Geskiedenis Podcasts

Militêre regering val in Venezuela - Geskiedenis

Militêre regering val in Venezuela - Geskiedenis

Militêre regering val in Venezuela
Die militêre diktatuur in Venezuela is in 1957 afgedank. Grootskaalse oproer het tot sy val gelei.


Hugo Chavez was 'n brandmerkdiktator van Venezuela

Hugo Chavez (1954 - 2013) was 'n voormalige luitenant -kolonel van die weermag en president van Venezuela. Chávez, 'n populis, het in Venezuela 'n 'Bolivariese rewolusie' ingestel, waar belangrike nywerhede genasionaliseer is en olie -inkomste gebruik is in sosiale programme vir die armes. Hugo Chávez was 'n vokale kritikus van die Verenigde State van Amerika en veral die voormalige president George W. Bush, wat hy op 'n beroemde en openbare wyse 'n 'donkie' genoem het. Hy was baie gewild onder die arm Venezolane, wat in Februarie 2009 gestem het om termynbeperkings af te skaf, sodat hy onbepaald herkiesbaar is.


Hulpbronne

Die belangrikste ekonomiese hulpbronne van Venezuela is petroleum en aardgas, waarvan die ontginning ongeveer 'n vyfde van die bruto binnelandse produk (BBP) uitmaak, maar minder as 1 persent van die arbeidsmag. Steenkool is ook belangrik, en daar is grootliks onontginde neerslae van ystererts, bauxiet en ander minerale. Sommige van die grootste beproefde petroleumreserwes ter wêreld bestaan ​​in die Orinoco -delta en in die buiteland, sowel as in die oostelike Llanos, in die Guarico-, Anzoategui- en Monagas -state, in die Maracaibo -meer (hoofsaaklik Zulia -staat) en in die westelike Llanos, veral in die deelstate Barinas en Apure. Voordat die regering die bedryf genasionaliseer het, was meer as vier vyfdes van die produksie verantwoordelik vir multinasionale ondernemings. Verfyning is hoofsaaklik op die see uitgevoer op Aruba, Curaçao en elders in die Karibiese Eilande. Na nasionalisering het 'n staatsbeheerde maatskappy, Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA) verantwoordelikheid vir produksie aanvaar, maar PDVSA was steeds sterk afhanklik van buitelandse oliemaatskappye om die olie en aardgas te verfyn, te vervoer en te bemark en om tegniese hulp te verleen. Die regering, wat met ekonomiese probleme te kampe het, het hervormings aan die einde van die tagtigerjare en die negentigerjare aangeneem, insluitend die heropening van die petroleumsektor vir buitelandse beleggings, veral om swaar ruolie -afsettings in die Orinoco -kom verder te ondersoek en te ontwikkel, om raffinaderye op te gradeer en om produksie te stroomlyn. deur gesamentlike ondernemings. In 'n omkering van hierdie neiging, het die oliebedryf in 2006 die fokus van die nasionaliseringspogings van Chávez geword, en in 2007 het hy die oorname van die sektor voltooi deur die operasionele beheer oor die laaste privaat -oliebedryf in die land te neem - die Orinoco -wasbak -olieprojekte —Van maatskappye in buitelandse besit. Van die swaar olie uit die Orinoco-wasbak word gebruik om bitumenryke orimulsie te skep, 'n ketelbrandstof wat minder skoon verbrand as baie ander brandstofbronne.

Venezuela het ook oorvloedige aardgasafsettings, weer een van die grootste bewese reserwes ter wêreld, en PDVSA het gesamentlike ondernemings gestig vir die verkenning en produksie daarvan. Boonop het 'n PDVSA -filiaal, Carbozulia, groot steenkoolreserwes in die Guasaré -rivierkom ontwikkel.

Moderne ystererts-ontginning in Venezuela het in die middel van die 20ste eeu begin in die streek rondom die huidige Ciudad Guayana, gebaseer op afsettings by Cerro Bolívar en El Pao. In 1975 is die mynboubedrywighede in die VSA genasionaliseer, en die Venezolaanse Guayana Corporation in besit van die regering het beheer oorgeneem. Die produksie van ystererts het sedert die middel van die tagtigerjare aansienlik toegeneem.

In die middel van die sewentigerjare is groot afsettings van bauxiet in die Guyana-hooglande ontdek, baie daarvan hoogwaardige erts wat geskik is vir aluminiumsmelting in die Ciudad Guayana-kompleks. Ander belangrike nie-ysterhoudende minerale sluit in goud en diamante in die Guyana Hoogland, steenkool noordwes van die Maracaibo-meer, soutafsettings op die Araya-skiereiland en verspreide afsettings van kalksteen van industriële aard. Daar is ook ekonomies belangrike hoeveelhede nikkel, fosfate, koper, sink, lood, titaan en mangaan, en opnames dui op die bestaan ​​van aansienlike afsettings van uraan en torium.


Venezuela: Geskiedenis

Die Arawaks en die Karibië was saam met sekere nomadiese jag- en visstamme die vroegste inwoners van Venezuela. Columbus ontdek die mond van die Orinoco in 1498. In 1499 is die Venezolaanse kus deur Alonso de Ojeda en Amerigo Vespucci verken. Laasgenoemde kom op 'n eiland van die Paraguaná -skiereiland (waarskynlik Aruba), en noem dit Venezuela (klein Venesië) vanweë inheemse dorpe wat bo die water gebou is op stelte wat die naam gehou het en is gou op die vasteland toegepas. Spaanse nedersettings is aan die kus by Cumaná (1520) en Santa Ana de Coro (1527) gevestig.

Die belangrikste taak van die verowering is uitgevoer deur Duitse avonturiers - Ambrosio de Alfinger, George de Speyer en veral Nikolaus Federmann - in diens van die Welsers, Duitse bankiers wat regte in Venezuela verkry het tydens keiser Charles V. Gedurende 'n deel van die koloniale tydperk die gebied was 'n byvoegsel van New Granada. Kakao -verbouing was die steunpilaar van die koloniale ekonomie. Van die 16de tot die 18de eeu. die kuslyn is aangeval deur Engelse buccaneers, en in die 18de eeu. daar was 'n vinnige smokkelhandel met die Britse eilande van Wes -Indië.

In 1795 was daar 'n opstand teen die Spaanse beheer, maar eers nadat Napoleon beheer oor Spanje geneem het, het 'n werklike rewolusie (1810) in Venezuela onder Francisco de Miranda begin. In 1811 is volkome onafhanklikheid verklaar, maar die revolusie het spoedig probleme ondervind. 'N Aardbewing in 1812 verwoes stede wat deur die patriotte besit word, en help om die saak van die royaliste voort te sit. Later kon Simón Bolívar (gebore in Venezuela) en sy luitenante uit Colombia egter Venezuela bevry ondanks terugslae wat deur die royalistiese bevelvoerder, Pablo Morillo, toegedien is. Die oorwinning van Carabobo (1821) verseker onafhanklikheid van Spanje.

Venezuela en ander gebiede het deel geword van die federale republiek Groter Colombia. Byna van die begin af was Venezuela egter rustig. José Antonio Páez, wat die laaste Spaanse garnisoen in 1823 in Puerto Cabello verower het, het onafhanklikheid voorgestaan. Hy was 'n caudillo met 'n sterk gevolg onder die geharde veehouers, die llaneros. In 1830 het die separatiste die oorhand gekry, en Venezuela het 'n onafhanklike staat geword. Páez was die leidende figuur. Alhoewel konserwatiewe en liberale partye verskyn het, was die werklike beheer van Venezuela hoofsaaklik deur caudillos uit die grondbesitsklas. Nadat Páez, José Tadeo Monagas en sy broer (1846) hulself aan die bewind verskans het, maar nie voordat 'n bitter stryd gevoer is om te verhoed dat die vuurvaste Páez 'n groot mate van politieke beheer kon behou nie.

