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Is die Hashemitiese konings van Irak en Transjordanië as vreemd beskou?

Is die Hashemitiese konings van Irak en Transjordanië as vreemd beskou?

Die Britte het twee seuns gemaak van Hussein bin Ali, Sharif van Mekka, heersers van die nuwe politieke entiteite van Transjordanië en Irak na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Hulle is albei gebore in die Hijaz (nou in Wes -Saoedi -Arabië), nie die gebied wat hulle regeer het nie. Aan die ander kant het die politieke onderskeid tussen hierdie gebiede vandag nie in die vroeë 20ste eeu bestaan ​​nie.

Die vraag: In watter mate is die seuns van Hussein bin Ali as buitelanders beskou deur die mense oor wie hulle geheers het, en het die sentiment hom ooit in die plaaslike politiek uitgespreek?


Gedurende daardie tyd was Pan-Arabisme in die mode in die Arabiese wêreld. Die geslagslyn van hierdie heersers wat teruggekeer het na die stam van die profeet Mohamed van Islam, was 'n pluspunt.

Arabiese lande het probeer verenig in verskeie mededingende mislukte projekte. Waar jy vandaan kom, was nie so belangrik as watter politieke dogma jy gehad het nie.


Ek sal die vraag herformuleer en beantwoord as: "Hoe goed is die Hashemitiese konings aanvaar deurdat die Britte na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog Transjordanië en Irak opgelê het?" Omdat die antwoorde nogal anders is.

Die huidige koning van "Jordanië" is Abdullah II. Hy is die seun van wyle (en gewilde) koning Hussein. Hussein was die kleinseun van Abdullah I, een van die twee broers (saam met Ali), wat deur die Britte in die destydse "Transjordanië" troon. Die Hashemiete regeer die moderne Jordaan vir byna 100 jaar en vier geslagte, met toenemend groter aanvaarding. Die twyfel wat die Trans -Jordaniërs aan die begin oor hulle gehad het, het verdwyn. (Die Britse invloed wat koning Abdullah I 'opgerig' het, is lankal weg, so wat sedertdien gebeur het, is nogal 'natuurlik').

Die "oorplanting werk nie naastenby so goed in Irak nie. Daardie land het verskeie regerings tussen die wêreldoorloë beleef, waaronder 'n pro-Nazi-regering. Na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het die Hashemiete met beperkte sukses probeer om die mag in Irak te herwin. In 1958 het die Irakse (Hashemitiese) monarg het aan Jordanië se koning Hussein voorgestel dat die twee lande hul monargieë saamsmelt as 'n teengewig met die Egipte-Sirië, die Verenigde Arabiese Republiek. Hy is op sy beurt in 1963 deur die Baathistiese party omvergewerp.)

Daar was basies geen groep in Irak wat die Hashemiete gesteun het nie. Sekerlik nie die Sjiïtiese Moslems (die Hashemiete is Soenniete), en ook nie die Koerden, wat mede -Soenniete is nie, maar hul eie agenda gehad het. Slegs Britse steun het die monargie in staat gestel om so lank te duur as in Irak.

Ek sou dus sê dat die Hashemitiese konings in Irak as baie meer 'vreemd' beskou is as in Transjordanië.


Toe Churchill Transjordanië uit Palestina skei

Die Sykes-Picot-ooreenkoms van 1916 het die opstel van mandate vir Frankryk (Libanon en Sirië) en Brittanje (Palestina en Irak) beoog. As 'n beloning vir hulp om die Ottomane te verslaan, is die seun van Sharif Hussein van die Hashemitiese dinastie deur die Britte geïnstalleer as die heerser van Sirië. Die Franse het hom egter in 1921 verdryf en die Britte het Faisal bin Hussein die volgende jaar die koning van Irak gemaak.

Die Hashemiete is vroeër uit die Hejaz, wat nou Saoedi -Arabië is, verdryf, en die Saoedi's sou baie jare daarna vrees dat hulle sou probeer om terug te keer en die Wahhabi wat die land regeer, te verdryf.

Volgens Frank Jacobs was & ldquoFaisal bin Hussein op pad om sy broer Abdullah in Sirië te help toe Winston Churchill hom smeek om af te sien, met die vooruitsig op 'n verpletterende nederlaag deur die Franse as stok, en die belofte van Abdullah & rsquos eie dinastie as wortel. & rdquo

Winston Churchill het gesê dat hy, met die slag van 'n pen een Sondagmiddag in Kaïro in 1921, die Britse mandaat van Transjordanië, nou bekend as die Koninkryk van Jordanië, geskep het. Blykbaar, nadat hy die dag gedrink het, was die koloniale sekretaris & rsquos penmanship wankelrig, en dit het na bewering 'n besonder onregelmatige grens veroorsaak.

& ldquoDie Britse, en Jacobs notas, & ldquosaw Transjordanië & rsquos waardeer hoofsaaklik as 'n transitsone tussen Palestina en Irak, maar ook as deel van 'n luggang (destyds toe vlugte relatief kort was en baie brandstof was). & rdquo Die ligging van die Oostelike Die grens tussen Transjordanië en Irak is ook as strategies beskou met betrekking tot die voorgestelde konstruksie van die Kirkuk & ndashHaifa -oliepypleiding.

Transjordanië, sogenaamd vanweë sy posisie aan die oostekant van die Jordaanrivier, was oorspronklik deel van die Britse mandaat vir Palestina wat op die San Remo-konferensie in 1920 geskep is. huis in die hele Palestina geskep sou word.

'N Memo oor Transjordanië wat op 12 Maart 1921 geskryf is, voor die byeenkoms van die Midde -Ooste -konferensie wat in Kaïro gehou is, verduidelik die Britse besluit om die oorspronklike mandaat te verander:

Op 12 Maart 1921 tel Churchill die koloniale kantoor (geparafraseer):

Die koloniale kantoor reageer (geparafraseer):

& ldquo Niks in hierdie mandaat sal die verpligte verhinder om so 'n outonome administrasiestelsel vir die oorwegend Koerdiese gebiede in die noordelike deel van Mesopotamië in te stel wat hy as geskik ag nie. & rdquo

In die gebiede wat tussen die Jordaan en die oostelike grens van Palestina lê, soos uiteindelik bepaal, is die verpligting geregtig om die toepassing van sodanige bepalings van hierdie mandaat wat hy as van toepassing op die bestaande plaaslike toestande mag ag, uit te stel of te weerhou, en sodanige voorsiening te maak vir die administrasie van die gebiede soos hy dit geskik ag vir daardie omstandighede, mits daar nie opgetree word wat strydig is met die bepalings van artikels 15, 16 en 18. & rdquo

Om die koninkryk vir Abdullah te skep, het Churchill & rsquos & ldquostroke van die pen & rdquo Transjordanië, ongeveer driekwart van Palestina, gesny uit die oorspronklike Britse mandaat wat in 1920 in San Remo gestig is. Churchill en Abdullah het daarna ooreengekom dat Transjordanië as 'n verpligte gebied aanvaar sou word 'N Arabiese land, afgesien van Palestina, en dat dit nie deel sou uitmaak van die Joodse nasionale tuiste wat wes van die Jordaanrivier gevestig sou word nie. Abdullah is toe in April 1921 aangestel as Emir van die Transjordania -streek. Brittanje het die deel wes van die Jordaanrivier as Palestina toegedien, en die deel oos van die Jordaan as Transjordanië.

In Augustus 1922 het die Britse regering 'n memorandum aan die Volkebond voorgelê waarin gesê word dat Transjordanië uitgesluit sou word van al die bepalings rakende Joodse nedersetting, en hierdie memorandum is op 12 Augustus deur die Bond goedgekeur. Dit het die Sioniste kwaad gemaak omdat dit die gebied beskikbaar vir 'n toekomstige Joodse staat, wat hulle verwag het om die hele Palestina, dit is weerskante van die Jordaanrivier, te omvat.

Ironies genoeg was dit Lord Arthur Balfour, wie se brief aan Lord Walter Rothschild in 1917 die Jode 'n nasionale tuiste in Palestina belowe het, wat op 16 September 1922 aan die Liga gesê het dat Brittanje die mandaat wil verander met die doel om Transjordanië terug te trek van die gebied was bedoel om 'n nasionale tuiste te bied vir die Jode wes van die Jordaan.


