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Slag van die rivier Ana, 79 v.C.

Slag van die rivier Ana, 79 v.C.

Slag van die rivier Ana, 79 v.C.

Die slag van die rivier Ana (79 v.C.) het Sertorius se legaat L. Domitius Calvinus, die goewerneur van nader Spanje, iewers aan die rivier Ana (Sertoriaanse oorlog) gesien.

Die geveg het plaasgevind in die tweede jaar van die Sertoriaanse Oorlog. Sertorius is in 80 v.C. teruggenooi na Spanje en het byna onmiddellik L. Fufidius, die goewerneur van Sullan van Verdere Spanje, aan die Baetis verslaan. In die daaropvolgende jaar het die eks -konsul Metellus Pius Fufidius vervang en gepoog om Sertorius tussen sy leër en dié van Lucius Domitius, die goewerneur van Naby Spanje, vas te trek. Sertorius kon egter twee leërs op die been bring. Terwyl hy met Metellus gekonfronteer word, is sy bekwame quaestor L. Hirtuleius gestuur om met Domitius te doen. Die resultaat was 'n oorwinning vir Hirtuleius, wat Naby Spanje onbeskermd gelaat het. Baie van die gebied val gou op Sertorius, wat die grootste deel van die res van die oorlog aan die ooskus van Spanje oorheers het.

Ons het slegs verbygaande vermeldings van hierdie stryd. Plutarchus noem dat Lucius Domitius, pro-konsul van nader Spanje, deur Sertorius se kwestor vermoor is.

Volgens Florus se toonbeeld van Livy het die geveg plaasgevind op die rivier Ana, die moderne Guadiana, en Sertorius se troepe was onder bevel van een van die Hirtulei.

Die periochae van Livy sê dat die proconsul Lucius Manlius en Marcus Domitius, sy adjunk in die geveg verslaan is deur die quaestor Hirtuleius.

Eutropius erken ook Hirtuleius met die oorwinning.

Terselfdertyd verslaan Sertiorus Thorius, een van Metellus se legate,


Slag van die Trebbia -rivier

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Slag van die Trebbia -rivier, (218 Desember v.C.), die eerste groot slag van die Tweede Puniese Oorlog, waarin die Kartago -magte van Hannibal die Romeinse leër onder Tiberius Sempronius Longus aan die oewer van die Trebbia -rivier verslaan het. Dit was Hannibal se eerste groot oorwinning in Italië, en dit het baie van die Kelte van Noord -Italië beïnvloed om hom te ondersteun.

Die Romeinse konsul Publius Cornelius Scipio is laat in 218 vC gewond in 'n skermutseling met Hannibal by die Ticinus -rivier (nou Ticino) in 'n ruitery, en hy trek sy magte terug na Placentia (moderne Piacenza), naby die samevloeiing van die Trebbia- en Po -riviere. Nadat konsul Tiberius Sempronius Longus die leër van Scipio versterk het, het hy gehoop om Hannibal te betrek en gedink dat hy die glorie teen die Kartago -generaal kan wen. Met behulp van inligting wat hy van sy spioene gekry het, het Hannibal die uitslagkarakter van Sempronius korrek bepaal en vermoed dat hy waarskynlik in 'n geveg op 'n tyd en plek van Hannibal sou word uitgelok. Alhoewel sy magte moontlik soveel as 'n derde was (daar word beraam dat 30 000 Kartagoërs en bondgenote ongeveer 42 000 Romeine in die gesig staar), het Hannibal geweet dat Sempronius 'n politieke aanstelling was sonder veel militêre ervaring. Hy het verder verstaan ​​dat Romeinse konsuls elke tweede dag van leiding afgewissel het. Alhoewel Scipio, 'n veteraanoffisier, hom beywer vir die uitstel van die verlowing tot die winter verby is, weet Hannibal dat hy net moet wag totdat Sempronius die bevel aanvaar het om 'n konfrontasie uit te lok.

Dit was tot voordeel van Hannibal dat die twee Romeinse leërs nie in 'n enkele kamp was nie, maar verdeel was tussen hul bevelvoerders. Aan die vooraand van die wintersonstilstand het Hannibal sy leër oor die Trebbia uit Sempronius se kamp opgerig en sy manne opdrag gegee om te rus en, nadat hulle wakker geword het, hulself met vet te smeer om teen die koue te isoleer. Hannibal het ook sy jonger broer Mago in beheer gestel van 'n hinderlaag wat die Romeine van agter sou aanval. Kontingente van Numidiaanse kavallerie is oor die vriesende rivier gestuur om die Romeine te bespot en Sempronius met persoonlike beledigings bespot. Deur die raad van Scipio te ignoreer, reageer Sempronius soos Hannibal verwag het en stuur sy leër in volle krag en sonder ontbyt. Die Romeine is oor die Trebbia gestuur om die Numidiërs te volg, maar die geharde Numidiaanse berge het die koue rivier met min moeite verbygesteek, terwyl die Romeinse infanterie op die verste oewer van die Trebbia versadig en gebewe was. Die Romeine het die duidelike numeriese voordeel gehad, maar Hannibal se warm, uitgeruste en goed gevoed leër was baie beter voorbereid op die geveg. Namate die Romeine gevorder het, het die skermutselinge van Hannibal groot tol geëis, en baie Romeine het op klippe geval wat deur Hannibal se elite Baleariese slingerers geslinger is. Ander is deur olifante vertrap of afgekap terwyl hulle probeer terugval na die rivier. Die Romeinse weermag het dapper geveg, maar dit is op die vlug geslaan toe Mago se mag van 2 000 infanterie en kavallerie uit verberging gekom het en die Romeinse agterkant aangeval het. Minstens 15 000 Romeine sterf by Trebbia, en moontlik is nog 12 000–15 000 gevange geneem, die Kartagoërs het ongeveer 5 000 slagoffers gely. Tot 10 000 Romeine het daarin geslaag om deur die Kartago -lyne te veg en na Placentia te ontsnap, waar hulle in die kamp gebly het - soos Scipio oorspronklik voorgestel het - tot die lente.

Sempronius het die Romeinse senaat probeer oortuig dat die stryd nie 'n nederlaag was nie, maar 'n tydelike terugslag wat hy die weer die skuld gegee het. Hierdie weergawe van die gebeure was heeltemal in stryd met die sterk verminderde krag van Sempronius se magte. Alhoewel die geveg en die daaropvolgende winter ook 'n tol op Hannibal se leër getrek het - veral die olifante - is die karakterisering van die geveg as 'n Romeinse nederlaag nie betwisbaar nie. Baie van die Kelte van Noord -Italië het Hannibal se saak gewen deur sy demonstrasie dat die Romeine verslaan kon word. Die geveg was slegs een van die vele geleenthede in die Tweede Puniese Oorlog waarin 'n slinkse Hannibal die natuur, die omgewing en kennis van sy vyand gebruik het om die sterkte van sy kleiner leër te versterk.


Antieke Rome se donkerste dag: die slag van Cannae

In 216 v.C. was die Romeinse Republiek gewikkel in die tweede van wat uiteindelik drie verwoestende oorloë met die Noord-Afrikaanse stadstaat Kartago sou wees. Wat ongeveer 50 jaar vroeër as 'n territoriale geskil begin het, het in 'n eksistensiële tweegeveg ontaard, met beide magte om oppermag. Rome was die oorwinnaars in die Eerste Puniese Oorlog, maar aan die begin van die tweede konflik in 218 vC het die Kartagoanse generaal Hannibal 'n gewaagde inval in Italië via die Alpe uitgevoer. Sedertdien het sy huursoldaat van Libiërs, Numidiërs, Spanjaarde en Kelte oor die platteland geteister en afval op landbougrond gelê en Romeinse legioene vermorsel. In net twee groot gevegte by die Trebia -rivier en die Trasimene -meer het Hannibal sy militêre genie gebruik om die Romeine tot 50 000 slagoffers te berokken.

Na hierdie vroeë verliese het Rome 'n vertragingsstrategie aangeneem om die toevoerlyne van Hannibal af te sny en die veldslae wat sy voorraad in die handel was, te vermy. Dit was 'n slinkse taktiek, maar een wat die hiper-aggressiewe Romeine nie lank sou aanvaar nie. In 216 vC verkies hulle Gaius Terentius Varro en Lucius Aemilius Paullus as mede-konsuls en voorsien hulle van agt legioene en die grootste leër in die geskiedenis van die Republiek. Die missie daarvan was duidelik: konfronteer Hannibal se leër en vermorsel dit.

Die kans op 'n kragmeting het later die somer aangebreek, toe Hannibal na Suid -Italië marsjeer en 'n belangrike voorraadopslagplek naby die stad Cannae beslag lê. Varro en Paullus het gejaag, en vroeg in Augustus was die Romeine en Kartagoë albei langs die rivier Aufidus ontplooi. Volgens die ou historikus Polybius het Hannibal ongeveer 40 000 infanterie en 10 000 kavallerie tot sy beskikking gehad (sy beroemde oorlogsolifante was almal teen 216 dood). Die Romeine spog met ongeveer 80 000 troepe en 6 000 kavallerie.

