Geskiedenis Podcasts

Word die geskiedenis in die algemeen as 'slegte' geskiedenis beskou?

Word die geskiedenis in die algemeen as 'slegte' geskiedenis beskou?

Ek is nuut in die geskiedenis, maar wat my opval, is dat mense in die veld dikwels kla dat 'n sekere teks te veel geskiedenis is. (Sien wikipedia vir 'n definisie.) Dit lyk regtig soos 'n kritiek of belediging vir die skrywer as hy van die geskiedenis beskuldig word. Is dit waar? Word die geskiedenis van die geskiedenis as 'n slegte geskiedenis beskou, of is daar skrywers wat trots is daarop om 'n geskiedenis te maak en dit eksplisiet te propageer?


Historiografies is die kyk van geskiedenis deur 'n progressiewe lens net so oor-veralgemeen as die kykgeskiedenis deur 'n konserwatiewe, marxistiese of Ayn Rand-lens.

Die term "Whig History" word egter gebruik as 'n beswadder. 'N Julle Olde Tory-kritiek op die geskiedenis wat in die toekoms inskakel, soos Kosmopolitisme, Tegnologiese Progressivisme of Post-Humanisme.

Die voorkoms en negatiwiteit van die term kan ook wetenskaplike frustrasie weerspieël oor die algemene gewildheid van die term "Ons is die beste en word beter" siening van die geskiedenis; en die idee dat suiwer "onbesoedelde" historici nie veronderstel is om kulturele relatiwiteit te gebruik of te weet nie (a/k/a History is Now).

Die belangrikste bekommernis moet wees of die geskiedenis deur 'n spesifieke lens gekyk word om sekere nuwe insigte uit te haal (goed) of om sekere teenstrydighede van die ondersteunende ideologie te begrawe (sleg).

'N Goeie skrywer sal gewoonlik sê watter lens hulle gebruik en waarom. As hulle dit gedoen het, het mense wat hulle as 'Whig Historians' aangedui het, dit bedoel as 'n belediging of as 'n gedagte-beëindigende cliche in plaas van 'n neutrale beskrywende term; as die term enige neutraliteit kan behou.

Die historiese kwaliteite van 'n werk* moet natuurlik op die gewone manier beoordeel word.

* Blameer fiksie -outeurs van 'Whig History' bedelaarsgeloof. Asof die leser of kritikus vergeet het in watter deel van die biblioteek hulle was. Of dat die meeste skrywers en lesers nie daarna streef om al die vreugde en hoop uit die verlede, hede en toekomstige gebeure te suig nie.


Die geskiedenisteorie, dat geskiedenis 'n lineêre vordering is tot volmaaktheid (in die algemeen) of 'n burgerlike liberale samelewing soos in die Verenigde Koninkryk (spesifiek) geïllustreer, kan maklik nie bewys word nie.

Die verhoudings tussen mense in wat nou Wes -Europa is, het byvoorbeeld gesink van wettige wederkerigheid tot gewapende geweld, terwyl Rome stadig in die Germaanse koninkryke verander het.

Byvoorbeeld, uit 'n staat met gekodifiseerde wette, het Mussolini se fascisme ontstaan ​​met sy sistematiese paralegaliteit.

Bo en behalwe hierdie kritiek, is die gegewe geskiedenis nie standvastig nie, aangesien dit aantoonbaar verkeerd is; die geskiedenis bevat die teoreties verdagte kategorie van 'vooruitgang', wat noodwendig ideologies van vorm is. Om as 'n transhistoriese (dws as die universele regverdiging van alle historiese prosesse) te beweer dat 'n bepaalde ideologiese uitkoms nie net teleologies is nie, dit is ook anachronisties: whiggery het nie gedurende 500 vC bestaan ​​nie.

