Geskiedenis Podcasts

Die 20ste Maine At Little Round Top Deur H. S. Melcher, 20ste Maine Regiment - Geskiedenis

Die 20ste Maine At Little Round Top Deur H. S. Melcher, 20ste Maine Regiment - Geskiedenis

Die Konfederale mag wat aangewys is om Little Round Top in besit te neem, blyk Robertson se brigade te wees, bestaande uit die 1ste, 4de en 5de Texas en die 3de Arkansas; en Law se brigade, bestaande uit die 4de, 44ste, 48ste, 47ste en 15de Alabama, albei uit Hood se afdeling. Eersgenoemde sou vooraanval, terwyl Law se brigade agter in die heuwel sou aanval; maar Robertson het gevind dat hy nie die hele voorkant met sy brigade kon bedek nie, die 44ste, 48ste en 4de Alabama van die brigade van Law losgemaak omtrent die tyd dat hulle in die opmars aan die voet van Round Top aangekom het en hulle met Robertson se lyn verbind het, dan goed voor Little Round Top. Dit het die 47ste en 15de Alabama gelaat om die flankbeweging alleen uit te voer, wat hulle gedoen het, verby die suidekant van Round Top en 'n tydperk van tien minute op die kruin tot stilstand gebring. Hierdie stop was noodlottig vir die sukses van hul onderneming, aangesien dit ons brigade (Vincent's) in staat gestel het om betyds Little Round Top te bereik om hul vooruitgang te weerstaan.

Hierdie twee regimente het hul opmars hervat, aan die noordoostelike kant van Round Top gegaan en oor die beboste depressie tussen die heuwels gevorder om die agterkant van Little Round Top op te laai en Vincent se brigade af te vee, waarna hulle sterk betrokke was by Robertson's Texans en die drie regimente van Law se brigade wat aan sy bevel toegewys was, wat probeer het om besit van voor af te kry. Maar net hier was hierdie, wat die linkerregiment van Vincent se brigade was, en ook die linkerkant van die hele leër van die Potomac, en om te pas by die kruin van die heuwel, om die hoek van die res van die res brigade. Dit was gelukkig, want in hul vooruitgang het die 47ste Alabama, onder bevel van luitenant-kolonel Bulger, ons regiment vierkantig voor geslaan en 'n moordende vuur op ons onbeskermde lyn oopgemaak, aangesien ons pas in posisie was, en nie tyd gehad het om op te gooi nie borswerke. Terselfdertyd het die 15de Alabama, onder bevel van kolonel William C. Oates, met 644 man en 42 offisiere, rondbeweeg om ons in flank en agterkant aan te val. Ons kolonel, Chamberlain, het hierdie beweging ontmoet deur die regtervleuel van die regiment in 'n enkele rang te sit om die 47ste te weerstaan ​​en die vyf linker kompanieë van die regiment skuins teruggebuig.

Ons regiment het 358 man getel, maar aangesien Kompanie B, met 50 man, uitgestuur is om 'ons flank te beskerm', het ons 308 man in die tou om die woedende aanval van hierdie twee sterk regimente te weerstaan, wat ons meer as 3 tot 1 was. Die konflik was hewig, maar noodwendig kort, want dit was net 'n kort tydjie waarin elke mens voor die superieure vuur van ons vyand moet val.

Toe 130 van ons dapper offisiere en mans neergeskiet is waar hulle staan, en slegs 178 oorbly - amper nie meer as 'n sterk skermutseling nie - en elke man die 60 rondtes patrone wat hy in die geveg ingedra het, en die oorlewendes afgevuur het As hulle uit die kassies van hul gevalle kamerade gebruik maak, het die tyd aangebreek dat daar besluit moes word of ons hierdie sleutel vir die hele veld van Gettysburg moet prysgee, of moet aankla en probeer om hierdie vyand af te gooi. Kolonel Chamberlain het die bevel gegee om 'bajonette reg te maak', en amper voordat hy kon sê 'hef'! die regiment spring teen die heuwel af en sluit toe met die vyand, wat ons agter elke rots en boom aantref. Verras en oorweldig het die meeste van hulle hul arms neergegooi en oorgegee.

Sommige het baklei totdat hulle gedood is; die ander hardloop 'soos 'n trop wildebeeste', soos kolonel Oates dit self uitgedruk het. In hul vlug word hulle ontmoet deur Kompanjie B, kaptein Morill, wat ons vermoed het gevange geneem, maar nou so sterk aangeval dat meer as honderd van die vlugtelinge genoodsaak was om oor te gee.

Luitenant-kolonel Bulger, bevelvoerder oor die 47ste, is gewond en val in ons hande, met meer as driehonderd gevangenes en al die gewondes.

Die 20ste Maine keer terug met sy gevangenes na die oorspronklike posisie en bly daar totdat hulle vroeg in die aand na Round Top beveel is.


'N Gebroke band? Die klein ronde topvete tussen Joshua Chamberlain en Ellis Spear

'Miskien het my lewe gered' Luitenant Holman Melcher (swaard opgehef) en kolonel Joshua Chamberlain was prominent in die 20ste Maine se bajonet -aanklag op Gettysburg. Chamberlain, wat hier getoon word deur die oorgawe van die 15de Alabama se luitenant Robert H. Wicker, het Melcher later erkenning gegee dat hy waarskynlik sy lewe gered het tydens die aanklag.

(Don Troiani/Private Collection/Bridgeman Images)

Die 20ste Maine se epiese standplaas en bajonetlading by Little Round Top op 2 Julie 1863 het die regiment se plek in die militêre geskiedenis verseker. Tydens die tweede gevegsdag in Gettysburg het bevelvoerders kolonel Joshua Chamberlain en majoor Ellis Spear - reeds goeie vriende van voor die oorlog - 'n oënskynlik onbreekbare band gesmee om die seuns van Pine Tree State te help om die meedoënlose 15de Alabama van kolonel William Oates terug te keer en te voorkom 'n Konfederale deurbraak op die linkerflank van die Army of the Potomac. As die 20ste Maine voor die aanslag gebreek het, het dit moontlik 'n domino-effek op ander hardgesinde federale eenhede langs Cemetery Ridge gehad. Die stand van die 20ste was 'n kritieke oomblik in die volgende dag 'n Yankee -triomf.

Chamberlain en Spear het albei die oorlog oorleef en 'n lang, voorspoedige lewe geleef, hul vriendskap blykbaar stewig. Ongeveer 25 jaar gelede het die verhaal egter begin posvat dat Spear verbitterd gesterf het omdat Chamberlain - ten koste van hom en ander in die regiment - te veel krediet geëis het vir hul Little Round Top -sukses in 'n naoorlogse rekening. Daar is elemente van waarheid in wat ons vandag ken as die 'Chamberlain-Spear Controversy', maar die idee dat daar 'n bloedstryd tussen die twee bestaan, is vergesog en moet verder ondersoek word.

Spear en Chamberlain het albei grootgeword, die oudste van vier seuns in gesinne wat geslagte lank tevore in klein skeepsbou -gemeenskappe langs die kus van Maine gevestig was. In die Amerikaanse sensus van 1860 het Spear se tuisdorp Warren 2 300 inwoners, Chamberlain's Brewer 2 800. Beide mans sou die Bowdoin College in Brunswick bywoon, terwyl Spear's Class van 1858 studeer onder professor Chamberlain, 'n gegradueerde uit 1852.

Uit briewe tussen die twee is dit duidelik dat Spear op die universiteit goeie vriende was met Chamberlain se volgende jonger broer, Horace. Alhoewel hulle twee jaar as studente uitmekaar was, het hulle kontak gehou, en selfs na afloop van die studie mekaar besoek terwyl hulle regte studeer. Horace sou selfs die derde Chamberlain -broer gewees het om in die 20ste Maine te dien - saam met Joshua en Thomas, die jongste - as hy nie net nege maande voordat die eenheid gestig is, dood is nie.

'N Kort breuk uit die oorlog: Ellis Spear het hierdie foto laat neem terwyl hy met verlof in Portland, Maine, was. Oorkant: die voerkap wat Spear in die 20ste Maine gedra het. (Die Hayes -familieversameling op MaineLegacy.com)

Spear en Chamberlain het 'n soortgelyke reünie gehad toe hulle in die laat somer van 1862 in dieselfde infanterieregiment dien. By die stigting van die 20ste Maine het Spear 'n pos as kaptein verdien, nadat hy die grootste deel van die manne gewerf het vir wat geword het daardie eenheid se Kompanjie G. Chamberlain het nie persoonlik lede van die regiment gewerf nie, maar is deur die goewerneur 'n kommissie as luitenant -kolonel - tweede in bevel - toegestaan. Tydens die oorlog het Spear ook na Thomas omgesien, hom in sy geselskap geneem, hom bevorder en selfs vir bevel oor die eenheid aanbeveel toe Spear self bevorder is.