Die Monagas -broers is in 1858 omvergewerp, en burgeroorlog tussen caudillos het chronies geword. 'N Kort liberale regime onder Juan Falcón het die gedesentraliseerde Verenigde State van Venezuela in 1864 tot stand gebring. Van 1870 tot 1888 het Guzmán Blanco Venezuela oorheers. Hy het onderwys, kommunikasie en finansies verbeter, die kerk verpletter en homself verryk. Hy is in 1888 omvergewerp, maar diktatuur is vier jaar later onder Joaquín Crespo hervat. Tydens Crespo se bewind het die Venezuela Grensgeskil met Groot -Brittanje begin oor die grens met Brits -Guyana (nou Guyana). Cipriano Castro, 'n nuwe diktator, het aan bewind gekom in 1899. Die finansiële korrupsie en onbevoegdheid van sy administrasie het gehelp om 'n nuwe internasionale voorval, die van die Venezuela -eise, teweeg te bring.

Die jaar 1908 was die begin van die heerskappy van een van die langdurigste van alle Latyns-Amerikaanse diktators, Juan Vicente Gómez, wat aan bewind gebly het tot sy dood in 1935. Sy bewind was een van totale en absolute tirannie, hoewel hy wel dwing die staat (met die hulp van buitelandse olie -toegewings) tot nasionale solvensie en materiële welvaart. Sy dood is gevolg deur volksvreugde. Eleazar López Contreras het president geword (1935–41) en het Venezuela se aandeel in die oliemaatskappye se winste vergroot onder sy wettigverkose opvolger, Isaías Medina Angarita, Venezuela het met die Geallieerdes gesimpatiseer en uiteindelik in 1945 die Tweede Wêreldoorlog aan die Geallieerde kant betree.

Later in 1945 het 'n militêre junta toegewyd aan demokrasie en sosiale hervorming beheer oor die regering gekry, wat toe gelei is deur Rómulo Betancourt van die Demokratiese Aksie -party. 'N Nuwe grondwet wat in 1947 uitgevaardig is, het vir die eerste keer in die geskiedenis van Venezuela voorsiening gemaak vir die verkiesing van 'n president deur direkte volksstem. Die eerste president wat onder die nuwe grondwet verkies is, was die vooraanstaande romanskrywer Rómulo Gallegos. Sy administrasie was egter van korte duur.

'N Militêre staatsgreep in November 1948 het die Gallegos -regering omvergewerp en 'n onderdrukkende militêre diktatuur is tot stand gebring. Teen 1952 het kolonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez diktator geword, en hy het wyd gebruik gemaak van polisiestaatstegnieke. 'N Gewilde opstand, ondersteun deur liberale eenhede van die gewapende magte, het vroeg in 1958 uitgebreek, en Pérez Jiménez het gevlug. Verkiesings wat daardie jaar gehou is, het die demokratiese heerskappy in Venezuela herstel. Rómulo Betancourt het 'n matige program vir geleidelike ekonomiese hervorming aangeneem en vriendskaplike betrekkinge met die Verenigde State onderhou ondanks die assosiasie van Amerikaanse belange met Pérez Jiménez. 'N Nuwe grondwet (1961) is aangeneem.

Die land, wat lankal skuldloos was weens die olie -inkomste, bereik 'n hoogtepunt van welvaart, maar die nuwe administrasie is nietemin ernstig uitgedaag. Linksgesinde groepe, veral die kommuniste, het die administrasie bitter gekant, en hul aktiwiteite, tesame met die herstel van die armer klasse en die afwyking van linkse elemente in die weermag, het tot talle opstande gelei. Uiterste regse elemente het ook 'n plan gemaak teen die Betancourt-regime. Betancourt is in 1964 opgevolg deur Raúl Leoni. In 1968 het die Sosiaal -Christelike party aan bewind gekom toe Rafael Caldera Rodríguez 'n noue presidentsverkiesing gewen het. Die grensgeskil met Guyana het weer opgevlam in die 1960's, met Venezuela wat aanspraak maak op ongeveer 60% van Guyana se gebied.

Die presidentsverkiesing van 1973 is gewen deur Carlos Andrés Pérez Rodríguez van die Demokratiese Aksie -party. In dieselfde jaar sluit Venezuela aan by die Andes -groep (later die Andes -gemeenskap), 'n ekonomiese vereniging van Latyns -Amerikaanse nasies. In 1976 het Venezuela sy olie- en ystermaatskappye in buitelandse besit genasionaliseer. Luis Herrera Campíns vervang Pérez in 1978. 'n Daling in die wêreld se oliepryse gedurende die vroeë tagtigerjare het die Venezolaanse ekonomie geskok en die buitelandse skuld van Venezuela grootliks toegeneem.

Die kandidaat vir Demokratiese Aksie, Jaime Lusinchi, het Campíns in 1983 verslaan. Hy het oor die nasionale skuld heronderhandel en besparingsbegrotings en besnoeiings in maatskaplike dienste ingestel, maar inflasie en werkloosheid het die land steeds teister. Pérez is in 1989 terug op kantoor te midde van betogings en onluste wat veroorsaak is deur verslegtende sosiale toestande. In 1992 het Pérez twee pogings tot militêre staatsgrepe oorleef, maar die jaar daarna is hy uit sy amp onthef op aanklagte van korrupsie, wat later skuldig bevind is en gevonnis is vir die misbruik van 'n geheime veiligheidsfonds. In 1994 word Rafael Caldera Rodríguez weer president, hierdie keer onder die vaandel van die National Convergence -party. Hy het in 1996 besparingsmaatreëls onthul en sommige staatsondernemings geprivatiseer.

Die ekonomie van Venezuela het gesak en sy begrotingstekort het toegeneem namate oliepryse aan die einde van die negentigerjare weer gedaal het. Die betrekkinge met Colombia, wat lankal gespanne was oor die beheer van buitelandse oliereserwes en die onwettige beweging van baie Colombiane na Venezuela om te werk, het in die 1990's versleg toe Venezuela beweer dat Colombiaanse guerrillas dwelms en wapens oor die grens handel. In 1999 word Hugo Chávez Frías, 'n voormalige kolonel van die weermag wat deelgeneem het aan 'n mislukte staatsgreep teen Pérez, president nadat hy as onafhanklike kandidaat was. Hy het gevra dat die privatisering van staatsbates stopgesit word en 'n wet goedgekeur wat hom in staat stel om ses maande lank 'n besluit te neem oor ekonomiese aangeleenthede. Hy het ook die olieproduksie van Venezuela verlaag om die pryse te dwing, en het 'n beroep op ander OPEC -lede gedoen om dieselfde te doen.

'N Referendum in April, 1999, het 'n beroep gedoen op 'n nasionale konstituerende vergadering om 'n nuwe grondwet op te stel, die vergadering is in Julie verkies en 'n maand later belê. Die vergadering en Chávez was 'n stryd om mag met die kongres en die regbank, die vergadering verklaar 'n nasionale noodtoestand en beroof die kongres van sy magte. 'N Grondwet wat 'n sterk president tot stand bring met 'n ampstermyn van ses jaar en die geleentheid om onmiddellik herverkies te word en 'n eenkamer-nasionale vergadering, is in referendum in Desember goedgekeur.Die nuwe grondwet verminder ook die burgerlike beheer van die weermag en verhoog die regering se beheer oor ekonomie. In dieselfde maand het Venezuela die ergste natuurramp van die eeu beleef, aangesien stortreën groot, verwoestende modderstortings langs die Karibiese kus veroorsaak het, en moontlik tot 5000 mense dood is.

