos se laaste groot offensief, bekend as die BATTLE OF THE BULGE teen Amerikaners, was 'n ydele poging om sy grootste en beslissendste oorwinning te herleef. 142

In alle gevalle het die as 'n oneweredige aantal troepe verloor, alhoewel hulle groot ongevalle veroorsaak het. Vir Hitler & rsquos -aanval was die verliese byna twee tot een. Vir die Japannese was die tekorte gemiddeld ses tot een. Die gevegte was tot 'n sekere mate deurslaggewend: die groot slagoffers het die nederlaag vergemaklik, wat waarskynlik baie later sou gekom het as 'n meer verdedigende houding ingeneem is.

Die Japannese Mitsubishi Zero was 'n uitstekende vegvliegtuig, maar dit is doelbewus sonder pantser gebou. Die rede was dat die beskerming van die vlieënier hom minder aggressief laat optree het.

10. DIE & ldquoARMY-NAVY SPEL & rdquo

Rivaliteite tussen dienste is so oud soos militêre geskiedenis. Takke veg mekaar net soveel as die vyand om aansien, bates en outonomie. Terwyl die groot geallieerde moondhede interne onenigheid deur leierskap en kommunikasie kon temper, was die asstate nie.

Voorbeeld: vliegtuie. HERMANN G & OumlRING en Benito Mussolini het geglo dat hul lugmag 'n monopolie op gevegsvliegtuie moet hê, wat 'n fundamentele rede was waarom geen vloot 'n werkende vliegdekskip ontwikkel het nie en waarom Italiaanse en Duitse leërs dikwels nie tydige lugbedekking gehad het nie. Daarteenoor het die Amerikaanse weermag, vloot en mariniers elk hul eie gevegsvliegtuie gehad, wat in enige gegewe situasie na behoefte gebruik kon word.

Die verwerking van as -intelligensie bly streng geskei tussen die gewapende dienste, wat die beste beskryf kan word as skisofreniese paranoia. Die Duitse weermag het byvoorbeeld dikwels meer tyd aan die Luftwaffe bestee as aan die Geallieerdes.

Ongetwyfeld bestaan ​​die grootste interne wedywering in Japan. Een van die belangrikste aansporings vir die keiserlike vloot om die Stille Oseaan in te val, was om die groeiende mag van die Japannese weermag te stuit, wat 'n groot deel van die militêre begroting met sy groeiende oorlog in China verswyg het. Die takke het ook hul eie werk gedoen oor INTELLIGENSIE, radarontwikkeling en straalaandrywing, maar weier om hul bevindings met mekaar te deel. Die verdelende praktyk het geld, hulpbronne en tyd gemors, wat die ryk nie kon bekostig nie. 143

Een Amerikaanse militêre wedywering wat ononderbroke voortduur, was die jaarlikse Army-Navy voetbalwedstryd. Navy wen in 1942 en 1943 se weermag seëvier in 1944. Die amptelike program vir die wedstryd van 1941, wat nege dae voor Pearl Harbor gespeel is, bevat 'n foto van die verdoemdes USS Arizona.


Was die einddatum van die Sowjet -Japannese grensoorlog die direkte rede waarom die Sowjet -inval in 1939 op Pole begin het - Geskiedenis

Vir die Russe is 9 Mei 1945 die dag wat die einde van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in Europa aandui, en dit word elke jaar gevier, insluitend hierdie een, met 'n reuse militêre parade deur die Rooi Plein in Moskou. Vir die voormalige Sowjet en nou die post-kommunistiese Russiese regering word dit beskou as die dag waarop "Sowjet-mag" onder leiding van Joseph Stalin Nazi-Duitsland verslaan en Europa uit die permanente kloue van Adolph Hitler en Nazi-tirannie gered het.

Wat vergeet word, is dat dit Stalin en die Sowjetunie was wat Hitler en Nazi -Duitsland se bondgenoot was in die aanvang van hierdie gruwelike oorlog wat meer as 50 miljoen mense se lewens geëis het, en na die nederlaag van Hitler vir ongeveer die helfte die toneel gelê het eeu -verslawing van die oostelike helfte van Europa onder kommunistiese tirannie.

Dit is die sprokie van Russiese onskuld en slagoffers om die Tweede Wêreldoorlog te begin en te beveg, wat nog steeds deur die post-Sowjet-regering van Vladimir Poetin gebruik word om 'n nostalgie vir die 'goeie ou dae' van die Sowjet-mag en vir die Russiese president om te sê dat die ineenstorting van die Sowjetunie die “grootste geo-politieke tragedie van die twintigste eeu” was.