In die naoorlogse jare het die liefde wat Spear vir die senior Chamberlain gehad het, nie bedaar nie. Hulle het gekorrespondeer, reünies en ander geleenthede bygewoon en 'n belangrike rol gespeel in die herdenking van hul ou regiment. In 1896 skryf Spear aan Tom Chamberlain en verduidelik sy pogings om die kongres te oortuig om 'n wetsontwerp op te stel wat die algemene pensioen van $ 25 per maand tot $ 100 verhoog. 'Skryf my asseblief en vertel my hoe hy is en of hy waarskynlik hierdie somer in Maine sal wees, en waar.' Spear geskryf. 'Ek het moontlik die geleentheid om hom in die somer te sien, en ek hoop om u te sien.'

Drie jaar later bepleit Spear steeds die pensioenverhoging. In 'n brief aan rep. Amos Allen (R-Maine), skryf hy: "[Joshua Chamberlain] is sewentig jaar oud en arm. Hy behou die beste voorkoms en is sensitief en trots, en is die laaste man wat armoede pleit of selfs erken. ” Spear het groot lof vir sy voormalige bevelvoerder toegevoeg. 'Ek was by hom toe hy gewond is, en ek weet hoe ernstig dit was. Die algemene opvatting was dat hy nie daarvan sou herstel nie. Sy saak is die opvallendste en mees unieke saak in die staat van uitnemende diens in die oorlog, oud en arm. ”

Spear se beskrywing van Chamberlain se armoede is moontlik oorbeklemtoon - die ou generaal het 'n huis in Brunswick, 'n groter somerhuis 'n paar kilometer daarvandaan en 'n seiljag besit - maar die briewe openbaar 'n volgehoue ​​respek en bewondering van Spear se kant en 'n aktiewe poging om te sorg vir sy voormalige kameraad. Tog het sy pogings om te help met die finansiële situasie van Chamberlain, selfs terwyl hy saamgespan het met Tom om dit van sy broer te weerhou, getoon dat Spear se gevoelens baie meer deernisvol was as enigiets anders.

Wat ook al die finansiële situasie van Joshua Chamberlain laat in die lewe, hy het 'n aanbod van $ 500 nie geweier nie Kosmopolitiese tydskrif in 1912 om 'n beskrywing van sy rol in die Slag van Fredericksburg te skryf vir 'n uitgawe wat die 50ste herdenking van die geveg vier. Hy is ook 'n paar maande later nie afgeskrik toe dieselfde uitgewer in 1913 vir 'n soortgelyke stuk op Gettysburg vir Hearst se tydskrif gevra het nie.

Die oorspronklike manuskripte van hierdie twee artikels is nog nooit gevind nie, so 'n gedetailleerde vergelyking van hul oorspronklike bewoording met wat in die druk verskyn nadat redakteurs hul werk gedoen het, is nie moontlik nie. Beide tydskrifte was egter die eiendom van William Randolph Hearst, die man wat sensasionele joernalistiek uitgevind het en selfs deur sommige die skuld gekry het dat hy die oorlog tussen die Verenigde State en Spanje in 1898 begin het. die bekende illustreerder, Frederic Remington, na Kuba om die oorlog te dek. Remington telegraaf huis toe en sê: 'Alles stil. Hier is geen moeilikheid nie. Daar sal geen oorlog wees nie. Wil terugkeer. ” Hearst se beweerde antwoord was "U verskaf die foto's, ek sal die oorlog lewer" - en hy het presies dit gedoen en sy koerante gebruik om die Amerikaanse regering te dwing om oorlog te verklaar.

"Die Hearst -redakteurs het my 'Gettysburg' vermink en 'reggemaak' sodat ek nie probeer het om afskrifte van hul tydskrif waarin dit verskyn het, te kry nie - Joshua L. Chamberlain

Hearst se redakteurs het ongetwyfeld die leiding van hul eienaar gevolg en lesers versoek om kopieë van sy tydskrifte te koop deur dramaties versierde verhale te publiseer wat die belangstelling van die publiek geprikkel het, of dit nou eerlik is of nie. Dit is duidelik dat redakteurs aansienlike vryhede geneem het met beide stukke wat Chamberlain aan Hearst -tydskrifte verskaf het, veral die tweede stuk oor Gettysburg, wat hy geskryf het voordat hy die gepubliseerde weergawe van sy opstel van Fredericksburg gelees het.

Toe vriende en bewonderaars die Hearst -artikel “Through Blood and Fire at Gettysburg” noem, het Chamberlain gekla en betreur dat dit “baie ingekort en verander is deur die invoeging van‘ bindweefsel ’deur die redakteur.” Toe 'n vroulike bewonderaar hom met die stuk komplimenteer, het Chamberlain geantwoord: 'Die Hearst -redakteurs het my' Gettysburg 'vermink en' reggestel 'sodat ek nie probeer het om afskrifte te kry van hul tydskrif waarin dit verskyn het nie.

Die lees van hierdie artikels het Spear baie geraak, wie se herinneringe aan die oorlog donker en tragies was. Hy beskou hierdie soort “ydel glorieryke” geskrifte as afskuwelik, maar het nooit die kans gehad om dit met sy voormalige bevelvoerder, wat binne 'n jaar na publikasie van die Gettysburg -artikel gesterf het, te bespreek nie. As hy dit gedoen het, was hy moontlik verbaas om te sien dat die gepubliseerde weergawes nie na wens van Chamberlain was nie.

Sonder afskrifte van die oorspronklike konsepte van Chamberlain, kan ons nie heeltemal weet hoeveel van elke artikel uit sy pen kom nie en hoeveel was die oordrywing of uitvinding van 'n sensasionele redakteur van Hearst. Daar is egter leidrade. Byvoorbeeld, in die Gettysburg -stuk is 'n vermeende brief, woordeliks in volledige vorm gedruk, van 'n 15de soldaat uit Alabama wat onthou dat hy in Gettysburg herhaaldelik Chamberlain in sy visier gehad het, maar ''n vreemde idee' 'verhinder hom om die sneller te trek. Hy het afgesluit deur te sê: 'Ek is nou bly daaroor, en ek hoop dat u dit is.'

Nêrens in die omvangryke versamelings briewe wat Chamberlain in sy leeftyd ontvang het nie, bestaan ​​daar nie 'n afskrif van hierdie brief of 'n vermelding van hierdie episode nie. Tog het Hearst dit in volledige vorm gepubliseer. Wat in een van hierdie versamelings gevind kan word, is 'n brief van 'n Bowdoin -oudleerling wat in 1903 'n hotel in die suide besoek het wat besit word deur 'n veteraan van die 15de Alabama. Hierin het die historikus die veteraan se verhaal oorgedra hoe hy op Chamberlain op Little Round Top geskiet het, maar 'Chamberlain se lewe is slegs gered deur die daad van 'n privaat wat voor die kolonel spring en self die skoot ontvang het. ”

Alhoewel daar geen direkte bewyse is om die idee te ondersteun nie, kan u u maklik voorstel dat die ontwerp van Chamberlain 'n verwysing bevat na hierdie werklike brief, waaruit die mense van Hearst hulle voorgestel het en eintlik 'n soortgelyke, maar meer dramatiese verhaal geskep het en 'n hele brief saamgestel het om te dramatiseer Dit.

In 'n opstel wat hy nooit gepubliseer het nie, ontleed Spear Chamberlain se "My storie van Fredericksburg" punt vir punt, en ontbloot dit wat hy as belaglike stellings beskou het. Bejaarde en swak (hy was 78 toe die Gettysburg -artikel gedruk is), het Spear sy frustrasies oor baie van Chamberlain se "herinneringe" aan hierdie twee gevegte gelaat.

Onder die meer onthullende is die beskrywing in Chamberlain se Fredericksburg -verslag van toe die regiment op pad na die dodelike maalstroom by Marye's Heights 'n rondloperhond teëgekom het. In sy memoires onthou Spear dat tydens 'n stilte '['n] klein hondjie kom huil het van skrik, blykbaar iemand se huisdier en ek het hom in my arms geneem en hom vasgehou terwyl ek daar gebly het.' Die verhaal van dieselfde eiesinnige hond verskyn egter heel anders in die artikel van Chamberlain in Fredericksburg: "My oë het die vorm van 'n geel hond gekry, regop gesit met oë gerig op sy dooie meester." Die hond bly daar vas, getrou tot die einde toe, ondanks die gesuis van koeëls en die bars van skulpe. 'Dit sou inderdaad jammer gewees het, amper 'n skande, om die voogdyskap te versteur. En ons het hom daar gelos. ”

Dieselfde deel van die beskrywing van Fredericksburg het 'n ontmoeting met 'n trop duiwe ingesluit wat ondanks hul vliegvermoë wou ontkom.