Die ramp het planne vir nuwe verkiesings vertraag, maar die kongres is vervang deur 'n tussentydse raad van 21 lede. In Julie 2000 het Chávez onder die nuwe grondwet verkiesing tot die presidentskap gewen, en sy koalisie, die Politieke Pool, het 99 van die 165 setels in die vergadering gekry, minder as die tweederde meerderheid wat nodig was om sonder beperkings te regeer. Chávez het goedkeuring van die vergadering gekry om deur middel van 'n besluit wetgewing te gee, en het 'n referendum in Desember 2000 gewen wat die arbeidsleiers van Venezuela verdryf het, 'n stap wat deur die Internasionale Arbeidsorganisasie aan die kaak gestel is. Chávez het ook die sluimerende grensgeskil met Guyana laat herleef en verklaar dat 'n satelliet-lanseerfasiliteit wat deur 'n Amerikaanse onderneming op die gebied wat deur Venezuela geëis word, 'n dekking is vir 'n Amerikaanse militêre teenwoordigheid.

In 2001 het Chávez ietwat meer gewild geraak by die toenemend gepolariseerde Venezolaanse bevolking, hoewel hy steeds aansienlike steun onder die laer klasse behou het. Sy pogings om beheer oor die oliemaatskappy te bewerkstellig, het vroeg in 2002 tot stakings en betogings gelei, en in April is hy kortliks in 'n staatsgreeppoging verdryf. Latyns-Amerikaanse nasies het egter geweier om 'n selfverklaarde tussentydse regering te erken onder die uitvoerende hoof van die onderneming, Pedro Carmona Estanga, en armer Venezolane het teenbetogings ter ondersteuning van hom gelewer. Chávez is in sy amp herstel en het tot versoening gevra en 'n daaropvolgende kabinetskommeling het sy regering 'n minder ideologiese rolverdeling gegee.

Die voortslepende politieke onrus, wat gelei het tot 'n langdurige, polariserende staking teen die regering in die belangrike oliebedryf (Desember 2002 - Februarie 2003), het die land in 'n resessie gelei en olie -uitvoer verminder. Alhoewel Chávez sy opvallende teenstanders oortref het, het die krisis die openbare steun vir sy regering verder uitgewis. 'N Ooreenkoms tussen die twee partye, wat in Mei 2003 deur die Organisasie van Amerikaanse State onderhandel is, het 'n einde gemaak aan geweld en 'n referendum oor Chávez se presidentskap later in die jaar. 'N Opposisie -versoekskrif waarin 'n referendum oor Chávez gevra word, is egter in September van die hand gewys weens prosedurele foute.

'N Nuwe versoekskrif vir 'n herroepings -referendum is in Desember aangebied, maar soveel van die handtekeninge is deur die verkiesingskommissie verwerp dat die versoekskrif onsuksesvol was. Onderhandelinge het uiteindelik tot 'n kompromie gelei waarin die opposisie in Mei 2004 drie dae toegelaat is om betwiste handtekeninge te herbevestig en die versoekskrif bekragtig is. Ook in Mei is 'n aantal burgerlikes en militêre offisiere gearresteer op aanklagte van die beplanning van 'n staatsgreep teen Chávez. Tydens die referendum wat in Augustus gehou is, het 58% gestem om Chávez te behou, en ondanks die opposisieverwerping van die uitslag, het buitelandse waarnemers dit ten sterkste onderskryf. Verskeie opposisieleiers is later (Julie 2005) daarvan beskuldig dat hulle saamgesweer het om die regering van Venezuela te ondermyn omdat hul organisasie, Súmate, wat 'n groot rol gespeel het in die versoekskrif, Amerikaanse fondse ontvang het wat na bewering gebruik is om die referendumpoging te finansier.

In Januarie 2005 onderteken die president 'n dekreet wat 'n nasionale grondkommissie instel wat die proses sal begin om die land se groot boedels op te breek en die grond te herverdeel. Gedurende dieselfde maand was die betrekkinge met Colombia gespanne nadat 'n Colombiaanse rebel in Venezuela (Desember 2004) deur oorvloedjagters ontvoer is en aan die owerhede in Colombia oorgegee is, maar die geskil is opgelos teen die tyd dat beide presidente van die nasies in Februarie in Caracas vergader het. . Die verkiesings van die Nasionale Vergadering in Desember 2005 het gelei tot 'n sweep vir partye wat die president ondersteun, maar slegs 'n kwart van die kiesers het gestem. Die meeste opposisiekandidate het hulle voor die stemming aan die wedstryd onttrek uit protes teen wat volgens hulle vooroordeel en gebreke in die verkiesingsproses was, wat die volledige beheer van die wetgewer aan Chávez oorgegee het.

Chávez het die verhoogde olie -inkomste van Venezuela gebruik om sosiale programme te befonds, 'n groot militêre reserwe en uitgebreide milisie op te stel en programme op te stel wat ontwerp is om die gevolge van hoë energiepryse op die Karibiese lande te verminder. Chávez het die Verenigde State ook in die openbaar daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n inval beplan het om hom omver te werp, terwyl Amerikaanse amptenare hom daarvan beskuldig het dat hy antidemokratiese magte in Bolivia, Colombia en Ecuador ondersteun. Sy openbare steun, in 2006, vir een kandidaat in die Peruaanse presidensiële wedloop en kritiek op die uiteindelike wenner, Alan García, het daartoe gelei dat Peru sy ambassadeur herroep het. Venezuela is middel 2006 toegelaat tot volle lidmaatskap in Mercosur (in 2012 bekragtig), terwyl dit onttrek het aan die Andes-gemeenskap, waarvan die lede Peru en Colombia insluit.

Chávez is in Desember 2006 maklik herkies en het baat gevind by 'n ekonomiese oplewing as gevolg van hoë petroleumpryse en die sosiale programme wat hy vir die armes ingestel het, maar die sterk oorwinning het die voortgesette polarisasie van die Venezolaanse samelewing in die klas, met die armer, gemasker. klasse wat die president oorweldigend bevoordeel. Terselfdertyd het inflasie egter toegeneem en dit het steeds gegroei gedurende 2007 en 2008. Met sy inhuldiging (Jan., 2007) het Chávez alle energie- en kragondernemings en die land se grootste telekommunikasiefirma uitgeroep. . Hy het ook besluit om ongeveer twee dosyn partye wat hom ondersteun, te konsolideer tot 'n verenigde sosialistiese party, wat slegs gedeeltelik suksesvol was, en het die reg om vir 18 maande by besluit te regeer, verseker. Chávez het daarna grondwetlike wysigings gekry wat die termyne van die presidensiële termyn sou beëindig het, die termyn van die president sou verleng en die president se bevoegdhede in die algemeen kon vergroot, maar die veranderinge het (Desember 2007) nie die goedkeuring van die kiesers gewen nie.

Na 'n Colombiaanse inval (Maart 2008) teen rebelle in Ecuador, was daar 'n paar dae spanning tussen Colombia en die naburige Ecuador en Venezuela, wat kragte na hul grense gemobiliseer het. Colombia het gesê dat rekenaarlêers wat tydens die aanval beslag gelê is, bewys het van bande tussen die rebelle en Chávez se regering. Alhoewel Venezuela dit ontken het, het Chávez, wat daarin geslaag het om die vrylating van verskeie gyselaars wat deur die rebelle gehou is, die simpatie te betoon met die Colombiaanse rebelleleier wat tydens die aanval doodgemaak is. (Die hoof van die Organisasie van Amerikaanse State het die daaropvolgende maand gesê dat geen regering die bewyse van bande tussen Venezuela en enige terreurgroep aan hom voorgelê het nie.) Vanaf middel 2009 is die betrekkinge met Colombia weer gespanne deur Colombiaanse beskuldigings van Venezuela se steun aan Colombiaanse rebelle , gedeeltelik aangevoer deur die opneem van die rebelle van wapens wat Venezuela uit Swede gekoop het Venezuela beweer dat Colombia se toelaat dat Amerikaanse magte Colombiaanse basisse teen dwelmhandelaars gebruik, 'n strydlustige stap was deur die Verenigde State. In November 2009 het Chávez 15.000 troepe beveel om die Colombiaanse grens die volgende maand te beskuldig dat hy die Verenigde State beskuldig het van die oortreding van die Venezolaanse lugruim vanaf die Nederlandse Antille, waar Amerikaanse antidrug -operasies gevestig is.