'N Geskiedenis van die kavallerie van die vroegste tye af (mikroform). (Krediet: Flickr)

Die oggend van 2 Augustus het die twee leërs op 'n warm, stofgeblaasde vlakte vergader en voorberei vir die geveg. Die Romeine het in 'n tradisionele blokformasie opgerig met 'n massa infanterie beskerm deur kavallerie op albei vleuels. Varro, die bevelvoerder op die dag, het gehoop om sy legioene soos 'n slagram te gebruik om die middel van die Kartago -lyne te breek. Hannibal het dit verwag, en daarom het hy sy leër in 'n onkonvensionele formasie ingerig om die Romeine se momentum teen hulle te gebruik. Hy het begin met die posisionering van sy swakste troepe - sy Galliese Kelte en Spanjaarde - in die middel van sy lyn. Daarna het hy sy meer elite, strydgeharde Libiese infanterie effens agter op albei flanke geplaas. Die kavallerie het posisie op die heel linker- en regtervleuel ingeneem. Toe dit volledig saamgestel was, het die Kartago -lyn gelyk aan 'n lang halfmaan wat in die middel na die Romeine na buite gebuig het. Hy was nooit een van agter af nie, maar Hannibal het 'n pos aan die voorkant aangeneem saam met sy Spanjaarde en Galliërs.

By trompetgeluide het die twee kante vorentoe gestyg en die geveg het begin. Nou begin 'n groot slagting en 'n groot stryd, het die historikus Appian later geskryf, en die kant van die kant het dapper geveg. . Die eerste beslissende maneuver het gevolg toe Hannibal se swaar kavallerie, onder bevel van 'n offisier met die naam Hasdrubal, in die ruiters op die regterflank gestamp het. Kortliks het die voortreflike Kartago -ruiters hul Romeinse teëstanders amper uitgewis.

Terug by die infanteriegeveg het Hannibal Galliërs en Spanjaarde met kaalbors gebots in 'n warrelwind van swaarde, spiese en skilde met die hoofliggaam van Romeine. Terwyl die troepe mekaar sny en steek, word die Karthagiese sentrum stadig teruggedruk en die vorming daarvan omkeer van 'n uitwaartse bult in 'n konkawe sak. Dit was alles deel van die Hannibal -plan. Deur die Romeine die indruk te gee dat hulle wen, lok hy hulle slegs in 'n ruimte tussen die nog steeds onbetrokke Libiese troepe aan die rand van sy formasie. Terwyl hul gees die hoogte ingeskiet het, het duisende legioene gou in die sak van die Kartago -lyn gestroom. Toe hulle dit gedoen het, het hulle hul ordelike vorm laat vaar en saamgevoeg.

Hannibal het nou die bevel gegee wat die Romeine se ondergang sou beteken. Op sy sein het die Libiërs na binne gedraai en die oprukkende legioenen aangeval en die linker- en regterflanke aangeval en hulle in 'n bankspan toegemaak. Hasdrubal het intussen oor die slagveld gehardloop en gehelp om die kavallerie op die linkervleuel van die Romeine te stuur. Nadat hy die Romeine van hul gemonteerde steun afgesweer het, het hy sy krag omgedraai en op die legioene geslaan en onbeskermde agterkant. Die oorlewende Romeine, miskien tot 70 000 mans, was heeltemal omsingel.

Die gedenksteen ter herdenking van die Slag van Cannae. (Krediet: De Agostini / V. Giannella / Getty Images)

Die lokval van Hannibal was voltooi, maar die stryd was nog lank nie verby nie. Die legioenen wat met die koraal verband hou, het geen tekens van oorgawe getoon nie, sodat die Kartagoërs toegesluit het en met die gruwelike werk begin het om hulle een vir een te kap. In die volgende paar uur het die vlakte by Cannae 'n moordveld geword. 'N Paar duisend Romeine het uit die omsingeling gebreek en gevlug, maar sonder om te beweeg, is die res stadig ingekry en geslag. Sommige is ontdek waar hulle lewendig lê, heupe en senings gesny het, hul nekke en keel oopgesper het en gebid het dat hul oorwinnaars die oorblyfsel van hul bloed laat dreineer. ” het die kroniekskrywer Livy later geskryf. Ander is gevind met hul koppe begrawe in gate wat in die grond gegrawe is. Hulle het blykbaar hierdie kuipe vir hulself gemaak en die vuilheid oor hulle gesigte opgehoop. Hannibal het ongeveer 6 000 man verloor.

Die woord van die slagting in Cannae het die stad in paniek laat ontstaan. “ Die menigtes het die strate opgedrom, ” het Appian geskryf, ȁ Klaagliedere vir hul familielede uitgedruk, hulle by die naam aangespreek en hul eie lot beklaag sodra hulle in die vyand se hande val. ” In hul desperaatheid, die Romeine het 'n senator na die Griekse orakel in Delphi gestuur om die betekenis van die tragedie te verklaar. Hulle het selfs menslike offers gebring om die gode te paai. Terwyl Hannibal uiteindelik besluit het dat sy leër te swak was om na Rome te marsjeer, het Cannae nog steeds die Republiek op die rand van ineenstorting gestoot. In net een dag van gevegte het die Romeine ten minste sewe keer soveel soldate verloor as wat later tydens die Slag van Gettysburg doodgemaak is. “ Sekerlik is daar geen ander nasie wat nie sou geswig het onder so 'n gewig van rampspoed nie, ” Livy het geskryf.

Maar selfs in hul donkerste uur wou die koppige Romeine eenvoudig nie toegee nie. Na 'n kort rouperiode het die senaat van Rome die vredesaanbiedings van Hannibal verwerp en geweier om sy Cannae -gevangenes te los. Die burgerskap is aan die gang gesit om nuwe wapens en projektiele te maak, en die kreupele leër is herbou deur die werwingsouderdom te verlaag, gevangenes te werf en selfs slawe hul vryheid te bied in ruil vir diens. Vir elk van die Romeinse legioene wat in Cannae vernietig is, is daar uiteindelik nog 'n paar opgevoed en toegewyd aan die veld.

Terwyl sy vyand terugval op sy oorweldigende mannekrag, word Hannibal net swakker. Hy het etlike jare voortgegaan om deur Italië te gaan op soek na 'n tweede Cannae, maar sy afgesonderde leër het stadig verdwyn nadat daar nie genoeg van Rome se bondgenote na sy saak gekom het nie. Die wonderbaarlike terugkeer van die Romeine het in 204 vC voortgeduur, toe die generaal, later bekend as Scipio Africanus, 'n inval in Noord -Afrika geloods het met ongeveer 26 000 man, waarvan baie die oorlewendes van die vernedering by Cannae. Hannibal is uit Italië teruggeroep om die Carthaagse geboorteland te verdedig, maar in 202 verslaan Scipio hom beslis in die oorlog teen die Slag van Zama.

Die Tweede Puniese Oorlog het effektief die heerskappy van Kartago as 'n militêre mag beëindig, waardeur Rome sy greep op die Middellandse See kon verskerp en sy ryk kon begin bou. Selfs in 'n nederlaag het Hannibal egter sy plek in die panteon van groot militêre bevelvoerders vasgemaak. Die Romeine het beelde van hom gebou om hul triomf oor 'n waardige teëstander te vier, en sy oorwinning op Cannae het later 'n fassinerende onderwerp geword vir generaals, wat wissel van Napoleon tot Frederik die Grote. Dwight D. Eisenhower beskryf dit as die “lassic -voorbeeld ” van 'n stryd om vernietiging. Tog was die taktiese meesterstuk van Hannibal nie genoeg om die Romeine te breek nie. Hy het 'n legendariese geveg in Cannae gewen, net om sy vyand nog meer vasbeslote te laat om die oorlog te wen.


3. Grieks 𠇊lala ” en 𠇎leleu ”

Krediet: De Agostini Picture LIbrary/Getty Images

Toe hulle in hul georganiseerde falanksformasies na hul vyande marsjeer, het antieke Griekse troepe tipies gevegsliedere, of “paeans, bedoel om die god Apollo aan te roep en hul senuwees te kalmeer. Maar sodra hulle binne trefafstand was, sou hulle ophou sing en in 'n volgehoue ​​strydkreet van 𠇊lala! ” of 𠇎leleu! ” inbreek, terwyl hulle hul wapens teen hul skilde slaan om vyandelike perde te skrik. As dit deur duisende spieswisselende hopliete uitgespreek word, het hulle gesê dat hierdie geroepe soos die geluid van troppe skreeuende voëls lyk, en dit was so bekend dat die ou skrywer Pindar hulle selfs in 'n 5de eeu v.C. gedig. ȁKies my, Alala, ” het hy geskryf, ”ogter van Ares, voorspel van die spiese, u aan wie mense as offerande val vir hul vaderland in die dood en#x2019 se heilige offer. ”


Slag van die rivier Ana, 79 v.C. - Geskiedenis

Slag van die Granicusrivier Mei-Junie 334 v.C.:

Arrian 1.13-15 Plut. 16 Diod. 17.19.1-3

Masedoniese magte: 32000 infanterie, 5100 kavallerie, plus vloot- en geallieerde magte = 90000 totaal. Persiese magte 20000 kavallerie en ongeveer dieselfde aantal infanterie. Sy belegstrein het ook sleepwaens, ingenieurs, landmeters, kampbeplanners, 'n sekretariaat, hofbeamptes, mediese personeel, bruidegom vir die kavallerie en muileerders vir die bagasie ingesluit. Sowat 182 oorlogskepe en voorraadskepe ondersteun sy mag, 160 geallieerde oorlogskepe. Alexander het in Bithynië aangekom met 70 talente goud en genoeg voorraad vir 'n veldtog van 30 dae. Memnon, 'n Griekse huursoldaatbevelvoerder wat saam met die Perse dien, het 'n strategie van berekende terugtog met verskroeide aarde aanbeveel, maar Persiese bevelvoerders, baie verwant aan koning Darius III, het aangedring op 'n konfrontasie en die Granicusrivier gekies. Alexander het 12000 infanterie, 1500 perde by Antipater in Masedonië agtergelaat.

