Geskiedenis Podcasts

10 Januarie 1945

10 Januarie 1945

10 Januarie 1945

Januarie 1945

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Birma

Geallieerde troepe vang Gangaw



25 Januarie 1945

Die Slag om die bult, ook bekend as die Teenaanval van Ardennes, was 'n groot Duitse offensiewe veldtog aan die Wesfront tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog wat van 16 Desember 1944 tot 25 Januarie 1945 plaasgevind het. Die offensief was bedoel om die geallieerde gebruik van die Belgiese hawe Antwerpen te stop en die geallieerde lyne te verdeel, sodat die Duitsers die vier geallieerde magte kon omsingel en vernietig en die Geallieerdes 'n vredesverdrag in die guns van die as -magte kon beding.

Die Duitsers het 'n totale verrassingsaanval op die oggend van 16 Desember 1944 bereik weens 'n kombinasie van geallieerde oorvertroue, beheptheid met geallieerde offensiewe planne en swak lugverkenning weens slegte weer. Amerikaanse magte het die swaarste van die aanval gedra en die grootste slagoffers tydens enige oorlog gehad. Die geveg het ook die gepantserde magte van Duitsland ernstig uitgeput; dit was gedurende die oorlog grootliks onvervang. Duitse personeel en later ook Luftwaffe -vliegtuie (die slotfases van die verlowing) het ook groot verliese gely. Die Duitsers het 'n swak verdedigde deel van die Geallieerde lyn aangeval en voordeel getrek uit swaar bewolkte weerstoestande wat die geallieerdes se superieure lugmagte gegrond het. Heftige weerstand op die noordelike skouer van die offensief, rondom Elsenborn Ridge, en in die suide, rondom Bastogne, het Duitse toegang tot belangrike paaie na die noordweste en weste geblokkeer waarop hulle vir sukses gereken het. Pantser- en infanteriekolomme wat veronderstel was om langs parallelle roetes te beweeg, was op dieselfde paaie. Dit, en die terrein wat die verdedigers bevoordeel het, het die Duitse opmars agter die skedule gelaat en die Geallieerdes die dun geplaasde troepe kon versterk. Die verste wes wat die offensief bereik het, was die dorp Foy-Nôtre-Dame, suidoos van Dinant, wat op 24 Desember 1944 deur die Amerikaanse 2de pantserdivisie gestop word. [15] [16] [17] Verbeterde weersomstandighede vanaf ongeveer 24 Desember toegelaat lugaanvalle op Duitse magte en toevoerlyne, wat die mislukking van die offensief verseël het. Op 26 Desember het die hoofelement van Patton se Amerikaanse derde leër Bastogne uit die suide bereik en die beleg beëindig. Alhoewel die offensief teen 27 Desember effektief verbreek is, toe die vasgekeerde eenhede van die 2de Panzerdivisie twee uitbraakpogings met slegs gedeeltelike sukses aangewend het, het die geveg nog 'n maand voortgeduur voordat die frontlyn effektief in sy posisie herstel is voor die aanval. In die nasleep van die nederlaag was baie ervare Duitse eenhede sonder manne en toerusting, en intussen het oorlewendes teruggetrek na die Siegfried Line.

Die Duitsers se aanvanklike aanval was betrokke by 410,000 man net meer as 1400 tenks, tenkvernietigers en aanvalsgewere 2600 artillerie-stukke 1,600 teen-tenkgewere en meer as 1,000 gevegsvliegtuie, asook 'n groot aantal ander gepantserde vegvoertuie (AFV's). [4] Dit is 'n paar weke later versterk, wat die totale sterkte van die offensief op ongeveer 450,000 troepe en 1,500 tenks en aanvalsgewere te staan ​​gebring het. Tussen 63 222 en 98 000 van hierdie mans is dood, vermis, gewond in aksie of gevang. Vir die Amerikaners, uit 'n hoogtepunt van 610,000 troepe, het [18] 89,000 [5] ongevalle geword, waarvan ongeveer 19,000 dood is. [5] [19] Die "Bulge" was die grootste en bloedigste enkele geveg wat die Verenigde State in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog [20] [21] [22] gevoer het en die derde dodelikste veldtog in die Amerikaanse geskiedenis.


10 Januarie 1945 - Geskiedenis

DIE OORLOG BINNE SY SLOTTE FASE
(1945)
Events & gt Dawn of the Atomic Era, 1945

  • Die oorlog begin sy laaste fase, 1945
  • Debat oor hoe om die bom te gebruik, laat lente 1945
  • Die Drie -eenheidstoets, 16 Julie 1945
  • Veiligheid en die Drie -eenheidstoets, Julie 1945
  • Evaluasies van Drie -eenheid, Julie 1945
  • Potsdam en die finale besluit om te bom, Julie 1945
  • Die atoombom van Hiroshima, 6 Augustus 1945
  • Die atoombom van Nagasaki, 9 Augustus 1945
  • Japan gee oor, 10-15 Augustus 1945
  • Die Manhattan-projek en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, 1939-1945

Op 12 April 1945, slegs weke voor Duitsland se onvoorwaardelike oorgawe op 7 Mei, President Franklin Roosevelt sterf skielik in Warm Springs, Georgia. Visepresident Harry S. Truman, 'n veteraan van die Amerikaanse senaat, was nou president. Truman was nie bekend met baie van Roosevelt se interne beleidsbesprekings nie en moes in die eerste weke in die amp uitgebrei ingelig word. Een van hierdie inligtingsessies, wat op 25 April deur die minister van oorlog, Henry Stimson, gelewer is, het betrekking op S-1 (die Manhattan-projek). Stimson, met Leslie Groves teenwoordig tydens 'n deel van die vergadering, het die geskiedenis van die Manhattan -projek opgespoor, die status daarvan opgesom en die rooster vir toetsing en bestryding van werk bestudeer. Truman het tydens die vergadering van vyf-en-veertig minute talle vrae gestel en dit duidelik gemaak dat hy die relevansie van die atoombom vir toekomstige diplomatieke en militêre inisiatiewe verstaan.

Teen die tyd dat Truman sy amp beklee, was Japan byna verslaan. Amerikaanse vliegtuie, veral B-29's (regs), bombardeer Japannese stede na willekeur. By 'n enkele vuurbomaanval in Maart is byna 100 000 mense dood en meer as 'n miljoen beseer in Tokio. 'N Tweede lugaanval op Tokio in Mei is 83 000 dood. Intussen het die Amerikaanse vloot die toevoerlyne van die eilande afgesny. Maar vanweë die algemeen aanvaarde opvatting dat die Japannese tot die bitter einde sou veg, het 'n duur inval op die tuiseilande waarskynlik gelyk, hoewel sommige Amerikaanse beleidmakers meen dat 'n suksesvolle bestryding van een of meer atoombomme die Japannese kan oortuig dat verdere weerstand tevergeefs was.

Strategieë om die oorgawe van Japan te dwing, het 'n sentrale fase geword. By die Jalta -konferensie in Februarie 1945 (links) het die Sowjetunie ingestem om die oorlog teen Japan aan te gaan sodra Duitsland verslaan is. Die Geallieerdes het lank gevra om die onvoorwaardelike oorgawe van Duitsland en Japan, maar Joseph C. Grew, die waarnemende minister van Buitelandse Sake, dring daarop aan dat dit in die openbaar duidelik word dat dit nie Japan se totale uitwissing beteken nie. As dit eers gedemilitariseer is, sou Japan vry wees om sy politieke stelsel te kies en sou hy 'n lewendige ekonomie kon ontwikkel. Grew het gehoop dat 'n openbare verklaring aan Japan tot oorgawe sou lei voordat 'n duur inval sou begin. Die gesamentlike stafhoofde het steeds getwyfel of dit moontlik was, en het voortgegaan om 'n grondinval in Japan self te bepleit, 'n plan wat as Operasie Olimpiese aangedui word. Stimson het gehoop dat 'n inval vermy kon word, hetsy deur die oorgawe -terme te herdefinieer of deur die atoombom te gebruik.

