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Japan val Port Arthur aan- begin die Russies-Japannese oorlog- geskiedenis

Japan val Port Arthur aan- begin die Russies-Japannese oorlog- geskiedenis


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Japan val Port Arthur aan

Die Japannese het die Russe op 8 Februarie oorlog verklaar. Dieselfde dag het hulle 'n verrassingsaanval op die Russiese vloot by Port Arthur geloods. Die Russe kon van toe af nooit weer herstel nie en het die oorlog verloor.


Japanse en Russiese belangstelling het gebots oor Mantsjoerije en Korea. Die Japanners het in hul oorlog met China beheer oor dele van Korea verkry. Rusland wou intussen sy teenwoordigheid in die gebied uitbrei, eerstens met 'n hawe vir alle weer en tweedens om die invloed van Groot -Brittanje teen te werk. Die Japanners was bereid om in te stem tot 'n kompromie wat hul invloed in Korea sou erken terwyl hulle die Russiese invloed in Mantsjoerije herkonformeer. Onderhandelinge het egter nie vorentoe gegaan nie, die Russe het geglo dat die Japannese sou instem met die Russiese voorwaardes wat voldoen aan wat die Russe meen hul superieure militêre mag was. Die Russe het die Japannese verkeerd beoordeel. Nadat hulle tot die gevolgtrekking gekom het dat die Russiese onderhandelinge slegs bedoel was om te vertraag, het hulle besluit om die Russe aan te val. Op 8 Februarie verklaar hulle formeel oorlog teen die Russe. Vier uur voor hulle hul oorlogsverklaring afgelewer het, het die Japannese vloot 'n verrassingsaanval op die Russiese vloot in Port Arthur uitgevoer. Die aanval het daarin geslaag om 'n aansienlike deel van die vloot te beskadig.

Die Japannese het toe die hawe geblokkeer. Hulle het gou troepe laat beland en die stad omsingel. Na 'n lang beleg en suksesvolle Japannese aanvalle het die Russe die stad op 2 Januarie 1905 oorgegee.


Russies-Japannese oorlog

Die Russies-Japannese oorlog was 'n oorlog tussen die Japannese Ryk en die Russiese Ryk. Dit het in 1904 begin en geëindig in 1905. Die Japannese het die oorlog gewen, en die Russe het verloor.

Die oorlog het plaasgevind omdat die Russiese Ryk en die Japannese Ryk nie saamgestem het oor wie dele van Mantsjoerije en Korea moet kry nie. Dit is meestal geveg op die Liaodong -skiereiland en Mukden, die see rondom Korea, Japan en die Geel See. Die politiek van die twee lande in die oorlog was baie ingewikkeld, maar albei wou grond en ekonomiese voordele behaal.

Die Chinese Ryk van die Qing -dinastie was groot, maar swak, en dit was Qing -land en besittings waaroor hulle geveg het. Korea was byvoorbeeld onder die Qing -bewind, maar is deur Japan in beslag geneem. Die Russe wou 'n 'warmwaterhawe' op die Stille Oseaan hê vir hul vloot en handel. Die hawe by Vladivostok vries in die winter, maar Port Arthur (nou die Liaodong -skiereiland in China genoem) kan altyd gebruik word. Rusland het die hawe reeds van die Qing gehuur en toestemming gekry om 'n Trans-Siberiese spoorlyn van Sint Petersburg na Port Arthur te bou.


Vra net vir Rusland: Pearl Harbor was nie die eerste sluipaanval van Japan nie

Hier is wat u moet onthou: Na Pearl Harbor is daar baie vingers gewys oor die onvoorbereidheid van die Pearl Harbor-verdediging, of hoeveel vroeë waarskuwings die VSA teen die verbreking van Japannese kodes het. Net soos Rusland moontlik nie 'n vernietigeraanval op 'n versterkte hawe verwag het nie, kan die Amerikaanse weermag dalk vergewe word omdat hulle nie op 'n ongekende tsunami in die lug van ses vliegdekskepe en vierhonderd vliegtuie.

Om middernag het die Russiese vloot geslaap.

'N Paar minute nadat die horlosie op 9 Februarie 1904 om 12 uur afgeklap het, het die Tsaristiese Rusland se Stille Oseaan -eskader vreedsaam op die anker by die Russiese vlootbasis in die Manchuriaanse stad Port Arthur gesak. Aan wal was die stemming daardie aand feestelik toe die garnisoen se weermag en vlootbeamptes tydens 'n verjaardagpartytjie vir die admiraal se vrou van verversings gebruik gemaak het.

Binnekort word hul plesier versteur deur flitse in die nag en die dof gedruis van torpedo's wat in metaalrompe slaan. Sommiges het gedink dit was vuurwerke ter ere van die vrou van die admiraal. In werklikheid was dit Japan wat die begin van die Russies-Japannese oorlog met 'n verrassingsaanval op die Russiese vloot by Port Arthur.

Die dronk partytjiegangers moes nie so verbaas gewees het nie. Rusland en Japan was lankal op 'n botsingskursus oor wie die oorvloedige hulpbronne van Mantsjoerije, en uiteindelik ook die Verre Ooste, sou beheer. Met die nuwe Trans-Siberiese spoorweg Rusland verbind Moskou met die Siberiese hawe Vladivostok en het 'n swak China gedwing om Port Arthur in 1895 af te staan, en het sy ambisies om die dominante mag in die streek te word, beweer.

Ongelukkig het Japan dieselfde idee gehad. Net vyftig jaar tevore het die samoerai hul swaarde in impotente frustrasie laat swaai oor die Amerikaanse oorlogskepe wat dit gewaag het om Japan se feodale isolasie te verbreek deur seil in Tokiobaai in. Maar met verstommende vasberadenheid en energie het Japan 'n moderne leër en 'n vloot gebou wat kragtig genoeg was nederlaag die siek Chinese Ryk in 1894-95.

Kan die beer en die tier saamleef? Sedert 1903 is onderhandelinge tussen St. Petersburg en Tokio aan die gang, met Japan wat Russiese beheer oor Mantsjoerije erken sou erken as Rusland Japan se beheer oor Korea erken. Maar Rusland het die Japannese as 'ape' afgemaak wat net hul Westerse weddenskappe beter gemaak het. As Japan sou aanval, sou die tsaar se soldate en matrose hulle verpletter. Waarom sou Sy Majesteit die moeite doen om iets aan hierdie gelyknamiges te gee?

Geskille oor wie Oos -Asië moet oorheers? Westerlinge verwerp Asiatiese militêre vaardigheid? Onderhandelings op 'n doodloopstraat? As jy 'n Amerikaner is, moet dit 'n klokkie lui.

Soos in 1941, het die Japannese leiers tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die tyd nie aan hulle kant was nie. Alhoewel die tsaristiese ryk 'n geval was van ondoeltreffendheid, was die Russiese kolos geleidelik besig om sy magte in die Verre Ooste op te bou. Besluit dat dit nou of nooit was, het Japan gekies om die situasie op sy eie onnavolgbare manier op te los. Dit het 'n eskader gestuur om Port Arthur te tref, wat 'n formidabele mag gebaseer het wat sewe vroeë slagskepe en ses kruisers ingesluit het. Soos admiraal Yamamoto sewe-en-dertig jaar later teen Hawaii, die briljante Japannese bevelvoerder, gedoen het Admiraal Togo het waagmoedig gewaag deur die tande in te vaar van 'n Russiese vesting beskerm deur kragtige artillerie.

In 1941 was die klein moordenaar van slagskepe die vliegtuig. In 1904 is dit nuutgemaakte stoom-aangedrewe torpedo's wat deur vernietigers gelanseer is. In plaas van sy hoofskepe te waag, het Togo besluit om tien vernietigers in te stuur om 'n massale nag -torpedo -aanval op die verankerde Russiese vaartuie te doen. Om 22:30. op 8 Februarie het die Japannese vernietigers 'n Russiese skip raakgeloop wat gevlug het om alarm te maak. Maar dit was te laat. Omstreeks 12:30 het die Japannese vloot 'n salvo van sestien torpedo's gelanseer. Slegs drie het hul doelwit bereik en die slagskepe beskadig Retvizan en Tsarevich, sowel as die kruiser Pallada.

Drie uur later het tsaar Nikolaas II die oorlogsverklaring van Japan ontvang.

As gevegte streng volgens materiële resultate beoordeel is, was die Japannese aanval nie deurslaggewend nie. Geen skepe is gesink nie, die meeste van die Russiese vaartuie is ongeskonde gelaat, en toe hulle later die dag uit die hawe vaar, het 'n onomwonde skermutseling ontstaan ​​wat verskeie skepe aan beide kante beskadig het voordat die Japannese onttrek het.