Notule van bespreking van Palestina tydens die vergadering
van die Volkebond (16 September 1922) - Klik op die afbeelding om te vergroot

Later het die Peel -kommissie, wat deur die Britse regering aangestel is om die oorsaak van die Arabiese onluste in 1936 te ondersoek, geskryf dat ten tyde van die Balfour -verklaring verstaan ​​word dat die Joodse Nasionale Huis in die hele historiese Palestina gestig sou word, insluitend Transjordanië.

Op 17 Junie 1946 het Transjordanië 'n onafhanklike nasie geword.

Toe koning Abdullah die Wesbank in 1948 geannekseer het, is die land herdoop tot Jordanië.

Bronne: Koninkryk van Jordanië
Frank Jacobs, & ldquoWinston & rsquos Hik, & rdquo New York Times, (6 Maart 2012)
& ldquoEmiraat van Transjordanië, & rdquo Wikipedia
Maurice Ostroff, & ldquo Die 1967 -kaart is minder relevant vir Israel se toekomstige grense as die 1920 -kaart, en rdquo Jerusalem Post, (31 Maart 2014).

Laai ons mobiele app af vir onmiddellike toegang tot die Joodse virtuele biblioteek


Virtuele Joodse wêreld: Transjordanië

Geografies sluit Transjordanië (Heb. עֵבֶרהַיַרְדֵּן) die gebied oos van die Jordaanrivier in, wat strek vanaf die bronne van die Jordaan naby die Hermon tot by die Dooie See. Die gebied noord van die Yarmukrivier (die Golan en Basjan) word egter as 'n aparte entiteit beskou, terwyl die gebied oos van die Dooie See en die Arabah, tot by die Rooi See, in die gebied van Transjordanië opgeneem is.

In sy geografiese opset bestaan ​​Transjordanië uit 'n reeks van drie streke wat van noord na suid strek: die oostelike Jordaanvallei, die hange wat na die vallei daal, wat weswaarts kyk en goed toegerus is met reënval en die berge wat saggies ooswaarts hang en saamsmelt met die woestyn steppe. Die gevestigde deel van hierdie gebied beslaan 6 840 vierkante meter. (17 500 vierkante kilometer), waarvan die Jordaan-Dooie See-depressie 215 vierkante kilometer beslaan. (550 vierkante kilometer), die berg- en heuwelstreek 2,617 vierkante myl. (6 700 vierkante kilometer.), Die hoë plato 2,051 vierkante myl. (5.250 vierkante kilometer), en die sanderige suidelike streke ongeveer 1,953 vierkante myl. (ongeveer 5.000 vierkante kilometer.). Polities, in die Hashemitiese koninkryk van Jordanië, word die gebied van Transjordanië beskou as 28,320 vierkante kilometer. (72 500 vierkante kilometer.) Steppe en woestyn in 'n breë strook wat by Irak aansluit en Sirië van Saoedi-Arabië skei.

Die gevestigde gebied word gesny deur samevloeisels van die Jordaan wat van oos na wes vloei, en deur riviere wat in die Dooie See uitloop: die Yarmuk, wat die noordelike grens vorm van die Jabbok -streek, wat Gilead van Ammon en die Peraea die Nimrin skei, gewoonlik die noordelike grens van Moab die Arnon, op sekere tye die grens van Moab die Zered, wat Moab van Edom en die berge van Seïr skei. Die bergreeks parallel met die Jordaan in die ooste wissel in hoogte: in die ʿAjlūn (Gilead) is Tell ʿIbbīn 1,182 m hoog, Umm al-Daraj is 1,201 m hoog en Qalʿat Ilyās is 1.092 m hoog. Suid van die Jabbok bereik Nabī Yūshaʿ tot 1,113 m en die berg Nebo tot 795 m suid van die Arnon, Jebel Sīhān is 1,065 m hoog en Jebel al- Ḥasāʾ is 1,234 m hoog. Die berge van Seir bereik 1,733 m. Die grootste reënval is in die ʿAjlūn (ongeveer 27 mm en 700 mm.) En in die berge van Seir (ongeveer 15 en 400 mm.). Die grootste deel van die bewerkbare gebied ontvang jaarliks ​​ongeveer 200 mm (8 duim), met 'n reënval van ongeveer 80 mm (3 duim) in die woestyn. Die berge van Gilead is nog in die oudheid bebos, maar die gebied was baie meer beboste, soos die verhaal van Absalom toon. Daar is bewyse dat 'n groot verbouingsgebied ooswaarts gestrek het. Yster is ontgin naby Jerash en koper in die Arabah (sien Punon).

Geskiedenis

Paleolitiese en mesolitiese oorblyfsels, die vroegste spore van besetting in Transjordanië, is gevind in die berge van Seir en in Wadi Nimrīn. 'N Pre-keramiek neolitiese nedersetting is by al-Bayḍāʾ, suidoos van die Dooie See, ontdek. Megalitiese konstruksies is gevind by Alfa Safat en al-ʿUdayma in die Jordaanvallei. Naby laasgenoemde plek is Tulaylāt al-Ghassūl, 'n Chalkolitiese plek van groot belang, wat sy naam gegee het aan die Ghassuliaanse kultuur. Vanaf die vroeë bronstydperk kan 'n sekere besettingspatroon, veral in die suidelike deel van Transjordanië, opgemerk word as gevolg van die argeologiese opname wat N. Glueck onderneem het: periodes van nedersetting wissel met periodes waarin die gebied oorgelaat is tot nomades.

Die eerste tydperk van nedersetting duur van ongeveer die 23ste tot die 19de eeu B.C.E. Volgens Bybelse tradisie het die vroeë bevolkings die Zuzims by Ham in die noorde van Gilead, die Emims in Moab en die Horiete in die berg Seïr (Gen. 14: 5 en ndash6) ingesluit. Miskien as gevolg van die inval wat in hierdie hoofstuk beskryf word, was daar 'n afname in die nedersetting van Transjordanië vanaf die 19de tot ongeveer die 14de eeu B.C.E. Egiptiese tekste noem geen stede in Transjordanië binne hierdie tydperk nie, behalwe dié in die Jordaanvallei: Pehel (Pella Execration Texts, Thutmosis III en Seti Ek), en miskien Zaphon (Tell el-Amarna letters), Zarethan (Execration Texts) en Kiriath Anab (Tell al-Shihāb op die Yarmuk Seti Ek, Papirus Anastasi Ek). Slegs in die 13de eeu, in inskripsies van Ramses II, is stede in Moab, waaronder Dibon, vir die eerste keer genoem. Die Bybelse definisie van die Egiptiese provinsie Kanaän (Num. 34) sluit beslis die Jordaan uit, wat aan die Shasu -nomades oorgelaat is.

Ongeveer 'n eeu voor die uittog is Transjordanië weer gevestig deur die Ammoniete, Moabiete en Edomiete, wat 'n sterk ketting van koninkryke gevorm het, met uitgebreide verbouingsgebiede en 'n stelsel van doeltreffende grensvestings. Waarskynlik aan die begin van die 13de eeu, is Moab vanuit die noorde aangeval deur Sihon, die Amoritiese koning van Hesbon, wat die gebied noord van die Arnon daaruit verwoes het. Die Israeliete, wat uit die wildernis gekom het, het dit uiters moeilik gevind om oor die Jordaan te kom, uiteindelik het hulle oos van die gevestigde gebied van Moab gegaan en Edom het hul oorwinning oor Sihon aan hulle die hele Jordaanvallei, die Gilead en 'n deel van Moab gegee. Hierdie gebied is toegewys aan die stamme van Ruben (van die Arnon tot die Nimrin -vallei), Gad (van die suide van Gilead tot by die Jabbok en die Jordaanvallei) en die helfte van Manasse (van die Jabbok noordwaarts).