Of hierdie rekeninge geskryf is soos opgestel deur Chamberlain of 'n gedeeltelike of volledige uitvinding was van 'n skrywer van Hearst se bedoeling om meer tydskrifte te verkoop, ons kan net bespiegel. Daar is egter 'n sprekende opmerking, geskryf deur Chamberlain in die kantlyn van 'n vroeë gedrukte kopie wat vir kommentaar aan hom gestuur is. Saam met hierdie gedeelte van die teks, skryf hy: 'Verloor asseblief episodes met honde en duif'. Ondanks sy pleidooi bly hierdie melodramatiese "episodes" in die finale druk.

As hierdie leidrade oor hoe die redakteurs van vroeë 20ste-eeuse tydskrifte-ten minste dié wat deur WR Hearst besit word-artikels herskryf om hul lesers te behaag, dan is die 'ydel glorie' wat Ellis Spear so onsmaaklik gevind het in die geskrifte van sy voormalige vriend, professor, bevelvoerder en mede -veteraan, was bloot die uitvinding van iemand anders as Chamberlain. As dit die geval was, en as Chamberlain lank genoeg oorleef het sodat die twee ou kamerade hul afsku kon deel met die uitkoms van hierdie twee literêre pogings, sou Spear moontlik die ware bron daarvan kon verstaan ​​en sou die sogenaamde "Chamberlain-Spear Controversy" nooit meer as driekwart eeu later tot stand gekom het.

Inwoner van Pine Tree State, Tom Desjardin, is direkteur van Maine's Bureau of Parks and Lands. Desjardin, 'n voormalige historikus by Gettysburg National Military Park, is die skrywer van verskeie boeke, insluitend Staan vas, seuns van Maine. Hy was ook 'n konsultant vir die akteur Jeff Daniels tydens die verfilming van die film van 1993 Gettysburg.

Oproepe sluit: Melcher, (bo) en Chamberlain is in 1864 byna binne enkele weke vermoor — Melcher in Spotsylvania Court House in Mei en Chamberlain (onder) in Petersburg op 18 Junie (Maine State Archives)


Waarom die heuwel Little Round Top Mattered genoem word

Namate die Slag van Gettysburg gedurende die eerste dag ontwikkel het, het die troepe van die Unie 'n reeks hoë rante gehou wat suidwaarts van die stad geloop het. Aan die suidelike punt van die rant was twee afsonderlike heuwels, wat jare lank plaaslik bekend was as Big Round Top en Little Round Top.

Die geografiese belangrikheid van Little Round Top is voor die hand liggend: elkeen wat die grond beheer het, kan die platteland in die weste vir myle oorheers. En terwyl die grootste deel van die Unie -leër noord van die heuwel gereël was, verteenwoordig die heuwel die uiterste linkerflank van die Unie -lyne. Dit sou rampspoedig wees om daardie posisie te verloor.

En ten spyte daarvan, aangesien 'n groot aantal troepe gedurende die nag van 1 Julie posisies ingeneem het, is Little Round Top op een of ander manier deur die unie se bevelvoerders oor die hoof gesien. Die oggend van 2 Julie 1863 was die strategiese heuwel skaars beset. 'N Klein groepie seinmanne, troepe wat deur vlagseine bevele gegee het, het die top van die heuwel bereik. Maar daar was geen groot gevegsoplossing nie.

Die bevelvoerder van die Unie, generaal George Meade, het sy ingenieurshoof, generaal governeur K. Warren, gestuur om die federale posisies langs die heuwels suid van Gettysburg te ondersoek. Toe Warren by Little Round Top aankom, besef hy dadelik die belangrikheid daarvan.

Warren vermoed dat die Konfederale troepe besig was om 'n aanval op die posisie te doen. Hy kon 'n nabygeleë wapenpersoneel kry om 'n kanonskoot in die bos te wes, wes van Little Round Top. En wat hy gesien het, bevestig sy vrese: honderde Konfederale soldate het in die bos beweeg terwyl die kanonbal oor hul koppe seil. Warren beweer later dat hy sonlig van hul bajonette en geweervate kan sien skyn.


20ste Maine -vrywilligerinfanterieregiment

Daar is twee monumente en 'n posisieskermer van die 20ste Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment in Gettysburg.

Oor die 20ste Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment op Gettysburg

Die 20ste vrywilligerinfanterie in Maine het 386 mans na Gettysburg gebring, waarvan 29 dood is, 91 gewond en 5 vermis is. Die name van die slagoffers word op die monument op Little Round Top gelys.

Kolonel Chamberlain en sersant Andrew Tozier is op 2 Julie met die erepenning bekroon vir hul optrede. Chamberlain vir 'n gewaagde heldhaftigheid en 'n groot volharding in die beklee van sy posisie op die Little Round Top teen herhaalde aanvalle, en die vooruitgang op die Great Round Top ” Tozier, wat tydens die verlowingskrisis hierdie soldaat, 'n kleur draer, alleen in 'n gevorderde posisie gestaan, terwyl die regiment teruggedra is en sy kleure verdedig het met muskiet en ammunisie wat by sy voete opgetel is. ”

Kolonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, die twintigste bevelvoerder van die Maine tydens die Slag van Gettysburg, het danksy die roman een van die bekendste manne van die burgeroorlog geword Die moordenaar engele en die fliek Gettysburg. Hy is ses keer gewond, het die Medal of Honor verwerf en het ná die oorlog as goewerneur van Maine en president van Bowdoin College diens gedoen.

Links van die hoofmonument vir die 20ste Maine op Little Round Top

Hoofmonument vir die 20ste Maine

Die hoofmonument is aan die suidoostekant van Little Round Top. (Little Round Top -toerkaart) Dit is die middelpunt van die lyn wat die regiment gehou het tydens die beroemde verdediging van Little Round Top op 2 Julie. Dit is in 1886 deur die staat Maine opgedra.

Van die voorkant van die hoofmonument op Little Round Top

Twintigste Maine

Vrywilliger Infanterie
Derde brig. Eerste Div.
Vyfde korps

Van die regterkant van die hoofmonument op Little Round Top

Hier is die 20ste Maine -regiment,
Kol. J.L. Chamberlain beveel, en vorm die
uiterste links van die nasionale strydlyn
op die 2de dag van Julie 1863, het die
aanval van die uiterste regs van Longstreet ’s
Korps en op sy beurt aangekla en 308 gevange geneem
gevangenes. Die regiment verloor 38 gedood of
dodelik gewond en 93 gewond uit
358 verloof.

Hierdie monument opgerig deur oorlewendes van
hierdie regiment n.C. 1888. Vaar amper
die plek waar die kleure gestaan ​​het.

Aan die linkerkant van die hoofmonument

Name van die offisiere en manne van die twintigste
Maine -vrywilligers wat vermoor of gesterf het
wonde wat in hierdie aksie ontvang is:

Aan die agterkant van die hoofmonument

Priv. Oscar Wyer Co. F
” Charles F. Hall ” F
” Benjamin W. Grant ” F
” Frank B. Curtis ” F
” Elfin J. Ross ” F
Serg. William S. Jordan ” G
Corp. Melville C. Law ” G
Priv. James A. Knight ” G
1ste Sers. Charles W. Steele ” H
Serg.George W. Buck ” H
” Isaac M. Lathrop ” H
Priv. Aaaron Adams ” H
” Goodwin S. Ierland ” H
” Iredell Lamson ” H
” Alexander E. Lester ” I
1ste Sers. George S. Noyes ” K
Priv. James R. Merrill ” K
” William F. Merrill ” K
” Stephen C. Chase ” K
” Williard W. Buxton ” K

Ligging van die hoofmonument vir die 20ste Maine Infanterieregiment

Die hoofmonument vir die 20ste Maine is op Little Round Top suid van Gettysburg. Dit is aan die suidoostelike kant van Little Round Top, ongeveer 170 meter suid van die parkeerarea langs Sykeslaan en ongeveer 65 meter noordoos van die kruising van Sykes, Warren en Wright Avenue. (39 ° 47 󈧚.1 ″N 77 ° 14 󈧎.1 ″W)

Posisioneringsmerker van maatskappy B op Little Round Top

'N Merker wat die posisie van die 20ste Maine Regiment ’s Company B tydens die verdediging van Little Round Top aandui, is 100 meter oos van die hoofmonument. Kaptein Morrill en ongeveer 40 manne van Kompanjie B, saam met 'n groep Amerikaanse skerpskutters, is hier geplaas om die flank van die 20ste Maine 'n bietjie beskerming te bied.