Maar soos Napoleon 'n eeu tevore gesê het, is die moraal drie keer belangriker as materieel. Daar is tye wanneer nasies, net soos mense, net op die verkeerde voet begin en nooit weer hul balans herwin nie. So was Rusland in die Russies-Japannese oorlog, 'n reus wat altyd 'n tree agter sy teenstander gelyk het, kreupel deur versigtige en bedwelmende bevelvoerders wat wou reageer op Japannese bewegings in plaas van hul eie wil op die slagveld af te dwing.

Die opening van die drama was die verrassingsaanval op Port Arthur, wat Rusland geskok en die wêreld beïndruk het. "Die Japannese vloot het die oorlog geopen deur 'n daad van waagmoed wat bestem is om 'n ereplek in vlootjoernaal in te neem," verklaar die Times of London, trots op 'n Japannese vloot wat die beskermheer was na die Royal Navy (wat self het in 1807 na Kopenhagen gevaar om die Deense vloot te vernietig of te vang). Die gordyn het op 27 Mei 1905 in die Straat van Tsushima tussen Japan en Korea op Rusland neergedaal. afgebreek deur die Japannese vloot. Aangesien Rusland nie die maritieme reddingsboei kon afsny wat voorrade en troepe van Japan na Mantsjoerië gebring het nie, kon die Japannese weermag die Russiese veldleër verslaan en Port Arthur in Januarie 1905 verower na 'n bloedige beleg. Van 1905 tot 1945 was dit Japan - nie Rusland nie - dit was die dinamiese, aggressiewe mag in Asië.

Die Russies-Japannese oorlog was 'n vlek op die Russiese militêre geskiedenis, 'n vernedering wat die tsaar se aansien fataal verswak het. Hoe ironies dat die bolsjewistiese pad na mag deur Japannese bajonette gebaan is. Maar as daar 'n verleentheid is vir die verrassingsaanval in Port Arthur, is dit nie Russies nie. Die tsaar se weermag was slap, maar watter Westerling in 1904 sou geglo het dat blote Asiërs so 'n ywerige aanval op 'n groot Westerse moondheid sou kon doen - of sou waag?

Maar wat was Amerika se verskoning teen dagbreek op 7 Desember 1941? Dat Japan eerste sou toeslaan as dit in 'n hoek gedruk is, sewe en dertig jaar tevore duidelik gemaak is. Dat dit met waagmoed en vaardigheid kon toeslaan, is ook bewys. En bowenal, dat Japan sou aanval voor sy vyande in kennis gestel het dat dit oorlog verklaar het, moes duidelik gewees het.

Na Pearl Harbor is daar baie vingers gewys oor die onvoorbereidheid van die Pearl Harbor-verdediging, of hoeveel vroeë waarskuwings die VSA teen die verbreking van Japannese kodes het. Net soos Rusland moontlik nie 'n vernietigeraanval op 'n versterkte hawe verwag het nie, kan die Amerikaanse weermag dalk vergewe word omdat hulle nie op 'n ongekende tsunami in die lug van ses vliegdekskepe en vierhonderd vliegtuie.

Terwyl die brandende Amerikaanse slagskepe stadig onder die golwe ingeglip het, het miskien 'n witkop-eks-matroos van die tsaar se vloot uit sy wiegstoel opgestaan ​​en gemompel: "Ons het u dit gesê."

Michael Peck is 'n bydraende skrywer vir die National Interest. Hy kan gevind word op Twitter en Facebook. Dit het 'n paar jaar gelede die eerste keer verskyn en word gepubliseer weens die belangstelling van lesers.


1904-5 Die Russies-Japannese Oorlog: Japan verbrysel die Russiese vloot en globale opvattings

Terwyl Japan vandag bekend staan ​​as 'n toonaangewende nasie wat tegnologie betref, was dit nie die geval in die laat 19de en vroeë 20ste eeu nie. Na 'n lang tydperk van internasionale isolasie, het Japan hom uiteindelik vir die wêreld oopgemaak en besef dat hulle agter die tyd was, en gebruik steeds 'n groot hoeveelheid verouderde tegnologie.

Die Japannese het nou die geleentheid gehad om nuut te begin deur oop te maak vir die wêreld.

Hulle het die verskillende westerse lande ten volle benut om die beste tegnologieë en veral die beste militêre hardeware te besoek. Die Japannese het ook adviseurs gestuur om weermagstaktieke en oefenmetodes by die Pruise en ander Europese moondhede te leer. Miskien is die belangrikste gevolg van hierdie beleid die groothandel van die Britse vloot. Die nuwe klem op opleiding is ter harte geneem deur die nuwe en groeiende Japannese vloot en bemanning wat voortdurend op hul nuutgeboude moderne vloot vloot.

Slagskepe is gebou met die nuutste tegnologieë, insluitend beter versterkings vir die romp en meer akkurate teikenstelsels. Alhoewel dit triviaal mag klink, het baie van die groter Japannese gewere omnidireksionele herlaai, wat beteken dat hulle in enige rigting kan bly wys en kan aanhou skiet. Baie ander skepe wat net voor hierdie punt gebou is, moes hul gewere in 'n spesifieke rigting in die gesig staar, wat beteken dat 'n aanval moes stop terwyl die rewolwer omdraai en na herlaai 'n teiken moes herwin.

Rusland was teen die vroeë 1900's 'n gevestigde wêreldmoondheid en was vol vertroue toe spanning met Japan 'n algehele oorlog uitbreek oor eienaarskap van die Koreaanse Skiereiland. Japan is as 'n vreemde en agterlike land beskou, en hoewel hulle dalk nuwe tegnologie het, word aangeneem dat hulle min vermoë het om moderne oorloë te veg.

Die Russe het beheer oor Port Arthur in die weste van die Koreaanse skiereiland sowel as die hawe by Vladivostok in die noordooste. Die Japannese het die meer geïsoleerde Port Arthur oor land en see geteiken. Een van die eerste oorlogsbetogings was 'n verrassende Japannese torpedo -aanval op die Russiese skepe in die hawe, wat geringe skade aangerig het, maar die Russiese moraal aansienlik verlaag het. Russiese trots is verder beskadig op die land toe die Japannese weermag vinnig deur Korea toeswerm en Russiese magte oorweldig het.

Die Russiese vloot het probeer om die vlootblokkade te breek, en het eintlik 'n slagskip en hul bevelvoerder Stepan Makarov aan 'n myn verloor. Die skepe was te demoraliseer om die offensief aan te gaan, terwyl die Japannese weermag net buite Port Arthur na 'n verhoogde posisie gestoot het. Van hier af kon die Japannese artillerie wat 'n groter reikafstand gehad het as die Russiese slagskepe en skulpe, vinnig in die hawe stort.

Unieke, onproduceerbare foto's 1904-1905 g.: Van Gatchina Japanese Front (Russies-Japanse oorlog) in Mantsjoerije om te veg met die Japannese gestuurde 23ste artilleriebrigade. Winter 1904 jaar. Op versoek van 'n fotojoernalis het Victor Bulla Gunners prentjiemooi tougestaan ​​vir die voorste beeld. 'N Eienaardige detail: die deur na die motor pronk met die vyfpuntige ster met 'n tweekoppige keiserlike arend in die middel.

Die Russiese vloot het op ongekende wyse groot skade gely, onder vuur van vuurwapens. Intussen het die Japannese 'n stelsel van tonnels onder die versterkings van die land ontwikkel en massiewe bomme afgeskiet om die Russiese posisies in duie te laat stort. Hierdie ontploffings was massief en demoraliserend, aangesien dit byna altyd tot 'n suksesvolle Japannese offensief gelei het. Die Russiese garnisoen sou binnekort oorgee. Die Japannese het 'n hoë prys betaal vir die oorwinning, aangesien die voortdurende strewe na verhoogde posisies duur was in terme van ongevalle, maar hul strategiese wins was die moeite werd, aangesien slegs Vladivostok vir Rusland oorgebly het.

Die landleërs het nou groter geword namate die Russiese versterkings hul kernmag tot 340 000 troepe en 800 stukke artillerie gebring het, terwyl die nou gekonsolideerde Japannese magte 280 000 troepe en 500 stukke artillerie getel het. Die twee ontmoet mekaar buite die Chinese stad Mukden.

Port Arthur na die oorgawe. die vlak baai het beteken dat baie skepe nog maklik sigbaar was nadat hulle#8220 gesink en#8221 was.

Die Russe het 'n groter leër gehad, maar die Japannese het die nou veteraan van die 3de weermag gehad, wat nou klaar was met die aanval en beleg van Port Arthur. Die plan van die Japannese generaal Oyama was om in 'n halfmaanformasie aan te val met die klem op die flanke, terwyl die derde leër in 'n breë flankaanval gestuur word. Sy plan het gewerk terwyl die geveg aan die einde van Februarie ontvou het. Die twee partye het in die grootste landgeveg sedert die Slag van Leipzig gebots.