In die tydperk van die Rigters is hierdie stamme onderwerp aan die konings van Ammon en Moab, totdat Dawid uiteindelik die hele Jordaan tot by die Rooi See verower het. In die tyd van Salomo is die Israelitiese beheerde Transjordanië georganiseer in die drie distrikte Ramoth-Gilead, Mahanaim en die suide van Gilead (Gad Ek Konings 4: 13 & ndash14, 19). Na die verdeling van die koninkryk het Ammon en Moab aan Israel en Edom in Juda geval, maar al drie het gou hul onafhanklikheid herwin. Soos uit die Mesha -stele bekend is, is Moab herower deur Omri, dit het in die tyd van Agab in opstand gekom teen Israel en uiteindelik sy onafhanklikheid verkry in die dae van Joram, die laaste van die Omrid -konings (851 en ndash842 B.C.E. vgl. II Konings 3). In latere tye het Israel nooit daarin geslaag om Moab te onderwerp nie, wat onder Mesha sy grense tot aan die rand van die Jordaanvallei vergroot het. Die konings van Juda het egter daarin geslaag om in die negende eeu groot dele van Edom te regeer gedurende die dae van Josafat en Joram, en weer in die agtste eeu in die dae van Amasia en Ussia.

Met die agtste eeu B.C.E., het die gevestigde gebied van Transjordanië weer begin krimp, 'n proses wat tot die Hellenistiese tydperk geduur het. Die Assiriese koning Tiglath-Pileser III het in 732 'n deel van die Israelitiese bevolking uit Gilead gedeporteer B.C.E. Die Ammoniete het hul onafhanklikheid behou, en die Edomiete het die Judese heerskappy in die tyd van Agas (743 en ndash727) afgeskaf B.C.E.). Na die val van Jerusalem en die deportasie van sy bevolking deur Nebukadnesar in 586 B.C.E., het die Edomiete na die suide van Judea verhuis en die plek daarvan word geleidelik oorgeneem deur die Nabateërs, 'n volk wat bekend is vir uitstekende prestasies in landbou, argitektuur en kuns. Hulle koninkryk bestaan ​​uit dele van Transjordanië, Palestina en Sirië, en Petra was hul hoofstad (vierde eeu B.C.E.). In die Persiese tydperk is Ammon beheer deur die Joodse familie van *Tobiads, wie se wortels in Gilead dateer uit die tyd van die Israelitiese monargie.

In die hellenistiese tyd het 'n nuwe tydperk van voorspoed vir Transjordanië begin, wat duur tot die Arabiese verowering. Die Ptolemeërs of Seleukiede het 'n aantal stede in die noordelike deel gestig: Gadara en Abila in die noorde, gevolg deur Pella en Gerasa. Rabbath-Ammon het die stad Philadelphia geword en is geskei van die gebied van die Tobiads, wat die gebied regeer het wat deur Jode tussen Philadelphia en die Jordaan (die Peraea) bevolk is.

Transjordanië het in 218 tydelik van die Ptolemaïese tot die Seleukidiese bewind oorgegaan B.C.E. en permanent in 198 B.C.E. Tydens die uitbreiding van die Hasmonean is groot dele van Transjordanië verower deur Jonathan (die Peraea), John Hyrcanus (Madaba en Heshbon) en Alexander Yannai (Moab tot by die Zered, Gerasa, Pella en Gadara). In 63 B.C.E., Pompeius herstel die outonomie van die Griekse stede, en laat slegs Peraea aan die Jode oor. Om die Griekse element onder die Romeinse bewind te versterk, vorm hy die Decapolis -liga, wat Philadelphia insluit.

Herodes het 'n tyd lank geheers oor Gadara, wat na sy dood in Sirië herstel is. In die Eerste Joodse Oorlog is die Peraea deur die Romeine verower (68 C.E.), maar die Joodse bevolking het gebly. In 97 is die stad Capitolias gestig by Belt al-Rās naby Pella. In 106 annekseer Trajanus die Nabatese koninkryk die stede Madaba, Esbus (Heshbon), Areopolis (Rabbath-Moab), Charachmoba en Petra het deel geword van die nuwe provinsie Arabië, waarby Philadelphia en Gerasa opgeneem is. Die stede in die gebied bereik 'n hoogtepunt van welvaart in die tweede eeu C.E. onder die Antonines, as gevolg van 'n nuwe verharde pad (die Via Nova) wat van Elath (Aila) na Bostra dwarsdeur Transjordanië loop.

Die Christendom het vroeg in die Jordaan posgevat toe die Jerusalem -gemeenskap in 70 na Pella verhuis het C.E. In die Bisantynse tydperk was suidelike Transjordanië verbonde aan Palaestina III, die res na Arabië. Kerke en kloosters is in al die groot stede gebou en die biskoppe het aan kerkrade deelgeneem.

In die laaste eeue van die Bisantynse heerskappy is Arabiese invloede in die gebied gemerk. Die eerste geveg tussen die Arabiere en die Bisantyne het plaasgevind in 629, nog in die leeftyd van die profeet Mohammed, in Transjordanië (in Mu & rsquota, naby Karak). Die finale Arabiese verowering is in verskeie fases uitgevoer: Suid -Transjordanië is in 630 ingeneem, die berge Seir en Moab in 634 en die res van die streek in 635. Met die geveg op die Yarmuk in 636 was Arabiese heerskappy in die gebied gevestig.

In die vroeë Arabiese tydperk was die gebied tot by Jerash verbonde aan die Jund al-Urdunn sentrale Transjordanië, insluitend Amman, aan die Jund Filasṭīn en die noordelike deel aan die Jund Dimashq (Damaskus). Onder Arabiese bewind vorm die noordelike deel van Transjordanië saam met die noorde van Palestina 'n administratiewe eenheid genaamd Jund al-Urdun, met Tiberias as hoofstad. Sentraal- en suidelike Transjordanië, met die ekwivalente dele wes van die Jordaanrivier, het Jund Filastīn geword, toegedien uit Ramleh. Die Arabiese tydperk was die begin van 'n nuwe afname in die bevolking, wat eeue ná die kruistogte uitgespreek het (13de tot 19de eeu).

Gedurende die kruistogte is die Jordaanvallei, deel van die ʿAjlūn, en die berge Karak en Shawbak tot by die Rooi See saamgevoeg tot 'n prinsdom bekend as Terre D 'Outre Jourdain. Aangesien die kruisvaarders, en veral die heersers van die vesting Montreal (Shawbak), die pelgrimsroete na Mekka en selfs die heilige stede self bedreig het, val Saladin die kruisvaardersvestings aan en verminder dit voor die slag van Ḥiṭṭin.

Onder die Mameloekse bewind is Transjordanië verdeel tussen Mamlakat Dimashq (die distrikte (aʿmal) van ʿAjlūn en al-Balqā ʾ) en Mamlakat al-Karak, wat Maʿān, Shawbak, Zughar (Zoar) en Karak insluit. In die tyd van Baybars is dit beheer deur die laaste afstammeling van die Ayyubid -dinastie.

In die Ottomaanse tyd het die bevolking van Transjordanië die laagste vlak bereik en die grootste deel van die Jordaan is aan die Bedoeïene oorgelaat, hoewel die sultans 'n skyn van administrasie in die westelike gebiede behou het. Die grootste deel van die streek was deel van die vilayet van Damaskus, verdeel in die Sanjak van Ḥawrān (tot by die Jabbok), die Sanjak van Nablus, wat soms die Balqāʾ, en die Sanjak van al-Karak insluit. Die suidelike gedeeltes, Ma & rsquoan en Aqaba, was deel van die vilayet van Hijaz. Die Ottomaanse bewind was egter die meeste van die tyd nominaal. Transjordanië word beskou as die agterplaas van Sirië en Palestina en het die Ottomane slegs tydens die jaarlikse pelgrimstog aangegaan, aangesien die belangrikste Hajj -karavaan uit Damaskus dit na Medina moes oorsteek. Eers in die tweede helfte van die 19de eeu, na die kortstondige Egiptiese besetting (1831 en ndash40) en gedurende die hervormingstydperk (Tanzimat), onder Abdul-Ḥamid II, is hervestiging begin. Die Ottomane het hul direkte heerskappy oor Transjordanië uitgebrei. Karak, die hoofstad van sy naamgenoot sanjak, was die belangrikste stad in die gebied en die jurisdiksie van sy goewerneur het oor die grootste deel van die sittende Transjordanië gestrek. Die plaaslike bevolking het toegeneem toe Circassiese vlugtelinge uit die Russies-besette Kaukasus deur die Ottomane aangemoedig is (in 1861 en ndash64, en later na die Turks-Russiese oorlog van 1877 en ndash78) om na Palestina en Transjordanië te migreer. In laasgenoemde vestig hulle hulle in en om Amman, Zarqa en Jarash.