Die voorbereidings is voortgesit vir die fisiese aflewering van atoombomme aan hul doelwitte. In September 1944, op Wendover Field in die weste van Utah, het kolonel Paul Tibbets (regs) begin met die boor van die met die hand uitgesoekte bomwerperpersoneel wat bestaan ​​uit die 393ste bombardementskader van die 509ste saamgestelde vleuel, Army Air Force. Alhoewel die presiese aard van hul missie vir almal behalwe Tibbets geheim gehou is, het die vlieëniers en die bemanning geweet dat iets vreemds aan die gang was, terwyl hulle herhaaldelik geoefen het om enkele, groot (5.500 pond) dummybomme uit hul nuwe B-29 langafstandbomwerpers te laat val . (Hulle noem hierdie oranje bomme 'pampoene'.) Na die oorgawe van Duitsland aan die Geallieerdes in Mei, was dit duidelik dat die bom op die enigste oorblywende vegter, Japan, gebruik sou word. Die volgende maand het Tibbets sy bevel na Tinian Island in die Marianas-eilande in die westelike Stille Oseaan verskuif, waar die Navy Seabees die grootste lughawe ter wêreld gebou het om die groot B-29's wat reeds Japan se stede gebombardeer het, te akkommodeer. Die voorbereidings vir die gebruik van die bom was naby voltooiing, maar die vraag hoe om dit te gebruik, het gebly.

  • Die oorlog begin sy laaste fase, 1945
  • Debat oor hoe om die bom te gebruik, laat lente 1945
  • Die Drie -eenheidstoets, 16 Julie 1945
  • Veiligheid en die Drie -eenheidstoets, Julie 1945
  • Evaluasies van Drie -eenheid, Julie 1945
  • Potsdam en die finale besluit om te bom, Julie 1945
  • Die atoombom van Hiroshima, 6 Augustus 1945
  • Die atoombom van Nagasaki, 9 Augustus 1945
  • Japan gee oor, 10-15 Augustus 1945
  • Die Manhattan-projek en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, 1939-1945

Volgende

Die teks vir hierdie bladsy is aangepas en gedeeltes is direk geneem uit die publikasie van die Office of History and Heritage Resources: F. G. Gosling, Die Manhattan -projek: die atoombom maak (DOE/MA-0001 Washington: History Division, Department of Energy, Januarie 1999), 42, 45-46. Die foto's van 'D-Day', die B-29's en die Jalta-konferensie is met vergunning van die National Archives. Die foto van Harry Truman Die eed van die amp is met vergunning van die Truman Presidensiële Museum en Biblioteek. Die foto van Paul Tibbets met sy grondpersoneel voor die Enola Gay word weergegee van Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: die weermag en die atoombom, Amerikaanse weermag in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), 535.


Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur Sers Joch & raquo 09 Aug 2019, 23:10

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur Ek het vrae & raquo 11 Aug 2019, 03:24

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur otis68 & raquo 24 Mei 2020, 00:38

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur adamb & raquo 13 Apr 2021, 22:13

Pz.Jg.Kp 1233 verskyn op die kaart van XXIII Army Corps in Januarie onder 23.Inf.Div. in die kroniek van hierdie afdeling of dokumente van die germandocsinrussia -webwerf verskyn dit egter nie meer later nie!

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur donwhite & raquo 14 Apr 2021, 08:31

Dit vul 'n leemte mooi in oor waar Pz.Jg.Kp. 1233 is ontplooi/geposisioneer. Kan ek vra wat die datum in Januarie is vir die kaart wat u geplaas het? Beter nog, sou dit moontlik wees om 'n skakel na die betrokke kaartlêer te plaas?

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur adamb & raquo 14 Apr 2021, 13:31

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur adamb & raquo 14 Apr 2021, 13:44

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur Ikel44 & raquo 28 Mei 2021, 17:47

Re: Oos -Pruise, Januarie 1945

Plaas deur FORBIN Yves & raquo 29 Mei 2021, 17:54

Watter lid het syfers verskaf?
En met u skakel kan ek nie toegang tot die lêers kry nie


Audie Murphy: One-Man Stand at Holtzwihr

Die mees onvergeetlike rol in die rolprent van die oorlogsheld, Audie Murphy, was soos hy in die diep persoonlike "To Hell and Back" (1955).

Daniel R. Champagne
Mei 2002

Op 'n ywerige Januarie -middag in 1945, is Kompanie B, 15de Regiment, 3de Infanteriedivisie, aangeval aan die buitewyke van Holtzwihr, Frankryk, deur ses tenks en 'n geskatte 250 Duitse infanteriste, wat vasbeslote was om die Bois de Riedwihr van die Amerikaners af te werp. . Eerste luitenant Audie L. Murphy het sekerlik gesê dat sy afgedankte geselskap die Duitse aanslag nie kon weerstaan ​​nie, en beveel sy manne om diep in die bos terug te keer na veiligheid. Nadat hy al sy karabyn -ammunisie aan die vyand bestee het, het Murphy self voorberei om terug te val. Skielik sien hy 'n .50-kaliber masjiengeweer op die rewolwer van 'n brandende tenkvernietiger. Omdat hy weet dat sy posisie ten alle koste beklee moet word, klim Murphy bo -op en begin die masjiengeweer op die aankomende Duitsers afvuur.

Inheemse Texan Murphy, bestem om 'n na -oorlogse filmster te word, het sy moedige standpunt gemaak tydens die offensief van Colmar, wat die Duitsers uiteindelik van hul laaste voet op Franse bodem verdryf het. Die 3de Infanteriedivisie se rol in die offensief was om vooruit te gaan naby die Bois de Riedwihr, 'n groot woud in die noordelike deel van die Colmar -sak wat strek tussen die sterk versterkte dorpe Riedwihr en Holtzwihr. Luitenant -kolonel Keith Ware, uitvoerende beampte van die 15de Regiment, onthou later hoe noodsaaklik dit was om die bos te beveilig, en verduidelik dat sy besit van kardinale belang was, aangesien die bos die Duitse vesting Holtzwihr oorheers het, waarvan die vermindering noodsaaklik was tot die vinnige uitvoering van die aanvallende take van die 3de afdeling ’.

Op 23 Januarie het die 30ste Regiment, 3de Infanteriedivisie, die bosse verower en die buitewyke van Holtzwihr en Riedwihr bereik, waar die Amerikaners 10 vyandelike tenks en tenkvernietigers teëgekom het, vergesel van minstens 100 infanteriste. Die gevolg was rampspoedig. Sonder omhulsel en nie in staat was om jakkalsgate in die bevrore aarde te grawe nie, is die Amerikaanse eenheid in stukke gesny. Gebroke, ondersterk en erg ongeorganiseerd, moes die 30ste hom aan die Bois de Riedwihr onttrek.

Die 15de regiment is beveel om dieselfde grond die volgende dag weer in te neem. Die daaropvolgende gevegte was so woedend dat onder meer die regiment se Kompanjie B onder 'n val was. Met die uitsondering van luitenant Murphy, is al die beamptes dood, en 102 van die geselskap se 120 aangewese mans is óf vermoor óf gewond voordat hulle selfs hul aangewese posisie bereik het. Teen middernag op 25 Januarie het Kompanjie B 600 meter die bos binnegedring en was sy posisie noord van Holtzwihr.

Binne 'n uur het vars voorrade die vermoeide oorlewendes van Kompanjie B bereik. Nadat die mans weer voorsien is, is hulle beveel om na die suidkant van die bos te beweeg, na die dorpie Holtzwihr, en die tou vas te hou totdat verligting kom. Die mans het in die vroeë oggendure deur sneeu -duisternis gevorder, en hulle het voor dagbreek hul aangewese posisie bereik. Toe hulle daar was, het die vermoeide GI's 'n vergeefse poging begin om jakkalsgate in die bevrore grond te grawe.

Murphy onthou later die frustrasie van sy mans: hierdie nag het ongewoon lank gelyk en die sneeu kouer as wat ek ooit gedroom het. Die geluid van pikke op bevrore grond klop soos 'n gek teen my trommelvlies. Die 18 mans wat in Kompanjie B oorgebly het, het gegrawe in die verdomde sneeubedekte graniet en die enigste voordeel daaruit was die oefening, wat hulle verhinder het om styf en onbeweeglik te word deur die koue. En selfs as 'n mens ophou grawe, was dit nodig om te loop om te voorkom dat jou voete vries.

Murphy, wat die uitgeputte onderneming gedurende die nag oorgeneem het, was bang vir 'n dagbreekaanval en was bekommerd dat sy mans nie 'n aanval kon deurstaan ​​nie. Vreemd, maar dit lyk asof dagbreek meer as enige ander tyd van die dag of nag beteken, vir 'n infanteris, het hy gesê oor die spanningsvolle aand. Dit is 'n aanvaarde tyd om aan te val of aangeval te word. Genadiglik, toe die bewolkte dagbreek aanbreek, het twee M10 tenkvernietigers van luitenant -kolonel Walter E. Tardy 601ste Tank Destroyer Battalion net betyds aangekom om die posisie van Company B ’s te ondersteun. Maar tot die verligting van Murphy en sy manne het die Duitsers nie met dagbreek aangeval nie.