Onder die leuens en verdraaiings van die Sowjet-geskiedenis wat die regering van Vladimir Poetin bly voortsit, is 'n afslag van die menslike koste om die sosialisme te probeer "bou" tydens die byna 75 jaar lange bewind van die kommunistiese bewind in die Sowjetunie, van 1917 tot 1991. Dit word geraam dat soveel as 64 miljoen onskuldige mans, vroue en kinders in die Sowjetunie vermoor is om die sosialistiese werkersparadys te bou. ” (Sien my artikel: Socialism: An Ideology of Death and Destruction.)

Die Sowjet -sprokie oor die begin van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog

Dit lyk dus die moeite werd ten tyde van nog 'n "oorwinnings" parade op die Rooi Plein in Moskou om die rekord reg te stel oor die begin van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in Europa. Eerstens is daar die propagandaverhaal wat die Sowjetregering en nou Poetin se regering hul eie mense en baie ander oor die hele wêreld oor die Sowjetse buitelandse beleid voor die aanvang van die oorlog in Europa in September 1939 geïndoktrineer het. loop iets soos die volgende:

In die dertigerjare het Groot -Brittanje en Frankryk nie daadwerklik getoon om die toenemende bedreiging van Hitler se Duitsland die hoof te bied nie. Stalin, in die Sowjetunie, het 'n duideliker begrip van hierdie bedreiging gehad en het groter vasberadenheid getoon om die toenemende mag van fascisme te weerstaan. Hy beëindig die aggressiewe propaganda van die Sowjetunie teen die Weste en probeer 'n 'volksfront' vorm met ander anti-fascistiese nasies en groepe in Europa op grond van 'kollektiewe veiligheid'.

Brittanje en Frankryk se beleidsbeleid vir vrede, wat Hitler in 1938 en vroeg in 1939 toegelaat het om Oostenryk en Tsjeggo -Slowakye te beset, het Stalin laat besef dat om die Sowjetunie te red dat hy moontlik Nazi -aggressie alleen moes ondergaan sonder die steun van die Westerse moondhede, hy 'tyd moes koop' "Om Sowjet -militêre verdediging op te bou.

Hy het dus besluit om 'n nie -aggressie -ooreenkoms met Hitler in Augustus 1939 aan te gaan. Hy het in 'n geheime protokol van die ooreenkoms ooreengekom om Pole met Nazi -Duitsland te verdeel in geval van oorlog, sodat die buffersone wat Nazi skei, verbreed word. militêre mag uit die Sowjet -hartland. Stalin se vrese is reg bewys toe Hitler die verdrag in Junie 1941 verbreek en die USSR binnedring.

Dit was miskien onaangenaam en jammer vir die Pole, wat hul volk in September 1939 deur die twee totalitêre reuse laat sny het, of vir die Finne, wat deur die Rooi Leër binnegeval is en in die winter van 1939 grensgebied aan die Sowjetunie verloor het. -1940 of vir die Baltiese nasies Estland, Letland en Litaue, wat in Junie 1940 deur Stalin geannekseer is of vir die inwoners van die Roemeense provinsies Bessarabië en Bukovina, wat ook in Junie 1940 deur Stalin se magte beset is. Maar hierdie lande het die Sowjetunie 'asemhalingsruimte' gebied om vreedsaam voor te berei op die onvermydelike oorlog en sy deel te doen, nadat dit binnegeval is, om die Nazi -bedreiging vir die mensdom te vernietig.

Stalin se plan om die Tweede Wêreldoorlog te bewerkstellig

Hierdie interpretasie is die afgelope drie dekades toenemend uitgedaag. Ernst Topitsch Stalin se oorlog (1987), Viktor Suvorov Ysbreker (1990), Heinz Magenheimer Hitler se oorlog (1998), en Albert Weeks se Stalin se ander oorlog (2002), byvoorbeeld, beweer almal dat Stalin se doel nie was om die Sowjetunie teen 'n vroeë aanval te beskerm nie. In plaas daarvan was Stalin se strategie om doelbewus die voorwaardes te skep vir 'n oorlog wat makliker tussen Nazi -Duitsland en die Westerse moondhede kon uitbreek. So 'n oorlog sou die "kapitalistiese nasies" verswak en die voorwaardes vir kommunistiese rewolusie in Europa op die punt van Sowjet -bajonette en tenks oplewer.