Die 19de eeu was ook 'n toenemende Europese belangstelling in Transjordanië, veral om argeologiese en historiese redes, en Burckhardt ontdek in 1812 Petra en in 1806 ontdek Seetzen Jarash. In die tweede helfte van die 19de eeu het die belang van die Palestina Exploration Fund sowel as van Christelike kerke en missies in Transjordanië onder meer die ontdekking van die Mesha -stele en die Madaba -mosaïekkaart opgelewer. In 1900 en ndash08 het die Ottomane die Hijazi -spoorlyn van Damaskus na Medina gebou. Ongeveer een derde van die 1 200 km. Die lyn het deur Transjordanië geloop en dit nader aan die administratiewe sentrums van Damaskus en Istanbul gebring, maar het ook verskeie rebellies in Karak veroorsaak.

Sien die moderne tydperk na 1914, ook Jordanië.

BIBLIOGRAFIE:

G. Schumacher, Oorkant die Jordaan (1886) idem, Karte des Ostjordanlandes (1908) A. Musil, Arabië Petraea (1907) R.E. Bruennow en A. Domaszewski, Provinsië Arabië, 3 vols. (1904 & ndash09) C. Sternagel, Der Adschlun (1927) H. Rhotert, Transjordanië (1938) N. Glueck, Die ander kant van die Jordaan (1940) idem, Verkennings in Oos -Palestina, 4 vols. (1934 & ndash51) A. Konikoff, Transjordanië (1946) L. Harding, Die oudhede van Jordanië (1959). VOEG TOE. BIBLIOGRAFIE: N. Lewis, Nomades en setlaars in Sirië en Jordanië (1987) R.S. AbuJaber, Pioniers oor Jordanië: The Frontier Settlement in Transjordan 1850 & ndash 1914 (1989) E. Rogan, Staatsgrense in die Laat Ottomaanse Ryk: Transjordanië 1850 & ndash 1921 (1999).

[Michael Avi-Yonah / Joseph Nevo (2de uitg.)]

Bron: Encyclopaedia Judaica. & kopie 2008 The Gale Group. Alle regte voorbehou.


Is die Hashemitiese konings van Irak en Transjordanië as vreemd beskou? - Geskiedenis

227. Dept het geen spesifieke kommentaar in gedagte wat u in gesprek met koning Abdullah kan lewer nie (Embtel 241 8 Junie 1), maar stel voor dat u ons algemene belangstelling in vooruitgang beklemtoon Arabiese samewerking ten behoewe van die algemene welstand en spreek hoop uit dat daar geen verswakkende stabiliteit in die Nabye Ooste mag plaasvind nie deur moontlike mislukking, onderhou en ontwikkel wedersydse vertroue voldoende onder die Arabiese state in hul betrekkinge met mekaar. U kan die geleentheid gebruik om informeel ons kommer uit te spreek oor die voortdurende onenigheid Groter Sirie -roering op die Arabiese wêreld.

Die rigting en doel van die onlangse Irak-Trans-Jordaan-, Turco-Irak- en Turco-Transjordanse-verdragte is beslis van belang en is vir ons kommerwekkend. As verdrae werklik weerspieël hoe hoë beleid wegbeweeg van die [Arabiese Liga] wat deur twee Hashimitiese heersers begin is met of sonder Britse goedkeuring of aanmoediging, behoort ons ten volle kennis te hê van ons beleid. Dit sal veral nuttig wees as u die besoek van Abdullah en die verwagte ratifikasie van die Turko-Irak-verdrag in die Senaat kan gebruik as geleenthede in gesprekke met Abdullah, Nuri 2 en ander om die ware motiewe agter hierdie bewegings vas te stel. 3


'N Eeu van Westerse inmenging in die Midde -Ooste: 'n agtergrond

Verlede week het die minister van buitelandse sake, Mike Pompeo, Egipte besoek en 'n toespraak gehou by die Amerikaanse universiteit in Kaïro. Sekretaris Pompeo het president Obama se buitelandse beleid in die streek gekritiseer deur te verwys na sy beroemde toespraak, ''n nuwe begin', wat in Kaïro gehou is nadat hy die president geword het in 2009. Hy het Obama die skuld gegee dat die Amerikaanse teenwoordigheid in die streek teruggetrek het en gesê: 'Amerika is 'n sterkte in die Midde -Ooste. Tydperk. […] As Amerika terugtrek, volg chaos. As ons ons vriende verwaarloos, bou wrok op. As ons met vyande saamwerk, vorder hulle. ”

Twee vrae ontstaan ​​uit die toespraak: Is Westerse betrokkenheid ten goede in die Midde -Ooste? Dien Westerse betrokkenheid in die streek die belange van die Westerse lande? 'N Kort oorsig van die Europese en Amerikaanse teenwoordigheid in die Midde -Ooste toon aan dat die Westerse state saam met die elite in die streek gewerk het sonder om baie aandag te skenk aan wat die massa gedink of gevoel het oor hul betrokkenheid. Hierdie verhouding wat die gewilde gevoelens verwaarloos het, het groot terugslae tot gevolg gehad. As gevolg hiervan het die Westerse moondhede teruggetrek en op lang termyn legitimiteit verloor.

Die Europese teenwoordigheid in die Midde -Ooste bereik sy hoogtepunt na die verbrokkeling van die Ottomaanse Ryk wat die Asiatiese lande van die Midde -Ooste in die hande van Brittanje en Frankryk gelê het. Aan die begin van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog was die grootste deel van Noord -Afrika reeds onder Europese beheer. Tydens die oorlog het Brittanje Sharif Hussein, die Hashemitiese emir van Mekka en 'n afstammeling van die profeet Mohammed, belowe om die koning van die Arabiese lande te word, op voorwaarde dat hy in opstand kom teen die Ottomaanse Ryk. Intussen het Brittanje en Frankryk 'n geheime ooreenkoms onderteken-die Sykes-Picot-ooreenkoms-wat hul invloedsfere in die Midde-Ooste in die naoorlogse era spesifiseer. Brittanje het ook tydens die oorlog 'n Joodse tuisland in Palestina aan die Sionistiese beweging belowe. Hussein het in opstand gekom teen die Ottomaanse Ryk, maar sy droom om die koning van die Arabiere in Sirië, Palestina, Irak en Hijaz te word, is nog nooit verwesenlik nie.

Na die oorlog het Frankryk mandaatregimes in Libanon en Sirië ingestel terwyl Brittanje beheer oor die mandate van Irak, Transjordanië en Palestina oorgeneem het. Frankryk verdeel Libanon en Sirië in kleiner state en regeer deur sy verteenwoordigers. Brittanje stel Sharif Hussein se twee seuns as konings in Irak en Transjordanië. Hussein het self die koning van Hijaz geword, maar vanweë sy toenemende wrok teen Brittanje het die Britse leiers steeds toegegaan toe Saoedi's die Hijaz -gebied in 1924 binnegeval het. Na die Saoedi -inval verlaat Hussein Mekka en die Saoedi's neem spoedig beheer oor die hele Hijaz -streek . Brittanje het die mandaat van Palestina beheer deur 'n verhouding met prominente Joodse groepe en Palestynse gesinne.

Alhoewel die Europese moondhede in die nasleep van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog beheer oor die Midde -Ooste oorgeneem het, het hul invloed mettertyd verdwyn en het hul koloniale ervaring in die Midde -Ooste 'n aanspreeklikheid geword. Die transaksies wat die Europeërs met prominente plaaslike elite gemaak het, het sterk anti-Westerse en populistiese nasionalistiese bewegings op plekke soos Sirië, Irak en Egipte ontlok. Die byna onvoorwaardelike steun van die Weste, veral die VSA, aan Israel het 'n gerieflike hulpmiddel geword vir idees en groepe teen die Weste om lede te werf. Die swaar inmenging van die VSA in Iran het een van die sterkste bronne van anti-Westernisme in die streek veroorsaak.