Die wye flank van die derde leër het die Russiese bevelvoerder, Alexei Kuropatkin, laat reageer deur verskeie afdelings troepe te neem om die aanval te begin. Dit het die Russiese weermag net verstrooi en verwar, en dit het stadig in duie gestort oor weke se gevegte terwyl die Japannese magte hulle elke dag meer volledig omsingel het. Teen die 9de Maart 1905 besef die Russiese bevelvoerder dat alle hoop verlore is en probeer terugtrek. Toe die Japannese dit sien, het hulle bevel gekry om te agtervolg en te vernietig. Die Russe het so vinnig gevlug dat byna al hul 800 artillerie -stukke saam met baie van hul gewondes en voorrade agtergebly het.

Russe probeer die meedoënlose Japannese aanval weerhou. Baie Japannese is dood, maar hulle het uiteindelik die taktiese en strategiese oorwinning behaal.

Die slag van Mukden was 'n volledige Japannese oorwinning, maar dit is ten duurste gewen. Die Japannese het 75 000 slagoffers opgedoen met 85 000 slagoffers vir die Russe. Die Russe is verslaan, alhoewel hulle 'n effens groter leër gehad het, maar hulle het minder artillerie -stukke gehad en was min voorraad. Die uitslag van die geveg was 'n oorweldigende strategiese oorwinning vir die Japannese.

Die Russiese Baltiese Vloot wat nou die Tweede Stille Oseaan -eskader genoem word, nader vinnig die Tsushima -straat net suid van Korea. Hulle het verneem van die val van Port Arthur terwyl hulle rondom Madagaskar was en die mans toenemend gedemoraliseer is. Daar is besluit dat die enigste ware skuif was om na Vladivostok te gaan. Die Japannese admiraal Togo het dit geweet en het sy vloot voorberei om hulle in die seestraat te onderskep.

Op 27 Mei vergader die twee magte. Die Russe het agt volle slagskepe gehad, sommige relatief nuut en sommige effens gedateer. Hulle het 'n matige aantal kusgevegskepe, kruisers en ander ondersteuningsskepe gehad. Die Japannese het slegs vier slagskepe gehad, maar baie meer kruisers en 'n paar dosyn ligte torpedobote. Togo het 'n vroeë, hoewel onvolmaakte, aksie van "die T -kruising" bereik, en het die pad van die Russiese skeepskolom gesny.

Toe die skepe van Togo voor die skepe van Zinovy ​​Rozhestvensky kruis, het Togo die gewaagde besluit geneem om sy kolom skielik om te draai om sy skepe direk te betrek. Hierdie draai -maneuver het byna elkeen van Togo se skepe tydens die draai in 'n kwesbare posisie geplaas, maar die Russiese bemanning was nie doeltreffend genoeg om die geleentheid ten volle te benut nie. Toe die draaie voltooi was, het die Japannese 'n woede gehad wat die Russe oorweldig het.

Russiese soldate in loopgrawe.

'N Kombinasie van Japannese opleiding en hul vroeëre ervarings teen die ander Russiese vloot was van onskatbare waarde tydens die geveg. Die Russiese skepe is verskeur en sommige het redelik maklik aan die brand geslaan, aangesien die Japannese plofbare doppe gebruik het en verskeie Russiese skepe steenkool of oorblyfsels van die steenkoolstapels op hul dekke gehad het. Een matroos het opgemerk dat hy hul eie metaalplate sien aan die brand slaan.

Die Russiese admiraal is ernstig gewond en die vloot het vinnig in verskeie groepe gefragmenteer, meedoënloos deur die Japannese agtervolg. Nadat dit nag geword het, het die Japannese 'n drie uur lange aanval deur hul torpedobote georganiseer. Die woede en ywer van die aanval was so groot dat sommige van die torpedobote gedurende die nag met groter Russiese vaartuie gebots het toe hulle probeer om in die geveg te kom. Dit en 'n mate van Russiese vergelding het die enigste Japannese verliese van die geveg tot gevolg gehad.

Een van die min Russiese cruises wat die geveg oorleef het, met 'n groot gat in die romp.

Die grootste deel van die oorlog was tot op hierdie stadium 'n reeks Japannese strategiese oorwinnings wat ten duurste behaal is. Die Slag van Tsushima het relatief min vir die Japannese gekos omdat hulle ongeveer 500 dooies en gewondes opgedoen het, in vergelyking met 10 000 Russies wat gedood of gevange geneem is. Byna al die Russiese skepe is gesink of gevang. Dit was 'n oorwinning op die skaal van Trafalgar en was 'n vernederende nederlaag vir die Russe, wat gou tot 'n vredesverdrag gedwing is.


Waarom Japan oorlog toe gegaan het

In Westerse oë word die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in Asië dikwels beskou as 'n stryd tussen die Ryk van Japan en die "ABCD" -magte van Amerika, Brittanje, China en die Nederlanders. Die oorlog word meer dikwels vereenvoudig tot 'n botsing tussen Japan en die Verenigde State.

Die manier waarop die Stille Oseaan-fase van die oorlog begin het-met die Japannese vlootaanval op Pearl Harbor in Desember 1941-en geëindig het-met die Amerikaanse vuurbomme en atoombomaanvalle in die lente/somer 1945-het die Japan-Amerikaanse aspek van die geveg beklemtoon. Hierdie aksent is massief versterk deur Hollywood.

Dit word verdraai. Die Japannese en die Amerikaners het sekerlik gesukkel om die Westelike Stille Oseaan te oorheers vir vier en 'n half jaar van verbysterende vernietiging. Maar bilaterale vyandigheid het in Desember 1941 nie uit die niet verskyn nie.

Baie in Japan het gebars op rasse -eksklusiwistiese, inheemse wette wat in die VSA aangeneem is en gerig is op mense van Asiatiese afkoms. Hulle is veral beseer deur dade van 1907 en 1924 wat Asiatiese immigrasie beperk het. Die Washington -vlootverdrag van 1922 word deur baie in Japan gelees as meer van dieselfde - 'n Asiatiese nasie wat op grond van ras uitgesluit is van die groot moondhede.

Toe president Franklin Roosevelt probeer om Japan ekonomies te wurg met embargo's en batesvries, het Japan uiteindelik genoeg gehad. Vanuit Tokio se perspektief was dit tyd om die Anglo-Europeërs uit Asië te verdryf.

Dit was as gevolg van Japan se oorlogsaksies in China dat Roosevelt 'n ekonomiese strop om Tokio se nek gegooi het. 'N Belangrike rede waarom Tokio in China geveg het, was om sy besittings in Mantsjoery te verdedig. En dit het die besittings vanweë die USSR.

Die ware wedywering

Die langer wedywering in Asië was, of is, tussen Japan en Rusland. Lank voordat die Japanse weermag daaroor gedink het om die VSA te beveg, het dit reeds teen Rusland geveg. Sedert die begin van Russies-Japannese interaksie, was die verhouding ten beste op sy hoede en gewoonlik teenstrydig.

Die Verdrag van Shimoda, wat bilaterale betrekkinge formaliseer, is in 1855 onderteken, minder as 'n jaar nadat die Konvensie van Kanagawa diplomatieke betrekkinge tussen Japan en die VSA gesluit het. Namate die Russiese Ryk dieper in Siberië en Mantsjoerië ingedring het en in Korea begin bemoei het, waar Japan dieselfde ding gedoen het, het Japan en Rusland in 1904 tot 'n val gekom.

Die Russies-Japannese oorlog word die beste onthou vir 'n vlootbetrokkenheid, die Slag van Tsushima, waarin Admiraal Togo Heihachiro's Japanse gekombineerde vloot 'n beslissende oorwinning oor die Russiese Baltiese vloot in Mei 1905 behaal het. Op land is die oorlog meestal in Mantsjoerije gevoer, Korea en die Liaodong -skiereiland, wat in Maart 1905 aanleiding gegee het tot 'n massiewe grondbetrokkenheid in Mantsjoerije - byna 50 jaar na die ondertekening van die Shimoda -verdrag.

Die landgevegte het ook grootliks gegaan oor toegang tot die see. Rusland begeer Port Arthur (vandag, Dalian), die enigste meerjarige ysvrye hawe in die Stille Oseaan wat die tsaar se vloot hoop het om te verkry. Japan het egter Port Arthur gewen ná Japan se nederlaag van die vervalle Qing -dinastie nege jaar tevore.

In die geval het die Amerikaners Japan gered in 1905. Die oorlog op die vasteland was besig om te verval, maar geen van die partye het die wil of kapitaal gehad om reguit te wen nie. President Theodore Roosevelt het afvaardigings van albei ryke in Augustus na Portsmouth, New Hampshire, genooi, sodat Japan die oorwinning kon opeis. Dit was ook in Portsmouth dat Japan die titel behou het na die suidelike helfte van die lang Siberiese eiland Sakhalin, wat Japan tydens die gevegte in beslag geneem het.