Opgetekende kragkomponente: 12000 Masedoniese Pezhetairoi 7000 geallieerde infanterie 5000 huursoldate infanterie almal onder Parmenio Odrysians Triballians, Illyrians = 7000 boogskutters en Agrianiërs 1000 = 3200 kavallerie 1800 hetairoi onder Philotas 1800 Thessaliërs, onder Callas seun van Harpalus 600 Griekse kavallerie onder Erigyius 900 Thracians en verkenners onder Cassander, wat gelyk is aan 'n totaal van 5100 ruiters. Parmenio het 'n vertraagde nag aanbeveel om die rivier oor te steek, maar Alexander het hom oorheers. Hy beveel 'n direkte aanval op die Persiese formasie op die oorkantse oewer van die rivier.

Plut: Alexander stort onmiddellik langs die oewer en in die water in met 13 eskaders in vinnig vloeiende water wat om hulle stroom en mans van hul voete afvee. Ten spyte hiervan het hy vorentoe gedruk en met 'n geweldige poging die oorkantste oewer bereik, 'n nat verraderlike helling bedek met modder. Daar is hy onmiddellik gedwing om die vyand in 'n deurmekaar stryd van hand tot hand te betrek, voordat die troepe wat agter hom aanstap, in enige formasie georganiseer kon word. Die oomblik toe sy manne voet op land sit, val die vyand hulle aan met harde geroep wat perd teen perd pas, met hul lansetjies stoot en met die swaard veg toe hul lansies breek. Baie van hulle het Alexander self aangekla, want hy was maklik herkenbaar aan sy skild en aan die lang wit pluim wat aan weerskante van sy helm vasgemaak was. Sy borsplaat is deur 'n spies gesteek. Spithradates ('n Persiese edelman) het op hom gery en hom met 'n strydbyl op die kop geslaan en die helm van sy helm gesplit. Cleitus die Swart, die broer van Alexander se nat verpleegster, het hom deurgeloop en Alexander se lewe gered. Terwyl Alexander se kavallerie besig was met hierdie woedende en gevaarlike optrede, het die Masedoniese falanks die rivier oorgesteek en die infanterie van beide kante het by die geveg aangesluit. Die Perse het min weerstand gebied, maar het vinnig gebreek en gevlug, en dit was slegs die Griekse huursoldate wat hul stand gehou het. Laasgenoemde het tot die dood toe geveg. Die Perse het 20000 infanterie verloor en 2500 perd Alexander het 34 kavallerie verloor, 9 in die infanterie. Gevangde skilde is na Athene gestuur om die Parthenon te versier.

Arrian 1.13-15: die kavallerie wat in 'n wigformasie gelaai is. [Die Persiese kavalerie was in 'n lyn 16 diep gerangskik, die Masedoniese falanks was 8 diep Alexander se kavalerie -eenheid was 10 diep gerangskik.] Alexander het die kavallerie in 'n skuins aanval oor die water gelei sodat die weermag nie geflankeer kon word nie: skuins na die huidige. Dit het hom in staat gestel om 'n flankaanval te voorkom toe hy uit die water kom en die vyand te betrek met 'n voorkant so sterk as wat hy kon. Die Perse was gereël met berede troepe voor en infanterie aan die agterkant. Dit was 'n kavaleriegeveg met as't ware infanterietaktieke: perd teen perd, man teen man, saamgesluit. Die Masedoniërs het hul uiterste bes gedoen om die vyand eens en vir altyd van die rivieroewer terug te jaag en hom in oop grond te dwing, terwyl die Perse geveg het om die landings te voorkom of om hul teenstanders weer in die water te gooi.

Die Griekse huursoldate veg tot die dood weens Philip II se waarskuwing dat alle Grieke wat die Perse ondersteun het tereggestel sal word. Ongeveer 2000 is tot slawe gemaak en na Masedonië gestuur.

Alexander in Klein -Asië:

Griekse stede het belasting aan hom betaal omdat hul nie -Griekse volk hulde gebring het. Hy het Lydia (belasting) bevry.

Hy onderdruk interne konflikte in stede en wen die respek van inheemse mense. Hy is aangeneem deur Ada, die weduwee van Mausolus van Caria. Hy gebruik die Persiese administrasiestelsel, maar verbeter dit deur burgerlike, militêre en finansiële gesag in aparte satrapies te verdeel. In Caria was Ada 'n burgerlike satrap, 'n Masedoniese generaal was strategos, en 'n derde persoon was 'n finansiële administrateur - almal afhanklik van Alexander.

Die strategiese bedreiging : Persiese weermag kan die Persiese vloot langs die kus vanaf die Anatoliese plato binnedring. Alexander se oplossing, om die 'spoorkoppe' van die binneland (Dascylium, Sardis) in beslag te neem en die Persiese vloot te ontneem van enige veilige hawens aan die kus.

As beleg van Milet het hy sy vloot van 160 oorlogskepe na Lade gebring, drie dae later het 'n Persiese vloot van 400 aangekom. Alexander vermy 'n seestryd en konsentreer op 'n beleg van die stad met sy vloot wat die hawe blokkeer. Die Persiese garnisoen het oorgegee. Alexander het nou Persiese graanskure gehad om sy leër te voed, en daarom het hy sy vloot ontslaan (hy kon dit in elk geval nie bekostig nie, alhoewel hy 20 Atheense trireme gehou het vir goeie gedrag). Hulde en bydraes het nou van verskillende partye gekom. Die Persiese vloot het geen hawe in die Egeïese See gehad nie.

Halicarnassos, mure 150 voet hoog, het Alexander die verdediging met belegwapens en 20 Atheense trireme aangeval. Hy kon die onderste stad inneem, maar nie die akropolis wat die hawe bewaak het nie (Memnon was die bevelvoerder van die weerstand wat hy nou in bevel was van die Persiese vloot en Klein -Klein -Asië), so Alexander het die garnisoen geïsoleer en verder gegaan. Hy stuur pas getroude Masedoniese troepe huis toe vir die winter saam met Coenus en Meleager in 'n poging om nuwe troepe te werf.

Parmenio is in die lente 333 Winter 334 van Sardis af met die belegstrein na die plato gestuur, waarna Alexander langs die suidkus opgeruk het om Pamphylia te gryp om te keer dat Persiese magte daar beland. Hy het hard baklei in Lycia, hy het Cnidus en Caunus (geïsoleerde hawens) omseil en Nearchus satrap van Lycia aangestel. Die stede Xanthus en Phaselis het oorgegee. In Pamphylia gee Perge, Aspendos en Side oor, maar Syllium en Termessos weerstaan ​​(Aristander van Termessos, Alexander se siener). Vanuit Pamfilië draai hy noord deur die berge om met Parmenio by Gordium te skakel. Hy marsjeer verby Sagalassos en Celenae na Gordium. Nuwe heffings van troepe het aangebreek. Antigonus is 'n satrap van Phrygia gemaak. Alexander het vinnig die plato (Cappadocia in April 333) oorrompel en na die Cilician Gates gegaan. As Darius vroeër die veld ingeneem het, sou hy moontlik die gang van Alexander deur die hekke geblokkeer het, maar die pas is deur Arsames, die plaaslike Persiese satrap, laat vaar. Alexander word siek, sy dokter Philip van Acarnania. Parmenio het beslag gelê op die Siriese poort wat Alexander na Sirië beweeg, terwyl hy verneem het van die oorwinning van Ptolemeus en Asander oor Orontobatos by Halicarnassos.

Gedurende die winter is 334/3 die Persiese agent Sisenes deur Parmenio gearresteer met 'n plan om Alexander dood te maak, terwyl hy met Alexander die Lyncestrian en Amyntas kommunikeer. Alexander het Parmenio vir die Lynstrian (wat toe die bevel van die Thessaliese kavallerie gehad het) laat arresteer, Amyntas is tereggestel. Olympias het Alexander gewaarsku oor hierdie komplot. Parmenio was destyds in Phrygia Alexander by Phaselis.

Winter 334/3 vaar Memnon met 700 oorlogskepe van Fenisië na Chios en Lesbos. Alexander beveel die beveiliging van die Hellespont. Die Greek League het 'n vloot daarheen gestuur. In die geveg het Memnon gesterf. Darius III het Pharnabazas gestuur om die operasies in die Egeïese See voort te sit. Antipater was verplig om 'n klein vlootmag te stuur om hul suksesse te neutraliseer.


Slag van die rivier Ana, 79 v.C. - Geskiedenis

Die romanse tussen Antony en Cleopatra het moontlik die wêreld verander. As Antonius daarin geslaag het om alleenbeheer oor Rome te wen met Cleopatra as sy koningin, kon hy die gang van die Romeinse Ryk verander het en die wêreld waarin ons vandag leef, 'n ander plek gemaak het. Hulle verhouding eindig egter in wedersydse selfmoord in 30 vC, elf jaar nadat dit begin het, toe Romeinse troepe die Egiptiese stad Alexandrië verswelg en dreig om gevange te neem.