In Sirië het die Franse mandaat tot die einde van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog voortgeduur. Tussen 1946 en 1970 het die nalatenskap van die Franse koloniale bewind die Siriese politiek in die skadu gestel. Sirië het 'n slagveld geword van verskeie mededingende faksies wat ontstaan ​​het as gevolg van die administratiewe afdelings van die Franse mandaatregering. As gevolg hiervan het Sirië 'n lang tydperk van onstabiliteit beleef met gereelde militêre staatsgrepe. Met die oog op groepsbelange en verskille, wat al die strydende partye verenig het, was 'n beroep op 'n populistiese weergawe van Arabiese nasionalisme wat na vore gekom het as 'n reaksie op die Europese inmenging. Die laaste militêre staatsgreep wat Hafez Asad in 1970 uitgevoer het, het tot 2011 relatiewe stabiliteit tot gevolg gehad met duisende sterftes en 'n onderdrukkende polisiestaat. Hafez Asad en sy seun Bashar Asad, wat aan bewind gekom het ná sy pa se dood in 2000, het in die grootste deel van hul bewind in Sirië met anti-Westerse beleid verbind.


WI: oorleef al die Hashemitiese koninkryke?

Gegewe die manier waarop die twee Ba'athistiese regerings oor die weg kom, sal verskeie Hashemiete moontlik nie beter doen nie.

Keiser Konstantyn

Wel, in die eerste plek is dit 'Hashemite', nie waar nie?

Gegewe die manier waarop die twee Ba'athistiese regerings oor die weg kom, sal verskeie Hashemiete moontlik nie beter doen nie.

Keiser Konstantyn

Clandango

Paul V McNutt

Anderman

Napoleonrules

Ek twyfel opreg dat Hussein die enigste rede is waarom die oorlog tussen Irak en Iran begin het. grensgeskille en oliereserwes en godsdienstige verskille (Sjiïties en Soenniete) en kulturele en taalkundige verskille sal nog steeds bestaan ​​en sal bykans almal tot oorlog bydra. Die Revolusie het meer te doen gehad met Westerse invloede en die terugslag daarteen.

Dit lyk asof ons ook vergeet dat Jordanië 'n Hashemitiese koninkryk is (dit maak nie saak hoe u dit in Engels translitereer nie). ek en my neefs sit & quot) oorloë uitskakel of ontmoedig nie. U kan 'n koning van Hejaz sien, as hy die Saud -familie verslaan, uiteindelik die kalief -titel met die ondersteuning van neefs op baie van die ander trone probeer neem, aangesien die Hashemitiese Hejaz -konings van Mohammad self afstam.

Cregan

Ek dink ons ​​ignoreer die Israeliese olifant in die kamer.

Hoe verloop die Arabies-Israeliese konflik met die Hashemitiese vorste in Sirië, Irak, Jordanië en Arabië?

Isfendil

Blackfox5

'N Oorlewende Hashemitiese monargie in Irak beteken ook dat Irak waarskynlik nooit die Bagdad -verdrag verlaat nie. Irak bly 'n konserwatiewe monargie soos Jordanië en is relatief pro-Westers. Aangesien Iran ook 'n lid van die verdrag is, is Iran en Irak bondgenote.

As daar ook 'n Hashemite Kingdom of the Hedjaz is, dan verander baie dinge. U het nie die Wahhabiste in beheer van die heilige stede nie (hoewel hulle waarskynlik steeds in beheer sal wees van die olieryke streke in die ooste van Arabië). Hulle sal waarskynlik die Hashemitiese beleid van Jordanië en Irak volg (miskien selfs by die Bagdad -verdrag aansluit).

As ons aanvaar dat hulle aan die bewind bly (wat moeilik, maar nie onmoontlik is nie - ons het Jordanië as 'n land wat die naald suksesvol gryp, selfs al is OTL Irak 'n voorbeeld van 'n mislukking), verander dit die Midde -Ooste drasties. Die streek is meer pro-Westers. Dit sal egter moeilik wees om die Kommuniste, Ba'athiste en Nasseriete te weerhou. Baie hang af van wat in Irak gebeur, en of dit oorgaan in 'n pro-Westerse diktatuur, of as 'n vorm van parlementêre bewind voortbestaan.

In 1958 het Jordanië en Irak 'n kort Arabiese Federasie gevorm wat by die twee Hashemitiese monargieë saamgevoeg het. Dit is gedoen as 'n reaksie op die Verenigde Arabiese Republiek onder Nasser. Die Arabiese Federasie het die buitelandse beleid en verdediging van elke land verenig, maar die oorgrote meerderheid ander binnelandse programme onder nasionale jurisdiksie gelaat. Dit het die staatsgreep van 1958 in Irak nie oorleef nie en het dus slegs 'n halfjaar geduur. ITTL as die monargie voortbestaan, gaan die Arabiese Federasie voort. Dit sluit waarskynlik ook die Koninkryk van die Hedjaz in.

It would be very interesting to see how/if the Arab Federation survives. With Baghdad, it controls one of the more important Arab capitals. It will also have guardianship of the holy cities. Iraqi oil also potentially offers some benefits for Jordan and Hedjaz, although Iraq will need to be careful not to alienate domestic opinion. Since the rulers of the three kingdoms share blood ties, it conceivably has a better chance of survival than the UAR.

In such a scenario, I think this puts a lot of constraint on Israel. It possibly puts Jordan into a more anti-Israeli position. It also makes Israel much less likely to antagonize Jordan which is part of the larger Arab Federation. The West Bank (and even East Jerusalem) might very well never belong to Israel. And even if there is a war scenario and Israel occupies it, the chances of a Hashemite-Israeli peace deal is much greater. The Palestinians will never have a chance for a state of their own, and they'll have to tolerate being part of a greater Hashemite kingdom. The PLO likely never achieves the status it does IOTL which also means their terrorist attacks never occur. I don't see anything like the murder at the Munich Olympics ever happening. And if the PLO never goes to Lebanon, then that has lots of potentially beneficial butterflies for Lebanon.

Deleted member 94680

I may be mis-remembering, but didn't the Hashemites get the throne of Iraq after they lost the throne of Syria? Didn't the British throne them a bone after the French kicked them out of their Mandates?

Didn't all of this come about after they lost Hejaz anyway? If they kept that, wouldn't they have no reason to be in power in Syria and Iraq?

Some Bloke

Dathi THorfinnsson

Simon

Keiser Konstantyn

I sincerely doubt that Hussein is the only reason the Iraq-Iran War began. boundary disputes and oil reserves and religious differences (Shi'ite and Sunni) and cultural and linguistic differences will still exist and will almost certainly all add up to war. The Revolution had more to do with Western influences and the backlash against it.

We also seem to be forgetting that Jordan is a Hashemite kingdom (no matter how you transliterate it in English, it doesn't really matter!) We saw in the early 1900s with WWI that related monarchs (despite the view "the war will end when my cousins and I sit down") does not eliminate or discourage wars. You could see a King of Hejaz, if he defeats the Saud family, eventually try to take the Caliph title with the support of cousins on many of the other thrones, as the Hashemite Hejaz kings are descended from Mohammad himself.

For Iran/Iraq, hard to say. The underlining tensions already existed true, but there's a difference between tension and out and out war. After all both were technically allied by the Baghdad pact. It also depends on Iran. With a POD in 1920 there's no guarantee that an Iranian revolution would occur, nor that it would result in an aggressive Theocratic state. Hell the POD was before the Pahlavis even came to power, so we could end up seeing a Qajar Iran (near ASB I know but within the realm of possibility).

To Jordan and WWI, there's a difference between cousins and brothers going to war with each other. Not to mention they were all of the same family line. We never saw real tension between Jordan and Iraq during the latter's time as a Kingdom, so no reason to think that the same stable situation wouldn't exist TTL. As to the Caliphate, hard to say. OTL King Huessin's proclamation of his Caliphate met mixed reception and didn't stop his Kingdom's destruction by the Saudis. However, if the core middle east is entirely ruled de-jure by his sons, then such a proclamation could very much end differently. Of course its hard to guess how long the Hejaz would last if the Sultanate of Najd remains under the Saudis. I can't see the British backing a Hashemite campaign to drive the Saudis out as it would give to much power to one family without a counterbalance.

I think we're ignoring the Israeli elephant in the room.

How does the Arab-Israeli conflict go with Hashemite monarchs in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Arabia?