Hierdie skrywers het ook aangevoer dat Stalin 'n aggressiewe oorlog teen Nazi -Duitsland beplan, met die enigste probleem dat Hitler die Sowjetunie aangeval het voordat Stalin die nie -aggressieverdrag kon verbreek en Duitsland sou binnedring. Magenheimer het selfs kaarte uit die Sowjet -argiewe weergegee wat die beplande rigtings van aanval op die Duitse hartland deur Sowjet -militêre eenhede toon. Die meningsverskille tussen hierdie skrywers was omtrent die datum vir Stalin se aggressiewe oorlog teen Duitsland. Sou dit in die somer van 1941 of die lente van 1942 gewees het?

Wêreldoorloë as 'n manier om kapitalistiese nasies te verswak

Vladimir Lenin, die Marxistiese rewolusionêr wat die Russiese rewolusie in November 1917 suksesvol gelei het, was van mening dat die Eerste Wêreldoorlog die katalisator was om die “kapitalistiese nasies” te verswak. Uit hul oorlog met mekaar het die geleentheid gekom vir sosialistiese revolusie en die omverwerping van die eiendom wat 'uitbuiters' besit. Die bewys hiervan, volgens Lenin, is getoon deur die sukses van sy kommunistiese beweging wat in 1917 aan bewind gekom het in Rusland, en die behoud van hul beheer oor 'n sesde van die landmassa van die wêreld na 'n driejarige burgeroorlog tussen 1918 en 1921.

Stalin het Lenin se siening aanvaar en was van mening dat 'n ander ewe uitputtende nuwe wêreldoorlog tussen die kapitalistiese nasies die sosialistiese rewolusie tot op die hele Europese vasteland sou laat uitbrei. In 'n geheime toespraak in Moskou voor lede van die Kommunistiese Party in Januarie 1925, het Stalin gesê dat die Sowjetunie nie in staat sou wees om uit 'n toekomstige oorlog te bly nie, maar as die USSR optree, moet dit aan die einde van die konflik wees die skaal na 'n uitkoms wat gunstig is vir die wêreldrevolusie.

In Stalin se eie woorde, "Maar as daar oorlog uitbreek, sal ons nie met gevoude arms kan sit nie. Ons sal moet optree, maar ons is die laaste om dit te doen. En ons sal dit doen om die beslissende gewig in die weegskaal te gooi, die gewig wat die weegskaal kan draai. ”

Stalin Reël met Hitler om 'n wêreldoorlog aan die brand te steek

Again, according to the “official” interpretation of Soviet foreign policy in the middle of the 1930s, Stalin made an appeal for “collective security” among the European nations against Nazi Germany. But the evidence really suggests that in the typical Marxist paranoia of “class” conspiracy and conflict, the trick, in Stalin’s mind, was to prevent all the capitalist countries from ganging up on the homeland of socialism in Soviet Russia.

The former Soviet archives have produced a previously secret speech that Stalin delivered on August 19, 1939, four days before the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact was signed in Moscow on August 23. Stalin explained that peace prevented the spread of communism war, on the other hand, provided the destruction and destabilization that was the entrée to revolution:

Comrades! It is in the interest of the USSR, the Land of the Toilers, that war breaks out between the [German] Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done so that the war lasts as long as possible in order that both sides become exhausted. Namely for this reason we must agree to the pact proposed by Germany, and use it so that once this war is declared, it will last for a maximum amount of time.

In Stalin’s mind, if the Nazis were defeated “the Sovietization of Germany follows inevitably and a Communist government will be established.” And if the war had weakened the Western allies enough, “This will likewise ensure the Sovietization of France.”

If the Nazis were to win at the end of a long war they would be exhausted and have to rule over a large area, which would pre-occupy them from attacking the Soviet Union and “these peoples who fell under the ‘protection’ of a victorious Germany would become our allies. We would have a large arena in which to develop the world revolution.” But regardless of the eventual victor, the Communist Parties in all these countries needed to keep up their propaganda and subversion so the groundwork would have been prepared for that revolution when the time came.

Stalin Frees Hitler to Fight Britain and France

Thus, in Stalin’s mind, Hitler’s drive for a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany was in fact a tool for him to use for advancing the global cause of communism. By freeing Hitler of the fear of a two-front war, Nazi Germany would invade Poland, the British and French might then declare war on Germany, and a prolonged war in central and western Europe would drain the capitalist nations, while leaving the Soviet Union neutral in the world conflict. This would enable Stalin to continue to build up Soviet military power, enter the war at a time of his own choosing, and bring communism to Europe through use of the Red Army.

This is why, after Hitler ordered the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, a little more than two weeks later, on September 17, 1939, Stalin ordered the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Poland, bringing about the end of Poland on the map of Europe before September of that year had come to a close.