In April 2008 beveel Chávez die nasionalisering van die sementbedryf en die grootste staalvervaardiger van Venezuela, dat bykomende maatskappye en nywerhede, veral finansiële instellings, genasionaliseer word in 2010. Omdat sy reg om by besluit te heers, einde Julie 2008 verstryk het , Het Chávez 'n aantal besluite onderteken wat baie van die grondwetlike wysigings weerspieël wat kiesers aan die einde van 2007 verwerp het, en in Januarie 2009 het hy 'n grondwetlike wysiging verkry wat die termyn vir alle verkose amptenare sou beëindig. 'N Referendum het die wysiging in Februarie 2009 goedgekeur.

Intussen het Chávez se bondgenote in November 2008 weer 'n meerderheid van die poste in plaaslike en streeksverkiesings gewen, maar die opposisie het die aantal poste wat hy beklee, verhoog en die Caracas -burgemeester gewen. Daaropvolgende regeringsbewegings het beduidende magte ontneem van poste wat opposisiekandidate gewen het, wat die mag verder in die hande van die sentrale regering gekonsentreer het, en die regering het korrupsie -ondersoeke of ander sake teen 'n aantal toonaangewende opposisiefigure en kritici geloods. Teen die einde van 2009 het droogte en toenemende energiebehoeftes tot so lae watervlakke agter die Guridam gelei dat industriële besnoeiings en ander rantsoeneringsmaatreëls, insluitend onderbrekings in 2010, ingestel is. In Februarie 2010 het die regering 'n noodtoestand vir elektrisiteit verklaar en strenger rantsoenering ingestel.

Die verkiesing van die Nasionale Vergadering in September is gewen deur Chávez se party, maar die opposisie, wat nie die verkiesing boikot nie, behaal aansienlike winste, wen 47% van die stemme en byna 40% van die setels en ontken die regerende party 'n grondwetlik belangrike twee- derdes meerderheid. In Desember 2010 was daar beduidende oorstromings in state langs die sentrale en W -Karibiese kus, en herstel en heropbou van vloed was die voorwendsel dat Chávez se wetgewing deur besluit besluit. Deur sy kritici aangewys as 'n poging om die inkomende Nasionale Vergadering te omseil, het die wet vir hom 18 maande lank dekreetbevoegdhede gebied op baie gebiede, soos bankwese en verdediging, wat nie met heropbou verband hou nie. In Maart 2011 het die regering reëls aangeneem wat die weermag magtig om die land se milisies te bewapen, 'n regeringsmag wat bestaan ​​uit militante ondersteuners van Chávez wat voorheen nie vuurwapens aan hulle gegee is nie.

Chávez is weer in Oktober 2012 herkies nadat hy vir kanker behandel is en verklaar het dat hy heeltemal herstel het, maar sy oorwinningsmarge was baie minder as in 2006. Daarna is die president egter weer vir kanker behandel. Hierdie keer het komplikasies hom in 'n Kubaanse hospitaal gehou en daartoe gelei dat sy inhuldiging in Januarie 2013 uitgestel is. In Desember 2012 het Chávez se party winste behaal tydens die goewerneursverkiesing. Chávez sterf in Maart 2013 nadat hy teruggekeer het na Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro Moros, sy vise -president, het tussentydse president geword.

In die presidensiële verkiesing van April is Maduro verkies, maar hy het slegs die opposisiekandidaat, Henrique Capriles Radonski, 'n staatsgouverneur wat in 2012 met meer as 10%verloor het, verslaan. Capriles het 'n herberoep gevra, maar 'n meer beperkte oudit is uitgevoer. Daar was 'n mate van geweld na die verkiesing, en Maduro beskuldig Capriles van 'n poging tot 'n staatsgreep. In Junie 2013 het die Venezuela-regering gesê dat dit 'n poging om Maduro te vermoor, in die wiele gery het. Maduro het voorheen die voormalige Colombiaanse president Uribe daarvan beskuldig dat hy hom wou doodmaak, en sy daaropvolgende ampstermyn is gekenmerk deur herhalende aanklagte van moordplotte deur verskillende teenstanders.

'N Paar beduidende kragonderbrekings het laat in 2013 die elektrisiteitsnetwerk van Venezuela geraak. Die regering het die onderbrekings op sabotasie blameer en in Oktober verskeie Amerikaanse diplomate wat hulle beskuldig het dat hulle betrokke was by 'n onderbreking, beskuldig, maar die regering het geen konkrete bewyse van sabotasie gelewer nie. Maduro het die bevoegdheid gekry om in November vir 12 maande by besluit te heers, wat volgens hom nodig was om korrupsie te bekamp en die ekonomie te reguleer, terwyl die inflasiekoers in 2013 intussen tot meer as 50% toegeneem het ondanks die prysbeheer van die regering en hoog gebly het gedurende 2014, toe die land binnegekom het 'n resessie. Die land het ook ekonomies gely onder die ineenstorting van oliepryse in 2014, en sy ekonomiese probleme het tot in 2015 voortgeduur.

Betogings teen die regering begin in Februarie 2014, nadat studente betoog het oor beweerde ongeërgdheid van die polisie teen 'n poging tot seksuele aanranding. 'N Aantal opposisieleiers, hoofsaaklik uit meer hardnekkige groepe, is in Februarie en Maart gearresteer, en drie lugmaggeneraals is in Maart gearresteer op aanklagte van die opstel van 'n opstand. Die verwerping van opposisieplanne teen die president en arrestasies en aanklagte teen politieke teenstanders het tot in 2015 voortgeduur. Maduro het ook kritiek ondergaan in 2014 vanaf prominente linkse persone wat ondersteuners van Chávez was.

Nadat die Verenigde State vroeg in 2015 sanksies teen Venezolaanse amptenare ingestel het weens beweerde skendings van menseregte, het Maduro gesoek en die bevoegdheid gekry om gedurende 2015 te besluit. Daarna het hy die grensgeskil met Guyana herleef oor olie-eksplorasie aan die kus van Guyanaese gebied. 'N Venezolaanse ineenstorting teen Colombiaanse migrante en smokkelaars in Augustus - September, 2015, het duisende mense na Colombia laat vlug en het gespanne verhoudings tussen die twee nasies ontstaan. Die opposisie het die verkiesings van die Nasionale Vergadering van Desember 2015 in 'n groot skof gewen en 'n meerderheid van twee derdes behaal, maar 'n handjievol van sy oorwinnings is daarna deur die regerende party in die hof uitgedaag. Die Maduro -regering het daarna die hooggeregshof vol simpatieke regters gepak en die bevoegdhede van die Nasionale Vergadering oor die sentrale bank beperk, waarna die hof hom in geskille met die Nasionale Vergadering met Maduro verbind het.