Monument vir Kompanie B van die 20ste Maine Infanterie op Gettysburg

Van die monument vir Company B op Little Round Top:

Posisie van Maatskappy B,
20ste ek. Vols., Kapt Walter G. Morrill,
losgemaak as skermutselinge,
val die vyand se regterflank aan,
middag van 2 Julie 1863.

Plek van die posisioneringsmerker van die maatskappy B

Die monument vir Company B van die 20ste Maine op Little Round Top is aan die suidoostelike kant van Little Round Top, ongeveer 100 meter oos van die hoofmonument. (39 ° 47 󈧘.0 ″N 77 ° 14 󈧉.0 ″W)

Monument vir die 20ste Maine -regiment op Big Round Top

'N Derde monument vir die 20ste Maine in Gettysburg is naby die top van Big Round Top. Dit toon die posisie waarheen die 20ste Maine gedurende die aand op 2 Julie gevorder het en wat dit gedurende die oggend van die 3de gehou het. Die monument is in 1889 ingewy.

Monument vir die 20ste Maine Infanterie op Big Round Top

Van die monument op Big Round Top:

Die 20ste Maine Reg. 3d brig. 1ste. Div. Kolonel van die 5de korps, kolonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, het hierdie posisie op die aand van 2 Julie 1863 ingeneem en beklee en die vyand van voor af agtervolg op die lyn gemerk deur sy monument hieronder. Die Regt. verlore in die geveg 130 gedood en gewond uit 358 verloofdes. Hierdie monument is die uiterste linkerkant van die Union -lyn tydens die stryd om die 3D -dag.

Ligging van die 20ste Maine -monument op Big Round Top

Die monument vir die 20ste Maine op Big Round Top is suid van Gettysburg, ongeveer 300 meter van die relatief steil staproete na die top van Big Round Top. (39 ° 47 󈧏.9 ″N 77 ° 14 󈧚.4 ″W) Die roete na die staproete is aan die suidekant van South Confederate Avenue, ooswaarts. Besoekers wil hierdie monument eers besoek voordat hulle verder ry in die South Confederate Avenue tot by Little Round Top.

Aanbevole leesstof:

Die twintigste Maine: 'N Klassieke verhaal van Joshua Chamberlain en sy vrywilligersregiment

“ Enkele beste geskiedenis van die burgeroorlogse eenheid wat ek gelees het. ”
“ Die definitiewe verslag van hierdie dapper regiment ”
– Amazon resensies


Thomas D. Chamberlain is gebore in Brewer, Maine, die jongste van vyf kinders. Jong Tom het grootgeword op die familieplaas in Brewer saam met sy vier ouer broers en susters: Joshua Lawrence (gebore in 1828), Horace Beriah (1834), Sarah Brastow (1836) en John Calhoun (1838). Dit lyk asof hulle opvoeding streng en godsdienstig was, maar ook liefdevol. Thomas was 'n ondeunde en aangename seun-sy broer het hom 'n 'klein skelm' genoem-en as die baba van die gesin was hy sy ma se gunsteling. Thomas was die enigste seun wat nie die universiteit bygewoon het nie. Of dit te wyte was aan 'n gebrek aan intelligensie, toepassing of neiging, is onbekend. Teen sy middel-tienerjare werk Thomas as bediende in 'n kruidenierswinkel in Bangor.

Die oupagrootjies van Chamberlain was soldate in die Amerikaanse Revolusionêre Oorlog en sy oupa het gedien tydens die oorlog van 1812. Sy pa het ook gedien tydens die aborsiewe Aroostook-oorlog van 1839. Sy broer Joshua was ook in die weermag.

In 1862 het Chamberlain by die Unie -leër aangesluit. Sy motiewe was gemeng - persoonlik, patrioties en godsdienstig.

Hy is spoedig in die nuutgevormde 20ste Maine -infanterie geplaas saam met sy broer Joshua, wat as kolonel van die regiment aangestel is.

Die 20ste Maine -regiment het opgeruk na die Slag van Antietam, maar het nie aan die geveg deelgeneem nie. Hulle het in die Slag van Fredericksburg geveg en geringe slagoffers gely tydens die aanvalle op Marye's Heights, maar hulle moes 'n ellendige nag op die ysige slagveld deurbring tussen die talle gewondes en dooies van ander regimente. Hulle het die Slag van Chancellorsville in Mei 1863 misgeloop weens 'n uitbraak van pokke in hul geledere, wat hulle aan die agterkant bewaak het. In Junie 1863 word Joshua bevorder tot kolonel van die regiment, na die bevordering van sy eerste kolonel, Adelbert Ames, tot brigade -bevel. Thomas Chamberlain was betrokke by die meeste ander gevegte waarin die 20ste Maine geveg het, veral die Slag van Gettysburg.

Die Slag van Gettysburg Redigeer

Tydens die verdediging van Little Round Top het die 20ste Maine swaar aangeval deur die Konfederale 15de Alabama -regiment, deel van die afdeling onder leiding van genl.maj John Bell Hood, en na ongeveer 3-4 uur se geveg het die 20ste Maine heeltemal gehardloop uit ammunisie. Chamberlain se broer, Joshua, erken die haglike omstandighede en beveel sy linkervleuel om op die rebelle te reageer deur afdraande met vaste bajonette te laai en sodoende die Konfederale aanval op die heuwel te beëindig. Die 20ste Maine en die 83ste Pennsylvania het saam meer as 400 soldate van die aanvallende Konfederale magte gevange geneem. Joshua is lig gewond in die voet deur 'n verwoeste koeël. Thomas was ongedeerd, behalwe vir "verskeie skrape". As gevolg van hul dapper verdediging van die heuwel, het die Chamberlain -broers, veral Joshua Chamberlain, en die 20ste Maine 'n groot reputasie gekry, en hulle was die onderwerp van baie publikasies en verhale.

Na Gettysburg Edit

Na Gettysburg was die Slag van Spotsylvania Court House en die beleg van Petersburg die belangrikste gevegte waarin Thomas Chamberlain en die 20ste Maine betrokke was. By die beleg van Petersburg was die 20ste Maine in reserwe, terwyl Joshua (teen sy beter oordeel) sy Pennsylvania Bucktail -brigade gelei het in 'n klag op 'n gedeelte van die Konfederale verdediging, bekend as Rives's Salient. Om sy troepe te stuur, word Joshua getref deur 'n mini -bal wat net onder sy regterheup ingedring het, sy blaas en uretra geknak het en by sy linkerheup gestop het. So 'n verwoestende wond moes noodlottig gewees het, en toe hy by die veldhospitaal aankom, drie myl agter die lyne, was daar 'n vrees vir sy lewe. Thomas Chamberlain, terug by sy regiment, het uiteindelik die nuus gehoor. Hy en die chirurg van die 20ste Maine, dr. Abner O. Shaw, is na die hospitaal waar Joshua gesterf het. Terwyl Thomas wag, het dr. Shaw, saam met dr. Morris W. Townsend van die 44ste New York, die hele nag gewerk om Joshua Chamberlain se lewe te red. Vyf en dertig jaar later skryf Joshua Chamberlain dat, nadat die chirurge klaar was: "Tom het soos 'n broer oor my gestaan, en so 'n een soos hy." Opvallend genoeg het kolonel Chamberlain dit oorleef om sy promosie ter plaatse na brigadier -generaal te geniet, hoewel hy nooit weer in volle fiksheid was nie. 'N Aantal biograwe van Joshua Chamberlain sê dat sy lewe gered is deur die aktiwiteit van sy broer, Thomas.

Bewerking van Appomattox -veldtog

Na Petersburg was Thomas Chamberlain en die 20ste Maine betrokke by die Battle of Five Forks (waarvoor hy Brevet -luitenant -kolonel toegeken is vir sy dapperheid) en die Battle of Appomattox Courthouse. Aan die einde van die oorlog marsjeer die 20ste Maine op 2 Mei uit Appomattox, Virginia, en bereik Washington, DC, op 12 Mei, waar dit uiteindelik op 16 Julie 1865 uit diens geneem word. Hy beëindig die oorlog met die rang van luitenant -kolonel.

Na die oorlog, ten spyte van sy uitstaande militêre rekord, het Chamberlain van die een werk na die ander gedryf. Hy het aan alkoholisme sowel as ernstige longsiektes en hartsiektes gely. Hy sterf op 55 -jarige ouderdom in Bangor, Maine.