Roosevelt het die Nobelprys vir Vrede gewen vir die verdrag tussen die twee mededingers, maar die einde van die Russies-Japannese oorlog het bloot oop vyandelikhede laat wag. En die oorwinning was pirries vir Japan. Die nederlaag van die magte van tsaar Nikolaas II het die lot van die Russiese Ryk verseël, en uit sy dop het iets oneindig dreigender ontstaan.

'N Aborsiewe revolusie in 1905 het die regering van die tsaar amper omvergewerp, maar dit was die Eerste Wêreldoorlog wat klaargemaak het met wat admiraal Togo per ongeluk begin het. Met die hulp van Japannese agente wat Rusland binnegesluip het om 'n anti-tsaristiese opstand te bewerkstellig, het die hard-linkse opposisie uiteindelik die Russiese Ryk laat val. Die nuwe tsaar, Lenin, het vinnig die verliese van Rusland tydens die Verdrag van Brest-Litovsk in Maart 1918 besnoei en ideologiese bewind oor ongeveer 170 miljoen Russe gekonsolideer.

Die Japannese het in 1918 kans gesien in die chaotiese toestand van Rusland, as lede van die seëvierende Geallieerdes van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, aan die “Siberiese ingryping” deelgeneem. tussen die Bolsjewiste ("Rooies") en Lojaliste ("Blankes").

In werklikheid was die ingryping vir Japan 'n droë loop vir 'n groter rol in die Verre Ooste. Deur Rusland verder te verswak, het Japan gehoop om die uitgestrekte gebied en natuurlike rykdom van Mantsjoerije te beveilig.

'N Ryk prys

Die oorheersing van Mantsjoerije en die wyer Verre Ooste het die strategiese horisonne van die Japanse weermag gevorm. In 1925 het die Japannese regering met toenemende alarm die opkoms van die internasionale kommunisme aangeneem en die Vredeswet behou, wat Japan toegelaat het om van die samelewing te ontsnap dat kommuniste beplan om die keiser omver te werp. Om die Russe in Siberië weg te hou deur die bufferstaat Mantsjoerije, was die eksterne arm van hierdie anti-kommunistiese strategie.

In 1928 het die moord van die Japannese weermag op krygsheer Zhang Zuolin, wat Mantsjoerije beheer het, 'n nog groter rol in Japan gespeel. In 1931 vind 'n bomaanval in Japan plaas wat bedoel was om die voorwendsel vir 'n grootskaalse inval in Mantsjoerije te verleen, op Mukden.

In 1932 word die staat "Manchukuo" opgerig onder Aisin Gioro Puyi, die laaste Qing -keiser wat die Japannese geïnstalleer het as 'n plaasvervanger vir Zhang Zuolin en 'n manier om te werk rondom Zhang se ondraaglike seun, Zhang Xueliang, en om te wen beheer van Mantsjoerije. Die gebied het 'n soort "omgekeerde ystergordyn" vir die Sowjetunie vir Japan geword.

In 1937 het 'n oop oorlog tussen Japan en China uitgebreek ná die voorval "Marco Polo -brug" buite Beijing. Hulpbronne wat ingespan is om Mantsjoerije teen die Sowjetunie te verdedig, is afgesweer toe Japan in oorlog met China verstrengel geraak het. Die moeras in China - waarin die Sowjetunie, wat deur die Komintern werk, maar al te graag Japannese magte wou trek - het Tokio grootliks afgelei van sy wedywering met die Sowjetunie.

Maar Japan word gou herinner dat die gevaarlikste vyand in Asië nie China was nie.

By Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol in 1939 het die Sowjets gedeeltelike wraak op Japan vir 1905 gewen deur 'n groot oorwinning op die grens tussen Mongolië en Mantsjoerië te verseker. Nadat hulle hierdie oorwinning behaal het, kon die Sowjete hul volle aandag vestig op die oorlog wat in die weste aan die broei was.

Nomonhan was ook om 'n ander rede 'n noodlottige keerpunt.

Die suidwaartse beleid

Die Japanse vloot was een van die magtigste op die see en het homself bewys teen Rusland en China. Terwyl die weermag van Japan op die vasteland vasgekeer het, het die "opmars noord" -statagem, waarvolgens Japan sy hoofmag teen die Sowjets in Mantsjoerië en Siberië sou werp, plek gemaak vir die "opmars suid" -benadering, waarvolgens Japan die aanval sou aanval Europese en Amerikaanse kolonies in Malaya, Singapoer, Indonesië, die Filippyne, Birma en uiteindelik Indië.

Hierdie massiewe uitbreiding van die oorlog kan lyk na 'n strategie om veel meer af te byt as wat gekou kan word. Maar holisties gesien, is hierdie aksies sinvol. Japan het die inbreuk van Europeërs en Amerikaners in sy eie magstog afgeweer, wat hulle nou gedwing het om die blanke imperialisme in die Verre Ooste omver te werp.

Baie Japannese het 'n 'pan-asiatisme' gevra om die usurpators en interlopers wat eeue lank in Asië heers, te verdryf. Dit was 'n beweging vol historiese betekenis.

Om seker te wees, daar was geld betrokke. Die rykdom van die Ooste, wat die Europeërs ingetrek het, het die nuwe Japannese mag oorgebly om uit te haal en uit te buit. Manifest Destiny, ja, maar ook ru -olie en rubber en jute en suikerriet het Yamato dieper na Asië gebring.

In die hoop om 'n vergelding van die Amerikaners te vermy, het die Japannese in Desember 1941 'n verrassingshou geslaan op die Amerikaanse lug- en vlootbasis in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. storm die kolonies van die Nederlandse en Britse Suidoos -Asië binne.

Japan het die mees vernederende nederlaag wat die Britte in hul geskiedenis in Singapoer gely het, toegedien. Terwyl Japan beheer oor die groot natuurlike rykdom van Nederlands -Indië en Malaya oorgeneem het, het die Britte teruggetrek in Birma. Dit sou 'n slagveld word vir die res van die oorlog, aangesien die Britte en hul Indiese onderdane terugveg, spoedig bygestaan ​​deur die Chinese en Amerikaners.

'N Uitgestrekte nuwe ryk - wat strek van Papoea -Nieu -Guinee, deur die uitgestrekte Stille Oseaan, tot in die hele Suidoos -Asië, Thailand, die grootste deel van Suid -China, Mantsjoerië en die tuiseilande - versprei nou oor die kaarte.

Maar met die Verenigde State in die oorlog en terugveg uit die groot Stille Oseaan, is Japan se uiteindelike lot verseël.

Stalin kyk oos

Die Sowjets het nie in die Stille Oseaan -teater baklei nie.

Danksy die vermoeidheid van Sowjet -spioene - veral die groep wat onder Richard Sorge werk, die dubbelagent wat so na aan die Duitsers in Japan was dat hy by die vrou van die Duitse ambassadeur geslaap het en haar man vir inligting oor drankies ingeroep het - het die Kremlin geweet Japan sou die suidelike roete volg en hulle nie aanval nie.

Japan en die USSR het 'n nie-aggressie-ooreenkoms onderteken in 1941. Die Rooi Leër was daardeur vry om die Wehrmacht van Adolf Hitler te ontmoet, wat uit die weste ingestorm het nadat die Duitsers hul eie neutraliteitsooreenkoms met die Sowjets opgehef het en 'Operation Barbarossa' van stapel gestuur het.

Die Sowjetunie wat Siberië nie van Japan hoef te verdedig nie, was 'n noodlottige ontwikkeling vir die Derde Ryk. Die Sowjets, nie die Westerse bondgenote nie, het Hitler gestop. Josef Stalin het die Nazi's tereg as die grootste vyand beskou, en het sy flank in die verre ooste dus dubbel beveilig: via 'n verdrag van nie-aggressie en deur by te dra tot die Stille Oseaanoorlog, met vergunning van kommunistiese spioene rondom Roosevelt.

Teen 1943 begin Stalin na die ooste kyk. Tydens die Jalta -konferensie in Februarie 1945 het die Sowjette ingestem om by die oorlog teen Japan aan te sluit drie maande na die afsterwe van die Nazi's. In ruil daarvoor sou Stalin die suidelike helfte van Sakhalin en die Kuriele terugkry.

Naïef, die Japannese, het gehoop dat die Sowjets 'n vredesooreenkoms sou bewerkstellig. Stalin, soos Roosevelt gedoen het, baba die Japannese saam.

Die USSR het drie maande en een dag - 9 Augustus 1945 - by die oorlog teen Japan aangesluit nadat Duitsland op 8 Mei aan die Geallieerdes oorgegee het. .

In die smeltkroes van die laaste dae van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog kan ons feitlik al die elemente sien wat die Russies-Japannese wedywering lank uitgemaak het. Hierdie wedywering, wat onder die vaandel van imperialisme begin het, en daarna oorgegaan het tot kommunisme in beide die Sowjetunie en China, het tot die huidige spanning gelei tot die meeste spanning wat Oos -Asië teister.