In Januarie 2016 het Maduro 'n ekonomiese noodtoestand verklaar, wat hom in staat gestel het om twee maande lank by voorskrif te regeer; dit is in Maart verleng en weer in Mei, toe hy ook 'n uitsondering verklaar het, wat sy magte aansienlik verhoog het. Nie een van die bevele is deur die vergadering goedgekeur nie, maar dit is nietemin deur die hof toegelaat. Die opposisie het voortgegaan met sy pogings om die president te herroep, aangesien die ekonomiese toestande in die land verder versleg het, wat gelei het tot 'n wydverspreide voedseltekort en plundering van voedselmarkte. Daar was ook 'n paar maande in die eerste helfte van 2016 elektrisiteitstekorte, wat (soos in 2009) verband hou met probleme met die Guridam. Maduro het die kiesraad gebruik om 'n herroepingsreferendum uit te stel, eers 'n moontlike stemming tot 2017 uitgestel en dan die herroepingstaak opgeskort en die verkiesing van die staatsbestuurder vertraag. Die hooggeregshof het wette wat deur die Nasionale Vergadering goedgekeur is, ongedaan gemaak en Maduro toegelaat om sonder wetgewende goedkeuring te regeer, aangesien die opposisie intussen verskeie protesoptogte teen Maduro geloods het.

In Desember 2016 is die land uit Mercosur geskors omdat dit nie sy nasionale wette in lyn gebring het met die belangrikste handels- en menseregte -reëls van die organisasie nie, en dat die opskorting onbepaald geword het in Augustus 2017. Teen Desember 2016 ondervind Venezuela hiperinflasie en in Januarie 2017 het dit banknote met 'n groot denominasie bekendgestel. 'N Poging tot onttrekking in die vorige maand van die destydse grootste denominasie-banknoot het protes en onluste veroorsaak. In Maart 2017 het die hooggeregshof verklaar dat die Nasionale Vergadering minagtend was en dat dit in plaas daarvan sou wetgewing doen. Wydverspreide nasionale en internasionale kritiek het Maduro en die hof genoop om dele van die antidemokratiese uitspraak om te keer, maar beide die president en die hof het voortgegaan om saam te werk sonder die opposisie-beheerde wetgewer. Die stap het ook gelei tot herhalende demonstrasies wat weke lank voortgeduur het.

In Mei het Maduro gevra dat 'n konstitusionele vergadering verkies word deur sosiale organisasies en munisipale regerings wat die regerende party meer ondersteun as die bevolking. Die verkiesing in Julie vir die konstitusionele vergadering is deur die opposisie geboikot, maar die regering beweer die oorwinning en 'n 40% -stemmigheid van die stemstelselonderneming het gesê dat daar met die stempersentasie gepeuter is. Die nuwe vergadering verwerp (Augustus) die sosialistiese prokureur -generaal, wat 'n uitgesproke kritikus van Maduro geword het, en sê dat sy die uitslag van die verkiesing in Julie sal ondersoek. Dit het ook aanspraak gemaak op uitsluitlike bevoegdheid om wette te aanvaar. Die verkiesing van die nuwe vergadering het ook gelei tot die verlamming van nuwe finansiële sanksies teen die regering deur die Verenigde State.

In die regeringsverkiesings in Oktober 2017 het die party van Maduro die oorgrote meerderheid van die poste verseker, ondanks sy ongewildheid, het die opposisie bedrog beweer, en daar was bewyse van 'n mate van onregverdigheid in die stemproses, maar onthouding deur opposisiekiesers was ook 'n faktor. In Mei 2018 het Maduro herverkiesing gewen in 'n wedstryd wat grootliks deur die opposisie geboikot is, wat dit veroordeel het. In Augustus 2018 was Maduro die teiken van 'n oënskynlike moordpoging. Die hiperinflasie van die land het gelei tot die bekendstelling van 'n nuwe, herwaardeerde geldeenheid, 'n verhoging van die minimum loon en 'n verlaging van brandstofsubsidies, wat in Augustus begin.

Toe Maduro in Januarie 2019 sy amp beklee, verklaar die Nasionale Vergadering dat sy regering onwettig is en erken Juan Guaidó, die president van die Nasionale Vergadering, as tussentydse president. Baie Amerikaanse en Europese nasies het Guaidó erken as die land se leier, en 'n aantal van hulle het nuwe sanksies op Maduro se regering ingestel, veral die Verenigde State het die erns van sy sanksies verhoog namate die tyd vorder. Hierdie bewegings en groot betogings ten gunste van Guaidó kon Maduro, wat die steun van Rusland en China behou het, nie ontwyk nie. In Maart het twee elektriese onderbrekings groot dele van die land dae lank op 'n slag sonder krag gelaat. In Julie het daar ook 'n groot onderbreking plaasgevind.

In Januarie 2020 het Maduro -bondgenote probeer om 'n nuwe spreker van die Nasionale Vergadering, Luis Parra, 'n voormalige bondgenoot van Guaidó, te kies deur te verhinder dat die meeste wetgewers die vergaderingsgebou binnegaan, deur die meerderheid op 'n ander plek herkies. Maduro en ander hooggeplaaste regeringsamptenare is in Maart 2020 deur die Verenigde State van Amerika aangekla van narkoterrorisme en ander misdade. meer as 60% sedert 2013) het die meeste na Colombia, Peru en Ecuador gegaan.

'N Poging om Maduro in Mei 2020 te ontvoer, is in die wiele gery deur die Venezolaanse veiligheidsmagte wat deur 'n Amerikaanse veteraan gereël is; dit was oorspronklik beplan in samewerking met twee van Guaidó se adviseurs, wat later onttrek het. In Junie en Julie het die hooggeregshof gelas dat verskeie groot opposisiepartye, waaronder Guaidó's, oorgeneem word. Hierdie optrede en die herorganisasie van die nasionale verkiesingsraad is veroordeel as bedoel om opposisiekandidate in die verkiesing van die Nasionale Vergadering in 2020 te frustreer.

Die Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6de uitg. Kopiereg © 2012, Columbia University Press. Alle regte voorbehou.

Sien meer ensiklopedie -artikels oor: Suid -Amerikaanse politieke geografie


Onstabiliteit in Venezuela

Venezuela is te midde van 'n humanitêre krisis. Thousands of people flee the country every day, mostly on foot. In April 2019, after years of denying the existence of a humanitarian crisis and refusing to allow foreign aid to enter the country—calling aid shipments a political ploy by the United States—Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro allowed the entry of a shipment of emergency supplies from the Red Cross. Venezuela’s infrastructure has been poorly maintained, recently leading to a series of country-wide blackouts in March 2019 that left millions without power.

Maduro was reelected to a second six-year term in May 2018, despite boycotts and accusations of fraud in a widely condemned election, including by a group of fourteen neighboring countries known as the Lima Group, and was officially sworn in to office in January 2019. Two weeks later, on January 15, the National Assembly declared Maduro’s election illegitimate and opposition leader Juan Guaidó announced that he would assume office as interim president until free and fair elections could be held. Guaidó was quickly recognized as interim president by the United States, Canada, most of the European Union, and the Organization of American States, but Maduro retains the support of several major countries including China, Cuba, Russia, and Turkey.

The resulting political standoff has seen an increase in U.S. sanctions against the Maduro government, including targeting oil shipments to Cuba—Maduro has increasingly relied on Cuban military and intelligence support to stay in power—as well as discussions about a potential military intervention. Russia, meanwhile, continues to support the Maduro government, sending Russian troops to Venezuela in March 2019 and helping the government evade sanctions on the oil industry. China has continued to back the Maduro government as well, including offering to help rebuild the national power grid.

Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela in 1998 and, because Venezuela is a petrostate with the largest oil reserves in the world, his socialist government was able to successfully implement its plan to provide subsidized goods and services to the Venezuelan people. However, years of economic mismanagement and corruption under Chavez led to Venezuela’s almost complete dependence on oil exports, and the collapse of global oil prices in 2014 led to a rapid economic decline.