Chamberlain was 'n karakter in die Michael Shaara se Pulitzer-bekroonde historiese roman, Die moordenaar engele. Hy is ook uitgebeeld in die film gebaseer op die roman, Gettysburg, gespeel deur akteur C. Thomas Howell, wat die rol in die Gode ​​en generaals prequel, gebaseer op die roman, Gode ​​en generaals, geskryf deur Jeff Shaara, die seun van Michael Shaara. Chamberlain word in die twee rolprente uitgebeeld as 'n energieke, jeugdige spanmaat vir sy bevelvoerder en ouer broer, Joshua Chamberlain (gespeel deur Jeff Daniels).


Die aanklag wat die unie gered het: Gettysburg 20ste bajonet in Maine by Little Round Top, 2 Julie 1863

Little Round Top deur Edwin Forbes

Die linkerflank het bestaan ​​uit die 386 offisiere en manne van die 20ste Maine -regiment en die 83ste Pennsylvania. Toe hy sien dat die Konfederate om sy flank skuif, rek Chamberlain eers sy lyn tot op die punt waar sy manne in 'n enkellêerlyn was, en beveel dan die mees suidelike helfte van sy lyn om tydens 'n stilte terug te swaai na 'n ander konfederale aanklag. Daar het hulle die lyn geweier ” - 'n hoek met die hooflyn gevorm in 'n poging om die konfederale flankmaneuver te voorkom. Ondanks groot verliese, het die 20ste Maine 'n totaal van negentig minute lank deur twee daaropvolgende aanklagte deur die 15de Alabama en ander konfederale regimente aangehou.

Chamberlain (met die wete dat sy mans nie meer ammunisie gehad het nie, sy getalle uitgeput was en sy mans nie 'n ander konfederale aanklag sou kon afweer nie) beveel sy manne om bajonette en teenaanval toe te rus. Hy beveel dat sy linkerflank, wat teruggetrek is, vorentoe beweeg in 'n ‘ regterwiel vorentoe ’ maneuver. As soon as they were in line with the rest of the regiment, the remainder of the regiment would charge akin to a door swinging shut. This simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver halted and captured a good portion of the 15th Alabama.[16] While Chamberlain ordered the advance, Lieutenant Holman Melcher spontaneously and separate to Chamberlain’s command initiated a charge from the center of the line that further aided the regiment’s efforts.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain ordered the bayonet charge on Little Round Top.
During their retreat, the Confederates were subjected to a volley of rifle fire from Company B of the 20th Maine, commanded by Captain Walter G. Morrill, and a few of the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, who had been placed by Chamberlain behind a stone wall 150 yards to the east, hoping to guard against an envelopment. This group, who had been hidden from sight, caused considerable confusion in the Confederate ranks.

Thirty years later, Chamberlain received a Medal of Honor for his conduct in the defense of Little Round Top. The citation read that it was awarded for “daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the Little Round Top against repeated assaults, and ordering the advance position on the Great Round Top.” About Little Round Top

Little Round Top (left) and [Big] Round Top, photographed from Plum Run Valley in 1909

Verwante poste:

Comments on this entry are closed.

Hi Gerard– Thanks for this post. Here are two links to paintings from the National Guard’s Heritage Series about July 2, 1863. The first is “The Twentieth Maine,” http://www.nationalguard.mil/Resources/Image-Gallery/Historical-Paintings/Heritage-Series/Twentieth-Maine/

Not to detract from the valor of Chamberlain’s charge at Little Round Top, the First Minnesota suffered appalling casualties in preventing the Confederates from pushing the Union forces off Cemetery Ridge on July 2. “The unit’s flag fell five times and was raised again each time. The 47 survivors [out of 262 men] rallied back to General Hancock under the senior surviving officer, Captain Nathan S. Messick. The 82% casualty rate stands to this day as the largest loss by any surviving military unit in U.S. history during a single day’s engagement.”

Two of my great-great-grandfathers were in one of the German-speaking Pennsylvania regiments at Gettysburg. They were not hotheads– their high respect for the Confederate soldiers they met at Gettysburg has been passed down through my family’s history. I hope Gerard will add a few words about the need to avoid another bloodletting like the one we endured from 1861 through 1865.

I’ve been there, many times, but I won’t tell the story. But I will say that the most amazing thing I ever saw was in the Gettysburg museum and it can’t be appreciated until you see it with your own bare eyeballs. Hundreds upon hundreds of bullets that met in mid-air on display on a wall. And those are just the ones that were found. I’m sure more than that are still in the ground.

Think of that. 2 bullets hitting in mid air is an almost impossibility if you tried to do it. But hundreds upon hundreds of them? The hellfire must have been thick enough to go hiking on. How does anybody survive something like that?

I was born there.
I seen that wall for the first time when I was about 8, and then many times after. It bore right into my skall. I learned everything possible about the civil war and gettysburg in particular and Lincoln was my hero. 40 years later I found out that most of what I learned was a lie. A goddamned lie. It was about then that I started to grow a deep distrust for this rotten assed gov’t. How dare they lie to me that way then, and now? If not for people like me they wouldn’t exist, and they lie to me? Over and over and over? I have no use for it. Any of it. Ooit.

Too bad my side didn’t win their independence on that battlefield. I’d have preferred the outcome if the 15th Alabama had drove a bayonet into Chamberlin’s abolitionist guts and rolled the whole Yankee line up.

Amazing battle and extraordinary courage on both sides. But the battle that saved the Union? Nope, not even close. It probably had almost no noteworthy effect on the course of the battle. I rest my case upon a lecture of the battle given to me and my fellow officers by the US Army’s Chief of Military History (Ph.D., Princeton University), Brig. Gen. Nelson (can’t recall his first name), who I would say spoke with authority. I posted about it back in 2013 (with the same video, too!). “Little Round Top battle was not a decisive action.”

I hear ya Ghostsniper. I never thought much about the civil war when I was growing up. My best friend in high school was a black guy who couldn’t get enough of it. I never doubted the official narrative until one day my friend told me straight out that Lincoln started the war intentionally.

I thought he was joking, but he wasn’t. That was years ago, but since then i’ve discovered he was right. That war was intentionally provoked by Lincoln, and it was done to stop European trade from moving out of New York to Southern ports, taking 200 million dollars per year with it.

We are still living with the consequences of that war today, though many of us don’t recognize it because we don’t see the roots of what has happened regarding Federal power.

We are way far away from what the founders intended regarding Federal power.

Who started the war and why? The Northerners knew at the time and said so. “
The Civil War did not start over slavery.”


(Appeared in July, 1996, Camp Chase Gazette and reprinted by permission)

Jim Morgan has written on various topics for CCG over the years. His somewhat divergent Civil War interests include artillery and music. In addition to writing artillery articles, he has produced a tape of Civil War music called "Just Before the Battle" and is now working on a second tape. Currently living in Lovettsville, Va, Jim works as the Acquisitions Librarian for the U.S. Information Agency in Washington, DC.

In November, 1896, Ellis Spear, formerly of the 20th Maine, sent a manuscript to Joshua L. Chamberlain, his old commanding officer, with the request that Chamberlain review it. The manuscript, authored by Spear, covered certain events from the wartime history of their regiment and Spear wanted Chamberlain's comments and evaluation.

In his response, Chamberlain noted some of the then-recent writings about the 20th Maine at Little Round Top, saying that "quite a number of things have been put in distorted perspective lately."1

"The Melcher incident," Chamberlain said, referring to Lieutenant Holman S. Melcher, "is also magnified. He is now presented to the public as having suggested the charge. There is no truth in this. I had communicated with you before he came and asked me if he could not advance his company and gather in some prisoners in his front. I told him to take his place with his company that I was about to order a general charge. He went on the run and did, I have no doubt, gallant service but he did no more than many others did, - you for instance, on whom so much responsibility devolved in bringing up the left wing and making it a concave instead of a convex line in the sweeping charge." 2

Nearly a century has passed since that Chamberlain-Spear exchange and the question, "Who saved Little Round Top?," has not been much debated during that time. Though some have claimed the honor for Brigadier General Gouverneur Warren because of his perception, for Colonel Strong Vincent because of his initiative, or for Colonel Patrick O'Rourke because of his regiment's timely arrival on the right, the question, as it relates to the overall action, has had a generally accepted answer. The savior of Little Round Top was Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain.

Recently, however, the Melcher challenge was revived in a 1994 work titled, With a Flash of His Sword: The Writings of Major Holman S. Melcher, 20th Maine Infantry. Edited by William B. Styple, and generally reflecting its sub-title, this book also includes reports, letters, speeches, and articles by Chamberlain, Spear, several other members of the 20th Maine, and Colonel William C. Oates of the 15th Alabama, all of whom were involved at Little Round Top. It is largely from these additional materials that the editor reconstructs the argument for Melcher.