Die saad wat hul verhouding laat ontstaan ​​het, is gesaai met die moord op Julius Caesar in Maart 44 v.C. (sien The Assassination of Julius Caesar). Rome het neergedaal in anargie en burgeroorlog. Teen 41 vC het Antony en Octavianus (wat later sy naam na Augustus sou verander) die leierskap van Rome gedeel en die staat in twee streke verdeel - die westelike deel, insluitend Spanje en Gallië, regeer deur Octavianus, die oostelike streek, insluitend Griekeland en die Midde -Ooste regeer deur Antony.


Marc Antony

Die Partiese Ryk in die hedendaagse Irak het 'n bedreiging vir die oostelike gebied van Antony ingehou en hy het 'n militêre veldtog beplan om dit te onderwerp. Maar Antonius het geld nodig om sy plan in werking te stel en hy het na Cleopatra, die heerser van Egipte en die rykste vrou ter wêreld, gesoek om dit te voorsien. In 41 vC het hy Cleopatra ontbied om hom te ontmoet in die stad Tarsus in die huidige Turkye.

Cleopatra was 'n verleidelike vrou en sy het haar talente gebruik om haar krag te behou en uit te brei. Haar eerste verowering was Julius Caesar in 48 vC. Hy was 52, sy was 22. Hulle verhouding het 'n seun gebaar en is slegs beëindig deur die moord op Caesar.

Haar aanvanklike reaksie op die dagvaarding van Antony was om haar reis te vertraag - moontlik om die boodskap aan die Romeinse leier te stuur dat sy as 'n koningin uit haar eie nie op sy wenke was nie. Uiteindelik oorgegee aan die onvermydelike, vaar Cleopatra uit Egipte na die stad Tarsus. Terwyl sy die laaste deel van haar reis met die rivier die Cydnus aflê, reis sy in 'n pragtige akker vol blomme en geurig met eksotiese parfuum terwyl sy op die dek lê, omring deur haar dienaars en goud. Antony geniet vroue en toe hy haar sien, val hy onder haar betowering.

[Antony was] ". Deur haar meegevoer na Alexandria, daar om die vakansie te hou, soos 'n seuntjie, in spel en afleiding, vermorsel en mislei in genot wat die duurste van alle waardevolle items is, tyd."

Plutarchus was 'n Griekse historikus wat 'n geskiedenis van die lewe van Antonius in die eerste eeu nC geskryf het. Ons sluit by sy verhaal aan terwyl Cleopatra die dagvaarding van Antony ontvang om by hom aan te sluit:

Sy het geloof in haar eie aantreklikhede, wat sy, nadat sy haar vroeër aanbeveel het by Caesar en die jong Pompeius, nie getwyfel het dat dit nog meer suksesvol sou wees met Antony nie. Hulle was 'n kennismaking met haar toe sy 'n jong, dogter en onkundig oor die wêreld was, maar sy sou Antony ontmoet in die tyd van die lewe wanneer die skoonheid van vroue die beste is en hul intellektuele volwassenheid vol is. Sy het groot voorbereidings getref vir haar reis, met geld, geskenke en waardevolle ornamente, soos so 'n ryk koninkryk kon bekostig, maar sy het haar sekerste hoop op haar eie towerkuns en sjarme gebring.

. sy vaar langs die Cydnusrivier in 'n aak met vergulde agterstewe en uitgestrekte seile van pers, terwyl silwer roeispane die musiek van fluitjies en vybe en harpe klop. Sy het self deurgaans gelê onder 'n doek van goud, geklee as Venus op 'n foto, en pragtige jong seuns, soos geverfde Amor, staan ​​aan elke kant om haar te waai. Haar diensmeisies was geklee soos Seenimfe en Graces, sommige stuur by die roer, sommige werk aan die toue.

. parfuum versprei hulself van die vaartuig na die kus, wat bedek was met menigtes. Die mark was redelik leeg, en uiteindelik het Antonius alleen op die tribunaal bly sit terwyl die woord deur die hele menigte gegaan het dat Venus saam met Bacchus vir die algemene welstand van Asië kom smul het.

By haar aankoms het Antony gestuur om haar uit te nooi vir aandete. Sy het gedink dat dit fiks is dat hy na haar toe moet kom, gewillig om sy goeie humor en beleefdheid te toon, het hy gehoor gegee en gegaan. Hy vind die voorbereidings om hom te ontvang wonderbaarlik, maar niks so bewonderenswaardig soos die groot aantal ligte nie, want skielik is daar 'n groot aantal takke in die steek gelaat met ligte daarin, so vernuftig gesetel, sommige in vierkante en sommige in sirkels, dat die hele ding 'n skouspel was wat selde vir skoonheid geëwenaar is.

Die volgende dag nooi Antony haar uit om te eet, en was baie begeer om haar te oortref, net soos in heerlikheid, maar hy het gevind dat hy in albei geslaan is, en was so oortuig daarvan dat hy self die eerste was wat grap en spot met sy armoede van verstandigheid en sy rustieke ongemak. Sy het besef dat sy raillery breed en brutaal was en meer van die soldaat as van die hofdienaar geniet het, het weer by dieselfde smaak aangesluit en dadelik daarin geval, sonder enige terughoudendheid of voorbehoud.

Antonius was so betower deur haar, dat terwyl Fulvia sy vrou sy stryde in Rome teen die keiser onderhou het deur die daadwerklike wapengeweld en die Partiese troepe. in Mesopotamië vergader en gereed was om Sirië binne te gaan, kon hy nog steeds toelaat dat hy deur haar weggevoer word na Alexandrië, om daar vakansie te hou, soos 'n seuntjie, in spel en afleiding, verkwistend en dwaas in genot wat die duurste was, soos Antiphon sê, van alle waardevolle items, tyd.

As Antonius ernstig was of opgewonde was, het sy op enige oomblik 'n nuwe vreugde of sjarme gehad om aan sy wense te voldoen by elke draai wat sy op hom gedoen het, en sy het haar nie dag en nag laat ontsnap nie. Sy het saam met hom in dobbelstene gespeel, saam met hom gedrink, saam met hom gejag en toe hy in sy arms oefen, was sy daar om te sien.

Saans sou sy saam met hom rondbeweeg om mense by hul deure en vensters te ontstel en te pynig, geklee soos 'n diensmeisie, want Antonius het ook in bediendeklere gegaan, en uit hierdie ekspedisies het hy dikwels baie skerp geantwoord en soms selfs swaar geslaan, alhoewel die meeste mense raai wie dit is. Die Alexandriërs in die algemeen het dit egter goed genoeg gehou en het humoristies en vriendelik by sy gedruis en spel aangesluit en gesê dat hulle Antonius baie verplig was om sy tragiese rol in Rome op te tree en sy komedie vir hulle te behou. & Quot

Verwysings:
Verwysings: Plutarchus se verslag verskyn in: Davis, William Stearns, Readings in Ancient History vol. 1 (1912) Grant, Michael, Cleopatra (1973).


Slag van die rivier Ana, 79 v.C. - Geskiedenis

Die kruising van 'n klein stroompie in Noord -Italië het een van die belangrikste gebeurtenisse in die antieke geskiedenis geword. Daaruit het die Romeinse Ryk en die ontstaan ​​van die moderne Europese kultuur ontstaan.

Gebore met ongebreidelde politieke ambisie en onoortreflike redenaarsvaardighede, manipuleer Julius Caesar sy weg na die

Romeinse legioenêr
posisie van konsul van Rome in 59 v.C. Na sy diensjaar is hy aangewys as goewerneur van Gallië, waar hy 'n persoonlike fortuin opgedoen het en sy uitstaande militêre vaardigheid getoon het om die inheemse Keltiese en Germaanse stamme te onderwerp. Caesar se gewildheid onder die mense het die hoogte ingeskiet, wat 'n bedreiging vir die mag van die Senaat en Pompeius, wat die mag in Rome gehad het, bedreig het. Accordingly, the Senate called upon Caesar to resign his command and disband his army or risk being declared an "Enemy of the State". Pompey was entrusted with enforcing this edict - the foundation for civil war was laid.

It was January 49 BC, Caesar was staying in the northern Italian city of Ravenna and he had a decision to make. Either he acquiesced to the Senate's command or he moved southward to confront Pompey and plunge the Roman Republic into a bloody civil war. An ancient Roman law forbade any general from crossing the Rubicon River and entering Italy proper with a standing army. To do so was treason. This tiny stream would reveal Caesar's intentions and mark the point of no return.

Suetonius was a Roman historian and biographer. He served briefly as secretary to Emperor Hadrian (some say he lost his position because he became too close to the emperor's wife.) His position gave him access to privileged imperial documents, correspondence and diaries upon which he based his accounts. For this reason, his descriptions are considered credible. We join Suetonius's narrative as Caesar receives the news that his allies in the Senate have been forced to leave Rome:

"When the news came [to Ravenna, where Caesar was staying] that the interposition of the tribunes in his favor had been utterly rejected, and that they themselves had fled Rome, he immediately sent forward some cohorts, yet secretly, to prevent any suspicion of his plan and to keep up appearances, he attended the public games and examined the model of a fencing school which he proposed building, then - as usual - sat down to table with a large company of friends.