Laastens gebruik sommige 'geskiedenis' om na enige teleologiese geskiedskrywing te verwys, soos byvoorbeeld Marx se teleos. Teleos in Marx is nie vasberade nie. In die besliste oorgang na feodalisme was daar geen verdere bepaling van kapitalisme of sosialisme nie. Die bourgeoisie was 'n newe -effek wat deur feodalisme voortgebring en weergegee is. Anders as whiggery wat 'n universele en vasberade projek postuleer; Marx se beskrywing van die geskiedenis se vorige bepaling is bloot 'n beskrywing.

Teleologie word dikwels as kritiek gebruik, maar dit het nie die mag om aan te dui dat iemand se geskiedenis 'n geskiedenis is nie. Daar is kringe waarin teleologiese geskiedenis nog aanvaarbaar is, solank die teleologie natuurlik gedemonstreer word. Daar is nie kringe waar ek die geskiedenis van die geskiedenis aanvaar het nie, maar dit herinner my wel daaraan om aan 'n vriend voor te stel dat 'n nie-historiese dissipline waarin hulle betrokke is, in die vuilheid van die geskiedenis van die spel speel.


Kom ons kyk na 1847's in spesifieke verband met Marx se teleologie (in verskillende stadiums) Armoede van die filosofie in hoofstuk 2:

M. Proudhon, die ekonoom, verstaan ​​baie goed dat mans lap-, linne- of symateriaal maak in definitiewe produksieverhoudings. Maar wat hy nie verstaan ​​het nie, is dat hierdie definitiewe sosiale verhoudings net soveel deur mense voortgebring word as linne, vlas, ens. Sosiale verhoudings is nou verbind met produktiewe kragte. By die verkryging van nuwe produktiewe kragte verander mans hul produksiemetode; en deur hul produksiemetode te verander, die manier waarop hulle hul bestaan ​​kan verander, verander hulle al hul sosiale verhoudings. Die handmeul gee u die samelewing met die feodale heer; die stoommeule, die samelewing met die industriële kapitalis.
Dieselfde mans wat hul sosiale verhoudings in ooreenstemming met die materiële produktiwiteit vestig, produseer ook beginsels, idees en kategorieë, in ooreenstemming met hul sosiale verhoudings.

Daar is 'n voortdurende beweging van groei in produktiewe kragte, van vernietiging in sosiale verhoudings, van vorming in idees; die enigste onveranderlike ding is die abstraksie van beweging - mors immortalis.

Marx se bepalende kategorie hier is baie naby aan 'n tegnologiese determinisme, en daar is 'n gevoel van teleos in die beweging van produksiekragte. Maar daar is geen aanduiding dat die handmeul kapitalisme produseer nie, net soos die stoommeule sosialisme produseer. Die handmeul produseer 'n nuwe voorbeeld van sosiale verhoudings waarvan die unieke karakter die volgende verander. Die samelewing van die handmeule kan nie industriële kapitalisme begryp nie, en dit het dit ook nie geproduseer nie. Afgesien van die universele van beweging, is daar geen vasberadenheid wat verband hou met genootskap A met genootskap B.

Die soort herfoutasie en massaslawerny wat Federici teëgekom het Caliban en die heks net so waarskynlik as vryloonarbeid wat verskyn in die stadige stryd van die Europese bourgeoisie met die aristokrasie. Ek veronderstel dat die Varieties of Capitalism -diskoers dit noukeuriger opvolg.

Ek sal egter saamstem dat Diamat, soos in die Sowjetunie geleer, en veral oor die geskiedenis, Marx geleer het as 'n universele weg van menslike sosiale verandering.


Die 10 ergste presidente in die geskiedenis van die Verenigde State

Vanweë sy vermeende mislukkings in die hantering van afdelings in die land wat die burgeroorlog veroorsaak het, word James Buchanan dikwels as die ergste Amerikaanse president beskou.

Gedurende sy geskiedenis het die Verenigde State 'n paar onvergeetlike staatshoofde gehad. Sommige word grotendeels as groot beskou, en ander as verskriklik, hoewel daar altyd 'n debat is oor die onderskeie verdienste en foute van elkeen. Deur na 'n aantal historiese meningspeilings en opnames oor openbare en kundige persepsies van die beste en slegste Amerikaanse presidente te kyk, het ons 'n lys saamgestel volgens die geweegde middele van hul saamgestelde ranglys. Ranglysteelsels is gewoonlik gebaseer op opnames van akademiese historici en politieke wetenskaplikes. Die ranglys fokus op presidensiële prestasies, leierseienskappe, mislukkings en foute.