Beginning with a slightly veiled reference to The Killer Angels, Mr. Styple criticizes the "novelization of history," 3then declares categorically that it was Lieutenant Melcher, not Colonel Chamberlain, who conceptualized and led the bayonet charge which immortalized the 20th Maine.

Melcher, it is true, does not appear in The Killer Angels, though Michael Shaara readily acknowledged having condensed some of the action and left out several individuals whom he judged to be "minor characters."4 Whether or not that judgement is correct, it was a simple exercise of artistic license in what is, after all, a work of fiction.

More importantly, Melcher's story is not unknown. He is mentioned in many relevant works, from the original pieces cited by Mr. Styple to John Pullen's definitive regimental history, The Twentieth Maine. He appears in Willard Wallace's Soul of the Lion and in Alice Rains Trulock's more recent biography, In the Hands of Providence: Joshua L. Chamberlain and the American Civil War. Lieutenant Melcher has not been neglected by history.

Though the various documents clearly show that Melcher behaved gallantly during the Little Round Top action, they "prove" only the old bromide that different men, viewing the same battle from different points and perspectives, will have different impressions of what went on.

At the end of his third chapter, Styple sums up his argument with a list of 10 conclusions about the Round Top fight. Of these, however, only three -- numbers one, two, and four -- relate directly to his contention that Melcher, rather than Chamberlain, deserves the credit for the charge. The other seven, though no doubt true enough, are, at best, interesting side issues.

To cite just one example, conclusion number five states that Colonel Oates "was planning to retreat before the charge was made."5 Oates himself later said that he had, in fact, already ordered such a retreat and there seems no reason to doubt him. But Chamberlain could hardly have read Oates' mind and was facing an enemy who had given him no indication of quitting the contest. That Colonel Oates "was planning to retreat" is simply beside the point.

The three conclusions noted above, however, address the issue more directly and therefore warrant close analysis.

Number 1: "The charge of the Twentieth Maine was an impulsive and spontaneous effort in order to protect their wounded comrades in front. 'Bayonets' was the only command given."

Mr. Styple contends that Chamberlain never ordered a charge, but that Melcher, out of compassion for the wounded, took it on himself to advance, and that it was his courageous personal example which led the rest of the regiment to follow his lead.

In support of this argument, Styple quotes a July 6 after-action report in which Chamberlain writes, "I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line."6

He further quotes from Chamberlain's 1889 speech at the dedication of the 20th Maine's monument on Little Round Top. In this speech, Chamberlain said, "(i)n fact, to tell the truth, the order was never given, or but imperfectly . There was only time or need for the words, 'Bayonet! Forward to the right!'"7 As far as they go, these two statements support Mr. Styple's contention.

Chamberlain, however, wrote two after-action reports on July 6. Mr. Styple quotes only from the second. In the first, Chamberlain wrote, "(a)s a last, desperate resort, I ordered a charge (underlined in the original). The word 'fix bayonets' flew from man to man."8

Melcher himself later says that Chamberlain "gives the order to 'fix bayonets,' and almost (my emphasis) before he can say 'charge' the regiment . leaps down the hill."9

This is all somewhat misleading and easily could degenerate into an argument over semantics. It does, however, demonstrate the danger of interpreting such texts literally without accounting for the possibility of hyperbole on the part of the writer.

At issue here is not whether Chamberlain actually said, "Charge!," or even whether he remembered precisely what he said during that very busy couple of hours, but whether, at any time, he gave his men some understandable order or instruction about the movement which put the 20th Maine into the history books. In the documents cited by Styple, statements made by Chamberlain (pp. 42, 123, and 296) and Melcher (p. 133), as well as by Private Theodore Gerrish (pp. 68-69), Captain J.H. Nichols (p. 72), Sergeant William T. Livermore (pp. 77-78), Corporal Elisha Coan (p. 84), Captain Howard L. Prince (p. 115), and Lieutenant Samuel L. Miller (p. 259) all either clearly state or reasonably can be interpreted to mean that he did.

It seems especially clear that the idea of an offensive movement came from Chamberlain. "It was too evident," he stated in his first report, "that we could maintain the defensive (underlined in the original) no longer."10

More to the point, Melcher seems only to have wanted to move his company forward and even asked his Colonel's permission to do this. Such a movement would have been a limited and essentially defensive action, while his request for permission shows that what happened was neither "impulsive" nor "spontaneous."

Chamberlain indicated to Spear in the 1896 letter quoted above that he had decided on the charge before Melcher approached him. Perhaps this is so, though time has a way of becoming very fluid at such stressful moments. Chamberlain also may have expanded on Melcher's more limited suggestion or he may have thought to charge about the same time that Melcher thought to advance his company. Various comments can be interpreted to support various conclusions and, as the line already had moved up and down the hill several times anyway, the idea of some sort of movement must have been in the minds of many of the men.

In any case, the evidence does not support an absolute declaration that the charge resulted simply from a spur-of-the-moment impulse by Lieutenant Melcher. It does, however, lend credence to the view that Chamberlain gave some sort of order or instruction beyond simply shouting "Bayonets!" This point will be explored further below.

Number 2: A "right wheel forward," was never ordered by Chamberlain. His first report stated that, "an extended right-wheel" was made only after the initial charge and the breaking of the first enemy line."

What Mr. Styple calls "his first report," actually was Chamberlain's second report. In the first, after noting his order to charge, Chamberlain wrote, "The men dashed forward with a shout. The two wings came into one line again, and extending to the left, and at the same time wheeling to the right, the whole Regiment described nearly a half circle."11

The "first enemy line" being, at most, 30 yards away, it is not surprising that the wheel did not develop until after that line was hit and broken. The 20th Maine did not have the manpower actually to flank the 15th Alabama, so wheeling before hitting the Confederate line would only have exposed it's own flank. "Extend-ing to the left," as Chamberlain said, the Maine men hit as far on the Alabamians' right as they possibly could before wheeling. They had no other choice.

Could an order to wheel have been given after the Confederate line was hit? This seems highly unlikely. Such an order would not only have to have been given, but effectively communicated to the extended and already advanced left, and then properly executed, all while the 20th was fully in motion, scattered through the woods, mixed up with the prisoners, and otherwise distracted.

Could the wheel have happened without an order? This is possible, but, again, unlikely. In fairness, it must be admitted that, by following the lay of the land, the attack more or less naturally would have drifted to the right anyway once the saddle between the Round Tops was reached. Still, mere "drift" does not seem an adequate explanation for a movement described by an eyewitness as looking "like a great gate upon a post."12

One other point. If the forward movement had been made on impulse with no order to wheel, the two wings of the regiment would have charged down the hill away from each other. Had that happened, Chamberlain could not possibly have made the statement quoted above from his first July 6 report.

Wheeling an infantry line requires considerable control and coordination even on the drill field. In the conditions then existing on Little Round Top, the very fact that the maneuver happened strongly suggests that clear preparatory instructions were given and that enough time passed between those instructions and their execution that the men knew exactly what was expected of them. Who but the regimental commander would have given either the instructions or the order to advance?

In other words, before he shouted "Bayonets!," Chamberlain must already have somehow informed his regiment that he was going to order a wheel. So why did he not mention any preparatory instructions in his July 6 reports?

Perhaps a better question is "why should he have done so?" Is it really necessary to detail in an after-action report background information which might reasonably have been inferred by the report's intended readers? Could Chamberlain not have thought that his statement, "I ordered a charge," combined with his short description of the wheel, were enough to make the point?

Chamberlain did, however, provide some of this background in his 1889 monument dedication speech at the regimental reunion and in articles written in 1907 and 1913. Given the various late-century writings on the topic, with the differing perspectives they brought to the public debate, and considering the mysterious rift which developed between himself and Spear in later years, a rift which included Spear's strident public attacks on him, Chamberlain, quite reasonably, might only then have felt a need to detail the background for the historical record.

In the 1889 speech he noted that, having decided on the bayonet charge, he "at once sent to the left wing to give them notice and time for the required change of front."13

In the very short 1907 piece, Chamberlain expressed this by saying that he "sent word to the senior officer on my left to make a right wheel of the charge and endeavor to catch the enemy somewhat in flank on the right."14

He addressed the same point in his 1913 essay, "Through Blood and Fire at Gettysburg," by noting that he "communicated this to Captain Spear of the wheeling flank, on which the initiative was to fall."15 And, of course, he mentioned this to Spear in the 1896 letter with which this essay began. These statements clearly demonstrate that Chamberlain sent a runner to inform Spear of his decision, a quite logical thing for him to have done.