Really hard to say. Again with a POD in 1920 we might not even see a State of Israel be created in the first place or it could be quite different than OTL. However, from what I remember the Jordanians were the most moderate towards the Israeli state, so that could be repeated among the other Hashemite Monarchies. Or a more unified Arab League could see a quite different end to the 1948 war. But I don't know much about Israel-Arab relations during that era so someone more knowledgeable than I can probably speculate better.

A surviving Hashemite monarchy in Iraq also means that Iraq probably never leaves the Baghdad Pact. Iraq remains a conservative monarchy like Jordan and is relatively pro-Western. Since Iran is also a member of the Pact, Iran and Iraq are allies.

If there is also a Hashemite Kingdom of the Hedjaz, then lots of things change. You don't have the Wahhabists in charge of the holy cities (although likely they will still be in control of the oil rich regions in the east of Arabia). They would likely follow Hashemite policy of Jordan and Iraq (maybe even also joining the Baghdad Pact).

Assuming they stay in power (which is difficult, but not impossible - we have Jordan as a country which successfully thread the needle even as OTL Iraq is an example of failure to do so), this drastically alters the Middle East. The region is more pro-Western. However, it will have difficulty holding off the Communists, Ba'athists, and Nasserites. Much depends on what happens in Iraq, and if it devolves into a pro-Western dictatorship, or if some form of parliamentary rule survives.

In 1958, Jordan and Iraq formed a brief Arab Federation which joined the two Hashemite monarchies together. It was done as a response to the United Arab Republic under Nasser. The Arab Federation united foreign policy and defense of each country but left the vast majority of other domestic programs under national jurisdiction. It didn't survive the 1958 coup in Iraq and therefore only lasted half a year. ITTL if the monarchy survives, then the Arab Federation continues. It also likely includes the Kingdom of the Hedjaz.

It would be very interesting to see how/if the Arab Federation survives. With Baghdad, it controls one of the more important Arab capitals. It will also have guardianship of the holy cities. Iraqi oil also potentially offers some benefits for Jordan and Hedjaz, although Iraq will need to be careful not to alienate domestic opinion. Since the rulers of the three kingdoms share blood ties, it conceivably has a better chance of survival than the UAR.

In such a scenario, I think this puts a lot of constraint on Israel. It possibly puts Jordan into a more anti-Israeli position. It also makes Israel much less likely to antagonize Jordan which is part of the larger Arab Federation. The West Bank (and even East Jerusalem) might very well never belong to Israel. And even if there is a war scenario and Israel occupies it, the chances of a Hashemite-Israeli peace deal is much greater. The Palestinians will never have a chance for a state of their own, and they'll have to tolerate being part of a greater Hashemite kingdom. The PLO likely never achieves the status it does IOTL which also means their terrorist attacks never occur. I don't see anything like the murder at the Munich Olympics ever happening. And if the PLO never goes to Lebanon, then that has lots of potentially beneficial butterflies for Lebanon.

Thanks for the detailed response. First off, not to sure about the Saudis. From what I've read about Ibn Saud he seems like an all or nothing type of guy. Would it be possible for the Hejaz to crush the Saudi state and form their own version of Saudi Arabia? If not then I think we'd see multiple wars between the peninsula's two native powers.

To what Iraq would look like, hard to say. I'd guess it would depend on how long Nur al-Said remains in power. Under his premiership the Parliament was a rubber stamp assembly, so once he's out the Iraqi government could begin to transition into a more democratic or at least parliamentary state. Although either way the Monarchy would retain a large amount of power, though how its used would depend on Faisal II (we don't know much about him).

Second, considering the ambitions of Hussein ibn Ali which seemed to be shared by his sons, I could see a TTL version of the Arab Federation form earlier, like say the forties. Maybe in place of the Arab League. So assuming the Hashemites form an Arabian Kingdom, we'd have all the territory between Egypt and Iran under a single polity. Considering the oil wealth of these states OTL it would potentially form a middle power, rivaling the West and the East.

Third, at this point would Israel even be in the cards? I mean if the Arab League/Federation is more unified we could see the TTL 1948 war end the Jewish state before it properly begins. Although, at the very least Israel would remain in its UN borders while the rest of Palestine goes to either Jordan (if it exists here) or to Syria. Would Lebanon still end up as an independent nation here or would it be a state/province of Syria?

I may be mis-remembering, but didn't the Hashemites get the throne of Iraq after they lost the throne of Syria? Didn't the British throne them a bone after the French kicked them out of their Mandates?

Didn't all of this come about after they lost Hejaz anyway? If they kept that, wouldn't they have no reason to be in power in Syria and Iraq?

Yes and no. The initially Iraq was to Faisal's brother Abdullah in March 1920 but he declined (not sure why). Later after Faisal was deposed he was suggested as a candidate for the Iraqi throne and accepted.

As to why, Hejaz had the holy cities but not much else. Iraq and Syria were two of the wealthiest countries in the Middle east and sat on strategic territories. Why limit your family to one throne when it can have three or even four?

OTL there was a lot of musical thrones in 1920-1921. Originally Faisal was to be King of Greater Syria, which was modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Abdullah was designated as King of Iraq at the 1920 Cairo conference but never formally ascended the throne. After the Syrian Kingdom was dissolved by the French Faisal went into exile in London and was later made King of Iraq in 1921 because of his apparent conciliatory attitude towards the Great Powers and based on advice from T. E. Lawrence, more commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia. In turn Abdullah was made the Emir of Transjordan, another of Britain's Mandate territories, later becoming today's Jordan.

So if Faisal keeps Syria then Abdullah becomes King of Iraq (the offer preceding the fall of Arab Syria). Then the only Hashemite Prince lacking a throne is Prince Zeid, OTL's later Pretender of Iraq. And even then he could end up as King of Palestine, at least potentially.


“The Human Being Is Our Most Precious Asset”

On 2 May 1953, His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal received constitutional powers amidst a delicate phase in Arab and international history. His Majesty was able to achieve the highest levels of civil and political development, becoming the builder of a moderate Jordan and securing a decent life for his people, in terms of advancement in the fields of public services, education and science. Jordan also continued to play its Arab and regional role ably and effectively

Throughout 47 years of His Majesty’s leadership, Jordan achieved tangible progress in all fields, especially economically, socially and politically. His Majesty coined the saying “The human being is our most precious asset,” as the cornerstone of development plans, with a focus on ensuring that their gains benefit all regions and all segments of society.

In continuation of a never-ending Hashemite journey of giving, King Hussein’s son, His Majesty King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, took on the mantle by assuming constitutional powers on 7 February 1999.


1921-1933 - British Mandate

At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolution they chose Faisal as Iraq's first King they established an indigenous Iraqi army and they proposed a new treaty. To confirm Faisal as Iraq's first monarch, a one-question plebiscite was carefully arranged that had a return of 96 percent in his favor. The British saw in Faisal a leader who possessed sufficient nationalist and Islamic credentials to have broad appeal, but who also was vulnerable enough to remain dependent on their support. Faisal traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad, and his ancestors had held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the tenth century. The British believed that these credentials would satisfy traditional Arab standards of political legitimacy moreover, the British thought that Faisal would be accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement because of his role in the 1916 revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leadership qualities.

As a counterforce to the nationalistic inclinations of the monarchy and as a means of insuring the king's dependence, the British cultivated the tribal shaykhs, whose power had been waning since the end of the nineteenth century. While the new king sought to create a national consciousness, to strengthen the institutions of the emerging state, and especially to create a national military, the tribal shaykhs supported a fragmented community and sought to weaken the coercive power of the state. A major goal of the British policy was to keep the monarchy stronger than any one tribe but weaker than a coalition of tribes so that British power would ultimately be decisive in arbitrating disputes between the two.

Ultimately, the British-created monarchy suffered from a chronic legitimacy crisis: the concept of a monarchy was alien to Iraq. Despite his Islamic and pan-Arab credentials, Faisal was not an Iraqi, and, no matter how effectively he ruled, Iraqis saw the monarchy as a British creation. The continuing inability of the government to gain the confidence of the people fueled political instability well into the 1970s.