Hitler could now turn his military fury on to the Western Allies, Great Britain and France, and bring about that war-caused exhaustion of the “capitalist enemies” that would set the stage at some point for a Soviet victory over the European continent.

But the swift defeat and German occupation of France in June 1940 changed the configuration of forces and the likely length of the war. Hitler attempted to draw Stalin actively into the Axis alliance against the British Empire in November 1940 when that failed because Stalin’s price for participation seemed too high, Hitler ordered the plans to be set in motion for the invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941.

Stalin’s Plan for an Aggressive War Against Germany

From documents that became available from partially opened formerly secret Soviet archives during the 1990s, it is evident that Stalin now shifted to a more aggressive military strategy against Nazi Germany. A huge military buildup of Soviet forces along the border with Germany (in what had been Poland) was set in motion. But the controversy has been about whether this buildup was for defensive or offensive purposes.

The documents show that no plan or preparations were organized for the construction of defense positions. The deployment and order of battle were virtually all consistent with an offensive strategy, not the repulse of an anticipated attack. The configuration of these forces explains why the Germans faced no serious defense positions when they invaded the Soviet Union, and why they were able to initially capture so many Soviet soldiers and advance so rapidly into Soviet territory—in the first six months of the German invasion, seven million Red Army soldiers were either captured or killed, and 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory were occupied.

Furthermore, there has come to light the text of a Soviet General Staff document from May 15, 1941, that explicitly presents the plan to “Preempt the enemy by deploying against and attacking the German Army at the very moment when he has reached the deployment stage but is still not able to organize its forces into a front or coordinate all his forces.”

Was this just a standard strategy plan prepared by the Soviet military, or was this reflective of Stalin’s intentions? Ten days earlier, on May 5, Stalin spoke at a reception for recent graduates of Red Army officer schools, and declared that the time for mere defense was now over, and that the Soviet military had been reconstructed and was ready for battle. “Now is the time to go from defense to offense.”

Stalin’s Mistakes Still Led to a Communist Eastern Europe

It is fairly clear that Stalin, having helped to start the Second World War through his pact with Hitler, was readying to attack Germany and begin the process of Sovietizing the European continent. Hitler, guided by his own aggressive ambitions, merely beat him to the punch by striking first. But even out of the actual turn of events, Stalin succeeded in imposing communism on half of Europe for half a century.

Stalin, however, was not pleased with even this successful outcome. At the Potsdam Conference in July of 1945 after the defeat of Germany, President Harry Truman went up to Stalin and congratulated him on the Soviet Army’s conquest of Berlin in the closing weeks of the war. Stalin, however, glumly replied that the Russian Army under Czar Alexander I had reached Paris in the war against Napoleon.

Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea, instigation of and participation in a virtual civil war in eastern Ukraine, and his recent military adventure in Syria all suggest that he, too, has imperial dreams to restore Russia to the “glory” and super-power status that Stalin had left to the Soviet Union that Putin had served so loyally as a member of the KGB before the demise of the communist regime in 1991.


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With his eastern flank secured, the pact unleashed Hitler to steamroll first Poland, then Norway, and then finally France, Belgium and everything in between. Similarly, the Soviet Union also exploited the new peace agreement to unleash hell on their neighbours: After seizing Eastern Poland and the Baltic States, the Red Army attacked Japanese forces in Mongolia and staged an all-out unprovoked invasion of Finland.

A colorized 1939 image of Finnish soldiers using a slingshot to lob grenades at Soviet soldiers in what became known as the Winter War. The conflict also saw the birth of the term Molotov cocktail. Finnish soldiers applied the moniker to makeshift firebombs in order to mock the Soviet foreign minister. Photo by Cassowary Colorizations - flickr.com/cassowaryprods


Nazi&ndashSoviet rapprochement

On 3 May 1939, the Soviet Secretary General Joseph Stalin replaced the Jewish Maxim Litvinov with Molotov as Foreign Minister, thereby opening for negotiations with Nazi Germany. Litvinov had been associated with the previous policy of creating an anti-fascist coalition, and was considered pro-Western by the standards of the Kremlin. Molotov let it be known that he would welcome a peaceful settlement of issues with Germany.

During the last two weeks of August 1939, Soviet-Japanese Border War reached its peak.

At Hitler's suggestion, the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop visited Moscow on 19 August 1939. A 7 year German-Soviet trade agreement (establishing economic ties between the two states) was signed for a German credit to Soviet Union of 200 million marks, in exchange for raw materials - petrol, grain, cotton, phosphates, and timber.