After Chavez’s death in 2013, then–Vice President Maduro assumed the presidency and was subsequently elected to office. His government attempted to address the economic crisis by printing money. This policy resulted in hyperinflation (the International Monetary Fund estimates that inflation could hit 10 million percent in 2019). By 2014, large-scale anti-government protests erupted across the country and, in 2015, voters expressed their dissatisfaction by electing the first opposition-controlled National Assembly in two decades.

Since the situation deteriorated and the crisis escalated in 2015, an estimated 3.4 million Venezuelans have fled the country Venezuela’s neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean host approximately 2.7 million refugees, with nearly 1.5 million in Colombia. Estimates from the United Nations suggest that these numbers will increase, with 5.4 million projected to leave the country by the end of 2019. The exodus has also caused a regional humanitarian crisis, as neighboring governments are unable to absorb refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, because the government has been unable to provide social services, Venezuelans face severe food and medicine shortages, as well as the continuing spread of infectious diseases.

As the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela escalates and the political situation deteriorates, the exodus of Venezuelans to neighboring countries is expected to continue. The strain on aid groups and regional governments to support refugees and asylum seekers may further expand what has already become a regional crisis. The United States has stated its interest in mitigating the humanitarian crisis and preventing further destabilization of the region.


Military Government Falls in Venezuela - History

Editor's Note:

Boom and bust. That economic cycle has happened repeatedly in places dependent on one natural resource, like Venezuela and petroleum. The history behind the most dramatic economic and human rights crisis in the Americas.

In the 1970s, Venezuela had the highest growth rate and lowest inequality in Latin America. Thanks to an oil bonanza, the government was able to spend more money (in absolute terms) from 1974 to 1979 than in its entire independent history. Indeed, during this time, this Gran Venezuela had the highest per capita GDP in region.

Scotch whiskey consumption was the highest in the world, the middle class drove Cadillacs and Buicks, and the free-spending upper class jetted off on shopping sprees to Miami, where they were known as “dame dos” (“give me two”). Politically, the country was one of only three democracies in Latin America in 1977, along with Costa Rica and Colombia.

But Venezuela is now deeply mired in political, economic, and humanitarian crises.

The nation’s economy contracted an estimated 18.6 percent in 2016, and is expected to shrink between 4.3 and 6 percent further in 2017. The 2016 inflation rate was estimated at 290 to 800 percent, and in December 2016 the country became the seventh in Latin American history to experience hyperinflation. Despite the government’s best efforts to continue payments, a crippling debt default also appears likely in 2017.

The human costs of the crisis have been dire, with food and medicine shortages, soaring infant mortality, and one of the world’s highest violent crime rates.

Massive queues for scarce goods like toilet paper, milk, cooking oil, butter, and corn flour (for the country’s ubiquitous arepas) have given rise to professional line standers who are paid to wait on behalf of others, digital apps to help citizens find scarce items, and stories like women giving birth in line or placid observers holding their places while witnessing a murder.

Three-quarters of Venezuelans have lost about 19 pounds of body weight in the last year on what people are calling “the Maduro Diet,” a scathing reference to current president Nicolás Maduro.

Public health is just as bad. As hospitals have run out of imported antibiotics, surgical supplies and spare parts for medical equipment, infant mortality rose 30 percent, maternal mortality 65 percent, and malaria 76 percent in 2016. Diphtheria, once thought eradicated, has made a comeback.

By some estimates, 2.5 million people have left the country since 1999 and Venezuela now leads U.S. asylum requests. On par with these devastating developments, the country has slipped from a hybrid regime—a type of political system that combines democratic traits with autocratic ones—into pure authoritarianism. The government postponed regional elections and suspended an opposition-driven presidential recall referendum against Maduro in October 2016.

Maduro has since tried attempted to dissolve the National Assembly, provoking international opprobrium, massive demonstrations, and condemnation from members of his own party. Some analysts fear the country may be on the brink of civil war.

Toilet paper is one of the basic necessities Venezuela has had a shortage of in recent years. This sign from 2014 limits customers to only three packages of toilet paper per person (left). The murder rate in Venezuela from 1998 to 2016 according to three different agencies (right).

What are the roots of this extraordinary economic and democratic decay?

To begin, Venezuela suffers from the resource curse, where instead of aiding development, the country’s ample mineral wealth actually undermined constructive economic and social development. And although the democracy of the country’s Fourth Republic (1958-1998) was enduring, its quality was not high: the party system was restrictive and unrepresentative of many sectors of society, and it eventually suffered a crisis of legitimacy.

Dissatisfied with the economic situation and a discredited political establishment, voters opted for the promises of the populist Hugo Chávez in 1998.

Chávez managed to radically change the country’s politics and economics without resolving any of the underlying political or economic problems. Instead, his free spending, ambivalent attitude towards liberal democracy, and astonishing economic mismanagement by both him and the feckless Maduro steered the country into today’s crisis.

President Hugo Chávez greeting supporters ahead of his election as president in 1998 ( left ). President Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s handpicked successor, wearing the presidential sash in 2015 ( right ).

Oil Dependency and the Resource Curse

Venezuelan diplomat Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), predicted that Venezuela’s dependence on petroleum would leave it destitute. Amid the oil boom of the 1970s, he prophesied, “Ten years from now, twenty years from now, you will see oil will bring us ruin . It is the devil’s excrement.”

The statement proved prescient.

Unlike some of its neighbors, which were long dependent on exporting a single commodity but have since diversified, Venezuela is a rentier state wholly dependent on the extraction and export of petroleum and its derivatives. The oil sector is the country’s largest source of foreign currency, the biggest contributor to the fiscal sector, and the leading economic activity. In 2016, revenue from petroleum exports accounted for more than 50 percent of the country’s GDP and roughly 96 percent of total exports.

A graph showing oil as a percentage of export earnings in Venezuela from 1998 to 2013 (graph created by the author from information from the Venezuelan Central Bank).

This level of dependency causes a “paradox of plenty,” or “resource curse,” in which a country with large natural resource endowments is nonetheless hard pressed to develop. It also leads to corruption, since a limited number of people generate wealth and the government plays a central role in distributing it. In places with weak representative institutions, oil booms—which create the illusion of prosperity and development—may actually destabilize regimes by reinforcing oil-based interests and further weakening state capacity.

All of this has happened in Venezuela, where oil dependency has contributed to at least three recurrent problems. First, it is difficult for dependent states to invest oil rents in developing a strong domestic productive sector.

Abundant revenue from natural resource extraction discourages the long-term investment in infrastructure that would support a more diverse economy. Venezuelan leaders have long recognized this challenge. In a famous 1936 op-ed, writer and intellectual Arturo Uslar Pietri urged his countrymen to “sembrar el petróleo” (plant the oil) by using oil rents to grow the country’s productive capacity, modernize, and educate.

Venezuelan intellectual Arturo Uslar Pietri urged his fellow citizens to use oil profits to develop the country and its people (left). A graph of Venezuela’s production (grey), consumption (black line), and exportation (green) of oil from 1965 to 2015 (right).

Leaders have been unable to heed his advice. Instead, mini-booms in oil prices consistently reverse growth in Venezuela’s non-oil sector, which sees an average 3.3 percent growth in pre-boom years turn into -2.8 percent in post-boom years.

The result is continued dependence on oil revenue at the expense of other industries, and a concentration of risk in a volatile commodity. As the above graph shows, oil dependency has grown since 1998, as the percent of export earning derived from petroleum rose from under 70 percent to more than 95 percent in 2012—and a reported 96 percent in 2016.

Second, in times of bonanza, oil rents may also cause a growing dependence on foreign imports at the expense of domestic industry.