Spear claimed in a 1913 article never to have received any orders 16. This could easily be true, given both the normal condition on a battlefield and the fact that Sgt. Reuel Thomas, serving as Chamberlain's designated messenger that day, was wounded during the fight. Spear's claim, however, does not support the argument that no order ws given.

The historical record, in any case, is quite clear that the wheel happened. Chamberlain described it in both of his July 6 reports. Oliver Willcox Norton, the brigade bugler, states in his classic, The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, that Chamberlain "made a right wheel with his line, which cleared the valley of the Confederates."17 Captain A.M. Judson, in his History of the 83rd Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, made the "gate upon a post" comment noted above, stating specifically that the line of the 20th Maine "swing (sic) around upon a moving pivot, like a great gate upon a post, until its left had swept down through the valley and up the sides of Big Round Top."18

Melcher himself made a revealing comment in an 1885 newspaper article (cited by Mr. Styple) when he wrote of how the Confederates "were driven in their flight, at first (emphasis mine), directly to the rear of the line of battle of our army."19 Obviously speaking of the initial thrust of the 20th Maine's sharply refused left wing, Melcher implies the development of the wheel with the phrase, "at first," which itself implies that the general direction of the Confederate retreat changed during the course of the action.

Parenthetically, this also explains how several dozen Confederates (those on their own far right) ended up behind the Union lines. When the Federals wheeled, the men who had retreated "directly to the rear" were cut off. Their only possible escape lay to the east. Either in panic or in a deliberate attempt to circle around the Union troops and get back to their own lines, they moved directly, if only temporarily, out of harm's way, and ultimately were killed or captured in fields east of the Round Tops.

Finally, we know that the 20th Maine took prisoners from Alabama and Texas regiments which were to the 15th Alabama's left. To do this, the 20th had to have swept around to its own right.

So the right wheel happened. It was not parade ground pretty and very likely was not even made by the entire regiment, as some portion of the 20th Maine's left wing must have pursued those Confederates who fled "directly to the rear." Nevertheless, it happened, which means that at least some of the men in the refused left knew about it, which in turn means that Chamberlain had indeed passed the word -- whether Spear got it or not.

Knowing specifically what they were to do, the veteran soldiers of the 20th Maine were ready to do it. Thus, at the critical moment, "the word was enough."

Number four: Col. Chamberlain did not lead the charge. Lt. Holman Melcher was the first officer down the slope.

Though directly related to Mr. Styple's argument, this is a very minor point and could even be called a quibble. Even granting Melcher the honor of being first down the slope (and such an interpretation is perfectly plausible), he did not "lead" the charge in a command sense, which is what the conclusion implies. Chamberlain probably was standing in his proper place behind the line when he yelled "Bayonets!," so if indeed "the word was enough" to get the men started, he could not have gone first as the entire line would have moved out ahead of him.

But it does not matter. The questions, "who was first down the hill?" and "who led the charge?" are different questions which should not be posed as one.

The Melcher papers are a valuable addition to the literature of the war. As a challenge to the traditional wisdom about Little Round Top, however, the Melcher argument is rather like the assault of the 15th Alabama -- a tenacious and courageous effort, to be sure, but one which ultimately falls short.

The question, therefore, remains: who saved Little Round Top? Given the available historical evidence, the answer likewise must remain: Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain.<>


Maine History Online

While most Civil War regiments were created with men from one geographical region, the 20th Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers was formed in August 1862 to absorb the overflow of volunteers.

Its members came together from across the state, in response to President Abraham Lincoln's call in July 1862 for 300,000 volunteers.

17th Maine Infantry volunteers, 1864

In late 1865 Joshua Chamberlain wrote of the 20th Maine, "It was made of the surplus recruits drifted together, the last of a call for 300,000 more.

"It was without pride. No county claimed them. No city gave them a flag. They received no words of farewell on leaving their state. No words of welcome on their return."

Scouts and guides with the Army of the Potomac, ca. 1865

Being primarily farmers and lumbermen before they enlisted, most of the men had no military background, but many were used to hard work and surviving in an often unforgiving environment, were familiar with firearms and had the benefit of having volunteered for service.

Colonel Adelbert Ames of Rockland, commander of the regiment, knew the soldiers were an independent lot and would not always obey orders with questioning or commenting on them.

Bowdoin College, Brunswick, 1862

Also lacking military experience, a number of officers were well educated, including 10 who had graduated from Bowdoin College.

Many were named officers because of their success at recruiting volunteers for the Maine regiments.

Commanding officer Col. Ames was trained as a military officer. He was a graduate of West Point and recipient of the Medal of Honor for his actions during the First Battle of Bull Run.

Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1862

Joshua L. Chamberlain was the regiment's lieutenant colonel.

A professor at Bowdoin College before his enlistment, Chamberlain lacked military training, but made up for that deficit with his intelligence.

Chamberlain was a graduate of Bowdoin College and the Bangor Theological Seminary.

When Chamberlain went to the Governor of Maine to acquire a commission in the Army, the Governor offered him the rank of Colonel.

Chamberlain declined, saying that he would like to learn the position first and took the rank of lieutenant colonel instead.

Battlefield of the United States Civil War, 1861-1865

Soon, the 20th traveled by rail and steamer to Washington, D.C., to join the Army of the Potomac as part of Butterfield's "Light Brigade" of the Fifth Corps.

From there, they marched to Antietam (Sharpsburg), Maryland, and were held in reserve with the rest of the 5th Corps during the battle of September 16-17, 1862.

The Battle of Antietam, known as the bloodiest battle of the Civil War, was the 20th's first taste of the war.

The Union Army won a strategic victory as Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia withdrew after suffering considerable losses.

The Battle of Antietam also gave President Lincoln the victory he needed to implement a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862 that freed slaves in rebel states. He issued the more detailed Proclamation in January 1863.

Thomas Chamberlain, Brewer, ca. 1864

Colonel Ames, who attempted to turn the untrained volunteers into an effective regiment, was respected by the troops -- but not liked.

Thomas Chamberlain, a young non-commissioned officer summed Ames up best when he wrote, "I tell you, he is about as savage a man you ever saw . . . I swear the men will shoot him the first battle we are in."

Chamberlain was the brother of Lt. Col. Joshua Chamberlain, later the commander of the regiment.

General Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1910

In May 1863, Col. Ames was promoted to a Brigadier General in General Oliver Otis Howard's corps.

Joshua Chamberlain was promoted to Colonel and commander of the regiment.

The men took to Chamberlain, admiring him for his willingness to get into the midst of things alongside of them.

Map of Gettysburg battlefield, 1863

Throughout the winter and spring of 1863 the Union and Confederate Armies were making their way north with only a few minor engagements.

It was not until Gettysburg that the armies met in a full-scale fight.

The Battle of Gettysburg began July 1, 1863, and at the end of the first day the Union Army had dug in on Cemetery Ridge and had command of the battlefield while the Confederate Army had taken position on Seminary Ridge.

Dead artillery horses after fight at Trostle's house in Gettysburg

On July 2, 1862, Confederate Gen. James Longstreet recommended that the rebel army move around the end of the Union line, get behind Gen. George Mead's army and attack from that position, but Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered a direct attack.

Because Sickle's Third Corps failed to take its assigned position at the left end of the Union line, after the Confederate attack began, four regiments of Vicent's Brigade, including the 20th Maine moved into position at Little Round Top.

Chamberlain managed to move his troops into a position that surprised the Confederates and then, when the 20th Maine was close to losing its hold on the hill, Chamberlain ordered an unlikely attack with bayonets -- as the regiment was out of ammunition -- on the resting Confederate soldiers.

The 20th Maine suffered heavy casualties, but held Little Round Top and allowed a Union victory at Gettysburg.

McLean House at Appomattox

The regiment later participated in every major battle with the Army of the Potomac, but Gettysburg had been its moment in the sun.

It would never again have as many men in its ranks as it did at Little Round Top.

Col. Chamberlain was soon put in command of a brigade and in 1865 was promoted to Brigadier General and later put in command by Ulysses S. Grant of all Union troops during the surrender of the Confederates.

Chamberlain and 20th Maine, Gettysburg reunion, 1889

The 20th Maine regiment was mustered out of service on June 16, 1865. Out of a total enlistment of 1,621 men, nine officers and 138 enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded and one officer and 145 enlisted men died of disease, for a total of 293 lost.

The war had a profound affect on many soldiers and transition back into civilian life was not always easy. Abner R. Small summed up the war well when he wrote in a letter to a friend, "War and heroes sound well in history but the reality is known to but the few that survive the strife."