Molotov proposed an additional protocol on August 19, "covering the points in which the High Contracting Parties are interested in the field of foreign policy". This was a direct reflection of Stalin's speech on Aug 19, 1939 (disputed), where he asserted that a great war between the western powers was necessary for the spread of World Revolution.

On August 24, a 10-year non-aggression pact was signed, with, in addition, agreement for: consultation arbitration if either party disagreed neutrality if either went to war against a third power no membership of a group "which is directly or indirectly aimed at the other".

There was a secret protocol to the pact, revealed only on Germany's defeat in 1945, according to which the states of Northern and Eastern Europe were divided into German and Soviet spheres of influence. In the North, Finland, Estonia and Latvia were apportioned to the Soviet sphere. Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its "political rearrangement"&mdashthe areas east of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San going to the Soviet Union while the Germans would occupy the west. Lithuania, adjacent to East-Prussia, would be in the German sphere of influence. In the South, the Soviet Union's interest and German lack of interest in Bessarabia, a part of Romania, were acknowledged. The German diplomat Hans von Herwarth informed his U.S. colleague Charles Bohlen on the secret protocol on August 24, but the information stopped at the desk of President Roosevelt.

The existence of a secret appendix was first speculated in Baltic intelligence organizations only few days after the signing of the pact, and speculations grew stronger when Soviet negotiators referred to its content during negotiations of military bases. The German original was presumably destroyed in the bombings, but its microfilmed copy was included in the archive of German Foreign Office documents Karl von Loesch, civil servant in Foreign Office, gave to British Lt. Col. R.C. Thomson in May 1945. The Soviet Union denied the existence of the secret protocols until 1988, when politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev admitted the existence of the protocols, although the document itself was declassified only after the Soviet collapse in 1992.

Stalin, who had feared that the West was encouraging Hitler to fight the East, must have been aware that the secret clause was likely to unleash war, because it freed Hitler from the prospect of a war against the USSR at the same time as against Poland, France and Britain.

The Pact started to deteriorate in April 1940, when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway and in June 1940, when Soviet Union annexed Bukovina from Romania. Both nations were clearly overstepping their defined spheres of influence (as defined by the Pact). However, in 1947, Stalin said that he would have continued to work with Germany had Hitler been willing certainly Stalin had more to gain from co-operation with Germany (e.g. Poland) than from co-operation with Britain. According to historian E. H. Carr, Stalin was convinced that no German would be so stupid as to incur hostilities on two fronts, considering it axiomatic that if Germany was at war with the West, it would have to be friendly with Sovet Union.

Soviet representatives and propaganda went to great lengths to minimize the importance of the fact that they had opposed and fought against the Nazis in various ways for the past 10 years. However, they never went as far as to take a pro-German stance officially, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was worded as a non-aggression treaty, not a pact of alliance. Still, it is said that upon signing the pact, Molotov tried to reassure the Germans of his good intentions by commenting to journalists that "fascism is a matter of taste".

The extent to which the Soviet Union's earlier territorial acquisitions may have contributed to preventing its fall (and thus a Nazi victory in the war) remains a factor in evaluating the Pact. Soviet sources pointed out that the German advance eventually stopped just a few kilometers away from Moscow, so the role of the extra territory might have been crucial in such a close call. Others say that Poland and the Baltic countries played the important role of a barrier of buffer states between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a precondition not only for Germany's invasion of Western Europe, but also for the Third Reich's invasion of the Soviet Union.


The Birth of Popeye

The artist named E.C. Segar who originally conceptualized Popeye the Sailor presented the character for the first time when it first appeared in a comic strip called the "Thimble Theater". It was in 1919 when readers first laid eyes on the popular tough guy. With his one eye and huge muscles, he became an instant hit.

According to the artist, Popeye was 34 years of age and hailed from Santa Monica, California. Ten years later, due to the popularity, the comic strip, which had a few characters, began to focus on Popeye a lot more, which is why that by 1929, the comic strip became known as "Thimble Theatre Starring Popeye".


War's aftermath

Shortly after the Potsdam meeting, a rapid sequence of major events unfolded in Japan. Truman issued the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, which called for Japan's unconditional surrender from the war. The Japanese government rebuffed that request. With military officials believing that a war against Japan could result in the loss of five hundred thousand lives, the United States decided to force a quick surrender by dropping atomic bombs on two Japanese cities—Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. Approximately 150,000 people were killed outright. On August 8, the Soviets had declared war on Japan and invaded Japanese-held Manchuria several days later. On August 14, Japan surrendered formal surrender documents were signed on the USS Missouri on September 2. With both Germany and Japan defeated, the Grand Alliance no longer had any reason to stay together.