However, after sunset some mules from a near-by mill were put in his carriage, and he set forward on his journey as privately as

Julius Caesar
possible, and with an exceedingly scanty retinue. The lights went out. He lost his way and wandered about a long time - till at last, by help of a guide, whom he discovered towards daybreak, he proceeded on foot through some narrow paths, and again reached the road. Coming up with his troops on the banks of the Rubicon, which was the frontier of his province, he halted for a while, and revolving in his mind the importance of the step he meditated, he turned to those about him, saying: 'Still we can retreat! But once let us pass this little bridge, - and nothing is left but to fight it out with arms!'

Even as he hesitated this incident occurred. A man of strikingly noble mien and graceful aspect appeared close at hand, and played upon a pipe. To hear him not merely some shepherds, but soldiers too came flocking from their posts, and amongst them some trumpeters. He snatched a trumpet from one of them and ran to the river with it then sounding the "Advance!" with a piercing blast he crossed to the other side. At this Caesar cried out, 'Let us go where the omens of the Gods and the crimes of our enemies summon us! THE DIE IS NOW CAST!'

Accordingly he marched his army over the river [then] he showed them the tribunes of the Plebs, who on being driven from Rome had come to meet him, and in the presence of that assembly, called on the troops to pledge him their fidelity tears springing to his eyes [as he spoke] and his garments rent from his bosom."

Verwysings:
Duruy, Victor, History of Rome vol. V (1883) Suetonius "Life of Julius Caesar" in Davis, William Stearns, Readings in Ancient History (1912).


Battle of the Hydaspes

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Battle of the Hydaspes, (326 bce ), fourth and last pitched battle fought by Alexander the Great during his campaign of conquest in Asia. The fight on the banks of the Hydaspes River in India was the closest Alexander the Great came to defeat. His feared Companion cavalry was unable to subdue fully the courageous King Porus. Hydaspes marked the limit of Alexander’s career of conquest he died before he could launch another campaign.

After conquering the Persian Empire, Alexander decided to probe into northern India. King Porus of Paurava blocked Alexander’s advance at a ford on the Hydaspes River (now the Jhelum) in the Punjab. The forces were numerically quite evenly balanced, although Alexander had more cavalry and Porus fielded 200 war elephants.

Alexander divided his army, leaving a small force with Craterus facing Porus on the ford while taking most of the army to cross a second ford 17 miles (27 km) away. When Porus learned that Alexander had advanced over the river, he marched to attack. Porus put his cavalry on the flanks and infantry in the center, with the elephants in front. Alexander posted his heavy infantry in a phalanx in the center, led the right wing cavalry himself, and sent the left wing cavalry under Coenus on a wide, outflanking ride behind a hill.

In the center, the Macedonian phalanx was almost broken by the charging elephants, but eventually drove them off, only to face the Indian infantry. Alexander attacked on the right, but failed to find a gap to exploit with his horsemen. When Coenus returned to the battlefield at the rear of the Indians, Alexander was able to defeat the Indian cavalry and encircle the infantry. Porus reformed his infantry into a defensive block and then offered to surrender if granted generous terms. Alexander agreed Porus could remain king of Paurava but imposed tribute.

Losses: Macedonian, 1,000 of 41,000 Indian, 12,000 dead and 9,000 captured of 50,000.


Battle of the River Ana, 79 BC - History

Opening alludes to Homer, suggests epic scale and purpose (memorialization). Rape of Io by Phoenician traders as Persian version of origin of East-West conflict (1). Reciprocal rapes of Europa and Medea by Greeks (2). Rape of Helen negotiations fail (3). Women are guilty in rape cases, as Helen was Helen was not worth fighting for (4). A Phoenician version of Io story makes her responsible. Hdt. reserves judgement he will tell the history of states large and small, with an awareness of human instability (5). Croesus of Lydia (ruled c. 560-546 BC) was the first eastern king to encroach on Greek freedom (6).

Digression from Croesus: how Lydian sovereignty passed from the Heraclidae to Croesus' ancestors. Candaules (c. 700 BC) was the last of the Heraclidae (7). Candaules offers his servant Gyges a chance to peep at his wife Gyges is reluctant (8). Candaules insists, and Gyges is forced to agree (9). Gyges spies on the queen, who notices him she does not let on (10). The queen summons Gyges, and offers him a choice: die himself, or kill the king and marry her. Gyges chooses to be king (11). Gyges murders the king Gyges is mentioned by Archilochus (12). Gyges' rule is endorsed by an oracle. The revenge of the Heraclidae is predicted Hdt. notes that the prophecy was accurate (13). Offerings of Gyges are still to be seen at Delphi in Hdt.'s own time (14). Gyges and his son Ardys both invaded Miletus, a major Greek city on the coast of Asia Minor. Cimmerians in Asia (15). Military exploits of Sadyattes and Alyattes (ruled c. 610-560 BC), successors of Ardys (16). Repeated invasions of Milesian territory by Sadyattes and Alyattes (17). Men of Chios (an island off the coast of Asia Minor) assist the Milesians (18). Alyattes' soldiers burn the temple of Athene Alyattes falls ill. An oracle advises rebuilding the temple (19). Note on sources: this is the Milesian version. Periander of Corinth (ruled c. 625-585 BC) advises Thrasybulus of Miletus about an oracle (20). Thrasybulus gives a public party when the ambassador from Alyattes arrives (21). Alyattes is tricked into thinking the Milesians have plenty of food, so he makes peace and builds new temples (22). The strange but true tale of Arion, a pioneering musician and poet. Made to walk the plank at sea, he jumped overboard and rode to safety on a dolphin a statue of him & the dolphin at Taenarum in southern Italy (23-24). The death of Alyattes his silver bowl at Delphi (25).

Attacks by Alyattes' son Croesus on Ephesus and other Greek cities of Asia Minor (26). Croesus conquers all Greeks on the coast, but decides not to use his navy against Greeks of the islands (27). Extent of the Lydian empire under Croesus (28). Solon the Athenian lawgiver visits Croesus the Athenians were bound to keep his laws for ten years (29). Solon is shown the wealth of Croesus asked to name the luckiest man he knows, Solon tells Croesus the story of Tellus of Athens, to illustrate true nature of happiness/wealth (Gk olbos 30). Solon names Cleobis and Biton, who won a lasting reputation for piety by pulling their mother to the temple of Hera in an ox-cart, the second most fortunate (31). Solon cites the unpredictability of human affairs in explaining why he refuses to call Croesus fortunate (32). Solon is dismissed by the heedless Croesus (33). How divine anger (Nemesis) got Croesus. After dreaming that his son Atys would be killed by an iron spear, Croesus tries to change Atys' life from military to domestic (34). Croesus gives purification and refuge to a Phrygian fratricide named Adrastus (35). Croesus agrees to send help to the Mysians, who are unable to defeat a monstrous boar (36). Croesus' son Atys asks to be allowed to go and fight the boar (37). Croesus refuses and explains to Atys about the dream (38). Atys argues that a boar cannot kill him with a spear Croesus agrees and lets him go (39-40). Croesus sends Adrastus to look after Atys (41-2). Adrastus accidentally kills Atys with a spear, fulfilling the oracle (43). Croesus invokes Zeus in three aspects (god of hearth, purification, and friendship) to punish Adrastus but then Croesus forgives the penitent Adrastus, who commits suicide (44-5). Croesus consults various oracles about challenging the growing power of Persia (46). How Croesus tested the veracity of the different oracles, and Delphi won (47-9). Sumptuous offerings to Delphian Apollo by Croesus some seen by Hdt himself (50-1). Offerings to oracle of Amphiaraus in Thebes by Croesus (52). Greek oracles consulted by Croesus re attacking Persia reply that he (Croesus) will destroy a great empire, and should ally with most powerful Greek state (53). Croesus is pleased by the response friendship of Lydians and Delphians (54). Croesus asks the oracle about the length of his rule the oracle suggests he flee when a mule is king of Persia (55). Croesus deliberates whether to ally with Athens or Sparta prehistory of the 'Ionians' (ancestors of the Athenians) and 'Dorians' (Spartans) (56).

Athens and Sparta: Early History

Researches of Hdt on the non-Greek nature of Pelasgian speech (57-8). Strange portent of the self-boiling kettle does not convince Hippocrates of Athens to disown his son Pisistratus. How Pisistratus, when Attica was split by factions, tricked the Athenians into giving him a bodyguard and became tyrant benevolent nature of the rule of Peisistratus (59). Pisistratus expelled by coalition of two rivals, Megacles and Lycurgus. Reconciliation of Megacles and Pisistratus Athenians tricked into believing that Athene (in fact a costumed woman of Attica) was bringing Pisistratus back in a chariot (60). Pisistratus marries Megacles' daughter, but fears to have children because of the curse on the Alcmaeonids (Megacles' ancestors) and so practices birth control by continually sodomizing Megacles' daughter. The angry Megacles forces Pisitratus into exile in Macedonia, where he spends ten years amassing an army with his sons Hippias and Hipparchus (61). Return of Pisistratus to Attica Pisistratus and his allies take Marathon, face Athenians at Pallene prophecy of the tuna fish (62). Successful advance of Pisistratus into Athens. Hostages to Naxos (one of the Cyclades islands, previously taken by Peisistratus) Delos is purified by exhumation (63-4). What Croesus learned about Sparta: that she had recently beaten Tegea (in the northern Peloponnesus) in war, and that long before their lawgiver Lycurgus had given the Spartan state its form (65). How the Spartans asked the Delphic oracle about conquering Arcadia, misinterpreted the oracle, and were beaten by the Tegeans (66). How the Spartans were told by the oracle to recover the bones of Orestes (son of Agamemnon) from Tegea, and did so, and so were successful against the Tegeans (67-8).