13 redes waarom mense dink die nommer 13 is ongelukkig

Gelukkige Vrydag die 13de! Waarom word die nommer 13 in elk geval as ongelukkig beskou? Hier is 13 moontlike redes.

1. DAAR WAS 13 MENSE BY DIE LAASTE SUPER.

En die tradisie het geglo dat die 13de wat sit, óf Judas óf Jesus self was.

2. BAIE GLO OF DIE LAASTE SUPER OF DIE KRUISIGING OP DIE 13DE.

Een van die groot twispunte rondom die Laaste Avondmaal is of dit 'n paasmaaltyd was of nie. Johannes stel voor dat die maaltyd die dag voor die Pasga geëet is, wat geleer het dat sommige geleerdes die Laaste Avondmaal tot die 13de Nisan ('n maand op die Joodse kalender) dateer, terwyl ander sê dat die kruisiging self op die 13de van Nisan.

3. BYBELSE VERWYSINGS NA DIE NOMMER 13 IS NIE ALLES POSITIEF NIE.

Volgens historikus Vincent Foster Hopper was die 16de -eeuse numeroloog Petrus Bungus een van die mense wat 13 werklik as ongelukkig beskou het. Onder sy redes? Hopper sê dat Bungus "aanteken dat die Jode 13 keer teen God gemurmureer het tydens die uittog uit Egipte, dat die dertiende psalm handel oor goddeloosheid en korrupsie, dat die besnydenis van Israel in die dertiende jaar plaasgevind het."

4. TRADISIONELE WAS DAAR 13 STAPPE NA DIE GALLOWE.

Volgens gewilde kennis is daar 13 trappe wat na die galg lei. Galg het eintlik baie gewissel, maar selfs dan word die getal dikwels tot 13 verhoog. 'N Parkwagter by Fort Smith Historic Site het eenkeer gesê: "[Daar was] 13 trappe op die galg - 12 op en een af."

5. DIE MESSE -ARREST EN UITVOERING VAN DIE RIDDER -TEMPLAR BEGIN OP VRYDAG DIE 13DE.

Die Tempeliers, wat algemeen geglo het dat hulle die Heilige Graal (die beker wat Jesus tydens die Laaste Avondmaal gedrink het) sowel as ander heilige voorwerpe beskerm, het ook as 'n soort bank vir Europese konings opgetree. Maar nadat die Franse koning Filips IV 'n oorlog met Engeland verloor het en 'n groot skuld aan die ridders gestaan ​​het, het hy 'n sameswering met pous Clemens V gesluit om alle lede van die Tempeliers in hegtenis te neem, van satanisme en ander misdade aangekla en te vermoor. Die samevatting van die Tempeliers het op Vrydag, 13 Oktober 1307, ernstig begin.

6. VROUE MENSTRUATE ROUGHLY 13 KEER JAAR.

Sommige dui daarop dat die verband met 13 wat ongelukkig is, te wyte is aan vroue wat gewoonlik ongeveer 13 menstruele siklusse per jaar het (gebaseer op 'n sikluslengte van 28 dae).

7. 'N HEKSERSKOF HET 13 LEDE.

Alhoewel 'n verbond nou beskou word as 'n groep hekse (of vampiere, in sommige vertellings), is dit eens geglo dat 'n verbond bestaan ​​uit presies 13 lede.

8. 13 BRIEWE IN 'N NAAM BETEKEN DIE PERSOON IS VERVLOEK.

Daar is 'n ou bygeloof wat sê dat as u 13 letters op u naam het, u vervloek sal wees. Dom, ja, maar effens meer oortuigend as u in ag neem dat 'n aantal berugte moordenaars se name (Charles Manson, Jack the Ripper, Jeffrey Dahmer, Theodore Bundy en Albert De Salvo) almal 13 letters bevat. En as u wonder: Adolf Hitler se doopnaam was Adolfus Hitler [PDF].