Sources: John J. Pullen, The Twentieth Maine: A Volunteer Regiment in the Civil War, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, 1984.

Thomas A. Desjardin, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign, Gettysburg, Pa.: Thomas Publications, 1995.


The Ballad of the 20th Maine

In 2019, almost a century after Maine adopted its state song “The State of Maine Song,” and seven years after the state adopted its state march “The Dirigo March,” Governor Janet Mills signed into legislation a bill which made “The Ballad of the 20 th Maine” the official state ballad of Maine. The ballad was written by Griffin Sherry, a member of the Maine-based folk band The Ghost of Paul Revere.

“The Ballad of the 20 th Maine” tells the story of Andrew Tozier, a member of the 20 th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment during the American Civil War. Beginning with his early life in Lichfield, Maine, the song follows him as a runaway teenager before he joins the Union army. The rest of the song focuses on Tozier’s role in the 20 th Maine’s iconic last stand at Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg. Tozier, by that point injured, was the colors-bearer for the regiment, and thus “alone I stood with colors, flying proud and true, for to let my northern brothers know the battle was not through.”

Representative Scott Cuddy introduced the bill to recognize the song as Maine’s state ballad as a way to both recognize Maine musicians and to commemorate the sacrifice of Maine’s men who fought in the Civil War. The bill ended up passing unanimously in both chambers, but did face some initial objection in the State and Local Government Committee from two Republican representatives. Rep. Frances Head thought that the pro-Union message would be insulting to the South, while Rep. Roger Reed praised the confederate cause, saying that “Many of them were great Christian men on both sides. They fought hard and they were fighting for states’ rights as they saw them.”

While these comments were made by a minority group which had no effect on the final passing of the bill, they prompt an important discussion about controversy and commemoration. Even recognizing the smallest and most insignificant audience reactions to controversial pieces of commemoration can give great insight. The internet has given us access to reactions that we could never have from the past—for example, Andrew Gockel of Jefferson, Maine. Wrote on twitter that “Rep. Scott Cuddy of Maine is partaking too much of mind-altering drugs” in response to Cuddy’s initial bill proposal.

These reactions—both from elected officials and Twitter commentators—tell us about the state of our country and its position on commemoration of our own dark past. In an era when Confederate monuments are at the forefront of thought, it’s unfortunately difficult to be surprised that legislators are arguing that the Civil War was fought solely about “states’ rights.” As the country grapples with how to commemorate our history, reactions to new commemorations can reveal the truth about where we are—which is perhaps much less far along than we might think if we ignored the controversy


Maine Memory Network

While most Civil War regiments were created with men from one geographical region, the 20th Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers was formed in August 1862 to absorb the overflow of volunteers.

Its members came together from across the state, in response to President Abraham Lincoln's call in July 1862 for 300,000 volunteers.

17th Maine Infantry volunteers, 1864
Item 4127 info
Maine Historical Society

In late 1865 Joshua Chamberlain wrote of the 20th Maine, "It was made of the surplus recruits drifted together, the last of a call for 300,000 more.

"It was without pride. No county claimed them. No city gave them a flag. They received no words of farewell on leaving their state. No words of welcome on their return."

Scouts and guides with the Army of the Potomac, ca. 1865
Item 4288 info
Maine Historical Society

Being primarily farmers and lumbermen before they enlisted, most of the men had no military background, but many were used to hard work and surviving in an often unforgiving environment, were familiar with firearms and had the benefit of having volunteered for service.

Colonel Adelbert Ames of Rockland, commander of the regiment, knew the soldiers were an independent lot and would not always obey orders with questioning or commenting on them.

Bowdoin College, Brunswick, 1862
Item 4334 info
Maine Historical Society

Also lacking military experience, a number of officers were well educated, including 10 who had graduated from Bowdoin College.

Many were named officers because of their success at recruiting volunteers for the Maine regiments.

Commanding officer Col. Ames was trained as a military officer. He was a graduate of West Point and recipient of the Medal of Honor for his actions during the First Battle of Bull Run.

Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1862
Item 5187 info
Maine Historical Society

Joshua L. Chamberlain was the regiment's lieutenant colonel.

A professor at Bowdoin College before his enlistment, Chamberlain lacked military training, but made up for that deficit with his intelligence.

Chamberlain was a graduate of Bowdoin College and the Bangor Theological Seminary.

When Chamberlain went to the Governor of Maine to acquire a commission in the Army, the Governor offered him the rank of Colonel.

Chamberlain declined, saying that he would like to learn the position first and took the rank of lieutenant colonel instead.

Battlefield of the United States Civil War, 1861-1865
Item 4287 info
Maine Historical Society

Soon, the 20th traveled by rail and steamer to Washington, D.C., to join the Army of the Potomac as part of Butterfield's "Light Brigade" of the Fifth Corps.

From there, they marched to Antietam (Sharpsburg), Maryland, and were held in reserve with the rest of the 5th Corps during the battle of September 16-17, 1862.

The Battle of Antietam, known as the bloodiest battle of the Civil War, was the 20th's first taste of the war.

The Union Army won a strategic victory as Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia withdrew after suffering considerable losses.

The Battle of Antietam also gave President Lincoln the victory he needed to implement a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862 that freed slaves in rebel states. He issued the more detailed Proclamation in January 1863.

Thomas Chamberlain, Brewer, ca. 1864
Item 4332 info
Maine Historical Society

Colonel Ames, who attempted to turn the untrained volunteers into an effective regiment, was respected by the troops -- but not liked.

Thomas Chamberlain, a young non-commissioned officer summed Ames up best when he wrote, "I tell you, he is about as savage a man you ever saw . . . I swear the men will shoot him the first battle we are in."

Chamberlain was the brother of Lt. Col. Joshua Chamberlain, later the commander of the regiment.

General Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1910
Item 4330 info
Maine Historical Society

In May 1863, Col. Ames was promoted to a Brigadier General in General Oliver Otis Howard's corps.

Joshua Chamberlain was promoted to Colonel and commander of the regiment.

The men took to Chamberlain, admiring him for his willingness to get into the midst of things alongside of them.

Map of Gettysburg battlefield, 1863
Item 4327 info
Maine Historical Society

Throughout the winter and spring of 1863 the Union and Confederate Armies were making their way north with only a few minor engagements.

It was not until Gettysburg that the armies met in a full-scale fight.

The Battle of Gettysburg began July 1, 1863, and at the end of the first day the Union Army had dug in on Cemetery Ridge and had command of the battlefield while the Confederate Army had taken position on Seminary Ridge.

Dead artillery horses after fight at Trostle's house in Gettysburg
Item 4286 info
Maine Historical Society

On July 2, 1862, Confederate Gen. James Longstreet recommended that the rebel army move around the end of the Union line, get behind Gen. George Mead's army and attack from that position, but Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered a direct attack.

Because Sickle's Third Corps failed to take its assigned position at the left end of the Union line, after the Confederate attack began, four regiments of Vicent's Brigade, including the 20th Maine moved into position at Little Round Top.

Chamberlain managed to move his troops into a position that surprised the Confederates and then, when the 20th Maine was close to losing its hold on the hill, Chamberlain ordered an unlikely attack with bayonets -- as the regiment was out of ammunition -- on the resting Confederate soldiers.

The 20th Maine suffered heavy casualties, but held Little Round Top and allowed a Union victory at Gettysburg.

McLean House at Appomattox
Item 4285 info
Maine Historical Society

The regiment later participated in every major battle with the Army of the Potomac, but Gettysburg had been its moment in the sun.

It would never again have as many men in its ranks as it did at Little Round Top.

Col. Chamberlain was soon put in command of a brigade and in 1865 was promoted to Brigadier General and later put in command by Ulysses S. Grant of all Union troops during the surrender of the Confederates.

Chamberlain and 20th Maine, Gettysburg reunion, 1889
Item 4163 info
Maine Historical Society

The 20th Maine regiment was mustered out of service on June 16, 1865. Out of a total enlistment of 1,621 men, nine officers and 138 enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded and one officer and 145 enlisted men died of disease, for a total of 293 lost.

The war had a profound affect on many soldiers and transition back into civilian life was not always easy. Abner R. Small summed up the war well when he wrote in a letter to a friend, "War and heroes sound well in history but the reality is known to but the few that survive the strife."

Bronne:
John J. Pullen, The Twentieth Maine: A Volunteer Regiment in the Civil War, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, 1984.

Thomas A. Desjardin, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign, Gettysburg, Pa.: Thomas Publications, 1995.


Kyk die video: Bufords speech before Day 1 Battle of Gettysburg. (Desember 2021).