This is due to the fact that new discoveries or rapidly rising prices of oil bring a sharp inflow of foreign currency. An increase in currency reserves leads to appreciation in the value of the currency, which hurts the competitiveness of the other products on the export market and increases dependence on foreign imports, which are cheaper. When oil money is flowing, imports increase.

However, when crude prices drop and petrodollars fall, as they have now, it becomes more difficult for the government to import goods, as demonstrated by scarcity in the 1980s and again since 2012. Compounding things right now, Venezuela’s government has made it a priority to pay its sovereign debt obligations rather than import more goods.

A third consequence of the resource curse is endemic corruption. Countries heavily dependent on external rents, such as natural resource exports, are able to embark on large public expenditure programs without having to develop a fiscal system to tax their populations. As a result, citizens have reduced incentives to hold the government accountable.

Further, whenever public agents have monopoly power and discretion over the distribution of valuable rights, incentives for corruption increase. This has long been the case in Venezuela, which has suffered from public sector corruption dating back at least to democratization in 1958. As oil prices skyrocketed in the late 2000s, horizontal checks on executive power and oversight of the state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA) decreased. Today, corruption has reached unprecedented levels.

This is reflected in the evolution of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in Venezuela. The country consistently ranked in the top 10% of the world’s most corrupt countries beginning with the first survey in 1995. Yet probity has dipped further since the mid-2000s, reflecting decreasing confidence in any measure of government rectitude under both Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.

The Military, Democratization, and “Partyarchy”

Political factors such as a tradition of military government, late democratization, and weak democratic representation have also greatly contributed to the present crisis.

Simón Bolívar, known at El Libertador, was a military and political figure who played a leading role in bringing independence from Spain to Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama (left). A 2014 military parade to commemorate President Hugo Chávez’s death in 2013 (right).

Independence hero Simón Bolívar supposedly said that “Ecuador is a convent, Colombia a university, and Venezuela a military barracks.” Indeed, the Venezuelan armed forces have been key actors in Venezuelan politics and state building. Until Julián Castro’s military dictatorship in 1858, all post-independence leaders were ex-military officers who represented the Liberal and Conservative parties.

Alternation between active and retired officers holding political power ended definitively with the Liberal Restoration Revolution of 1899. From that time until 1945, a succession of military officers ruled the country under dictatorship: Cipriano Castro (1899-1908) Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935) Eleazar López Contreras (1935-1941) and Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945).

President Cipriano Castro ruled Venezuela from 1899 to 1908 after seizing power with his personal army (left). President Juan Vicente Gómez seized power from his predecessor and ruled from 1908 until his death in 1935 (second from left). President Eleazar López Contreras served as his predecessor’s War Minister before ruling Venezuela from 1935 to 1941 (third from left). President Isaías Medina Angarita also served as his predecessor’s War Minister and ruled Venezuela from 1941 until 1945 (right).

The country attempted electoral democracy during the trienio adeco (1945-1948), but this was quickly followed by the repressive dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez. In the absence of interstate conflict, the armed forces saw themselves as the key institution fostering internal development and modernization.

Military involvement in politics meant democracy arrived late. Stable democracy, in fact, did not occur until 1958, when representatives of Venezuela's three main political parties—the Social Democratic Acción Democrática (AD), Social Christian COPEI and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD)—signed a formal agreement known as the Pact of Punto Fijo.

President Rómulo Betancourt, the “Father of Venezuelan Democracy,” voting in 1946 (left). President Marcos Pérez Jiménez, who ruled as a military dictator from 1952 to 1958, receiving a commendation from U.S. Ambassador Fletcher Warren in 1954 (right).

The pact aimed to preserve democracy through elections, cabinet and bureaucratic power sharing, and a basic program of government. Although the accord allowed Venezuelan democracy to survive the tumultuous 1960s and a leftist guerrilla threat, as well as destabilization attempts by the Dominican Republic’s right wing dictator, Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, it also helped bind Venezuela’s political system to exclusive competition between two parties, AD and COPEI, after the URD lost power in the 1960s.

This two-party dominance created what Michael Coppedge termed “partyarchy”: government of the people, by the parties, for the parties. In it, AD and COPEI exercised a “pathological kind of political control” over political, economic, and social life that guaranteed stability at the expense of representation.

The parties relied on a system of concertación, in which they would confer with each other or business and military interests to seek consensus on major policies. They also used patronage to coopt civil society organizations and other means of limiting channels of representation such as interest groups, the media, and the courts.

From left to right, Rafael Caldera, Jóvito Villalba, and Rómulo Betancourt at the signing of the Pact of Punto Fijo in 1958 (left). The logo of the Social Democratic Party, Acción Democrática, (AD) (top). Members of the Social Christian Party, COPEI, marching for a mayoral candidate around 2010 in the party’s trademark green color (bottom).

These limitations hurt the system, and as oil prices fell and resources for patronage dried up in the 1980s, public support for the parties and the Fourth Republic democratic system declined.

Venezuela’s achievements in the 1960s and 1970s, look less impressive through the prisms of oil dependency and democratic rigidity. While GDP per capita, social spending, and quality of life all rose, and while the country avoided the democratic collapses of Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and others, its gains were ultimately unsustainable.

These fundamental political and economic weaknesses also created conditions for the crises of the 1980s and 1990s and paved the way for the allure of populism and the explicit involvement of the armed forces in politics in the 2000s.

Economic Crisis and the Unraveling of Partyarchy

The economic shoe was the first one to drop, as oil prices collapsed in the early 1980s. High public debt, the drying up of international loans, and an overvalued currency led to massive capital flight in 1982 and early 1983.

On February 18, 1983, or viernes negro as it is known in Venezuela, the government established currency controls—something Chávez would do 20 years later—to stop this flight and halt inflation. Purchasing power declined by almost 75 percent overnight.

Partyarchy also began to crumble.

Buffeted by low oil prices and rising interest rates on its international debt, the Venezuelan government struggled to finance itself. President Carlos Andrés Pérez attempted a fix through a packet of neoliberal economic reforms in February 1989, but they only further aggravated the economic situation for the working class, leading to a wave of protests, riots, and looting on February 27 that left hundreds of civilians dead.

In its wake, the Revolutionary Bolivarian 200 Movement (MBR-200), a radical left-wing group led by Army Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, accelerated its planning for a coup d’état. This February 1992 coup attempt was unsuccessful—as was a second attempt by the Air Force in November of that year—but it marked the beginning of the end of Punto Fijo democracy.

A deep institutional crisis followed during the 1990s with the impeachment of Pérez in 1993 and a major financial and economic crisis during the Rafael Caldera administration (1994-1999) that coincided with the lowest international crude prices in decades.


The military and educational pathways

Venezuela’s first military academy was founded in Caracas in 1910. At the time, this constituted a milestone in the gradual formation of a centralized modern state after decades of fractional struggles, caudillo rule and civil wars following the country’s liberation from Spain in 1811. 6

In 1971, the Venezuelan government implemented what was known as Plan Andrés Bello, which implied expanding the academic focus on military education, translating it into university standards. This reform did not only intellectualize military education, familiarizing students with critical political thinking and leftist writers, but it also expanded their contact with civilian progressive circles. The new educational model put strong emphasis on honor, discipline and self-sacrifice, as well as inciting deep nationalist and patriotic sentiments inspired by the Venezuelan national hero from the Wars of Independence, Simón Bolívar. His teachings were (in comparison with dominant thinking at the time) egalitarian and progressive as well as anti-imperial, adding to the nascent leftist-progressive and nationalist current amongst junior officers—a change that also represented a generational shift within the Armed Forces (ibid., 46–47).