Murphy het voordeel getrek uit die onverwagte stilte om sy lyne te begin vorm, met behulp van een tenkvernietiger en vyf pantservoertuie van die 3de verkenningstroep om sy regterflank te beskerm. Maatskappy A verbind losweg met sy linkerflank. Die tweede tenkvernietiger het 'n posisie ongeveer 40 meter voor die lyne gekies. Murphy het toe sy bevelpos in 'n afvoersloot 10 meter voor die agterste tenkvernietiger opgerig. Hy het kontak gehou met die hoofkwartier van die bataljon, 'n kilometer van die agterkant af, met 'n veldtelefoon.

Maatskappy B was gespan oor 'n agterkant van 'n groot 'U ’ waarvan die sye gevorm is deur twee groot vingers bome wat na Holtzwihr gelei het, onthou Murphy. Die sterk versterkte dorpie het nou 'n duidelike uitsig oor die golwende, sneeubedekte velde. Die twee tenkvernietigers sit langs 'n smal grondpad wat diep die bos in loop. Murphy het geweet dat die Duitse wapenrusting langs die pad sou moet vorder. Vroeg die middag bel hy terug na die eerste bataljon se hoofkwartier vir instruksies op die laaste oomblik. Hy is meegedeel dat die 2de Bataljon, 30ste Regiment, nog nie opgedaag het om sy geselskap te versterk nie. Hou u posisie, was sy bevele.

Om 1400 uur op 26 Januarie 1945 het die Duitse pantser en infanterie uit Holtzwihr uitgetrek, voorafgegaan deur 'n spervuur ​​van artillerie. Uit my vlak voorkant sien ek die teenaanval vorm met ses tenks en ongeveer 250 voet soldate in wit pakke, onthou Murphy, so dit sou onmoontlik gewees het om hulle vroeër of verder as 'n kilometer verder te sien. Ek het die mans gewaarsku en na die veldtelefoon gehardloop en die artilleriebeampte by die bataljon se hoofkwartier gebel en gereël dat die 2de bataljon afvuur. Ek het nie gou die bevel gegee om te skiet nie, want die hel het losgebars. Die Duitsers het hul voorlopige spervuur ​​begin. Privaat eersteklas Donald Eckman onthou: U kon die wimpels op die antenna van die Duitse tenks sien, en dit het dadelik ons ​​aandag getrek. Ons het ook 'n groot see wit infanterie na ons toe sien kom.

Die infanterie behoort aan die Duitse 2de Bergafdeling, wat uit Noorweë na die Colmar -streek oorgeplaas is. Die mans is opgelei vir operasies in bergagtige terrein. Individuele maatskappye van hierdie afdeling is van Noorweë afgebring en in die rye gevoer sodra hulle aankom. Deur hierdie elite -afdeling in Holtzwihr tot aksie te verbind, het die Duitse bevelvoerders gedemonstreer hoe noodsaaklik hulle was om 'n brughoof wes van die Ryn te hou.

Die Duitse taktiese doel was om beheer te kry oor die pad wat vanaf Holtzwihr deur die posisie van Murphy gelei het en tot in die bos buite die regimentêre hoofkwartier. As dit suksesvol was, sou die vyandelike aanval die posisie van die 3de afdeling duidelik bedreig. Murphy erken die belangrikheid daarvan om die pad ten alle koste te hou.

Toe die vyand binne bereik kom, het die tenkvernietigers van Tardy ’s losgebrand. Ongelukkig het hul 90 mm -skulpe onskadelik van die staalkant van die aankomende Duitse wapenrusting gestamp. Ek het gesien hoe die vyandelike tenks regstreeks treffers kry, het Murphy gesê, maar die rondtes was ondoeltreffend teen die swaar gepantserde Duitse tenks. Hulle het 'n masjiengeweer-span van Company B uitgeskakel en kwaai gevuur. Toe word die agterste tenkvernietiger getref deur 'n skulp van 88 mm wat sy dun pantser deurboor en die bevelvoerder en kanonnier doodgemaak het. Die oorlewende bemanningslede skarrel uit en trek terug in die bos.

Ontevrede het die bemanning in die loodtenkvernietiger, nadat hy verskeie nabye oproepe oorleef het, self 'n aanval uitgevoer. Personeelsersant Joseph Tardiff en korporaal Robert Hines het gelyktydig met 0,50- en .30-kaliber masjiengewere weggebrand en die aankomende vyandelike infanteriste afgesny. Skielik het die bemanning egter beheer oor die tenkvernietiger verloor toe hulle probeer om in 'n beter afvuurposisie te beweeg. Die voertuig gly van die pad af in 'n dreineringsloot en laat die hoofgeweer op 'n nuttelose hoek wat verhinder dat hy op die vyand opgelei kan word. Vinnig vas in die sloot, het die tenkvernietiger 'n sit -eend geword vir Duitse vuur. Die bemanning klim uit en trek haastig terug na die bos.

Omdat beide Amerikaanse tenkvernietigers buite werking was en groot vyandelike infanterie en gepantserde magte op sy posisie beweeg het, het Murphy besef dat die oorblyfsels van sy geselskap nie meer kon uithou nie. Hy het sy mans beveel om terug te keer na veiligheid diep in die bos terwyl hy agtergebly het en artillerievuur gelei het. Privaat eersteklas Irving Kelly was huiwerig om Murphy te verlaat. Ek onthou hoe mal ek was toe Murph vir ons gesê het om terug te gaan, onthou Kelly. Ons wou bly en langs hom baklei. Ek onthou duidelik dat sersant Harold Corl en ek die laaste twee was. As gevolg van 'n tegniese probleem met die voorste waarnemer 1ste Lt. Walter Weispfenning se radio, bly Murphy op sy pos en stuur artillerievuur oor die veldtelefoon. Dit was nie 'n heroïese daad nie, het Murphy gesê. Ek het gedink as een man die werk kan doen, waarom die lewens van ander in gevaar stel?

Hy beveel vuur direk bo -op die oprukkende Duitsers, en rig die teikeninstruksies aan die hoofkwartier van die eerste bataljon, terwyl hy terselfdertyd met die karabyn op die vyandelike infanterie skiet. Ek was mal oor die artillerie, onthou Murphy. Ek kon sien hoe Kraut -soldate in rook- en sneeuwolke verdwyn, hoe hulle hoor skree en skree, maar tog kom hulle aan asof niks hulle sal keer nie. Die Duitsers het tot binne 50 meter van Murphy gevorder toe 'n senuweeagtige luitenant van die bataljon se hoofkwartier navraag doen oor die posisie van die vyand. Murphy het geantwoord: As u net 'n minuut aan die telefoon hou, laat ek u met een van die bastards praat.

Nadat hy sy karabynammunisie uitgeput het, was Murphy besig om voor te berei om terug te val toe die .50-kaliber masjiengeweer op die rewolwer van die brandende tenkvernietiger sy oog vang. Binnekort sou die vuur die voertuig se brandstof en ammunisie bereik, maar Murphy het geweet dat die geweer sy enigste kans was om die Duitsers te stop. Hy klim aan boord van die tenkvernietiger en begin die groot .50-kaliber op die vyand spuit. Privaat eersteklas Anthony V. Abramski het later berig dat ek Lt. Murphy bo -op die brandende tenkvernietiger sien klim terwyl uitbarstings van masjienpistoolvuur van die oprukkende infanterie teen die romp slaan en trap.

Murphy het geweet dat die .50-kaliber geen effek op die tenks sou hê nie, en daarom konsentreer hy sy vuur op die opkomende infanterie. Ek sal nie my ammunisie mors op iets wat direkte treffers deur 90 mm -skulpe nie kan vertraag nie, het hy gesê. Ek het my op die voetsoldate toegespits en geglo dat die tenks nie baie ver sou kom sonder hulle nie. Privaat Charles Owen, een van die 18 mans wat in Kompanjie B oorgebly het, het ontsag gekyk hoe Murphy die aankomende vyand ruk. Owen, hy was effektief op die .50-kaliber, het Owen gesê. Ek weet nie of hy ooit 'n 50-kaliber opleiding gehad het of nie. Maar die Duitsers was dodelik bang vir .50-kalibers wat hulle oor wapens deurboor het.

'N Ander waarnemer, sersant Elmer Brawley, wat die verlowing van die bosse aanskou het, het bygevoeg: Die Duitse infanteriste het binne 10 meter van luitenant Murphy gekom, wat hulle in die trekkings vermoor het, in die weide, in die bos en#8211 waar hy hulle ook al gesien het . Murphy se dodelike vuur op die ondersteunende infanterie het die tenks uiteindelik gedwing om na 'n gebied voor die bos terug te keer. Hierdie tenks het hul moorddadige vuur bygevoeg by die van die Kraut-artillerie en vuurwapens wat die posisie van die luitenant laat oorstroom het, het Brawley gesê.