Further Adventures of Croesus

An alliance made between Croesus and the Spartans (69). A valuable gift from the Spartans to Croesus, a huge bronze bowl, disappears at Samos (an island off the Ionian coast) conflicting accounts of what happened to the bowl (70). Advice of Sandanis the Lydian to Croesus, preparing to attack Cappadocia (a territory of the Persians) Croesus advised not to attack rough nature of Persian civilisation makes them an unworthy target (71). Ethnographic and geographic info on the Cappadocians (Syrians) (72). Origin of Croesus' hatred for Cyrus the Persian King. Cyaxares, father of Croesus' brother-in-law, hosts some Scythian exiles, who quarrel with him, feed him human flesh, and escape to Croesus' father Alyattes the resulting war of Lydians and Cappadocians ends when the armies are terrified by an eclipse (585 BC?) Croesus' sister is given to Cyaxares' son Astyages as part of the treaty. Cyrus attacks and defeats Astyages, thus angering Croesus (73-4). Story of how Thales of Miletus diverted the river Halys so Croesus' army could cross is doubted by Hdt, who thinks bridges were used (75). Croesus battles Cyrus at Pteria in Cappadocia (76). Croesus retreats back to Lydia, and summons reinforcements from his allies Egypt, Babylon, and Sparta (77). Croesus dismisses the mercenaries. The portent of the horses and snakes is interpreted too late for Croesus to benefit (78). Cyrus decides to advance into Lydia and surprises Croesus excellence of Lydian soldiers (79). Battle of Sardis Cyrus uses camels to defeat the Lydian cavalry. Sardis under seige (80). Urgent requests of Croesus for aid from allies (81). The Spartans are battling the Argives (their neighbors to the northeast) over Thyreae. A Homeric battle of champions fails to resolve the issue. The Spartans are victorious why the Spartans have long hair and the Argives short (82). The Spartans are too late to help Croesus (83). How Sardis was taken by Cyrus. Tale of Meles and the lion (84). How Croesus' mute son fulfilled a prophecy by speaking his first words on an unlucky day (85). The fall of Sardis fulfills the Pythian oracle (cf. 1.53). Croesus, about to be burned alive, names Solon. Croesus explains Solon's wisdom to Cyrus. Cyrus is moved and orders Croesus removed from pyre (86). The Lydians say Apollo sent a rainstorm to put it out. Croesus blames the gods for his decision to attack (87). Croesus warns Cyrus that his soldiers will be corrupted if allowed to plunder Sardis he convinces him to dedicate the treasure to Zeus instead (88-9). Cyrus gives Croesus permission to send symbolic chains to Apollo at Delphi and reproach the god for ingratitude (90). How the oracle defended itself and Apollo against the accusations of Cyrus. Cyrus fulfilled the prophecy dooming the descendants of Gyges, and himself misinterpreted the oracle (91). Dedicatory offerings of Croesus are seen by Hdt. some stolen from Croesus' half-brother Pantaleon, whom Croesus tortured to death (92). Strange but true facts about Lydia and the Lydians (93). Lydian coinage, games, and colonisation of Umbria in Italy (Tyrrhenians) (94).

Early History of Persia

Sources for Cyrus and Persia are discussed. Assyrians and Medes (95). How Deioces the Mede won a reputation for justice and was made king. Description of his capital at Agbatana (96-8). Why Deioces lived in isolation from his people (99). His administration of justice and iron-fisted policies. The Median tribes (100-1). His son Phraortes becomes king (656 B.C. ?) and expands the empire greatly (102). Phraortes' son Cyaxares is defeated by the Scythians while trying to conquer the Assyrians how the Scythians crossed into Asia Minor. Scythians are the masters of Asia (103-4). The Scythians attack Egypt without success. How some Scythians destroyed a temple of Aphrodite and were forever cursed with an hereditary venereal disease (105). Harsh rule of the Scythians in Asia Minor is ended after 28 years by Cyaxares (106). His son Astyages is in power. Astyages' daughter, married to Cambyses, bears a son, Cyrus. Astyages is warned by dreams about Cyrus, so he gives the baby to a servant, Harpagus, to kill it (107-8). Harpagus decides not to kill the baby (109). Harpagus instructs a herdsman to expose the baby (110). The herdsman and his wife, knowing the child's royal blood, decide to raise it she has just given birth to a stillborn baby, whose body they substitute for Cyrus'. Harpagus is fooled (111-13). How Cyrus' identity was revealed at the age of ten. Playing King of the Hill, he beats the son of a nobleman upon questioning by Astyages (his grandfather) his regal manner gives the secret away (114-15). Astyages confirms his suspicions by questioning the herdsman (116). Harpagus confesses and reveals how he was fooled (117). Astyages pretends to forgive Harpagus, and invites him and his own son (a boy of 13) to dinner (118). Astyages has Harpagus' son roasted and fed to Harpagus, then reveals the deed. Harpagus accepts the punishment (119). Astyages is advised by his wise men that the prophecy (that Cyrus would be king) has already been fulfilled by the game. Cyrus is allowed to live (120). Cyrus is sent to Persia to live with his real parents. The origin of the story that he was suckled by a wild dog is explained (121-22). An angry Harpagos sends a secret letter to Cyrus, urging him to lead the Persians in rebellion against Astyages and promising the support of Median nobles (123-24). Cyrus is convinced. He assembles all the tribes of the Persians and wins their loyalty by showing them the good life of ease and feasting (125-26). Astyages puts Harpagus in command of the Medes Cyrus' first victory is assured by defections among the Medes (127). Astyages executes his wise men, leads his reserves against Cyrus, and is defeated and captured (128). The final bitter words between Harpagus and Astyages (129). Persians are supreme in Asia thereafter Cyrus' clemency for Astyages overview of Persian affairs (130). Strange but true religious practices of the Persians (131). Persian birthdays, and their eating/drinking habits (132-33). Social practices and hierarchy of the Persians. How the Medes ran their empire (134). Further customs of the Persians: sexual practices education legal system superstitions nomenclature (135-39). Burial customs of the Persians and Magi sacrifices (140).

The Greeks of Asia Minor

History of East-West conflict momentarily resumed. Cyrus rejects a peace offer from the Ionian Greeks the parable of the flutist-fisherman. Assembly of Ionians at Mycale (Samos) (141). Climate and dialects of the Ionian Greeks (142). The Milesians and islanders are temporarily safe from the Persians, who have no navy yet. Remarks on the tribal characteristics of the Ionians (143). A Dorian parallel for intertribal rivalry. Why Hdt's own city of Halicarnassus is barred from the Dorian temple of Triopian Apollo (144). Ionians and Achaeans (145). Why the claim of the Ionians of Asia to be the purest Ionians is false (146). Yet some Asian Ionians are pure Ionians (147). The Panionium or Ionian Center at Mycale an Ionian festival there (148). Aeolic cities of Asia Minor (149). How Smyrna changed from an Aeolic to an Ionian city. Aeolians of the islands, Lesbos and Tenedos (150).


Battle of Kadesh

Thirty-three hundred years ago, below the sun-drenched walls of Kadesh, the Egyptian and Hittite empires fought for control of the land now known as Syria in the first battle about which modern man has detailed contemporary accounts.

For the first 100 generations of its recorded history, the kingdom of Egypt had been very nonmilitant. Except for the occasional civil war and skirmishing for control of Nubia, Egypt experienced little military action. At one point during the Middle Kingdom, the king felt so secure that he sent his personal bodyguard to Nubia on semipermanent garrison duty.

Egypt had no need for a strong military because the deserts to the east and west, and the Mediterranean to the north, protected her from invasion. To the south, the Egyptians ruled Nubia as a conquered province. The Egyptians believed they already possessed the richest lands in the known world, so they had no desire for conquest.

That era of peace and tranquility ended with what historians call the ‘Second Intermediate Period.’ By 1700 bc the Hyksos (‘Rulers from Foreign Lands’) had conquered Lower Egypt and extended their influence up the Nile from their capital at Avaris in the eastern delta. A vassal prince ruled Nubia, while the kings of Upper Egypt at Thebes paid tribute to the Hyksos.

The rise of Egyptian militarism coincided with the advent of the New Kingdom. Around 1650 bc, Queen Kamose defeated the Hyksos, driving them down the Nile toward the delta. Her grandson Ahmose completed the task of driving the Hyksos from Egypt when he took Avaris in 1590 bc, then pursued them to Sharuhen, in Palestine, which he besieged and destroyed.

The war against the Hyksos whetted the Egyptian appetite for battle. Around 1500 bc, Thutmose I marched as far north as Syria. Later, after winning a resounding victory at the Battle of Megiddo in 1483, Thutmose III established the Egyptian empire with a border in southern Syria.

Thutmose III was ancient Egypt’s greatest military leader. His immediate successors, though less brilliant, were capable enough to maintain the borders of the empire. During the reigns of the succeeding kings, Egypt’s enemies either seized lands adjacent to those borders or weakened the bonds between the Egyptian king and his vassal rulers. Egypt’s reigning monarch was identified by his palace, the High House, or Peron, which evolved into the modern term ‘pharaoh.’