Great war losses left Britain and the Soviet Union considerably weakened. Britain was heavily in debt and no longer had the resources to be a world leader. Britain still had substantial military forces and colonies around the world, but its superpower status would soon fade. Similarly the Soviet Union was economically crippled near the war's end. Over twenty million Soviets had died, and the country's agricultural and industrial economies were in ruin Stalin's immediate goal following the war was to avoid further military conflict. In contrast to Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States emerged from the war as a world power in a league of its own. Its gross national product, or total market value of the country's goods and services, had increased from $90 billion in 1939 to $211 billion in 1945. The U.S. population had also increased during the war, from 131 million to 140 million. The United States was the world's economic leader and major source of financial credit. Its military was vast, and it was the only country with atomic weapons.

A meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London in September 1945 to determine terms of peace treaties and other end-of-the-war matters, ended in disarray. The United States and the Soviet Union strongly disagreed over draft treaties concerning Romania and Bulgaria and the Soviet role in postwar Japan. Some diplomats left the meeting feeling that the two nations were clearly on an unavoidable collision course. Many of them had begun to understand that the United States and other Western nations held basic economic and political values that were loathsome to the Soviets. Likewise, Western governments were inherently opposed to Soviet values.

In order to resolve differences, Truman sent Secretary of State Byrnes to Moscow, the Soviet capital. Byrnes was able to reach substantial compromises with the Soviets, including recognition of general spheres of influence for both nations the Soviets were given control over Romania and Bulgaria. U.S. and Soviet diplomats agreed to meet in May 1946 in Paris to develop a series of peace treaties for other European nations. They also created the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Byrnes faced intense criticism when he returned to the United States some Americans felt he was too soft in his negotiations with the communists. Because of this perception, his influence over foreign policy would substantially decline.


Germany Allies with China Instead of Japan?

Germany for a while had a much larger relationship with China than Japan after 1911. They tried to help the Kuomintang, and the Nazis at first didn't mind as they were fighting communists. But eventually they switched to Japan since they had a larger military and a desire to take British, French (and American) colonies along with disputes with the USSR. But what if China for whatever reason remains Germany's favorite, signs the non-comintern pact, and eventually joins the Axis Powers in exchange for German support against Japanese invasion. Hitler, being either cooperative, stupid, or however you want to put it, declares war against Japan. After all, think of the Chinese industry and potential economic market and the prospect of a too powerful Japan. As for the CCP, with early German support sticking, perhaps the CCP could have been scattered entirely or reduced even further from being a threat since the Kuomintang army could have been upgraded and given several tanks and planes. Germany could even send some forces there and less forces into Spain.

What I ask is.
1. With Japan also fighting limited amounts of German troops (no navy as Germany's navy wouldn't really do anything) as well as the Chinese military with now upgraded gear, when WW2 breaks out in Europe, when Germany takes over Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, and France and the Battle of Britain is done, would Japan officially side with Britain and join the allies?
2. Would Japan in this condition still bomb Pearl Harbor and jump American forces, or would the Japanese alliance against the Nazis with the British prevent any sanctions in the first place that would result in such an attack.

Rodger

EmperorTigerstar

Mephistopheles

I can see a weird Soviet-Japanese alliance if Hitler still invades the Soviet Union.

Strike South would have to be abandoned too though. The Soviets would not want to draw in the West against them in some three-way war.

Sam-Nary

With regard to question 1, that would depend on how Britain reacts to any Japanese overture. Some have argued that if Britain had maintained its earlier alliance with Japan that they could have mitigated the worst of Japanese acts of aggression and kept Japanese attacks rather limited. though I don't agree with it, and I'd also say that it'd be a moot point if Japan decided to ally again with the UK in 1940. By that time, the Japanese government was being lead by militarist extremists who weren't about to back down from what they wanted.

By 1940 post Battle of Britain, while Britain might be willing to accept help from the Japanese against Germany, it would be doubtful that there would be any possibility of the British mitigating Japanese aggression in China and the alliance would be a rather tense one, much like the alliance in history between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union during the war.

With regard to question 2, while Japan might consider helping the UK, it'd be more likely that the alliance would be manipulated entirely to Japan's advantage. Which would mean the conquest of China would continued, but now, to fully cut the Chinese off, they'd only need to seize French Indochina as Britain would be urged to shut down the supply routes to Germany's ally in Burma and India.