The British decision at the Cairo Conference to establish an indigenous Iraqi army was significant. In Iraq, as in most of the developing world, the military establishment has been the best organized institution in an otherwise weak political system. Thus, while Iraq's body politic crumbled under immense political and economic pressure throughout the monarchic period, the military gained increasing power and influence moreover, because the officers in the new army were by necessity Sunnis who had served under the Ottomans, while the lower ranks were predominantly filled by Shia tribal elements, Sunni dominance in the military was preserved.

The final major decision taken at the Cairo Conference related to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Faisal was under pressure from the nationalists and the anti-British mujtahids of An Najaf and Karbala to limit both British influence in Iraq and the duration of the treaty. Recognizing that the monarchy depended on British support--and wishing to avoid a repetition of his experience in Syria--Faisal maintained a moderate approach in dealing with Britain. The twenty-year treaty, which was ratified in October 1922, stated that the king would heed British advice on all matters affecting British interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq was in debt to Britain, and that British officials would be appointed to specified posts in eighteen departments to act as advisers and inspectors. A subsequent financial agreement, which significantly increased the financial burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of supporting British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations under the new treaty included providing various kinds of aid, notably military assistance, and proposing Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty ensured that Iraq would remain politically and economically dependent on Britain. While unable to prevent the treaty, Faisal clearly felt that the British had gone back on their promises to him.

After the treaty had been signed, Iraq readied itself for the country-wide elections that had been provided for in the May 1922 Electoral Law. There were important changes in the government at this time. Cox resigned his position as high commissioner and was replaced by Sir Henry Dobbs Iraq's aging prime minister, Abd ar Rahman al Gailani, stepped down and was replaced by Abd al Muhsin as Saadun. In April 1923, Saadun signed a protocol that shortened the treaty period to four years. As a result of the elections, however, Saadun was replaced by Jafar al Askari, a veteran of the Arab Revolt and an early supporter of Faisal.

The elected Constituent Assembly met for the first time in March 1924, and it formally ratified the treaty despite strong (and sometimes physical) opposition on the part of many in the assembly. The assembly also accepted the Organic Law that declared Iraq to be a sovereign state with a representative system of government and a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The newly ratified constitution-- which, along with the treaty, had been hotly debated--legislated an important British role in Iraqi affairs. The major issue at stake in the constitutional debate revolved around the powers of the monarchy. In the final draft, British interests prevailed, and the monarchy was granted wide-ranging powers that included the right to confirm all laws, to call for a general election, to prorogue parliament, and to issue ordinances for the fulfillment of treaty obligations without parliamentary sanctions. Like the treaty, the constitution provided the British with a means of indirect control in Iraq.

After the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was ratified, the most pressing issue confronting the newly established constitutional monarchy was the question of boundaries, especially in the former Ottoman wilayah of Mosul, now known as Mosul Province. The status of Mosul Province was complicated by two factors, the British desire to gain oil concessions and the existence of a majority Kurdish population that was seeking independence apart from either Iraq or Turkey. According to the Treaty of Sevres, concluded in 1920 with the Ottoman Sultan, Mosul was to be part of an autonomous Kurdish state. The treaty was scrapped, however, when nationalist leader Mustafa Kamal (1881-1938--also known as Atat rk) came to power in Turkey and established control over the Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey. In 1923, after two failed British attempts to establish an autonomous Kurdish province, London decided to include the Kurds in the new Iraqi state with the proviso that Kurds would hold government positions in Kurdish areas and that the Kurdish language would be preserved. The British decision to include Mosul in Iraq was based largely on their belief that the area contained large oil deposits.

Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British- controlled Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) had held concessionary rights to the Mosul wilayah. Under the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement--an agreement in 1916 between Britain and France that delineated future control of the Middle East--the area would have fallen under French influence. In 1919, however, the French relinquished their claims to Mosul under the terms of the Long- Berenger Agreement. The 1919 agreement granted the French a 25 percent share in the TPC as compensation. Beginning in 1923, British and Iraqi negotiators held acrimonious discussions over the new oil concession. The major obstacle was Iraq's insistence on a 20 percent equity participation in the company this figure had been included in the original TPC concession to the Turks and had been agreed upon at San Remo for the Iraqis. In the end, despite strong nationalist sentiments against the concession agreement, the Iraqi negotiators acquiesced to it. The League of Nations was soon to vote on the disposition of Mosul, and the Iraqis feared that, without British support, Iraq would lose the area to Turkey. In March 1925, an agreement was concluded that contained none of the Iraqi demands. The TPC, now renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), was granted a concession for a period of seventy-five years.

In 1925 the League of Nations decided that Mosul Province would be considered a part of Iraq, but it also suggested that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be extended from four to twenty-five years as a protection for the Kurdish minority, who intensely distrusted the Iraqi government. The Iraqis also were to give due regard to Kurdish sensibilities in matters of culture and of language. Although reluctant to do so, the Iraqi assembly ratified the treaty in January 1926. Turkey was eventually reconciled to the loss by being promised one-tenth of any oil revenues that might accrue in the area, and a tripartite Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty was signed in July 1926. This settlement was to have important repercussions, both positive and negative, for the future of Iraq. Vast oil revenues would accrue from the Mosul Province, but the inclusion of a large number of well-armed and restless Kurds in Iraqi territory would continue to plague Iraqi governments.

With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the settling of the Mosul question, Iraqi politics took on a new dynamic. The emerging class of Sunni and Shia landowning tribal shaykhs vied for positions of power with wealthy and prestigious urban-based Sunni families and with Ottoman-trained army officers and bureaucrats. Because Iraq's newly established political institutions were the creation of a foreign power, and because the concept of democratic government had no precedent in Iraqi history, the politicians in Baghdad lacked legitimacy and never developed deeply rooted constituencies. Thus, despite a constitution and an elected assembly, Iraqi politics was more a shifting alliance of important personalities and cliques than a democracy in the Western sense. The absence of broadly based political institutions inhibited the early nationalist movement's ability to make deep inroads into Iraq's diverse social structure. Thus, despite the widely felt resentment at Iraq's mandate status, the burgeoning nationalist movement was largely ineffective.

Nonetheless, through the late 1920s, the nationalists persisted in opposing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and in demanding independence. A treaty more favorable to the Iraqis was presented in December 1927. It remained unratified, however, because of nationalist demands for an unconditional promise of independence. This promise eventually was made by the new high commissioner, Sir Gilbert Clayton, in 1929, but the confusion occasioned by the sudden death of Clayton and by the suicide of Abd al Muhsin as Saadun, the most powerful Iraqi advocate of the treaty, delayed the writing of a new treaty. In June 1929, the nationalists received their first positive response from London when a newly elected Labour Party government announced its intention to support Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932 and to negotiate a new treaty recognizing Iraq's independence.

Faisal's closest adviser (and soon-to-be Iraqi strongman), Nuri as Said, carried out the treaty negotiations. Despite widespread opposition, Nuri as Said was able to force the treaty through parliament. The new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930. It provided for a "close alliance," for "full and frank consultations between the two countries in all matters of foreign policy," and for mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted the British the use of air bases near Basra and at Al Habbaniyah and the right to move troops across the country. The treaty, of twenty-five years' duration, was to come into force upon Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. The terms of the treaty gained Nuri as Said favor in British eyes but discredited him in the eyes of the Iraqi nationalists, who vehemently opposed its lengthy duration and the leasing of air bases. The Kurds and the Assyrians also opposed the treaty because it offered no guarantees for their status in the new country.


Rule Under Saddam

In July 1979, Bakr resigned, and his chosen successor, Saddam Hussein, assumed the offices of both President and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. He was the de facto ruler of Iraq for some years before he formally came to power.

Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), eventually devastating the economy. Iraq declared victory in 1988 but actually achieved a weary return to the status quo ante bellum. The war left Iraq with the largest military establishment in the Persian Gulf region but with huge debts and an ongoing rebellion by Kurdish elements in the northern mountains. The government suppressed the rebellion by using weapons on civilian targets, including a mass chemical weapons attack on the city of Halabja that killed several thousand civilians. The Iraqi government continued to be supported by the US, which continued sending arms shipments.

Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction culminated in the '70s with "Osirak", the French built nuclear reactor in Iraq. In 1981, the reactor was destroyed by Israeli Air-Force jets. Saddam reacted by executing Iraqi generals in charge of defense. Israel claimed it acted to protect itself from threat of mass murder, but the action was internationally condemned as aggressive. However, in hind sight, following the Persian Gulf War this action might be viewed a prescient intervention, to prevent Iraq from developing a nuclear military capability - a capability which would have most likely deterred the UN intervention in defence of Kuwait.

Invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War

A long-standing territorial dispute led to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Iraq accused Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border to secure oil resources, and demanded that its debt repayments should be waived. Direct negotiations began in July 1990, but they soon failed. Saddam Hussein had an emergency meeting with April Glaspie, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, on July 25, 1990, airing his concerns but stating his intention to continue talks. April Glaspie informed Saddam that the United States had no interest in Iraq/Kuwait border disputes.

Arab mediators convinced Iraq and Kuwait to negotiate their differences in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on 1 August 1990, but that session resulted only in charges and counter-charges. A second session was scheduled to take place in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, but Iraq invaded Kuwait the next day. Iraqi troops overran the country shortly after midnight on August 2, 1990. The United Nations Security Council and the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion. Four days later, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Iraq that prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq.

Iraq responded to the sanctions by annexing Kuwait as the "19th Province" of Iraq on 8 August, prompting the exiled Sabah family to call for a stronger international response. Over the ensuing months, the United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and implementing total mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. Other countries subsequently provided support for "Operation Desert Shield". In November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678, permitting member states to use all necessary means, authorising military action against the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, and demanded a complete withdrawal by January 15 1991.

When Saddam Hussein failed to comply with this demand, the Persian Gulf War (Operation "Desert Storm") ensued on the 17th of January 1991 (3 a.m. Iraq time), with allied troops of 28 countries, led by the US launching an aerial bombardment on Baghdad. The war, which proved disastrous for Iraq, lasted only six weeks, one hundred and forty thousand tons of munitions had showered down on the country, the equivalent of 7 Hiroshima bombs. Probably as many as 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians were killed.

Allied air raids destroyed roads, bridges, factories, and oil-industry facilities (shutting down the national refining and distribution system) and disrupted electric, telephone, and water service. Conference centres and shopping and residential areas were hit. Hundreds of Iraqis were killed in the attack on the Al-Amiriyah bomb shelter. Diseases spread through contaminated drinking water because water purification and sewage treatment facilities could not operate without electricity.

A cease-fire was announced by the US on 28 February 1991. UN Secretary-General Javier P rez de Cu llar met with Saddam Hussein to discuss the Security Council timetable for the withdraw of troops from Kuwait. Iraq agreed to UN terms for a permanent cease-fire in April 1991, and strict conditions were imposed, demanding the disclosure and destruction of all stockpiles of weapons.

Iraq under UN Sanction

On August 6 1990 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 661 which imposed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq, providing for a full trade embargo, excluding medical supplies, food and other items of humanitarian necessity, these to be determined by the Security Council sanctions committee. After End of war Iraqi sanctions were linked to removal of Weapons of mass destruction by Resolution 687[1] (http://www.mideastweb.org/687.htm) .Iraq was later allowed under the UN Oil-for-Food program (Resolution 986) to export $5.2 billion (USD) of oil every 6 months with which to purchase these items to sustain the civilian population. According to UN estimates, a million children died during trade embargo, due to malnutrition or lack of medical supplies. 30% of the proceeds were redirected to a war reparations account.

The United States, in an attempt to prevent the genocide of the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq and the Kurds to the north, declared "air exclusion zones" north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel. The Clinton administration judged an alleged attempted assassination of former President George H. W. Bush while in Kuwait to be worthy of a military response on 27 June 1993. The Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad was targeted by 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched from US warships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Three missiles were declared to have missed the target, causing some collateral damage to nearby residential housing and eight civilian deaths.

In May 1995 Saddam sacked his half-brother, Wathban, as Interior Minister and in July demoted his notorious and powerful Defense Minister, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known popularly as "Chemical Ali" because of his role in gassing operations in Kurdistan. These personnel changes were the result of the growth in power of Saddam Hussein's two sons, Uday Hussein and Qusay Hussein, who were given effective vice-presidential authority in May 1995. They were able to remove most of Saddam's loyal followers and it seemed clear that Saddam felt more secure protected by his immediate family members. In August Major General Hussein Kamil Hassan al-Majid, his Minister of Military Industries and a key henchman, defected to Jordan, together with his wife (one of Saddam's daughters) and his brother, Saddam, who was married to another of the president's daughters both called for the overthrow of the Iraqi government. In response, Saddam promised full co-operation with the UN commission disarming Iraq (UNSCOM) in order to pre-empt any revelations that the defector could make.

The weakening of the internal position of the government occurred at a time when the external opposition forces were as weak as ever, too divided among themselves to take any effective action. At the same time, France and Russia pushed for an easing of sanctions. US determination to keep up the pressure on Iraq prevailed however. In any case, the apparent weakening of the government was illusory, not least when the two defectors returned home and were killed, apparently by other clan members, in a warning to other potential defectors. In fact, during 1996, the government's grip on power seemed to have significantly strengthened despite its inability to end the UN sanctions against it.

In December 1998, US President Bill Clinton authorized air strikes on government targets and military facilities. In response, Saddam expelled all UN inspectors and closed off the country. Intermittent air strikes against military facilities and alleged WMD sites continued into 2002.

2003 invasion of Iraq

Following talks with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in September 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush urged the United Nations to encourage Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to comply with UN resolutions or "actions will be unavoidable". Bush said that Saddam has repeatedly violated 16 UN Security Council resolutions, which include a call for Iraq to "disarm its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs". Iraqi officials rejected Bush's assertions (that were based on flawed intelligency reports, as it later emerged), and a team of U.N. inspectors lead by Swedish diplomat Hans Blix was admitted into the country their final report stated that Iraqis capability in producing "weapons of mass destruction" was not significantly different from 1992, when the country dismantled the bulk of their remaining arsenals under terms of the ceasefire agreement with U.N. forces. The United States and the United Kingdom opposed the team's requests for more time to further investigate the matter the U.N. Security Council hence refused to issue a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.

In March 2003 the United States and the United Kingdom, with some aid from other nations, invaded Iraq.


Circassian and Chechen minorities

17 The Circassians are a mosaic of peoples, languages and various socio-political organizations, grouped under the name Adyge, or “men”. In the late nineteenth century, the Russians drove them out of the north-west Caucasus towards the territories of the Ottoman Empire, which allocated land to them ( de Bel Air 2003). The first Circassians and Chechens were accepted by the Ottomans in Europe (Turkey and Bulgaria) and to a lesser extent in the Vilayet of Aleppo. Following the massacres carried out by Circassian mercenaries in Bulgaria in 1876, in February 1878 Circassians were sent by boat from Greece and Macedonia to the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus, via Beirut, Acre (to Nablus) and Tripoli (to Homs). Some arrived in Amman at that time. Overall, 25,000 Circassians settled in southern Syria and about 15,000 settled near Aleppo in 1878 ( Lewis 1987, p. 98). Many died of malaria and chickenpox, those who survived had to adapt their farming methods to the dry climate of the Middle East. The Ottoman government exempted them from tax and granted them access to miri land, which they defended fiercely against the Bedouins.

18 In Jordan, the Circassians were responsible for border control and for developing agriculture on the steppe, where they created many new agricultural zones. They were supported by the Ottoman authorities and joined the ranks of the army, they later joined the troops of Emir Abdullah the 1 st in the Transjordan Frontier Force and the Arab Legion. In the early 1920s, out of a total population of 300,000, there were only 7,000 Caucasians (6,000 Circassians and 1,000 Chechens).

19 The first Chechens settled in Transjordan from 1902 in Zarqa, they subsequently founded Ruseifa in 1904, and Suweileh and Sukhnah in 1905. In March 1906, European sources estimated the number of Circassians to be 1,949 families in Qunaytra, 2,250 families in Transjordan, 670 families near Homs, 550 families in the vilayet of Beirut (including the Sanjaks of Latakia and Acre) and a total of 25,000 people in the Vilayets of Damascus and Beirut. After the creation of the Kingdom of Jordan in 1949, Amman had 640 families (Shabsugh and Kabarday groups), Wadi al-Sir had 370, Zarqa 790, Jerash 400, Naur 170, Suweileh 120, Sukhna 20 and Azraq Shishan 20 ( Lewis 1987, p. 116).