Historians tout the reign of Akhenaten (1372-1354 bc) for the advances made in the concept of monotheism. For the Egyptian empire, however, his reign was a disaster. At the same time that Akhenaten was concentrating on religious reform — and virtually ignoring international affairs — a threat to Egypt’s empire arose from the Anatolian plateau of modern Turkey.

About 1740 bc Tudhaliyas I had re-established the city of Hattusas (near modern Boghazköy, Turkey). Despite the fact that King Anittas of Kussara had destroyed the town about 1900 bc and had placed a curse on the site, the Hittite kings traced their ancestry back to him.

Less than 100 years later, King Labarnas united neighboring city-states to form the Hittite empire. At first the king was answerable to a council of nobles, the Pankus, but civil war later led to the concentration of power in the king’s hands.

Early in the 14th century bc, Suppiluliumas I (1375-1355 bc) created a new Hittite empire by defeating Kaska and Arxawa and eventually absorbing the Mitanni, an Asiatic people of whom little is known, save that they had constituted the backbone of resistance to Egyptians during the reigns of Thutmose I and III. As the Mitanni fought the Egyptians to the south, the Hittites advanced against the Mitanni from the north. The Mitanni threw back the initial Hittite advance, but increasing pressure from the north eventually pushed the Mitanni into an alliance with the Egyptians. A daughter of the Mitanni king even became one of Thutmose III’s wives.

The Egyptian-Mitanni alliance maintained the balance of power in Asia Minor for 30 years, but all that changed during the reign of Akhenaten. The assassination of Mitanni King Tushratta resulted in civil war among aspirants to his throne. Hittite King Suppiluliumas quickly took advantage of the situation when the Mitanni crown prince, Mattiwaza, fled to the Hittites for protection. Suppiluliumas married his daughter to Mattiwaza, then forced the remainder of the Mitanni kingdom to accept him as king. That change put the Mitanni into the Hittite sphere of influence and tilted the balance of power.

With Hittite influence in the area growing, other vassal states of Egypt revolted, forcing the second king of the 19th Dynasty, Seti I, to make a foray into Syria to try to re-establish Egyptian influence. His success was only temporary. As soon as Seti I returned to Egypt, the Hittite king, Mursilis II, marched south to take the town of Kadesh on the Orontes River. Once taken, Kadesh became the strongpoint of the Hittite defenses in Syria, although the Hittites ruled through a viceroy in Carchemish.

In spite of their aggressive activities in expanding their political influence in Asia Minor, the Hittite kings actually tried to avoid a direct confrontation with the Egyptians. They paid tribute to the Egyptian king, and avoided attacking Egyptians lands.

Nevertheless, the two powers were on a collision course, and war finally erupted as the result of the political maneuvering of Ramses II, who succeeded his father, Seti, in 1301 bc, at age 20. Early in his reign, Ramses convinced Prince Bentesina of Amurru to switch alliances. To protect (and to expand) that new influence, Ramses planned to invade Syria. As those plans were implemented, both Ramses and the Hittite king, Muwutallis, began raising large armies.

The bulk of the Egyptian army was infantry, raised by press gangs that roamed the Nile River valley. The principal infantry weapons were the javelin and the short sword. Every fifth man (probably an officer) carried a baton. For protection, the Egyptians wore close-fitting helmets and mailed tunics made from matting. Each man carried a shield of oxhide over a wooden frame, square at the bottom and rounded at the top. While it protected him, this heavy shield also limited the infantryman’s mobility on the battlefield.

Although Ramses’ infantrymen were mostly Egyptian — supplemented by Sardian mercenaries hired specifically for this campaign — his bowmen were almost exclusively Nubian, armed with composite bows made of laminated layers of bone and wood.

The most powerful weapon of the Bronze Age was the chariot, and the Egyptians had a small, permanent chariot force. The chariots were relatively small and light, each carrying two men — a driver and a warrior. The Egyptians viewed chariots as mobile firing platforms the driver would maneuver it about on the battlefield, while the warrior showered the enemy formation with arrows.

While the bulk of the Egyptian army was infantry, the Hittite strength lay in its own chariotry. The Hittites’ acumen in battle was the result of their rigorous training, plus their success in horse breeding and horse training. Those factors combined to give the Hittite commander more maneuverability with which to exploit opportunities as they arose on the battlefield.

The regular Hittite army was small — just a king’s bodyguard and a small force to patrol the frontiers and to put down rebellions. In time of a major conflict, however, the king was able to draw upon troops from the local population and from his vassals. Suppiluliumas I began the policy of turning conquered lands into vassal states. That practice precluded the need for large Hittite garrisons, and at the same time it allowed the king to call upon the native population for troops.

As Ramses had done, Muwutallis also filled out his ranks with mercenaries, including a group of Lycian pirates.

Muwutallis organized his army into groups of 10. One officer commanded a 10-man unit, 10 of those units formed a group, and then 10 groups formed an even larger group, and so on. The Hittite warriors wore pointed helmets and long robes.

The Hittite chariot had a body made of leather mounted on a wooden frame. That frame in turn was mounted between two spoked wheels, with the axle positioned farther forward than on an Egyptian chariot in order to support the weight of three men: a driver, a warrior and a shield-bearer. Although the warrior carried a curved sword, his principal weapon was the spear. The Hittites used their chariots in mass formation as a shock force to break the enemy’s infantry lines, after which the chariots, joined by the infantry, would exploit the resulting confusion to rout the enemy force.

Ramses opened his campaign in the summer of 1296 bc by seizing a port in southern Lebanon. A small Hittite army under Muwutallis advanced on the town, but Ramses drove it off.

Ramses, the arrogantly self-confident 25-year-old heir to a 1,000-year-old empire, intended to strike east from the Mediterranean to the Orontes River, which he would then follow north into Syria (in effect, emulating the successful strategy pursued by Thutmose III 100 years before). That was exactly what Muwutallis wanted Ramses to do, however. An experienced campaigner then into the 20th year of his reign, the Hittite king planned to draw the Egyptians as deep into his territory as he could before engaging them in battle.

Ramses organized his army into six distinct units. The majority of the men were in four divisions, each named after an Egyptian god: Amon, Re, Ptah, and Set. Each division was a combined arms unit of 9,000 men — chariots, infantry and bowmen. The fifth unit was made up of Ramses’ personal bodyguard. The last unit was a group of Canaanites (the Na’arum). Little is known about them, but they apparently were an auxiliary or reserve force.

The two armies were almost equal in size. Ramses had more than 35,000 men in his various units. Muwutallis had 3,500 chariots (10,500 men) and 17,000 infantry, for a total of 27,500. If the Egyptians had more men, the Hittites had many times more chariots.

Ramses sent the Na’arum up the coast to seize Sumura on the Mediterranean to give him a better line of communications with his navy. With the remainder of his army, he marched east to the Orontes. Less than one day’s march from Kadesh, Ramses camped at the high (i.e., southern) end of the Buka’a Valley. At that point, the Orontes flowed through a narrow rocky gorge several hundred feet deep. The river was not crossable until it reached Shabtuna, several miles to the north. At dawn, Ramses could see Kadesh in the distance through the haze. With his bodyguard in the van, the Egyptian monarch led his army north along the east bank of the river.

Before he reached Shabtuna, Ramses’ men brought in two Shosu (Bedouins) who claimed to have been loyal vassals of Egypt conscripted into the Hittite army. They told Ramses what he wanted to hear — that Muwutallis was afraid of him and had retreated with his army toward Aleppo, far to the north.

Without bothering to put scouts out in front, Ramses pressed on ahead with just his bodyguard. In his haste to besiege Kadesh, he left his army spread out behind him through the Buka’a Valley.

The Egyptians crossed the Orontes at Shabtuna, then passed through the forest of Robaui and the clearing that lay between it and Kadesh. West of the town, they crossed a brook, el-Mukadiyek, to reach the clear ground northwest of the city. When Ramses arrived there at about 2:30 p.m., the Division of Amon was still south of Kadesh, struggling to catch up. Once that division arrived, the Egyptians erected a fortified camp, its perimeter marked by a palisade formed with the shields of the infantry.

Ramses’ confidence was shaken when a liaison squadron then brought in a pair of Hittite spies it had captured. The Egyptians forced the two to talk by beating them with sticks. They told Ramses that he had just walked into a trap: ‘Behold, the prince…has many people with him, that he has victoriously brought with him from all the countries. They are armed. They have infantry, and chariots, and weapons, and are more in number than the sands of the sea. Behold, they are in fighting order hidden behind the town of Kadesh.’

Muwutallis had indeed lured Ramses into a trap. The two Shosu who had reported the Hittites to be far away actually had been sent by the Hittite king for the purpose of lulling Ramses into a false sense of security. Ramses then compounded his problem by allowing his army to become spread out.

Instead of being far to the north, the Hittites were within striking distance, just east of Kadesh. Only a few hours earlier, in fact, the entire Hittite force had been camped on the very ground where Ramses’ army now camped. Why the Egyptians had not noticed evidence of that encampment is not clear today.

Although Ramses called his princes together and berated them for failing to provide him with accurate intelligence, he still was not overly concerned over the situation. The Division of Amon had arrived and was going into camp. The Division of Re was just south of Kadesh, emerging from the Forest of Robaui. Ramses had half his army present. He ordered his vizier (chief of staff) to send a messenger to bring up the Division of Ptah. With three-quarters of his army at or within marching distance of Kadesh, he was confident there was little to worry about. What Ramses did not realize was that his divided army was, in fact, teetering on the brink of disaster.