9. OPSTELLING HET VRYDAG DIE 13DE SLEUTEL GEMAAK VIR BESIGHEDE.

Vrydag die 13de is 'n duur dag vir besighede. Een ontleder beweer dat ongeveer 'n miljard dollar per jaar verlore gaan omdat mense besluit om op Vrydag die 13de nie sake te doen nie.

10. 12 IS 'N PERFEKTE NOMMER, dus 13 MOET Ongelukkig wees.

In sommige numerologiese skole word die getal 12 beskou as die voorstelling van perfeksie en voltooiing. Dit is dus logies dat probeer om perfeksie te verbeter deur 'n syfer by te voeg 'n baie slegte idee is - u hebzucht word beloon met ongeluk.

11. ZOROASTRIAN TRADITION VOORWAARDES CHAOS IN DIE 13DE MILLENNIUM.

Die ou Perse het die geskiedenis in vier stukke van 3000 jaar verdeel. En hoewel die presiese tydsraamwerke kan wissel, meen sommige geleerdes dat daar aan die begin van die 13 000ste jaar chaos sal wees, aangesien die bose 'n groot stryd teen die goeie begin (alhoewel goed uiteindelik sal seëvier).

12. SPORTGROOTTE MET JERSEYNOMMER 13 SOMMER SOMMER KORT.

Dan Marino is 'n konstante wedstryd op of naby die top van enige "beste quarterbacks om nooit 'n Super Bowl" -lys te wen nie. Miskien kom sy mislukking om die grootste prys in sokker te haal, neer op sy trui nommer - 13. En hy is nie die enigste voorbeeld nie: basketbalster Steve Nash was 'n tweemalige NBA MVP en word beskou as een van die beste puntewagters van alle tye, maar hy en sy trui #13 het nooit 'n kampioenskap gewen nie.

13. SUPER BOWL XIII WAS 'N GROOT FINANSIËLE TERUGVOERING VIR SPORTBOEKE.

En sport was die Super Bowl XIII van 1979 veral sleg vir boekies. Dit word 'Black Sunday' genoem, en dit het die Dallas Cowboys, die verdedigende kampioene, teen die Pittsburgh Steelers gekonfronteer. Maar namate geld uit Texas en Pennsylvania aanhou stroom het, het die verspreiding aanhou verander totdat dit presies by die werklike verspreiding gekom het. Die verliese was legendaries.

Om al hierdie onnodige haat teen die arme nommer 13 teen te werk, is hier een rede om dit lief te hê: 'n bakkersdosyn. Mmm, ekstra donut.


Voorbeelde van historiese revisionisme

Slag van Agincourt

Histories is geglo dat die Engelse weermag in die Slag van Agincourt vier tot een in die getal was deur die Franse leër. Selfs teen sulke kanse kon die dapper Engelse soldate 'n byna onmoontlike oorwinning behaal. Hierdie feit is nog meer in die toneelstuk Henry V van Shakespeare geïntimideer. Onlangse bevindings weerspreek dit egter.

Professor Anne Curry, wat die oorspronklike inskrywingsrekords bestudeer het, verklaar dat die Franse in die werklike geveg inderdaad die Engelse en Wallieser was, maar slegs 12 000 tot 8 000. Dit is moontlik dat die getalle later deur die Engelse oordryf is om patriotisme aan te wakker.

Die Holocaust

Daar is 'n aansienlike hoeveelheid feitlike bewyse uit hoogs geloofwaardige bronne dat bykans ses miljoen Jode tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog dood is. Sommige revisioniste hou egter steeds vol dat die holocaust nie plaasgevind het nie, net om by hul eie oortuigings te pas. Een duidelike voorbeeld hiervan was die verhoor teen die Britse historikus David Irving in 2006, wat ontken het dat die holocaust ooit plaasgevind het. Hy is skuldig bevind en drie jaar tronkstraf opgelê.