U moet die skielike, massiewe "blitzkrieg" -aanval deur die Sowjette in Mantsjoerije in die konteks van Sowjet -realiteite en verwagtinge sien. Die Sowjette het 1,6 miljoen bajonette, ondersteun deur massiewe wapens en lugbates, teen Japan ontplooi. Die Kremlin het so beslissend beweeg omdat hy gevrees het dat Japan sou oorgee voordat die Sowjets by die geveg kon aansluit en sodoende die buit kon verloor.

Daar was ook 'n uitdaging vir Moskou wat in China gestyg het. Die Sowjette was terdeë bewus van Mao Zedong se veldtog "Sinifisering van Marxisme" en sy roete van die "28 Bolsjewiste" as deel van die interne oorlog in die party tussen die internasionale faksie gewy aan die Komintern en die nativistiese faksie wat vasbeslote was om die Maoïs te volg, China-eerste reël.

In die geval was dit egter Mao wat Manchuria gewen het. Deur sy vastrapplek in Noord -China en Mantsjoerië te gebruik, het Mao die nasionaliste oortref en die Chinese burgeroorlog in 1949 gewen. Die nasionaliste vlug na Taiwan, voorheen deel van die Japanse Ryk.

Wat ander dele van die Japannese Ryk voor 1941 betref, het die Russe Sakhalin en beheer oor die helfte van Korea gekry.

En daar was nog 'n verborge Sowjet -oorwinning - die infiltrasie van Japannese instellings. Japan is ná die Tweede Wêreldoorlog oorstroom met plaaslike kommuniste. First, the members of the Japan Communist Party were released from prison by the Americans in October of 1945.

Next, the Siberian Detainees, more than a million soldiers and civilians captured by the Soviets and interned in concentration camps, returned. The Siberian Detainees, many brainwashed, exercised enormous ideological control over postwar Japanese thinking.

Then and now

Today, ex-enemy America is Japan’s chief ally and protector. Japan’s former European foes (the French and Dutch) and allies (Germany and Italy), united under the EU, are on-side too, albeit via a free-trade agreement, not an alliance. Former wartime enemies Australia, India and the UK all appear to be upgrading military cooperation with Japan, and Tokyo and London are negotiating an FTA.

Russia continues to view Japan as its main rival in the Far East. President Vladimir Putin has been stringing along negotiations over the Northern Islands that Japan claims and Russia occupies, with minimal progress.

Russia has no more territory to gain in the Far East, but it does have one final legacy from World War II to clear up – the elimination of the Americans from Russia’s Pacific flank and the end, finally, to the challenge to the great Russian empire from Japan.

The Kremlin looks unlikely to be able to do that. Instead, a vast new communist state has eclipsed Russia. Today, the rising power of China is casting ever longer shadows over the land of the rising sun and the region as a whole.

Jason Morgan is associate professor at Reitaku University in Kashiwa, Japan.


Campaign of 1905 [ edit | wysig bron]

Retreat of Russian soldiers after the Battle of Mukden.

With the fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese 3rd army was now able to continue northward and reinforce positions south of Russian-held Mukden. With the onset of the severe Manchurian winter, there had been no major land engagements since the Battle of Shaho the previous year. The two sides camped opposite each other along 60 to 70 miles (110 km) of front lines, south of Mukden.

Battle of Sandepu [ edit | wysig bron]

The Russian Second Army under General Oskar Gripenberg, between 25 and 29 January, attacked the Japanese left flank near the town of Sandepu, almost breaking through. This caught the Japanese by surprise. However, without support from other Russian units the attack stalled, Gripenberg was ordered to halt by Kuropatkin and the battle was inconclusive. The Japanese knew that they needed to destroy the Russian army in Manchuria before Russian reinforcements arrived via the Trans-Siberian railroad.

Battle of Mukden [ edit | wysig bron]

An illustration of a Japanese assault during the Battle of Mukden.

The Battle of Mukden commenced on 20 February 1905. In the following days Japanese forces proceeded to assault the right and left flanks of Russian forces surrounding Mukden, along a 50-mile (80 km) front. Approximately half a million men were involved in the fighting. Both sides were well entrenched and were backed by hundreds of artillery pieces. After days of harsh fighting, added pressure from the flanks forced both ends of the Russian defensive line to curve backwards. Seeing they were about to be encircled, the Russians began a general retreat, fighting a series of fierce rearguard actions, which soon deteriorated in the confusion and collapse of Russian forces. On 10 March 1905 after three weeks of fighting, General Kuropatkin decided to withdraw to the north of Mukden. The Russians lost 90,000 men in the battle.

The retreating Russian Manchurian Army formations disbanded as fighting units, but the Japanese failed to destroy them completely. The Japanese themselves had suffered large casualties and were in no condition to pursue. Although the battle of Mukden was a major defeat for the Russians and was the most decisive land battle ever fought by the Japanese, the final victory still depended on the navy.

Battle of Tsushima [ edit | wysig bron]

The Russian Second Pacific Squadron (the renamed Baltic Fleet) sailed 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to relieve Port Arthur. The demoralizing news that Port Arthur had fallen reached the fleet while it was still at Madagascar. Admiral Rozhestvensky's only hope now was to reach the port of Vladivostok. There were three routes to Vladivostok, with the shortest and most direct passing through Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan. However, this was also the most dangerous route as it passed between the Japanese home islands and the Japanese naval bases in Korea.

Admiral Togo was aware of Russian progress and understood that, with the fall of Port Arthur, the Second and Third Pacific Squadrons would try to reach the only other Russian port in the Far East, Vladivostok. Battle plans were laid down and ships were repaired and refitted to intercept the Russian fleet.

The Japanese Combined Fleet, which had originally consisted of six battleships, was now down to four (two had been lost to mines), but still retained its cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Russian Second Pacific Squadron contained eight battleships, including four new battleships of the Borodino class, as well as cruisers, destroyers and other auxiliaries for a total of 38 ships.

By the end of May the Second Pacific Squadron was on the last leg of its journey to Vladivostok, taking the shorter, riskier route between Korea and Japan, and travelling at night to avoid discovery. Unfortunately for the Russians, while in compliance with the rules of war, the two trailing hospital ships had continued to burn their lights, ⎮] which were spotted by the Japanese armed merchant cruiser Shinano Maru. Wireless communication was used to inform Togo's headquarters, where the Combined Fleet was immediately ordered to sortie. ⎯] Still receiving naval intelligence from scouting forces, the Japanese were able to position their fleet so that they would "cross the T" ⎰] of the Russian fleet. The Japanese engaged battle in the Tsushima Straits on 27–28 May 1905. The Russian fleet was virtually annihilated, losing eight battleships, numerous smaller vessels, and more than 5,000 men, while the Japanese lost three torpedo boats and 116 men. Only three Russian vessels escaped to Vladivostok. After the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese army occupied the entire chain of the Sakhalin Islands to force the Russians to sue for peace.

Military attachés and observers [ edit | wysig bron]

Japanese General Kuroki and his staff, including foreign officers and war correspondents after the Battle of Shaho (1904).

Military and civilian observers from every major power closely followed the course of the war. Most were able to report on events from the perspective of "embedded" positions within the land and naval forces of both Russia and Japan. These military attachés and other observers prepared first-hand accounts of the war and analytical papers. In-depth observer narratives of the war and more narrowly focused professional journal articles were written soon after the war and these post-war reports conclusively illustrated the battlefield destructiveness of this conflict. This was the first time the tactics of entrenched positions for infantry defended with machine guns and artillery became vitally important, and both were dominant factors in World War I. Though entrenched positions were a significant part of both the Franco-Prussian War and the American Civil War due to the advent of breech loading rifles, the lessons learned regarding high casualty counts were not taken into account in World War I. From a 21st-century perspective, it is now apparent that tactical lessons available to observer nations were disregarded in preparations for war in Europe, and during the course of World War I. ⎱]

In 1904–1905, Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton was the military attaché of the British Indian Army serving with the Japanese army in Manchuria. Amongst the several military attachés from Western countries, he was the first to arrive in Japan after the start of the war. ⎲] As the earliest, he would be recognized as the dean of multi-national attachés and observers in this conflict but he was out-ranked by a soldier who would become a better known figure, British Field Marshal William Gustavus Nicholson, 1st Baron Nicholson, later to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff.


How Russian Defeat During the Siege of Port Arthur by Imperial Japan Changed the World

Kernpunt: Russia's loss was the first time an Asian power completely beat a European country in war.

On the chilly night of February 8, 1904, the Imperial Russian Navy’s Pacific Squadron lay peacefully at anchor just outside Port Arthur’s main harbor. Part fortress, part naval base, Port Arthur was located at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula in southern China. With the Yellow Sea to the east and the Bohai Sea to the west, it commanded the approaches to Peking (Beijing), China’s ancient capital. Port Arthur also protected Russian interests in the region, particularly its claim to mineral-rich Manchuria.