Earlier in the day, the Hittites had withdrawn out of sight east of Kadesh. Then as Ramses arrived at the town, Muwutallis advanced in two sections. The Hittite king’s main force, including the majority of his chariots, swung left to cross the Orontes River south of Kadesh, to strike at the rear of the Egyptian army. Muwutallis himself, with the infantry and a reserve force of 1,000 three-man chariots, swung right — intending to block the Egyptian retreat across the Orontes to the north.

As the Egyptian Division of Re marched on Kadesh, there was no sense of urgency — the king’s orders had not reached it yet, and would not arrive until it was too late. The Egyptian officers were behind the troops, still in the Forest of Robaui, as the division slowly crawled across the plain, the infantrymen trudging along with their heavy shields slung across their backs.

West of the Orontes, meanwhile, the Hittite chariots quickly spread out into attack formation, then charged. Twenty-five hundred chariots ripped into the rear of the division. Some Egyptians were killed there, others were captured. Some of the survivors fled back into the forest, but most simply ran north toward Kadesh, spreading panic through the rest of the division and making it impossible for anyone to rally it. Within minutes, the Division of Re had ceased to exist as a fighting unit.

Ramses was still berating his officers when the first refugees (including two of his sons) arrived by chariot. At last the Egyptian king realized that he faced disaster. Turning to his vizier, Ramses ordered him to go after the Division of Ptah himself the Division of Set was so far back that Ramses ignored it.

As the refugees from the Division of Re poured into Ramses’ camp, their panic spread among the Division of Amon. Its soldiers, too, joined the flight from the Hittites, leaving Ramses and his bodyguard cut off. ‘Then the infantry and chariotry fled before them, northward, to the place where his majesty was,’ wrote Ramses’ poet-historian Penator. ‘Lo, the foe…surrounded the attendants of his majesty, who were by his side.’

The vanguard of Hittite chariots crashed through the wall of Egyptian shields, but the royal bodyguard proved to be more than a match for them. Throwing themselves at the horses, some of the bodyguard dragged the chariots to a stop. That allowed other Egyptians to swarm over them, killing many Hittites.

As the Hittite assault reached its high tide, however, only one chariot in the Egyptian camp had its horses in harness for a counterattack — Ramses’ own war chariot, drawn by horses named Victory in Thebes and Mut is Satisfied. Ramses summoned his driver, Mennu, but the man was too afraid to come.

At that point, according to Penator, a humbled Ramses prayed to the god Amon for the strength and courage to save his army, and perhaps the empire, from destruction. Then, wrapping the reins about his waist to control the horses so his hands were free, Ramses singlehandedly charged the Hittites, grimly determined to restore his fortunes or die trying.

The Egyptian account says Ramses managed to ride completely around the Hittite host, returning to his own camp unharmed. The account — which was written not as an objective work of history but as a flattering tribute to Ramses’ prowess as a leader and a warrior — neglected to mention that the Hittites, who understandably believed their enemies to be totally routed, had stopped to loot the Egyptian camp. Only two groups of Hittites remained in their chariots, one on the east and another on the west flank of the main force. By the time Ramses returned to his camp, a small group of Egyptian chariotry had formed, made up of his personal bodyguard and some of the chariots recovered from the broken Divisions of Amon and Re. Ramses rallied them to charge against the Hittite force to the west. The Egyptian king quickly decided the number of chariots there was too great, however, and chose to avoid a direct engagement. Retiring back to his camp, he immediately launched an attack against the Hittite force to the east. This time his counterstroke was successful, driving the Hittites back across the Orontes. In the first few minutes of battle, the Egyptian army had all but been destroyed. Now it was the Hittites’ turn to suffer a major disaster.

The main Hittite force was still on foot, looting the Egyptian camp, when the Na’arum arrived from the west — apparently the Hittite force on the western flank had fled at their approach.

Although the Na’arum had chariots, the bulk of their force was infantry. They were equipped and trained to fight on foot, whereas the Hittites were not. With swinging swords and flying spears, the Na’arum poured into the Egyptian camp, overwhelming the Hittites. The surviving Hittites fled toward Kadesh.

Muwutallis, who up to that point had seen the battle go entirely his way, suffered a staggering setback, but he still had his reserve chariotry and his infantry. For some reason, though, Muwutallis chose to dispatch only his 1,000 chariots against Ramses’ relative handful, while he and his infantry remained on the other side of the river, an action the Egyptians attributed to cowardice.

As the Hittite chariots crossed the Orontes, Ramses changed tactics. Instead of maintaining his distance, Ramses decided to close with the enemy, a form of battle seemingly favorable to the Hittites.

Actually, Ramses wanted to use the terrain as an ally. The Hittite chariots had to cross the river and mount the riverbank to reach the plain where the Egyptians were. The Hittite chariots were most effective at battle speed. Ramses wanted to close with them before they could reach that speed. Also, by fighting them close to the river, he kept the Hittites from deploying into formation. That protected Ramses’ flanks and allowed him to fight only a fraction of the Hittite force at one time.

The Hittite chariots splashed through the river and had started up the far bank when the Egyptians descended on them. The impact drove them back into the water. Muwutallis ordered another charge. Again, the Egyptians waited until the Hittite chariots forded the river, then charged and once again drove them back. Muwutallis reorganized his ranks before sending his chariots across the river a third time, but with the same, unsuccessful result.

For almost three hours Muwutallis threw his chariots across the river, and for three hours the Egyptians, led by Ramses, drove them back. ‘Then his majesty advanced swiftly and charged into the foe of the vanquished,’ said the Egyptian chronicle. ‘At the sixth charge among them, being like Baal [the Cannite equivalent of Set, the Egyptian god of war] behind them in the hour of his might, I made slaughter among them, and there was none that escaped me.’ (It is interesting to note that while most of the Egyptian account of the battle was written in the third person, the narrative abruptly changed to the first person in the description of the last Hittite attack.)

On the Hittite side, the casualties included high-ranking figures. Soldiers pulled the half-drowned prince of Charbu from the Orontes and had to revive him by holding him upside down. Less fortunate was Muwutallis’ brother Metarema, who was killed by an Egyptian arrow before he could reach the river. Also dead were Cherpaser, the royal scribe Tergannasa and Pays, Muwutallis’ charioteers Teedura, chief of the bodyguard Kamayta, a corps commander and Aagem, commander of the mercenaries.

The battle had begun about 4 p.m. At about 7, the lead elements of the Division of Ptah, with Ramses’ vizier in the lead, emerged from the Forest of Robaui. The arrival of that third Egyptian division threatened the Hittite rear.

The Egyptian account says the Hittites retreated inside Kadesh, but is is improbable that so many men could have stayed inside the city. More likely, Muwutallis retired toward Aleppo.

The next morning, Ramses proclaimed that he had won a great victory. In a sense, it had been. After blundering into a devastating ambush, the young king had escaped death or capture and, displaying courageous leadership, had rallied his scattered troops. Even so, the Egyptians had suffered heavy casualties, Kadesh’s defenses were unbroken, and Muwutallis’ army, though badly bloodied, was still intact, with more than 1,000 chariots still at his disposal. Chastened, Ramses prudently gathered the remnants of his army and marched toward Damascus.

Muwutallis, too, had had enough, although once safely back at Hattusas, he, too, proclaimed a great victory. Later, he tried to foment another revolt against the Egyptians, but he died while Ramses was preparing to crush the uprising. Among other successes, Ramses took Dapur, south of Aleppo, in 1290 bc.

The Battle of Kadesh holds great interest to scholars of military strategy but, as pointed out by Egyptian press attaché and Egyptologist Ahmed Nouby Moussa, its epilogue was equally historic in the realm of international diplomacy. After a dynastic struggle, Khattusilis III succeeded Muwutallis and subsequently invited Egyptian plenipotentiaries to Hattusas for what would amount to the first summit conference between two equally matched powers. In 1280 bc, Ramses and Khattusilis signed history’s oldest recorded international agreement, establishing a condominium between the two empires. After 13 years of peace, Ramses sealed the treaty by marrying one of Khattusilis’ daughters. With his northeastern borders secure, the Egyptian king ruled on until 1235 bc — a reign of 67 years, during which his name would be literally etched in stone as Ramses the Great.

This article was written by Robert Collins Suhr and originally appeared in the August 1995 issue of Military History tydskrif.

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The Aftermath

At Issus, Alexander's men rewarded themselves richly with Persian loot. Darius' women at Issus were frightened. At best they could expect to become the concubine of a high-status Greek. Alexander reassured them. He told them not only was Darius still alive, but they would be kept safe and honored. Alexander kept his word and has been honored for this treatment of the women in Darius' family.

"Upset at Issus," by Harry J. Maihafer. Military History Magazine Oct. 2000.
Jona Lendering - Alexander the Great: Battle at the Issus
"Alexander's Sacrifice dis praesidibus loci before the Battle of Issus," by J. D. Bing. Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 111, (1991), pp. 161-165.

"The Generalship of Alexander," by A. R. Burn. Greece & Rome (Oct. 1965), pp. 140-154.


Kyk die video: Wit Roos Van Mooi Rivier (Januarie 2022).