Nuwe wêreld ontdekking

Tradisioneel was feite oor die kolonisasie van Amerika nog altyd vanuit die oogpunt van die baanbreker -Europeërs. In die meeste historiese boeke word die siening van die inheemse bevolking van Amerika baie min tot geen belang geheg nie, met baie tekste wat dit nie eens noem nie. Dit is duidelik opvallend wanneer die ontdekking van Amerika deur Christopher Columbus vertel word.

Moderne revisionistiese geleerdes ondersoek egter toenemend die impak van Europese verkennings en kolonisasie op inheemse Amerikaners. Geskiedkundiges Kirkpatrick Sale en James Loewen het veral pogings in hierdie rigting aangepak.

Sowjet -hersiening van die geskiedenis

Stalin het die geskiedenis hersien deur die naam van die voormalige keiserlike hoofstad van Rusland te verander van St. Petersburg na Petrograd, en Leningrad en Stalingrad. Dit is gedoen om die stukke van die tsariese bewind uit die Russiese geheue te vee. Daarbenewens beveel Stalin ook veranderinge in foto's en geskiedenisboeke, wat die leerproses in Sowjet -opvoedkundige instellings verwring het.

Franse aanvalformasies in die Napoleontiese oorloë

Wat die geskiedenis van Napoleon betref, was die geskrifte van sir Charles Oman en sir John Fortescue nog altyd die algemeenste. Hulle mening dat die Franse infanterie swaar kolomme gebruik het om infanterieleine aan te val, was jare lank onbetwisbaar.

In 1998 het twee nuwe boeke oor Napoleontiese gevegstaktieke dit egter uitgedaag deur te beweer dat die Franse in die reël in die stryd om Maida geveg het. In 'n ander publikasie in 2002 is opgemerk dat General Compère se brigade by Maida in 'n lynvorming gevorm is om 'n beslissende aksie wat in minder as vyftien minute voltooi is, aan te val by Kempt's Light Battalion –.

Militêre leierskap tydens die Eerste Wêreldoorlog

Na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, dekades lank, was die leierskap van die Britse leër in die kruishare van historici en politici, wat dit gekritiseer het as arm en ondoeltreffend. Militêre generaals word beskuldig dat hulle blind was vir die werklikheid van loopgraafoorlogvoering en onoplettend was oor die toestand van die mans wat hulle beveel het, wat later tot enorme slagoffers gelei het. Die Britse leër van die tyd is selfs beskryf as leeus onder leiding van donkies

Die afgelope paar jaar is die onderwerp egter meer objektief geëvalueer. Verskeie nuwe dokumente en bewyse wat versamel is, het historici, soos Gary D. Sheffield en Richard Holmes, laat sien dat die Britse weermag verskeie onbeheerbare probleme ondervind het, waaronder 'n gebrek aan militêre kommunikasie. As gevolg hiervan, hoewel baie historici vandag nog die Britse kommando kritiseer, het hulle uitbeelding daarvan ietwat verbeter.

Blameer vir die Tweede Wêreldoorlog

Die ortodokse opvatting is dat dit Hitler, Nazi -Duitsland en die keiserlike Japan was wat verantwoordelik was vir die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, maar revisionistiese historici soos Charles A. Beard het opgemerk dat Amerika ten minste gedeeltelik die skuld moes kry, aangesien dit ook op Japan gedruk het. moeilik in 1940-41, en was nie gereed om kompromieë te aanvaar nie.

Die beoefening van revisionisme kan dus 'n goeie sowel as 'n slegte invloed op die geskiedenis hê. Om die geskiedenis objektief te hersien, is voordelig om die werklike waarheid te leer. Hierdie tipe hersiening in die geskiedenis, ondersteun deur konkrete bewyse en feite, staan ​​bekend as wettige historiese revisionisme. As die revisionistiese teorie egter gebaseer is op los feite of nie-bestaande bewyse, staan ​​dit bekend as buite-egtelike historiese revisionisme, wat kan lei tot 'n verdraaiingsgeskiedenis, mense kan mislei en ook 'n aantal sosiale en politieke kwessies kan veroorsaak.