In a country with relatively rigid class structures, the military constituted a potential path for upward mobility through its enrollment programs, allowing lower-class and middle-class citizens to enter military education on special scholarships. Amongst them was Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, the son of two poor rural teachers from the inland state of Barinas. Chávez had entered the military academy on a baseball scholarship and had originally envisioned a future as a baseball player in the United States. However, whilst at the military academy he became increasingly caught up in political activities through his older brother Adán, who was an important figure amongst communist groups. Throughout the 1980s, Chávez gradually became a key figure of a clandestine leftist network within the military, whilst at the same time ascending in military ranks and eventually reaching the degree of Lieutenant Colonel.


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The waterfall has been known as the Angel Falls since the mid-20th century they are named after Jimmie Angel, a U.S. aviator, who was the first person to fly over the falls. [2] Angel's ashes were scattered over the falls on 2 July 1960. [3]

The common Spanish name Salto Ángel derives from his surname. In 2009, President Hugo Chávez announced his intention to change the name to the purported original indigenous Pemon term ("Kerepakupai Vená", meaning "waterfall of the deepest place"), on the grounds that the nation's most famous landmark should bear an indigenous name. [4] Explaining the name change, Chávez was reported to have said, "This is ours, long before Angel ever arrived there . this is indigenous land." [5] However, he later said that he would not decree the change of name, but only was defending the use of Kerepakupai Vená. [6]

Exploration Edit

Sir Walter Raleigh, in his expedition to find the fabled city of El Dorado, described what was possibly a tepui (table top mountain), and he is said to have been the first European to view Angel Falls, although these claims are considered far-fetched. [7] Some historians state that the first European to visit the waterfall was Fernando de Berrío, a Spanish explorer and governor from the 16th and 17th centuries. [8] Other sources state that the first Westerner to see the waterfall was the Spanish explorer Fèlix Cardona in 1927. [9]

They were not known to the outside world until American aviator Jimmie Angel, following directions given by Cardona, flew over them on 16 November 1933 on a flight while he was searching for a valuable ore bed. [9] [10] [11]

Returning on 9 October 1937, Angel tried to land his Flamingo monoplane El Río Caroní atop Auyán-tepui, but the plane was damaged when the wheels sank into the marshy ground. Angel and his three companions, including his wife Marie, were forced to descend the tepui on foot. It took them 11 days to make their way back to civilization by the gradually sloping back side, but news of their adventure spread and the waterfall was named Angel Falls in his honor. The name of the waterfall—"Salto del Ángel"—was first published on a Venezuelan government map in December 1939. [12]

Angel's plane remained on top of the tepui for 33 years before being lifted out by helicopter. [13] It was restored at the Aviation Museum in Maracay and now sits outdoors on the front of the airport at Ciudad Bolívar.

The first recorded European to reach the base of the falls was the Latvian explorer Aleksandrs Laime, also known as Alejandro Laime to the native Pemon tribe. He reached the falls alone in 1946. He was the first to reach the upper side of falls in the late 1950s, by climbing on the back side where the slope is not vertical. [14] He also reached Angel's plane 18 years after the crash landing. On 18 November 1955, Latvian independence day, he announced to the Venezuelan newspaper El Nacional that this stream without any known local name should be named after a Latvian river, Gauja. The same year, this name was registered in the National Cartographic Institution of Venezuela. There is no convincing proof that the indigenous Pemon people had named the local streams, as Auyán-tepui was considered to be a dangerous place and was not visited by the indigenous people. [14] However, lately the Pemon name Kerep is used as well.

Laime was also the first to clear a trail that leads from the Churún River to the base of the falls. On the way is a viewpoint commonly used to capture the falls in photographs. It is named Mirador Laime ("Laime's Viewpoint" in Spanish) in his honor. This trail is used now mostly for tourists, to lead them from the Isla Ratón camp to the small clearing.

The official height of the falls was determined by a survey carried out by an expedition organized and financed by American journalist Ruth Robertson on 13 May 1949. [12] [15] Robertson's expedition, which began on 23 April 1949, was also the first to reach the foot of the falls. [16] The first known attempt to climb the face of the cliff was made in 1968 during the wet season. It failed because of slippery rock. In 1969, a second attempt was made during the dry season. This attempt was thwarted by lack of water and an overhang 120 metres (400 ft) from the top. The first climb to the top of the cliff was completed on 13 January 1971. The climbers required nine and a half days to ascend and one and a half days to rappel down. [17]

Angel Falls is one of Venezuela's top tourist attractions, though a trip to the falls is a complicated affair. The falls are located in an isolated jungle. A flight from Maiquetia Airport or Puerto Ordaz or Ciudad Bolívar is required to reach Canaima camp, the starting point for river trips to the base of the falls. River trips generally take place from June to December, when the rivers are deep enough for use by the Pemon guides. During the dry season (December to March), there is less water seen than in the other months.


What do Venezuelans say?

One of the biggest challenges facing Venezuelans is hyperinflation. According to a study released by the National Assembly, by the end of 2018, prices were doubling every 19 days on average.

“[Regardless of the politics] we don’t have a good life [in Venezuela], we are forced to leave. There are people dying because we don’t have the right medicines in the country, or food, or we don’t have security in the streets,” Rosina Estrada, a Venezuelan citizen, told Al Jazeera.

The International Monetary Fund anticipates that the country’s inflation rate will reach 10 million percent in 2019.

Venezuela is also facing what has become the largest exodus in Latin America history. Over three million people have fled the country since 2014, and it’s expected to reach 5.3 million by the end of 2019, according to the UN figures.

“The situation we are living in is unprecedented. And on top of all the domestic challenges, we are seeing a fragile government that still has some power and force, but that is slowly losing control,” Ramon Pinango, a Venezuelan sociologist, told Al Jazeera.

The dire situation have led many Venezuelans to question the current government, analysts say.

“Maduro has a big challenge internally with the current hyperinflation [and the situation], it’s obvious that his rule doesn’t have the support that Chavez had,” Javier Buenrostro, a professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, said.

“But we can’t forget that the opposition is not characterised for playing fair, and they haven’t found support among the citizens either,” he added.

The opposition, as a group, has also showed divisions and has failed to demonstrate clear leadership in its movement.

One clear of example took place in 2017 when four opposition politicians broke with the official line and acknowledged the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly, after a loss for the group in regional elections.

“The Chavismo not only managed to win critical elections [back then], they also managed to put the opposition in crisis by leading them to an electoral confrontation,” Marco Terugi, an author and political analyst explained.

One of the biggest challenges facing Venezuelans is hyperinflation [File: Rodrigo Abd/AP]

President Chavez dies

2013 April - President Hugo Chavez dies at age 58 in March after a battle with cancer. Nicolas Maduro, his chosen successor, is elected president by a narrow margin. The opposition contests the result.

2014 February-March - At least 28 people die in suppression of anti-government protests.

2014 November - Government announces cuts in public spending as oil prices reach a four-year low.

2015 December - Opposition Democratic Unity coalition wins two-thirds majority in parliamentary elections, ending 16 years of Socialist Party control.

2016 September - Hundreds of thousands of people take part in a protest in Caracas calling for the removal of President Maduro, accusing him of responsibility for the economic crisis.

2017 July - Controversial constituent assembly elected in the face of an opposition boycott and international condemnation.

2018 May - Opposition contests the official victory of President Maduro at presidential elections.

2018 August - UN says two million Venezuelans have fled abroad to neighbouring countries since 2014.

2019 January-February - Opposition leader Juan Guaidó declares himself interim president, appeals to military to oust President Maduro on the grounds that the 2018 election was rigged.

European Union, United States, and most Latin American countries recognise Mr Guaidó.

2020 December - Opposition boycotts legislative elections, which are duly won by President Maduro's party and allies.


Kyk die video: Inside the Secret Bubble of Venezuelas ULTRA RICH (Oktober 2021).