Japan also coveted Manchuria, just as it had designs on neighboring Korea. The two rival empires were on a collision course, and half-heated attempts to resolve their differences only seemed to accelerate the headlong rush to war. In early 1904, Port Arthur received word that Japan had broken off diplomatic relations, but the news scarcely lifted an eyebrow. Who would dare to attack the great fortress, a bastion of Holy Mother Russia?

Japanese Sneak Attack on Port Arthur

Seven Russian battleships were riding at anchor, including the flagship Petropavlovsk, a 12,000-ton vessel that mounted four 12-inch and 12 6-inch guns. No less than six cruisers also were on hand, along with the transport ship Angara. The cruisers Pallada and Askold probed the ocean darkness with their searchlights, a precaution against surprise attack. Vice Admiral Oskar Victorovitch Stark, the fleet commander, had ordered the searchlights utilized to guard the approaches to the Russian ships. He also commanded that each vessel’s torpedo nets be raised, but some of the ships ignored the order. Most of the crews were ill-trained, and many of the officers were arrogant aristocrats more interested in shore leave than the overall welfare of their men.

At 11:50 pm, 10 Japanese ships from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas suddenly appeared out of the blackness and launched a series of torpedoes at the Russian ships. Ironically, the Russian searchlights had found the Japanese ships moments before the attack began. The Japanese held their breath as long fingers of light illuminated their destroyers for a few seconds before moving on. No alarm was raised, so a relieved Captain Asai Shojiro ordered his destroyers to launch their torpedoes at once. The Russian sailors on searchlight duty apparently had mistaken the Japanese ships for returning Russian patrol vessels. There had been no formal declaration of war between the two countries, and surprise was complete.

When the night attack was over, three of Russia’s proudest ships were damaged. Pallada, Retvizan, and Tsarevitch were crippled the latter’s bulkhead was shattered and her forward compartment flooded. Ironically, only three of the 16 Japanese torpedoes fired that night found their mark the rest either missed or malfunctioned. It didn’t matter. Japan had struck first, a psychological blow that put the Russians badly off-kilter in the opening months of the conflict.

There were sound strategic reasons why the Japanese wanted Port Arthur. First and foremost, they hoped to wipe out what they considered a national dishonor. In 1894-1895, a newly modernized Japan had fought a war against the decaying Chinese empire. It was an easy victory, and the triumphant Japanese forced the Chinese to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The pact gave Japan the Liaodong Peninsula and allowed it to occupy Korea, at the time still a Chinese vassal state. One of the victors’ first acts was to land at Port Arthur, and as soon as Japanese troops were ashore they massacred the Chinese garrison. As many as 2,000 Chinese were put to the sword, a figure that included women and children.

The Gibraltar of the East

Russia viewed the events with a mixture of jealousy and alarm. Czar Nicholas II and his ministers felt that China’s decline offered new opportunities for Russian expansion in the Far East. In the wake of the Boxer Rebellion, the various European powers were scrambling to grab choice bits of the Chinese mainland, and it was natural for Russia to stake its own claim. Manchuria was a bleak land of frigid wastes and barren hills, but underneath the windswept surface lay enormous deposits of coal, iron, and copper.

For the Russians, the real prize was Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula. The hills surrounding Port Arthur shielded its harbor from the worst effects of the freezing blasts of winter wind that barreled in from the Arctic, keeping its port facilities ice free all year round. Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, was some 1,220 miles to the north, and its harbor was frozen solid for at least three months of the year. Accordingly, Russia joined with Germany and France to force Japan to relinquish control of the Liaodong Peninsula and return it to China. Japan yielded grudgingly to the so-called Tripartite Intervention, but the subsequent loss of face was hard to bear. Tokyo would bide its time, gather strength, and win back what had been “stolen” from Japan.

Once Japan was ejected from the region, Russia lost no time in strong-arming the Chinese into a new series of concessions. Peking agreed to a 25-year lease of Port Arthur and a rail line through Manchuria. A rail spur was also constructed that linked Port Arthur to the Trans-Siberian railhead at Harbin. Russian engineers worked hard to strengthen Port Arthur’s defenses. The goal was to make the town the Gibraltar of the East. Russia’s desire to have a warm water port, a dream that dated back as far as Peter the Great, seemed at last fulfilled.

A Fortress and a Naval Base

By 1904, Port Arthur was one of the most heavily fortified places on earth, a position that most observers thought was impregnable. It was named after Lieutenant William C. Arthur of the British Royal Navy, who sheltered there in 1860 during a raging typhoon. He described the harbor in great detail, and before long people started calling the place Port Arthur in honor of the intrepid Englishman. Port Arthur in some respects was not one city but two: an Old Town and an embryonic New Town. Old Town’s narrow, unpaved streets were lined with dilapidated warehouses, shabby hotels, and poorly built administrative and residential buildings. By contrast, New Town boasted broad tree-lined avenues and modern buildings—a visual declaration that Russia was there to stay.

When all was said and done, Port Arthur was both a fortress and a naval base. In the East Basin of the harbor were docks, machine shops, fuel depots, and ammunition stockpiles. The Japanese would find Port Arthur a tough nut to crack. The first line of defense was a series of fortified hills that rose like a giant’s backbone against the slate gray skies. They ran in a great semicircle some 20 miles through the brownish-gray landscape, bristling with 6-inch guns and Maxim machine guns. Gaps between the forts were filled with connecting trenches and covered ways, and good roads assured an easy passage for men, guns, ammunition, and supplies.

Among the more prominent forts were Little Orphan Hill and Big Orphan Hill to the east and 203 Meter Hill, 174 Meter Hill, and False Hill to the west. Thick tangles of barbed wire were strung on the precipitous slopes, and wherever possible natural features were incorporated into the design. Big Orphan and Little Orphan Hills were steep, and the Russians had purposely dammed the Tai River to provide a natural moat at their bases. The Russians also made good use of old Chinese fortifications that once had sheltered and protected Old Town. Most prominent was the Chinese Wall, a 10-foot-high mud and brick structure that snaked its way through the western outskirts of Port Arthur. It was protected from artillery fire and featured a covered way that could be used for both shelter and communication purposes.

“Port Arthur Will be My Tomb!”

In the weeks before the siege, Maj. Gen. Roman Kondratenko and his 8th Siberian Rifles were assigned the task of strengthening the port’s defenses. Hundreds of Chinese supplemented the work force, digging into the hard earth and carting away basketfuls of soil. There was a shortage of concrete and barbed wire, so the Russians improvised with telegraph line. Kondratenko’s men also planted land mines and laid new telephone lines for better communications and fire control. Approaches to the fortifications were sown with fiendishly ingenious booby traps such as nail boards, wooden planks that bristled with a carpet of 5-inch nails, points facing outward. Since Japanese troops often wore straw sandals, the nail boards would prove particularly effective. The Russians also built trenches in the sides of steep hills and roofed them with timber supports. Once covered with earth and boulders, they seemed part of the hill’s natural slop e. Loopholes and vision slits allowed defenders in the trenches to fire down upon advancing attackers and roll down hand grenades.


Japanese attack Port Arthur, starting Russo-Japanese War


On February 8, 1904, just before midnight, Japanese destroyers entered the harbor of Port Arthur (now Lü-shun, China). Soon after, they unleashed torpedoes against Russian ships in a surprise attack that began the Russo-Japanese War.

The conflict grew over competition between Russia and Japan for territory in both Korea and Manchuria, in northern China. Japan had won Port Arthur, at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, from China in an 1894–1895 war. Russia joined with other European powers to force it to relinquish the port, however — and then three years later had compelled China to grant the city to it. These actions rankled Japan, as did Russia’s refusal to honor a promise to withdraw troops from Manchuria. Japan decided to go to war.

The attack on Port Arthur resumed in the late morning of February 9, when bigger Japanese ships began shelling the Russian fleet and nearby forts. The Russians put up more resistance than expected, however, and the Japanese ships withdrew.

/>The attack on Port Arthur was inconclusive, but the rest of the war went largely Japan’s way. The Japanese enjoyed several victories in 1904, seizing Korea in March, and defeating Russian forces twice in Manchuria during the summer. More success followed in 1905, with the surrender of Port Arthur in January, a victory over a large Russian army in Manchuria in March, and a decisive naval battle at Tsushima Strait in May that destroyed the Russian fleet. Russia’s government, facing unrest at home, was forced to seek peace.

The Russo-Japanese War marked the first victory of a non-European nation against a European one in modern times. It also contributed to unrest in Russia that would lead, more than a decade later, to the Russian Revolution.