Die golwende rook van die tenkvernietiger, gekombineer met die voortdurende gevegsgeveg, het die Duitsers verhinder om op te spoor waar die vuurwapen vandaan kom. Volgens Murphy, met al die geknetter van vuurwapens en groot skulpe wat oral rondplof, het hulle waarskynlik nie eers my masjiengeweer gehoor hoor nie, nog minder die oorsprong daarvan. Alhoewel die rook 'n mate van verberging veroorsaak het, het dit ook die sigbaarheid van Murphy belemmer, waardeur sommige vyandelike soldate ongemerk op sy regterflank kon kruip. Hy het geskryf: Toe ek hulle die eerste keer sien, het hulle in die dreineringsloot reg voor my gestop en het hulle iets besonders bespreek. Ek het die sneller gedruk en stadig deur die loop gegaan en die liggame het in 'n stapelposisie geval.

Skielik klap twee 88 mm skulpe in die tenkvernietiger. Die harsingskudding en skok van die ontploffing het Murphy gewelddadig teen die rewolwer gegooi en hom amper op die grond neergeslaan. Luitenant Murphy was omhul in rookwolke en vlamspore, onthou Weispfenning. Wonder bo wonder het Murphy daarin geslaag om sy kalmte te behou en het hy voortgegaan met die vuurwapen. Die enigste keer dat hy opgehou het om te skiet, was toe hy die opdragte moes herlaai of aan die artillerie moes oordra. Jare later, met sy kenmerkende droë humor, het Murphy opgemerk: Ek onthou dat ek die hel uit my geskud het, maar dit was niks nuuts nie. Ek onthou ook dat my voete vir die eerste keer in drie dae warm was.

Verbasend genoeg het sy geluk steeds aangehou toe die grys wolke lank genoeg gebreek het sodat Amerikaanse vegvliegtuie bo die woedende slagveld kon vergader. Nadat hy die glorieryke geluid van die naderende vliegtuie gehoor het, het Murphy die artillerie die Duitse posisies met rookskille laat merk, sodat die vlieëniers kon begin rits. Die vyandelike aanval, hoewel dit vertraag is, het egter steeds vorentoe gedruk. Weer eens dreig die infanterie om die sterkpunt, wat nou deur 'n enkele Amerikaner gehou word, te oorskry. In 'n gewaagde beweging het Murphy voortgegaan om artillerievuur te vra, al het dit teen daardie tyd ongemaklik naby hom geval. Ek het gedink ek kan dit uit die spervuur ​​kry as die Krauts dit kan doen, het hy gesê.

Met die hernude spervuur ​​het die Duitsers uiteindelik besef dat iemand hulle met artillerie laat nul het. Hulle kon egter steeds nie die bron vind van die vuurwapen wat hul geledere in stukke gesny het nie. 'N Klein groepie Duitsers het daarin geslaag om die bos te infiltreer tot by die hoofkwartier van die eerste bataljon, maar die meerderheid van die vyandelike infanterie het teruggeval na Holtzwihr. Sonder die beskerming en ondersteuning van die voetsoldate het die Duitse wapenrusting verstandig die veld verlaat. Ek kan verstaan ​​hoekom die Kraut -infanterie my gemis het, Murphy. Maar ek kan die Duitse tenkmanne nooit vergewe vir hul swak skerpskut nie. Dit was regtig slordig.

Net toe die Duitsers begin terugval, het die veldtelefoon van Murphy doodgegaan. Uitgeput en erg gebloei, klim Murphy van die brandende tenkvernietiger af en hink terug in die bos. Ek het van die Duitsers afgewyk en nooit teruggekyk nie, onthou hy. Ek was te swak van vrees en uitputting om meer om te gee. Kort nadat hy die bos bereik het, het Murphy die tenkvernietiger hoor opblaas en die rewolwer waarop hy gestaan ​​het, afgeblaas het.

Alhoewel staal- en rotsfragmente deur die veldkaart wat hy tydens die geveg gedra het, deurtrek het, was Murphy ongelooflik gelukkig. Sy broek was deurdrenk van bloed uit 'n ou wond, het die vorige Oktober gely, wat tydens sy woedende beproewing weer oopgemaak is. Murph was 'n waaghals wat hy die kans waag dat ander dit nie sou waag nie, onthou Brad Croeker, 'n privaat onderneming van B. Hy was te waaghalsig vir die meeste van ons. Sy middelnaam was gelukkig. Bill Weinberg het bygevoeg: ek dink hy was net bereid om sy nek uit te steek. Maar dit was ook 'n kwessie van versigtig wees. Hy het meer kanse gewaag as ander, maar hy het dit op 'n berekende manier gedoen.

Toe Murphy by sy onderneming terugkom, het hy gehelp om 'n teenaanval te reël. In beëdigde getuienis verklaar sersant Brawley: Luitenant Murphy, wat weier om ontruim te word, het ons in 'n sterk aanval op die vyand gelei en die Duitsers uit die hele gebied verdryf. Murphy het verder gevorder totdat die manne van Kompanjie B hul oorspronklike posisies weer beklee het.

Bevrore en uitgeput, het die GI's die res van die middag die stryd aangesê. Daardie nag lê ons tussen ons dooie kamerade wat die middag geval het, het Murphy gesê. Croeker onthou: Ons was reg langs die Colmar -kanaal. Nadat die bloedige dag verby was, het ons na die kanaal gegaan om 'n drankie te drink.

Versterk deur plaasvervangers, het die 3de Bataljon, 30ste Infanterieregiment, Holtzwihr op 27 Januarie gevange geneem. Behalwe vir klein sakke vyandelike weerstand, was die gebiede oos van die Illrivier en noord van die Colmar -kanaal teen 28 Januarie vry van vyandelike magte.

Op 2 Junie 1945 het luitenant -generaal Alexander Patch, bevelvoerende generaal van die Sewende Leër, aan Luitenant Murphy die Erepenning oorhandig. Die amptelike aanhaling lui gedeeltelik: 'n Uur lank probeer die Duitsers elke beskikbare wapen om luitenant Murphy uit te skakel, maar hy bly sy posisie beklee en sy leiding oor artillerievuur het baie van die vyande wat hy doodgemaak het of ongeveer 50 gewond het, uitgewis. Murphy se onwankelbare moed en sy weiering om 'n sentimeter grond te gee, het sy onderneming gered van moontlike omsingeling en vernietiging en dit in staat gestel om die bos te hou, wat die vyand se doel was.

Charles Owen onthou jare later: Hy het ons lewens gered. As hy nie gedoen het wat hy gedoen het nie, sou die Duitsers ons vernietig het. Ons was al redelik sleg en amper sonder ammunisie.

Vir Murphy was die Medal of Honor die kroon op 'n roemryke gevegsloopbaan. Teen die einde van die oorlog het hy elke medalje ontvang vir dapperheid wat sy land te bied gehad het, waaronder twee Bronze Stars, die Distinguished Service Cross, twee Silver Stars, drie Purple Hearts en die Legion of Merit, wat hom die mees versierde Amerikaner gemaak het soldaat tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog.

Na die oorlog keer Murphy terug na Texas, maar die huiwerige held is in September 1945 na Hollywood genooi deur die akteur James Cagney, wat sy foto op die voorblad van Lewe tydskrif. Murphy het meer as 40 films gemaak, insluitend Na die hel en terug, Die rooi kenteken van moed en baie Westers. Op 28 Mei 1971 het 'n privaat vliegtuig buite Roanoke, Va., Neergestort en die vyf mense aan boord doodgemaak, waaronder passasier Murphy (46).

Hierdie artikel is geskryf deur Daniel R. Champagne en verskyn oorspronklik in die Mei 2002 -uitgawe van Tweede Wereldoorlog.


Twee gewapendes van die 317ste Infanterieregiment, 80ste Infanteriedivisie, neem 'n rukkie om hul eie sigarette in Goesdorf te rol ná 27 dae se geveg - 10 Januarie 1945

Die vingernael lengte spektrum is mal oor hierdie twee ouens.

REGS? Die arme man aan die regterkant het amper niks! Dit was die eerste ding wat ek opgemerk het.

Ek het nog nooit kleiner naels gesien nie! Hoe is dit moontlik? Ek bedoel, wat veroorsaak dit eintlik?

Kyk, my naels is soos die man aan die linkerkant, en as ek hulle sien soos die man aan die regterkant, maak hulle my nogal bang

Die arme man aan die regterkant het 'n vreeslike geval van 'n paar buitegrawe gekry. Hartseer om te sien

My gedagte presies, dit is duidelik hoekom ou rol en 'n ander ou kyk

Ek was heeltemal afgelei deur die pienk ring om iets anders raak te sien.