Om te sluit of nie te sluit nie?

Leners wat reeds lenings het, moet intussen hul kredietgeskiedenis in ag neem voordat hulle 'n bestaande kredietrekening sluit. Dit is omdat, soos vroeër bespreek, uiteindelik geslote rekeninge uit hul kredietverslae sal val.

Sodra hierdie rekeninge uit u kredietverslae verwyder is, word dit nie meer by die berekening van u FICO -telling ingesluit nie, aangesien die telling op 'n spesifieke tydstip bereken word as 'n momentopname van u verslae. Dit beteken dat die sluiting van 'n rekening u kredietgeskiedenis dramaties kan verkort, afhangende van hoe lank u u individuele kaarte gehad het en as u op die kort termyn geen nuwe kredietkaarte of lenings aangaan nie.

Die sluiting van 'n rekening kan 'n meer onmiddellike impak hê op u benuttingsverhouding - die bedrag wat u skuld in vergelyking met u kredietlimiet - wat u FICO -telling ook kan benadeel.

As u byvoorbeeld een kaart met 'n kredietlimiet van $ 10 000 en 'n nulbalans het, en 'n ander kaart met 'n limiet van $ 5,000 en 'n saldo van $ 4000, is u totale benuttingsverhouding 27 persent. Maar as u die limietkaart van $ 10 000 sluit - miskien omdat dit nie gebruik word nie - spring u kredietbenuttingskoers tot 80 persent. So 'n dramatiese verandering in u skuld-tot-limiet-verhouding sal u telling bykans benadeel.

As u al u rekeninge oop hou, moet u dit betyds betaal en u saldo so laag as moontlik hou. U krediet sal grasieus oud word, en u telling sal die toets van tyd deurstaan. Noudat u op hoogte is van die kredietgeskiedenis, is dit 'n goeie plek om na 'n kredietkaart te gaan soek.

Sien verwante: Hoe die gemiddelde kredietrekeningouderdom u FICO -telling beïnvloed, hoe om bestaande kaarte te kombineer sonder om die telling te benadeel


En toe het dinge erger geraak. redelik sleg Russiese geskiedenis copypasta.

So hierdie pos verskyn. Ek is nie regtig seker hoekom dit daar is nie, dit lyk asof dit 'n ewekansige pasta is. En gelukkig is dit 'n copypasta, maar ek vind dat dit die moeite werd is om af te breek.

(R) die geskiedenis van die Oesie begin wanneer die Oos-Slawiërs en die Fino-Oegriese volke begin vestig en 'n staat stig, en hulle skakel betrekkinge met die Bisantyne en neem die Christendom aan.

So nie presies nie. Die mitiese stigtingsjaar van Rus (wat ek nie regtig as Rusland beskou nie) is 862. Rus het in die 980's tot die Ortodokse Christendom bekeer. Die mite agter Rurik sê egter dat hy 'n Varangiaan was, wat meer Skandinawies was as Finno-Ugric. Die stigtingsmite sê ook dat die plaaslike Slawiërs die Varangiërs gevra het om asseblief ons owerste te wees. Ek is skepties daaroor, maar aangesien dit net 'n mite is, kan dit gly.

Genghis het gekom (in die winter, let op) en in minder as drie jaar het die Mongole die jong staat Rus heeltemal vernietig en meer as die helfte van die mense doodgemaak.

Rus ' (weereens, nie Rusland nie) was nie regtig 'n verenigde staat nie, nie ten minste soos moderne mense dit verstaan ​​nie. Op 'n manier herinner dit my 'n bietjie aan die Heilige Romeinse Ryk - daar was semi -onafhanklike owerhede, gekoppel aan 'n sentrale gesag (wie se heerskappy nie absoluut was nie) en (soms) godsdiens en taal. Sou dit meer as 'n veldtog van drie jaar regtig saak maak as die Mongole in die winter begin? Mongolië en die Sentraal -Asiatiese steppe is ook nie juis bekend daarvoor dat hulle warm en tropies is nie.