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The Russo-Japanese War begins, Feb. 8, 1904

Armed conflict between Russia and Japan began on this day in 1904 when the Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on Port Arthur and blockaded the Russian Far East fleet in what is now northeast China. A victorious Japan forced Russia to curtail its expansionist policy in the Far East, becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European one.

The immediate involvement of the United States in that struggle revolved mainly around an American good-faith effort, which was accepted, to mediate between the warring powers. However, the geopolitical fallout from that 113-year-old conflict has been felt repeatedly for many more years, both in the White House and on Capitol Hill, even to this day.

The ramifications loomed in the background with the advent and outcome of World War II in the Pacific Theater in the rise of Communist China during the Korean War, in which the Chinese staged a successful surprise attack against the American-led U.N. forces as they approached the Yalu River under Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the ensuing Sino-Soviet split and during the decades-long Cold War.

In pre-Soviet times, Russian expansion into Eastern Asia triggered the war. Russian ambitions ran counter to Japanese plans to gain a foothold on the Asian mainland. In 1898, the Russians leased Port Arthur (now Lushun) from China, with the aim of turning it into a major naval base. The Japanese reacted by mounting a naval blockade.

DeVos defeat just the start for reeling Democrats

The fortunes of war favored one side and then the other — until the climactic Battle of Tsushima, in which the Russian Baltic Fleet, which had sailed halfway around the world and had taken on coal at what later became a major U.S. base during the Vietnam War, was annihilated by the Japanese navy.

Japan and Russia, both exhausted by heavy casualties, finally accepted an offer by President Theodore Roosevelt to broker a peace treaty. (Roosevelt’s ultimately successful diplomatic efforts earned him the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize.)

Under the resulting Treaty of Portsmouth, signed at the New Hampshire coastal resort on Sept. 5, 1905, Russia gave up its lease of Port Arthur, ceded to the Japanese the southern half of Sakhalin Island, evacuated Manchuria, and recognized all of Korea as a Japanese sphere of influence. Japan’s defeat in World War II reversed these territorial gains.

In China, fallout from the war ultimately led to the downfall of the Qing dynasty in 1912. Although the ensuing revolution ushered in a republic, China remained unprepared — then as now — to become a democracy.

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Russo-Japanese War: Japan’s First Big Surprise


This 1905 photo of a flag-waving crowd in Tokyo records the mixed outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. Smiles reflect Japan's supremacy over its Russian foe, while grim faces belie the high toll of that victory. (Library of Congress)

‘For all the talk of Bushido of Yamato damashii (&ldquoJapanese spirit&rdquo), virtually every victory was more expensive than it had to be’

Everyone knows that wars are supposed to teach us lessons, and that only a careful study of the last war allows armies to prepare for the next one. Consider our standard narrative of the 1904&ndash05 Russo-Japanese War: It featured trenches and barbed wire, rapid-fire artillery and machine guns, and hundreds of thousands of casualties. European generals did not seem to learn much from it, however. Just 10 years later they led armies into World War I, and in many ways that conflict looked like a replay: the trenches and wire, the pounding artillery, machine guns chattering away and soldiers being sent to their deaths wholesale in senseless infantry assaults.

An open and shut case of military ignorance?

The notion that the generals of World War I failed to note the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War is laughable. Every single Great Power&mdashincluding the United States&mdashsent observers to the earlier conflict, and staff officers pored over their reports in excruciating detail. The intensive firepower, the strength of the defense, the monstrous casualties&mdashthe Great Powers knew all about these things. Indeed, the lessons they learned from &ldquoWorld War Zero&rdquo guided the fighting in World War I.

If you were handicapping a war between the Russian and Japanese empires in 1904, you probably would have picked the Russians to win. Russia held all the strategic advantages: three times the population (130 million to 47 million), five times the trained military manpower and virtually unlimited resources. Just as important to the contemporary world, the Russians (most of them, anyway) were white Europeans, and in the heyday of Western imperialism it seemed inconceivable for an Asian people to beat them in a war. When conflict did erupt, the smart money was on Russia&mdashliterally. Japan needed foreign loans to fight the war but found that international money markets were closed to them. No one in Europe was eager to loan money for a quixotic and probably doomed military adventure.

Japan itself was a question mark. Dragged out of centuries of isolation by the &ldquoblack ships&rdquo of Commodore Matthew Perry in the 1850s, the country had embarked on a crash modernization program. It had abolished its feudal system, established a central government with a Western-style constitution, and formed a modern army and navy. Such rapid change is never easy, and the new state had to fight a series of nail-biting civil wars against remnants of the old samurai caste and southern rebels, an ordeal it barely survived. Since then Japan had fought and won a war with China in 1894&ndash95, but to Western analysts that Asian-on-Asian conflict said little one way or the other about Japan&rsquos military proficiency.

Japan&rsquos leaders shared this uncertainty. They understood Japan&rsquos weakness vis-à-vis the West, and they knew they could never survive a contest of numbers and materiel with one of the Great Powers. They had to find a different way to prepare the nation for armed struggle. If Japan could not contend in the material realm, perhaps it could rely on spiritual factors: its unique heritage, its unbroken imperial line stretching back more than 1,000 years its sense of cultural and moral superiority to neighboring races. Japan had rid itself of the samurai during the civil wars, but now it had to resurrect something like the old samurai ethos and impose it on its peasant conscripts. It had to turn these ordinary soldiers into &ldquohuman bullets&rdquo who were willing, even eager, to die in the service of the emperor.

En so Bushido (&ldquothe way of the warrior&rdquo) was born. Death before dishonor. No retreat. No surrender. It was an idealized samurai code, one that many samurai had failed to live up to in the past. While its roots are ancient, Bushido was also a modern invention, a conscious attempt by the Japanese military to create a spiritual equalizer on battlefields that it could never hope to dominate with brute force or numbers.

It is easy to shake our heads over this today, since we know how it all ended in 1945. But consider the course of the Russo-Japanese War: Tensions between the two empires had been rising for a decade. After Japan&rsquos quick victory over China, the Western powers had stepped in and forced Japan to hand back key territorial gains, including the naval base at Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula. Japanese anger rose when the Russians first occupied the port and then leased it from China for 25 years. Subsequent Russian railroad building in the region&mdashthe Trans-Siberian to Vladivostok, the Chinese Eastern through Manchuria, and the South Manchuria down to Port Arthur&mdashseemed to herald a Russian grab for dominance in East Asia, and when Russian business interests pressured the Korean court into granting mining and timber concessions, the Japanese felt they had no choice but to strike.

On Feb. 8, 1904, Japan opened hostilities with a surprise attack on Russia&rsquos 1st Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur. Ten Japanese destroyers approached the roadstead at night, loosed their torpedoes at the anchored Russian ships and sped off. The attack left two of Russia&rsquos seven modern battleships (Retvizan en Tsesarevich) extensively damaged. A follow-up attack the next morning by the Japanese battle fleet under Admiral Heihachiro Togo was an inconclusive affair, however. The Russians refused to give battle, sheltering under the protective fire of their shore batteries. After damaging five more Russian ships, Togo withdrew.

It was only a partial success, but with the Russian fleet bottled up in Port Arthur, the Japanese could now transport armies to the mainland. On February 16 First Army landed at Chemulpo (present-day Inchon) in Korea. Led by General Count Tamemoto Kuroki, it comprised the 2nd, 12th and Guard Divisions, 42,500 men in all. After entering Seoul, Kuroki launched his army north. He soon reached the Yalu River and in late April engaged a Russian force&mdashthe 3rd Siberian Corps, 16,000 men plus a 5,000-man brigade of Cossack cavalry&mdashdug in along the north bank. Even granting the edge in numbers, Kuroki handled his attack skillfully, using a flanking maneuver upriver by the 12th Division to get the Russians to commit their reserves, then launching a brisk frontal assault by the 2nd and Guards Divisions that cracked the position and drove the defenders back in disorder from the Yalu.

It had been a tough little fight. Russian defensive fire had meted out major punishment to the 12th Division&rsquos flanking attack, and the Guards Division, too, had run into a buzz saw in its frontal assault. Both sides were firing artillery with the new shrapnel shells, and the casualties were not only high but also often horrible to look upon. But the fight also showed Japan might not be a bad investment after all, and the country began to find eager lenders in the foreign banking community. Moreover, it set the pattern for the rest of the war: The Japanese would take all the risks, launch virtually all the attacks and drive the Russians from one defensive position after another.