Dankie! Die man aan die regterkant se naels maak ons ​​mal!

Links is SSG Abraham Aranoff, Boston, Mass., Regs is privaat Henry W. Beyer van Grand Rapids, Michigan. Hierdie manne, van E Kompanjie, 1ste Bataljon, 317ste Infanterie, het 27 dae agtereenvolgens geveg, die meeste daarvan tydens die Duitse teenoffensief in die Ardennen. Hulle is pas uit die lyne gehaal vir 'n kort, welverdiende blaaskans. (Dankie Ingrid Goossens!)

The Battle of the Bulge (16 Desember 1944 - 25 Januarie 1945) was die laaste groot Duitse offensiewe veldtog in sy westelike teater tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Dit is teen die einde van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in die Europese teater deur die dig beboste Ardennen -streek Wallonië in België, Frankryk en Luxemburg aan die Westelike Front gelanseer. Die verrassingsaanval het die geallieerde magte heeltemal onkant betrap. Amerikaanse magte het die swaarste van die aanval gedra en die grootste slagoffers tydens enige oorlog gehad. Die geveg het ook die gepantserde magte van Duitsland ernstig uitgeput, en hulle kon dit grotendeels nie vervang nie. Duitse personeel en later ook Luftwaffe -vliegtuie (in die slotfase van die verlowing) het ook groot verliese gely.

Die Duitsers het amptelik na die offensief verwys as Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein (& quotOperation Watch on the Rhine & quot), terwyl die Geallieerdes dit as die Ardennen -teenoffensief aangewys het. Die frase "Battle of the Bulge" is deur die hedendaagse pers geskep om die bult in die Duitse voorste linies op nuuskaarte in die oorlog te beskryf, en dit het die naam wat die meeste gebruik word vir die geveg. Die Duitse offensief was bedoel om die gebruik van die Geallieerdes van die Belgiese hawe Antwerpen te stop en die geallieerde lyne te verdeel, sodat die Duitsers vier geallieerde leërs kon omsingel en vernietig en die Westerse Geallieerdes moes dwing om 'n vredesverdrag te onderhandel ten gunste van die asmagte. Once that was accomplished, the German dictator Adolf Hitler believed he could fully concentrate on the Soviets on the Eastern Front. The offensive was planned by the German forces with utmost secrecy, with minimal radio traffic and movements of troops and equipment under cover of darkness. Intercepted German communications indicating a substantial German offensive preparation were not acted upon by the Allies. The Germans achieved total surprise on the morning of 16 December 1944, due to a combination of Allied overconfidence, preoccupation with Allied offensive plans, and poor aerial reconnaissance. The Germans attacked a weakly defended section of the Allied line, taking advantage of heavily overcast weather conditions that grounded the Allies' overwhelmingly superior air forces. Fierce resistance on the northern shoulder of the offensive, around Elsenborn Ridge, and in the south, around Bastogne, blocked German access to key roads to the northwest and west that they counted on for success. Columns of armor and infantry that were supposed to advance along parallel routes found themselves on the same roads. This, and terrain that favored the defenders, threw the German advance behind schedule and allowed the Allies to reinforce the thinly placed troops. Improved weather conditions permitted air attacks on German forces and supply lines, which sealed the failure of the offensive. In the wake of the defeat, many experienced German units were left severely depleted of men and equipment, as survivors retreated to the defenses of the Siegfried Line.

The Germans' initial attack involved 406,000 men 1,214 tanks, tank destroyers, and assault guns and 4,224 artillery pieces. These were reinforced a couple of weeks later, bringing the offensive's total strength to around 450,000 troops, and 1,500 tanks and assault guns. Between 67,200 and 125,000 of their men were killed, missing, or wounded in action. For the Americans, out of 610,000 troops involved in the battle, 89,000 were casualties. While some sources report that up to 19,000 were killed, Eisenhower's personnel chief put the number at about 8,600. British historian Antony Beevor reports the number killed as 8,407. It was the largest and bloodiest battle fought by the United States in World War II


Today in History: Born on June 22

George Vancouver, English navigator.

Erich Maria Remarque, German novelist (All Quiet on the Western Front).

Billy Wilder, film director (Sunset Boulevard, The Apartment).

Anne Morrow Lindbergh, author, wife of Charles Lindbergh (Gifts from the Sea).

Joseph Papp, theater director and producer, founder of the New York Public Theatre and Shakespeare-in-the-Park.

Ed Bradley, broadcast journalist.


Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 31 May 2019, 14:19

Casualties of the 2 Belorussian Front by day:

14.1.45 - 1011 men killed, 4292 wounded
15.1.45 - 2113 killed, 9428 wounded
16.1.45 - 1535 killed, 7610 wounded
17.1.45 - 1220 killed, 4624 wounded, 146 missing
18.1.45 - 1053 killed, 4164 wounded
14-18.1.45 (cumulative) - 6764 killed, 30 0089 wounded, 169 missing
19.1.45 - 995 killed, 3290 wounded
20.1.45 - 714 killed, 2258 wounded
14-20.1.45 (cumulative) - 8473 killed, 35 637 wounded, 169 missing
21.1.45 - 633 killed, 2193 wounded
22.1.45 - 534 killed, 1701 wounded
24.1.45 - 418 killed, 1319 wounded
25.1.45 - 443 killed, 1665 wounded
26.1.45 - 764 killed, 2209 wounded
27.1.45 - 436 killed, 2571 wounded
28.1.45 - 866 killed, 3498 wounded
29.1.45 - 806 killed, 2207 wounded
31.1.45 - 569 killed, 1746 wounded

(from the 2 BF's war diary)
Those numbers should be viewed as minimal, as they were preliminary, incomplete and omitted some of the units.

For records of casualties of the 3 Belorussian Front see:
viewtopic.php?p=2108139#p2108139

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Michael71 » 31 May 2019, 23:10

I know a book on the southern section Neidenburg-Willenberg-Ortelsburg

The book by Edelfried Baginski:

1945 -When Ortelsburg was lost. Is writen in german language . 1945 -Als Ortelsburg verloren ging"
Little bit about Army situations and little bit about the ciylian and Volkssturm.

These map is from the book:

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 01 Jun 2019, 19:05

Casualties of the 49 Army/2 Belorussian Front:
1-10 January 45: 65 men killed, 177 wounded, 813 sick, 18 non-battle, total 1073 men
11-20 January 45: 636 killed, 17 missing, 2199 wounded, 581 sick, 21 non-battle, total 3454 men
21-31 January 45: 1587 killed, 9 missing, 4290 wounded, 84 sick, 10 non-battle, total 5984 men

Divisional strength on 10/20/30 January 45:
385 Rifle Division 5961/-/5482
238 Rifle Division 6049/-/4760
139 Rifle Division 6032/-/5482
42 Rifle Division 5967/5295/5282
199 Rifle Division 6007/5635/4441
380 Rifle Division 5990/4965/4221
51 Rifle Division 6785/6637/6270
208 Rifle Division 6677/5952/4480
216 Rifle Division 6927/6724/6619

As of 10 January there were 67 399 men in combat units (rifle and artillery) plus 1458 in the 11 Engineer Brigade, 3516 in the 185 Army Replacement Regiment, and 871 in seven penal companies. Total strength (including service and supply units) as of 1 January - 83 570 men.

Total 544 POWs and various equipment captured during January 1945
From the Army's war diary

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 02 Jun 2019, 09:38

Casualties of the 3 Army/2 Belorussian Front:

1-10 January 1945 - 38 killed, 142 wounded, 866 sick, 1046 men total
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=131296644

10-20 January 1945 - 1898 killed, 8142 wounded, 436 sick, 21 missing, 10 497 men total
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=131296647

20-31 January 1045 - 1904 killed, 6759 wounded, 252 sick, 214 missing, 9129 men total. Also 6 SU-76, 1 SU-85, 1 SU-152 destroyed, 5 SU-76, 4 SU-85, 3 IS-2, 1 SU-152, 5 KV damaged
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=131296650

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 02 Jun 2019, 10:45

Casualties of the 3 Army/2 Belorussian Front in January 1945:
3830 men killed, 14 943 wounded, 2333 sick, 235 missing, 21 341 men total. Also 45 tanks and SP guns destroyed, 45 damaged, 11 damaged by mines.

Divisional strength on 5.1/1.2.45:

5 Rifle Division - 6232/5221
129 Rifle Division - 6851/5628
169 Rifle Division - 6791/4816
120 Guards Rifle Division - 6675/4397
269 Rifle Division - 6323/4330
283 Rifle Division - 6065/4235
250 Rifle Division - 6195/4107
290 Rifle Division - 6013/4223
328 Rifle Division - 6602/4363
Total 75 241/62 427 men in combat units on 5.1.45/1.2.45

No replacements received during January, the Army's replacement regiment sends 1160 men to combat units in the second half of Jan45.