This would probably still irritate the US which was not responding well things like the Paney Incident and the Rape of Nanking. Had Japan not committed these atrocities or could truly prove that they were fighting to establish a China under Chinese rule, it might have been possible that the Americans would have looked the other way, as FDR was also an opponent of Hitler and US public opinion by the end of 1940 was also turning against Germany. but since the restoration of the British/Japanese Alliance would come after these atrocities had been committed, Japan is not likely to have friends in Washington.

Pearl Harbor would likely still occur and Britain would then be faced with the same problem it faced after WWI involving the dropping of their first alliance with Japan. an irate US. The British would have to then likely drop their support for Japan as they were getting most of their supplies from the US.


History Mark-scheme Cold War

The question does not require that the leaders have different ideologies. Possible choices could be: Eisenhower and Kennedy for the USA Khrushchev for the USSR Castro in Cuba Nasser in Egypt Mao in China etc. Accept any leaders of the candidate's choice providing that they are relevant for the time period and the Cold War.

Arguments/suspicion over issues raised and discussed at Yalta, and especially by the time of

Potsdam, should be well known. Coverage of the German Question, Poland, Greece and Turkey, the "liberation"/"occupation" of Eastern Europe, Containment policies (Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan) and Soviet moves (Cominform and Comecon), NATO, and the spread of conflict to Korea (given the 1953 date), are all relevant.The respective "fears" of both need to be addressed - what was the perception of both sides in relation to such events? Were leaders simply reacting to perceived aggression (military, economic) of the other - or were both sides deliberately pursuing aggressive and expansionist policies in their own interests?

The "to what extent" invitation allows for the identification of other factors which initiated a breakdown - e.g. ideology, deliberate pursuit of aims by one side or the other in an attempt to spread their respective values system.

[0 to 7 marks] for unfocused generalizations.

[8 to 10 marks] for narratives of the origins of the Cold War with implicit assessment.

[11 to 13 marks] for more explicit identification of fears and assessment.

[14 to 16 marks] for structured and focused responses with a sound historical knowledge base and awareness of other factors.

There is much to choose from. Do not necessarily expect all, but the emphasis should be on

judging the effectiveness of the policy after it was adopted. Did it halt expansion - how, where, why? Examples where it proved less successful - how, where, why? Specific details/examples are needed for substantiation.

[0 to 7 marks] for poorly substantiated or inadequate responses.

[8 to 10 marks] for narrative/descriptive accounts with implicit assessment of effectiveness.

[11 to 13 marks] for adequate detail and explicit focus. Not all implications considered or sufficiently developed.

[14 to 16 marks] for informed, well-focused and explicit assessment of the effectiveness ofthe policy.

For Korea, accept answers which use either the start of the Korean War in 1950, or the "liberation" from Japan in 1945 as a starting date.

For Vietnam - accept starting date from either 1946, or from 1960-61.

Middle East - could include the Arab-Israeli dispute characterized by a series of wars since 1948 and/or Iran/Iraq/Afghanistan. Reasons could include: ideology strategy mutual fear of perceived rival expansion prestige proxy/surrogate conflict economic resources etc.

Material shortages, production problems, the difficulties of maintaining a satisfactory level of consumer goods whilst maintaining expenditure on military/defence budgets, ossification of the command economy and central planning systems could all be examined and commented upon.

"External pressures" could be seen as linked to economic pressures since they required the regimes' expenditure to the disadvantage of the population - leading to dissatisfaction, demonstrations or a need for restructuring which opened the gates to political reform. Other external pressures (the role for example of religious institutions) could be considered - e.g. in Poland or the GDR/DDR.

both countries were divided and each had one part under Soviet influence and the other under US influence

both were episodes of actual warfare in the Cold War

both widened the war (geographically)

both wars involved Communist and Western powers seeking to retain their influence

both involved US forces but not Soviet troops officially

both caused many casualties and raised tension.

the US forces fought under the UN banner in Korea, but as American forces in Vietnam

Vietnam was more of a Communist victory and US defeat, whereas Korea ended with an armistice

the Korean War marked an important stage in Chinese involvement in the Cold War

Most of the answer should be devoted to the second part of the question, which requires candidates to assess why Communism collapsed. Candidates can discuss economic weaknesses, the Communist bloc's financial debt to the West, political problems, the

impossibility of keeping the people in ignorance of Western standards, growth of opposition,

(especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia), policies of the Soviet leader Gorbachev,

(from 1985), of Glasnost and Perestroika.

[0 to 7 marks] for inaccurate or inadequate knowledge.

[8 to 10 marks] for narrative accounts with implicit "why".

[11 to 13 marks] for explicit attention to "when and why".

[14 to 16 marks] for structured, focused and analytical answers.

both countries were allies of the USSR, but had their differences

both had strong, ambitious leaders, Mao and Castro

both used aid to developing countries to further communism and their own role

both influenced the development of détente.