On May 5 the Second Army landed at Pitzuwo on the Liaotung Peninsula. As General Baron Yasukata Oku&rsquos men marched south, advancing on the key port of Dalny, they soon reached one of the world&rsquos great military bottlenecks. As the peninsula extends southwest, it narrows into an isthmus just 3,500 yards wide at its narrowest point. Looming over it is Nanshan, a ring of hills about a mile in diameter. The bare, open slopes provided the Russians with a perfect field of fire, and they had also fortified the hill with trenches, barbed wire and machine guns. Artillery was plentiful, the guns dug in deeply and connected by telephone, and fronting the position were dense minefields and a double fence of barbed wire. Russian engineers had even hauled up a generator to power searchlights, in case the Japanese tried a nighttime coup. As a military observer for the Die tye of London put it, if a Russian army could not hold Nanshan, &ldquoIt is hard to say what position it can expect to defend with success.&rdquo

Needless to say, Nanshan was not a battle of finesse. Thick waves of Japanese infantry, three divisions abreast, stormed the hill, only to be mowed down by Russian machine-gun fire, as well as by artillery deployed to the rear in one of history&rsquos first uses of indirect fire. The Japanese came up again and again over the course of the day, launching nine separate charges and reeling back each time with heavy losses. Only the 4th Division, on the right flank, managed to move forward, due mainly to fire support from a nimble flotilla of Japanese gunboats in Chinchou Bay. In an unusual 20-minute amphibious assault the men actually had to enter the water, wade with rifles held high and then re-land. They made just enough progress to prompt the Russian commander at Nanshan to blow his ammunition dumps and order a retreat. The Japanese had taken Nanshan, but losses had been grievous&mdashnearly 5,000 men on a very small field.

Brisk maneuver, aggressive frontal assaults, contempt for death: This was the Japanese recipe for success. It was costly, but it worked, and even if it did not &ldquoforce&rdquo the enemy to retreat in any real sense, it seemed to put Russian commanders in the mood to flee. It would be the same in the next three battles, each one larger than the last, each one bloodier, and each ending in Japanese victory.

Consider the fight for Port Arthur itself. The next Japanese army to arrive in the theater was the Third, its 90,000 men commanded by General Baron Maresuke Nogi, the same crusty old warrior who had wrested Port Arthur from the Chinese during the previous war. Nogi landed at Dalny, marched his three divisions (1st, 9th and 11th) south toward Port Arthur and on August 19 launched an assault on the outer works.

Given his desire to seize the fortress quickly, the size of the forces involved and the available firepower, losses were bound to be high. But even an assault on a fortress can have some subtlety. Nogi went for a short bombardment followed by a single thrust along the eastern approaches to Port Arthur, the most heavily defended point in the Russian line. He seriously underestimated the strength of the defenses&mdashconcrete and steel bunkers, fortified villages, lunettes, barbed wire, trip wires and electric mines. The result was predictable, and horrific. Japanese infantry came up with their usual verve, three divisions abreast, and were shot to pieces. Back they came and then again. The fighting raged for six days, or, to be more accurate, six days en nights, as searchlights were now part of the arsenal. In the end Bushido bowed to firepower, and Nogi called off the assault. In taking a few outlying forts, his army had suffered more than 18,000 casualties.

There would be a second assault on Port Arthur in September and a third in October. The latter sacrificed more than 4,000 men in a vain attempt to take 203 Meter Hill, the dominant height on the left of the Russian line. With winter coming on, Nogi made one last try in November. His army now bulged with 100,000 men, backed by the fire of 11-inch Krupp howitzers. This attack, too, left thousands of Japanese dead in front of the Russian trenches, but bit by bit Nogi&rsquos infantry, braving enemy fire and ignoring their losses, fought their way to the top of the hill. The cost, again, had been high: another 8,000 men.

It was the decisive moment in the siege. With a direct line of sight down into the harbor, the Japanese could now call down artillery fire onto the Russian fleet, and they destroyed it, a ship at a time, in December. In January 1905 Port Arthur surrendered. Disease and six months of fighting had cost the Japanese 90,000 men, a high price to pay even when driving an enemy out of a supposedly impregnable position.

As the fighting raged at Port Arthur, the main Japanese drive to the north had begun. Three armies, the First, Second and the newly arrived Fourth (General Viscount Michitsura Nozu), now converged on the city of Liaoyang. Field Marshal Iwao Oyama, chief of the Japanese General Staff, had arrived in theater and was acting as supreme commander. His aim was not merely to drive back the enemy or to seize Liaoyang, but to destroy the Russian forces in Manchuria and end the war. To that end he had two armies (the Second and Fourth) advance directly upon the city, moving up the line of the South Manchuria Railway. They would launch a frontal assault to pin the Russians in place, while Kuroki&rsquos First Army made a wide flanking maneuver on the right, crossing the Taitsu River and getting into the Russian rear.

It was a solid plan, but again the Japanese underestimated their enemy. Kuroki started out on August 26, but rather than pass cleanly around the Russian flank, he had to fight his way up to the river. When he finally did cross, a storm blew away the bridges to his rear. It was a tight spot, with Russians to the front and a swollen river to his rear. But as grimly as the Russians defended, they never managed any sort of counterstroke. Kuroki&rsquos losses were heavy, but he was able to grind his way forward, posing a threat to Liaoyang and compelling the Russians to retreat. As for those armies launching the frontal assault, their men died in droves, and the final casualty toll for both sides topped 40,000 men.

Once again the Japanese had pried the Russians from a heavily fortified position. It was clear, however, they were reaching their limit. They had made an epic march deep into Manchuria but were no closer to ultimate victory. The Russians had lost every battle but remained in the field, and their army was growing with the arrival of every troop train. Oyama knew it was time for a decisive win.

In early 1905 the Japanese once again marched up the South Manchuria line and met the Russians, entrenched this time in front of the city of Mukden. The resulting battle, opening on February 20, was the largest of the war and among the largest in history: 330,000 Russians facing 270,000 Japanese. Oyama now had five full armies under his control, a suitable battle array for this gifted commander. The newly arrived Fifth Army (General Baron Kageaki Kawamura), on the extreme right of the Japanese line, led off the attack with a thrust through the rough terrain southeast of Mukden. When the Russians countered by shifting reserve formations to block it, Oyama launched a frontal assault by the three armies in his center. Advancing directly on the Russian trenches, they took heavy losses, but their Krupp howitzers dished out some serious pain to the entrenched Russians.

With the defenders pinned frontally, and their reserves committed far to the east, Oyama launched his main blow&mdasha wide turning maneuver to the west by Nogi&rsquos Third Army, aiming to outflank and destroy the Russians in a battle of encirclement. Nogi set out on February 27, but as at Port Arthur he moved a bit too slowly, a function of raging snowstorms, his own nature and tough enemy resistance. The combination allowed the Russian commander, General Alexei Kuropatkin, to organize hasty counterattacks by small reserve detachments, often comprising rear-area personnel, supply troops and cooks, men not used to the rigors of tactical combat. They slowed but did not stop Nogi&rsquos advance. The Japanese gradually drove in the Russian flank, and soon the line was bent into a tight crescent some 100 miles long. On March 9, with the Japanese nearing the railroad and his reserves used up, Kuropatkin ordered a retreat through a very narrow corridor. In fact, it was a nightmare&mdasha gauntlet peppered with Japanese fire from both sides.

The Japanese had won their war, but it had been a grueling contest. Initial plans had gone awry. The failure to destroy the Russian fleet in Port Arthur had led to a bloody land campaign to take the town itself. For all the talk of Bushido of Yamato damashii (&ldquoJapanese spirit&rdquo), virtually every victory was more expensive than it had to be, including 75,000 more casualties at Mukden. Not everyone was happy to serve as a human bullet in Manchuria, and publication of the casualty rolls was the occasion for serious unrest and even rioting in Japan.

But let us return to our original notion of war&rsquos lessons. Imagine being a European staff officer in 1910. It is a tense era, and a general war seems inevitable. You are a diligent student of the military arts, and you recognize the importance of military history. What lessons would you draw from the Russo-Japanese War? Could you honestly look at it and say machine guns and entrenchments are too terrible? That they have rendered the attack obsolete? You would be far more likely to conclude that victory had gone to the side that attacked, kept attacking and had stomach enough to tolerate casualties. You would think a lot about Port Arthur: one failed assault after another with losses that would have crushed many armies, until the Japanese had apparently willed themselves to final victory on 203 Meter Hill. You would vow that, when your chance came, you would be equally determined.

World War I was horrific, especially the blood-drenched fighting on the Western Front. It wasn&rsquot because the generals ignored the Russo-Japanese War, however. On the contrary, they studied it carefully and drew what seemed to them logical conclusions about how to achieve victory. Perhaps the lessons of war are more complex than we like to think.

For further reading Rob Citino recommends Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, by Richard Connaughton Japan&rsquos Imperial Army, by Edward J. Drea and The Russian Way of War, by Richard W. Harrison.


Kyk die video: The Russo - Japanese War, Part 4, February to Spring, 1904 (Julie 2022).


Kommentaar:

  1. Mahdi

    Dit is aangenaam, nuttige gedagte

  2. Dorrell

    Na my mening maak u 'n fout. Kom ons bespreek. E -pos my by PM, ons sal praat.

  3. Vora

    We will speak to this topic.

  4. Kazilkis

    die simpatieke vraag



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