Total 1077 POWs and various equipment captured during January 45.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 03 Jun 2019, 22:21

Casualties of the 48 Army/2 Belorussian Front in January 1945:
3177 men killed, 10599 wounded, 427 missing and captured, 1767 sick, 244 non-battle losses, total 16214 men.
2486 (alternative number - 3056 in another place) POWs and many various weapons and equipment including more than 1000 motor vehicles and about 10000 bicycles were claimed during the same month.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 03 Jun 2019, 22:58

2 Shock Army/2 Belorussian Front.

Slagoffers:
1-10 January 45 - 40 men killed, 93 wounded, 807 others, total 940 men
11-20 January 45 - 1840 killed, 7138 wounded, 404 others, total 9382 men
21-31 January 45 - 1825 killed, 5401 wounded, 793 others, total 8009 men
Total January 45 - 3837 killed, 13306 wounded, 1958 others, total 19901 men
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=153906880

Casualties by days and divisions:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=153906879
with cumulative totals 2704 killed, 9302 wounded and 344 others (12 360 men total) for the period 14-31 January 45

Claims - about 1600 POWs, many weapons, vehicles and other equipment:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=153906885

Divisional strength 10/25/31 January 45
142 Rifle Division 6985/4769/4752
281 Rifle Division 7013/6430/6362
381 Rifle Division 7072/5056/5163
46 Rifle Division 7066/5282/4420
90 Rifle Division 7057/5457/5426
372 Rifle Division 7118/6216/5359
86 Rifle Division 7043/6943/6835
321 Rifle Division 7087/7031/6153
326 Rifle Division 7068/7036/6317

Total personnel in combat units:
99 592 on 10.01.45, 124 005 (incl. 8 Guards Tank Corps and 8 Mechanized Corps) on 25.1.45, 105 935 (incl.8 Mechanized Corps) on 31.1.45

Total personnel:
113 202 on 10.1.45, 119 938 on 31.1.45

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur donwhite » 04 Jun 2019, 01:45

Great Links and very informative. Thanks for posting.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 06 Jun 2019, 10:58

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur Art » 07 Jun 2019, 18:14

Casualties of the 70 Army/2 Belorussian Front 1-31 January 1945 (including 1 Guards Tank Corps, I guess):
2712 killed, 27 missing, 11 897 wounded, total 14 036 battle casualties.

Divisional strength 14.1/1.2.45
71 Rifle Division - 6128/5930
136 Rifle Division - 6036/4634
162 Rifle Division - 6329/5094
1 Rifle Division - 5961/4267
38 Guards Rifle Division - 6031/4564
165 Rifle Division - 6119/3780
76 Guards Rifle Division 6241/4976
160 Rifle Division - 6356/5085
200 Rifle Division - 7279/5053

Claims 14-31.1.45: 1600 POWs, 91 guns, 50 mortars, about 200 vehicles etc.

Re: East Prussia january 1945

Plaas deur I have questions » 23 Jul 2019, 22:38

A few inconsistencies are arising. After reading bit more of Hamilton's book, the only certainty is that StuG Brigade 'GD' possessed StuG's during this time frame raised. The actual quantity is not so definite. In detailing the move from Lübben to Litzmannstadt/Lodz, on p.102 Hamilton states "they immediately received their full complement of 18x Sturmgeschutz(?), loaded them onto trains with fuel and ammunition, then rolled East". On p.105 Hamilton quotes passages from unit member diaries and further describes the unit unloading at Litzmannstadt/Lodz with eighteen Sturmgeschutz, again described as a 'full complement'. There is no explanation on the noticeable discrepancy between the earlier quoted number of 35x Sturmgeschutz allocated (p.81) and these later figures. It also does not match with the prior linked post by Martin Block who describes 40x StuG's/StuH's being dispatched but never reaching the Brigade due to the Soviet advance and Kamen Nevenkin's "Fire Brigades" book which mentions the same figure (but he actually has the Brigade taking receipt of them!). Confusingly he also has the Brigade re-equipping at Mielau/Mlava (not Lübben) and entraining from there to Litzmannstadt/Lodz!

in the book "panzers in defense of Festung Posen" the authors note that there were several Stug/StuH from the GD's Sturmgeschutz-Brigade involved in the battle. They arrived by train near Posen heading to their unit when due to the Russian advance were incorporated into the Armored Assault Reserve within the city. More if you are interested, but these are the most relevant bits


Weather: Clear to cloudy with periods of continuous drizzle. Visibility moderate. Wind light variable becoming 10–15 mph.

Very quiet day. Stand down all day.

Weather:- Mainly cloudy. Visibility moderate. Wind NW’ly 20-35 mph, gusty at times.

The New Year was started off with a Battle Order. 15 aircraft were detailed and briefing scheduled for 12:30 hours. Take off around 14:50 hours. Target: LUDWIGSHAVEN(sic)-(LUDWIGSHAFEN on slide). All aircraft took off and proceeded to the target.
Nil cloud in target area but only a fair amount of haze. Several good sized explosions were seen and so far as visual and other identification could establish some were obviously of an oil category. Flack was moderate but searchlights activity was experienced over target area. Our aircraft “S” LW133 encountered an ME210 and the rear gunner opened fire with 200 rds and enemy aircraft broke away. Shortly after a twin engine enemy aircraft attacked the same A/C and the rear gunner fired a short burst as evasive action was taken.
Nil claims. All aircraft returned safely to base.

Weather: Cloudy with periods of rain and slights snow. Visibility good. Wind W–NW 30–35 mph, gusty at first, falling to 5–10 mph at midday.

Operations called for this morning detailing fifteen aircraft. Briefing scheduled for 12:30 hours. However it was scrubbed after main briefing. G/C J.B. Millard, DFC and BAR had everyone together for a half hour during the afternoon for a lecture. Title “Review of recent Ops”.

Weather: Fair to cloudy with wintry showers during. Visibility good, but poor in showers. Wind N.W. 10–20 mph.

Cold today but clear. Ten aircraft were detailed for training exercises (F/A, Sim. Bombing, Air to Sea) in the morning but this was scrubbed later. In the afternoon nine aircraft were detailed for Sim. mining, H2S X–Country, Gee and APT homings and these exercises were carried out. Aircraft “W” MZ 355 (Captain F/O Miller) landed at Hemswell while on H2S X–country.

Weather: Cloudy becoming fine visibility good. Wind NW–W 5–10 mph.

Operation order issued during morning detailing 15 aircraft. Briefing scheduled for 12:30. Takeoff around 16:20 hours. Target: HANOVER(sic)-(HANNOVER on slide). All aircraft took off and proceeded to the target. 8/10th cloud over the target and assessment of the raid is impossible. Master bomber was heard by most of the crew. Several large explosions were reported. The flak was slight to moderate in barrage form aimed at sky markers. Searchlights were ineffective. One aircraft “Y” NR 257 Captain S/L S.G. Crew, DFC (second tour) “B” Flight Commander, did not come back. All other aircraft returned safely to base.
Five crews carried out training exercises during the afternoon. (F/A, Sim. and Range Bombing and Air to Sea). A/C “W” returned from Hemswell.

Weather: Cloudy with fair periods. Visibility good. Wind light variable.

Operation Order came through this morning detailing fifteen aircraft. Briefing at 12:45 hours, take-off at apporx. 15:50 hours. Target– HANAU. All aircraft took off and proceeded to the target. 10/10th cloud over in the target. Most of the crews bombed on sky markers as instructed by the Master Bomber. Result of the bombing is impossible to assess But there was a good concentration of aircraft over the target. A very large glow on the cloud was visible for forty miles after leaving the target. Slight to moderate flak mostly in barrage form. One aircraft “J” LM 130 was attacked by an unidentified aircraft – believed to be a Halifax. Mid Upper replied with a short burst, as he felt sure that the attacking aircraft was a Halifax he ceased firing. F/O Gerald, V.J.P (J.26347) Bomb Aimer was hit by a bullet as he moved forward to take over the V.G.O. He had his nose removed. This aircraft landed at Woodbridge. Bullets extracted were mk 303. All other aircraft landed at base.

Weather:Fair to fine with occasional slight rain early. Visibility good. Wind N-NW 10–30 mph.

Very cold morning. Training programme was issued detailing three aircraft at 12:30 hrs. And 10 at 14:00 hours. Another training list detailed six crews for night flying. All but two got away o.k. and landed before 23.59 hours as weather was expected to close in. F/O Bell in “J” LM130 returned from Woodbridge at 15:20 hours.