Mao had more differences with USSR than Castro did

Mao had ambitions to be accepted as leader of the Communist bloc

China was active in Korea and Vietnam

for Cuba the height of the Cold War was the Missile crisis

the Americas was Cuba's main sphere of interest, Asia was China's

Reasons for involvement could include: Khrushchev's personality as a risk-taker, looking for a personal triumph to establish his leadership the desire to break containment imposed by US the American rejection of Castro which created an opportunity for the USSR Castro actively seeking assistance to break the American economic grip Soviet desire to improve their image in the Third World, especially in light of Chinese criticism the opportunity to gain a foothold in the Western hemisphere from which to spread communism and undermine US influence in Latin America a possible method of putting pressure on the US over the issue of Berlin and a base from which to address the Soviet strategic disadvantage in terms of long-range missiles.

Results of involvement could include: Soviets negotiated economic agreements with Cuba Soviet troops were stationed in Cuba Soviet naval bases were established, Soviet missiles were installed, which brought on the missile crisis the fall of Khrushchev by 1964 Cuba became a major source of anti-US propaganda in Latin America as a model for Latin American nationalists Cuba was a base for the spreading of communism in Latin America (Che Guevara), however this proved largely unsuccessful Cuba provided troops to support Soviet incursions into Angola and Ethiopia Cuban economy became a major drain on Soviet finances and Soviet presence in Cuba undermined their relations with the US.

Policies which caused disagreement included: post-war settlement of Europe treatment of Germany reparations Poland.

Results could include: break up of war time alliance increase of mutual fear and suspicion onset of the Cold War division of Germany establishment of Soviet satellite states.

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was a permanent military alliance, established by treaty in 1949. Its purpose was to defend Europe against Soviet aggression. Its institutions included a council, international secretariat, headquarters, bases and committees.

The Warsaw Pact was a delayed Soviet response to NATO. It was formed in 1955 like NATO all members were obliged to come to the aid of any member which was attacked. Unlike NATO it was also used to keep its members under control.

Non-alignment in the early years of the Cold War refers to states which decided not to take sides in the major division in world politics between the USA and the USSR, and formed the Non-aligned Movement which tried to mediate between the superpowers, and thus make a contribution to world peace. It was particularly associated with India and Nehru. Attempts by Mediterranean, African and Asian countries in the 1960s to renew the movement failed to reduce continuing superpower hostility. However conferences of the Non-alignment Movement were still held in the 1980s.

Détente means a reduction of conflict and tension between states. The term is usually applied to improved relations between East and West in the Cold War, especially to arms limitation. In the 1970s détente led to several agreements between the USA and USSR, including SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979), as well as the Helsinki Conference on economic and technological co-operation 1975. The 1980s saw a challenge to the process of détente until later in the decade.

Of course not all experienced all of the above. Actual details will depend on the two countries chosen.

The Marshall Plan originated from a speech by George Marshall at Harvard on 5 June 1947. It offered financial aid from the USA for a programme of European recovery. It was based on the fear that poverty would encourage the speed of communism in European countries. Its intention was to ensure economic recovery for both security and economic reasons. The results were suspicion from the USSR, and the recovery of Western Europe from the dislocation of the Second World War. Congress approve Marshall "aid" totalling $17 billion to be administered through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) between 1948 and 1952.

Containment was the policy adopted by the USA in 1947in response to Soviet policies of expansion at the end of, and after, the Second World War. It aimed to contain communism. For importance, candidates could refer to the impact of containment on US foreign policy both in Europe and elsewhere.

COMECON - the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, was established in Moscow by Stalin in January 1949, to improve trade between the USSR and its satellite Eastern European states. It was a reaction to the Marshall Plan and the economic power of the west. It eventually consisted of 10 member states, was dominated by the USSR, but there were often disagreements. It was disbanded in 1991. Its importance would include the way it was used to extend political influence as well as to control the production and distribution of goods within the communist world etc.

Détente was a term used to indicate the lessening of tension between the two sides of the Cold War. The term is usually applied to the improved relations, beginning in November 1969 with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). There were several agreements between the USA and USSR in the 1970s including SALT I (1972), SALT II (1979) and those made at the Helsinki Conference in 1975 on economic and technological cooperation. In the 1980s détente was interrupted by further arms build-up, but returned with the policies of Gorbachev, from 1989 into the 1990s. Its importance would include the change it signified in relations between Cold War rivals, enabling arms control agreements etc.


Kyk die video: SADF Border War (November 2021).