Weather: fair to overcast with frequent snow showers. Visibility good, becoming moderate poor in showers. Wind NW’ly 15–40 mph, gusty at times.

Very quiet today. Snowing and heavy wind. No flying due to adverse weather.

Weather: mainly cloudy with frequent snow showers. Visibility moderate to poor. Wind N’ly 5–20 mph.

Weather is bad for flying today. There is a heavy snowfall and wind. Aircraft personnel were detailed to shovel the snow from the runways. No flying.

10/1/45

Weather: Fair to cloudy with wintry showers during evening. Visibility moderate to poor. Wind NW’ly 10–20 mph.

No flying today as snow is still bad. The pelting snow is freezing over and more aircrew are being sent to clean it away.
F/O Gerald V.J.P (J.26347) has been sent to R.A.F hospital East Grinstead, where plastic surgery is remodelling his nose.

11/1/45

Weather: Cloudy with wintry showers. Visibility moderate. Wind mainly N'ly 10-25 mph.

Weather still bad for flying. Ice, snow and slush everywhere. Several Lancs have come in lately and are beginning to crowd the Hangars. The latest news has it that these Lancs will all be going to Skipton and then the Squadrons on this Station will be converting.
In the afternoon there was a lecture on P.F.F given by Group Captain Hanish. The lecture lasted for just over an hour. Good "gen".

12/1/45

Weather: Cloudy with rain and drizzle. Visibility moderate. Wind NE'ly 10-20 mph.

Operation came through this morning detailing 13 aircraft on a bombing "do" and three aircraft on a mining ops. The bombing was scrubbed however. The aircraft detailed for mining took off around 7:45 hours. Target - Young Wallflower. One aircraft "Z" NR148 was u/s and 429/V MZ865 replaced it. 10/1Oths cloud prevented visual identification at the mining area but operation is considered to be successful. Heavy flak slight to moderate was encountered en route and in the target area. Numerous fighter flares, orangish in colour were noted on track outward. and homeward. All aircraft landed safely at base before 23:45 hours.

13/1/45

Weather: Cloudy with slight rain and drizzle during morning. Visibility moderate. Wind NE’ly less than 10 mph.

Battle Order came through this morning. Four aircraft were detailed for mining and fourteen for bombing. Main Briefing for mining scheduled for 13:30 hrs. and bombing 1430 hrs. The mining was scrubbed prior to take-off. The aircraft detailed for bombing took off around 15:35 hrs. Target· - SAARBRÜCKEN. Nil to 2/1Oth cloud and slight ground haze is reported at the target . The bombing was concentrated on the marshaling yard and two large explosions were seen on the northern edge of the target area. It is considered to be a very successful attack. Slight heavy flak and a few fighter flares are reported in the area. All crews attempted photographs. Two aircraft "U" LW130 and "X" NP.941 returned on three engines and all landed at base.
Watching the take-off and landing were Air Vice Marshal C.M. McEwen MC DFC A.O.C. of No. 6 (RCAF) Group, Mr. P. Bracken, the premier of Manitoba, Canada, and several other unnamed notables.

14/1/45

Weather: Cloudy, visibility moderate, wind light and variable.

Two operation orders through this morning again. Four aircraft detailed for Gardening and ten aircraft detailed for bombing. Main briefing for bombing was scheduled for 13:00 hours. Take off around 15:55 hours. Target - GLADBACH(sic)-(Grevenbroich on slide). One aircraft "J" NP956 was replaced by 429/E MZ318 and all aircraft took off. Nil cloud, slight haze but visibility was good and clear. Very good marking and bombing looked equally good. Concentration of aircraft was very heavy over the target and many fires were seen to start. As out aircraft were on the first wave the crews find that it is too early for an assessment but believe that this must be a good "do". All aircraft returned safely to base.

The aircraft detailed for mining operation took off around 1935 hrs. "P" LV.988 was a non starter due to a mechanical failure. The mining area was Oslo Fjord. 8/10th to 10/10th cloud in mining area but visibility was good above. All crews claimed to have released their mines by aid of H2S. Met winds were not as briefed and the three aircraft were late to make concentration point on time. All aircraft returned safely to base.

15/1/45

Weather: Fair to cloudy. Slight rain and drizzle during evening. Visibility moderate. Wind N.W. 5-10 mph, becoming light variable.

Two of our repatriated pilots were awarded a Bar to their D.F.C. These are the Twin Sherlock Brothers. These boys enlisted together in 1940, gained their commission the same day in 1942. They completed their second tour of operations with our Squadron and Training exercises were held in the morning. Nine aircraft were on Bombing, Air to Sea, Fighter Affiliation and S.B.A. Six aircraft were detailed for night flying but this was cancelled at 1700 hrs.

16/1/45

Weather: Fair to cloudy with slight rain early. Visibility mainly moderate. Wind light variable becoming W'ly 10-25 mph.

Operation Order came through this morning for mining and Bombing efforts again. Three A/C were detailed for mining and fifteen for bombing. Main briefing for mining was scheduled for 1230 hrs. Take off around 1825 hrs. Main briefing for Bombing was scheduled for 1400 hrs. and take off for 1905 hrs. Prior to take off "C" LV922 was (replaced?) by "J" NP956.

17/1/45

Weather: Fair to cloudy with slight rain during evening. Visibility good. Wind W'ly 15-25 mph, gusty.

All aircraft returned from yesterday operations by approximately 0155 hrs. The Gardening area was (ONIONS) ( Oslo). The three aircraft took off and proceeded to their allotted areas. Nil to 2/10th cloud with visibility excellent over mining area. Winds were much higher than briefed. One aircraft "L" NP957 did not drop his mines according to instructions received at briefing. Winds were 50 miles per hour too fast. Defences were slight in the gardening area. All aircraft returned safely to base.
Fifteen aircraft detailed for bombing MACDEBURG returned at approximately the same time as the mining do. Clear weather with slight haze but visibility was very good. Markers clearly visible and well concentrated over target. Fires were reported to be seen at a distance of 100 miles from target area. Flak was slight to moderate in loose barrage form. Searchlights were active in target area with some attempt at coning but ineffective. Fighter flares were in evidence en route, at the target and particularly all along the track homeward. All crews attempted photos. None of our aircraft were damaged by flak and all landed safely at base. A new arrival to this squadron, F/0 F.D. Kaye and his crew had a check out flight today. Five aircraft carried out some training namely H2S X-Country and S.B.A.

18/1/45

Weather: Mainly cloudy with wintry showers. Continuous rain during morning. Visibility moderate. Wind mainly W’ly 20-30 mph, max. 35.

Very quiet day. The Engineers' section sent one man for link training and also six men to No.1 Hangar for practical repairs of aircraft under the supervision of M.A.P.

19/1/45

Weather: Wintry showers. Visibility good. Wind N'ly 30- 40 mph.

Operations came through this morning detailing 18 A/C. Briefing was scheduled for 1400 hrs however, the operation was scrubbed later on. Three crews took part in night flying exercises.

2O/1/45

Weather: Fair to cloudy with wintry showers. Visibility moderate. Wind calm becoming NW'ly 15-20 mph.

A training order was issued this morning detailing nine A/C for take off at 1130 hrs. All crews got out to their A/C and a few got airborne. But a snowstorm promised by for 1200 hrs surprised - all by arriving at 1158 hrs. Thus the training was scrubbed. All aircrew reported to the Station Cinema at 1445 hrs where Major Nicholson, the flak and fighter expert from Group, kept us all happy as he gave us the latest information on Jerry's defences, flak, radar and fighters. News is going around today that F/O Gerald, the "Plastic Nose Kid" is on his way back to the squadron soon.

21/1/45

Weather: Fine to Fair. Visibility good. Wind NW'ly 10-20 mph.

A training programme issued for this morning was cancelled as Battle Order came through detailing 17 aircraft. Briefing scheduled for 1700 hours. However operations were scrubbed when Nav. Briefing was well under way. In the evening there was some night flying. Two crews could not get off the deck due to mechanical failure of the aircraft.

22/1/45

Weather: Fine, visibility good, deteriorating during evening. Wind NW' ly 10-20 mph at first becoming light variable.

Operation called for this morning. Battle Order detailed twenty aircraft. Briefing was scheduled for 16:30 hrs but at 1400 hrs the usual scrub came through. Ten aircraft carried out Sim. Bombing and H2S X-Country exercises during the day. The Engineer Section sent a man to Link Training during the morning and afternoon.

23/1/45

Weather: Mainly overcast with fog. Visibility poor. Wind calm. Foggy this morning. According to yesterday paper, Leeming was the coldest spot in England. No flying today.

Ten pilots and navigators held a Navigation Lecture for two hours in the morning and again in the afternoon another lecture for three hours with twelve pilots and navigators attending. In the Bombing Section F/L Head J.T. DFC (J.14508) kept our Bomb Aimers very interested with a lecture on Operational Navigation.

24/1/45

Weather: Fine with fog and mist. Visibility poor. Wind calm.

A Gardening Order came through this morning detailing five crews. This was scrubbed however, during lunch. F/L Wilgress F.J. (52006),the Squadron Flight Engineer leader returned today, from a course which he had been attending at Wombleton. This course was to "gen" him up on Lancs, because we will soon be converting to this A/C.

25/1/45

Weather: Mainly cloudy with fog. Visibility poor. Wind calm. No flying today.

Engineer Section was lectured today on the fuel system and on what makes a Lanc tick. It was given by their Leader F/L F.J. Willgress.
W/C Canderton, our C.O., F/O A.L. D'Eon, acting Signals Leader and F/L J .G. Williams, Bombing Leader, went on leave today.
The Signals section held a party at "Jocks". It was soon discovered, however, that it was not too warm in "Jocks". The beer was frozen in the bottles. There was quite a debate as to whether they should suck the beer, or chew it. Dinner was due to start at 18:30 hrs., but like Met. man at briefing, it was late. The party terminated at Jocks at 22:00 hours but was continued at the Officers' Mess for quite a while.

26/1/45

Weather: Cloudy with snow showers during morning, becoming fine. Visibility poor early and late moderate late morning and early afternoon. Wind NW'ly 5-10 mph falling calm in evening.

Five aircraft carried out Fighter affiliation, Bombing and Sim. Bombing and S.B.A. exercises during the day. No night training was put on because the weather forecast was duff.
Pilots and Engineers of "A" Flight had a lecture on Hydraulics delivered by F/L Wilgress our Engineer Leader. Lancs "gen" coming up. Two engineers took instruction on the Link Trainer.

27/1/45

Weather: Fair to cloudy with snow showers. Visibility poor to moderate. Wind NW'ly 10-20 mph.

Operation called this morning detailing 16 A/C. Briefing scheduled for 1.3:00 hrs and take off around 16:00 hrs. All A/c were marshaled for take off when the scrub came through. A heavy blizzard was the cause of this. "B" Flight pilots and engineers were today lectured on . Hydraulics by F/L Willgress, F/E Ld.

28/1/45

Weather: Mainly cloudy with frequent snow showers. Visibility moderate becoming poor late in evening. Wind N'ly 10-20 mph falling calm late in evening.

Operation came through this morning with the same detail as yesterday. Sixteen aircraft. Briefing scheduled for 16:30 hours and take-off around 19:30 hours. All aircraft got away to a good start.

29/1/45

Weather: Cloudy with snow in the evening. Visibility moderate to poor.

Our aircraft did not return this morning because they were diverted to Blackbush. One aircraft "B" NR 171 was an early return and landed at Linton-on-Ouse (62 Base). Engine failure. The target was a suburb of Stuttgart called ZUFFENHAUSEN. Crews reported 10/10ths cloud in the target area. The target marking appeared sonewhat late. Even the backers up were late. A concentrated glow of fires was reflected on the cloud as well as the glow of the T.Is. A good stream of A/C was maintained both into and out of the target area. In view of the cloud cover an assessment of the raid is impossible. FLak was slight to moderate mostly in barrage forms. All aircraft landed at Blackbush around 03:25 hours.
Late in the morning a Battle Order came through for Gardening. Four crews were detailed and it was scrubbed a few minutes prior to briefing. At 23:59 hours our aircraft were not back from Blackbush but "B" NR17I was back to base.

30/1/45

Weather: Cloudy with snow, fog, drizzle rain becoming fair to fine.

This morning the aerodrome is covered with snow. No flying. Our aircraft are still away at Blackbush.


The Luftwaffe Self Destruct Mission: Operation Bodenplatte – January 1st 1945

For the German Luftwaffe, World War II all but ended on January 1st, 1945 with their last, desperate attempt to strike back against the Ally’s air superiority. After this day, Germany’s skies were quickly lost in the following few months as the Western and Eastern fronts collapsed into Berlin.

Operation Bodenplatte was designed to cripple Allied air power in support of the Ardennes Offensive, or the Battle of the Bulge (December 16th, 1944-January 25th 1945), but bad winter weather pushed back the operation until the first available date, January 1st.

By the time the weather had improved enough for an effective, mass aerial strike like Operation Bodenplatte, the Ardennes Offensive had been stalled by the Western Allies. So this Luftwaffe assault was changed to support Operation Northwind.

Operation Northwind was planned by the Germans as another push on the ground to regain momentum and try, once gain, to split the bulk of the British and American forces in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Northern France.

The Luftwaffe hadn’t been inactive in December 1945, however. They ran what operations they could to support the Ardennes Offensive. Between December 17th and December 27th, over 600 fighters were lost and over 300 pilots killed.

For the second half of 1944, the Luftwaffe had been growing increasingly desperate. Not only had the British been building the Spitfire Mk. IX since 1942 (the first plane to diminish the vast superiority of the German Focke-Wulf Fw 190, which had been outclassing the Ally’s air forces and planes like the Spitfire Mk. V), but the Germans had been losing huge numbers of their skilled pilots while entirely running out of safe training areas for new pilots.

Focke-Wulf FW 190.

By December of 1944, poorly trained and untested pilots were filling the ranks of the Luftwaffe.

Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz was assigned to lead Operation Bodenplatte by Luftwaffe Commander-in-Cheif Hermann Göring. Pilots from II. Jagdkorps, 3 Jagddivision, and 5 Jagddivision carried it out.

Operation Bodenplatte assigned over 900 German aircraft to attack 16 Allied airfields in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France and destroy their air power. The planes used were the dreaded Focke-Wulf Fw 190A and 190D, and the Messerschmitt BF 109 (which was the most popular fighter aircraft in history, with well over 30,000 frames produced between 1936 and 1945).

Bodenplatte translates into English as baseplate or floorboard. The Germans wanted to drive their boot heels into the foundation of the Ally’s air forces and stomp out their power to support ground troop operations.

P-47s and Y-34s burning at an American airfield, Metz-Frescaty

Secrecy was a high priority for this mission and several large blunders were made which hampered it from the start due to this. Most pilots weren’t briefed until right before they flew, and many believed they were running a mass reconnaissance mission as they followed their commanders into battle. Pilots were also given maps without their bases or flight paths on them should they fall into enemy hands. This lead to at least one assault on the wrong airfield.

The biggest blow dealt to the operation, by far, due to the German command’s insistence on secrecy was not informing many of their anti-air batteries that the armadas flying overhead on January 1st would be Luftwaffe. As a result, these batteries, like the ones guarding V2 missile launch sites around The Hague, fired on their own aircraft. It is estimated that up to a quarter of the Luftwaffe’s losses that day were from friendly fire.

The attack, at least, managed to catch the British and Americans somewhat off guard. Though only 11 of the 34 air combat Gruppen made their targets on time and the Allies were able to put their planes in the air and mount a substantial defense. Pilots of United States Army Air Force P-51 Mustangs made a huge showing that day in defending their airfields, downing dozens of German aircraft.

A Focke-Wulf Fw 190A being shot down by an American fighter

At many of the 16 targets the Luftwaffe hit that day, there was a high amount of initial success. At some, few, if any, Allied aircraft were destroyed.

At Melsbroek airfield, just Northeast of Brussels, 35 Royal Air Force planes were destroyed and a further 9 heavily damaged. Jadgdeschwader (squadron) 27 and 54 began the assault with 43 planes. Seven were lost to enemy aircraft and friendly fire before ever reaching the target. By the end of the battle, they had lost almost half their aircraft and 17 pilots were killed or captured.

Many of the battles for the operation had similar results, hurting the Allies, but devastating the already beleaguered Luftwaffe.

It is estimated that Operation Bodenplatte destroyed 305 Allied aircraft and damaged another 190. Although, due to improper records of losses, mostly by the Americans, this figure is challenged and some believe it to be much higher.

Regardless, the operation was far from a success. The Allies lost very few pilots and were well enough supplied in Europe by this point to replace almost all their lost aircraft within the week.

The Luftwaffe, however, lost about 280 aircraft and, more critically, lost many pilots: 143 killed or missing and 70 captured. Among these were many officers, formation leaders and veteran flyers, leaving the few left with crippled resources and often inexperienced pilots for the defense of Germany.

Operation Bodenplatte was, in fact, the last major assault the Luftwaffe was capable of. The war ended 17 weeks later, after the loss of hundreds of more pilots. The boot heel of the Luftwaffe had landed hard on their own foot.


Kyk die video: Анимированный Восточный фронт: 19441945 (Januarie 2022).