Die Mongoolse Ryk het in duie gestort en 'n leemte in Asië gelaat. Rusland hervestig homself as die Groothertogdom, en daarna die Tsardom, maar dit duur baie lank voordat Rusland as 'n streeksmoondheid beskou kan word.

MOSKOU was 'n Groothertogdom. Dit het bestaan ​​as 'n sub-eenheid van Kievan Rus '. Die Mongoolse ryk het ook nie tegelyk in duie gestort nie. Dit was 'n lekker stadige proses wat (verrassing) daartoe gelei het dat dinge soos die Groothertogdom Moskou 'n streekmoondheid geword het. Ek maak ook 'n probleem met die bewoording ' Rusland hervestig homself '. Rusland het homself in die eerste plek nooit gevestig nie; heroprigting lyk nogal taai.

In die tyd van die Ryk kon Rusland, sonder hawens met warm water, nie oor die see uitbrei nie, en is dit deur die kragtige Duitsland/HRE/Oostenryk in die Weste geblokkeer, sodat hulle die Ooste uitgebrei het, en hoe meer dit uitgebrei het, hoe duideliker was dit was dat Rusland vir homself 'n identiteit vorm wat op een of ander manier anders was as die res van Europa. Namate die ryk gegroei het, het dit ook meer geïsoleer geraak. Hulle het agter geraak, ekonomies en sosiaal. Feodalisme in die vorm van here en diensknegte het tot 1861 in Rusland bestaan, maar toe dit afgeskaf is, het dit die laer klasse nog armer gemaak. In 1906 is 'n grondwet geskryf, maar die Aristokrasie het dit verwerp.

Sjoe. Dus in die eerste plek die feit dat die hele tyd tussen

1500-1780 (90) word regtig deurmekaar, dit pla my regtig. Baie dinge het gebeur, waaronder Mikhail Romanov ('n stadige hervormer), Peter the First 's (Great) hervormings (nie 'n stadige hervormer nie), en (afhangende van wanneer ons die begintyd van 'the Age of Empire ') stel mense soos Katarina die Grote, die Napoleontiese Oorloë en die Decembrist Revolt. Dit is baie moeilik om te sê dat dit 'n geskiedenis van Rusland is en al die dinge weglaat, om nie eers te praat van die dinge wat Ek ' ter wille van kortheid weggelaat.

Wat die 3 blokkeermagte in die Weste betref - Eerstens, geen melding van die Ottomane, die Russiese Ryk se konstante foelie en vyand nie? Ok fine, seker. Omdat die Russiese Ryk beslis baie oorlog gevoer het teen die HRE, Duitsland en Oostenryk-Hongarye. Laat ons nie eens noem dat Duitsland en die HRE nie eens dieselfde ding is nie.

As ons verder gaan, kom ons agter dat diensbaarheid in Rusland tot 1861 bestaan ​​het. Skokkend genoeg was dit min of meer losbandige slawerny, dit is net iets anders genoem.

Ek is veral woedend oor die feit dat die nederige diens die laer klasse armer gemaak het. Ja, dit gebeur amper presies wat gebeur as u in ruil vir niks meer diensbaarheid mense opsaal wat niks gehad het met 'n groot, oorerflike skuld nie. Ek gaan 'n hoofstuk van Pytor Krapotkin in die draad plaas Herinneringe van 'n rewolusionis. Hy het beslis 'n byl gehad om te slyp, maar die Russiese diensbaarheid was nie 'n soort salige bestaan ​​nie.

Die Eerste Wêreldoorlog het begin. Dit was 'n soort Rusland se skuld; hulle was die eerste om hul weermag te mobiliseer (wel, hulle het op een of ander manier daarin geslaag om met die woord & quotmobilize & quot rond te sluip, sodat hulle na die oorlog die vinger kon wys na Duitsland, wat gemobiliseer het in reaksie op Rusland &# x27s & quototally-not-a-mobilisation & quot) Rusland was nie gereed vir die oorlog nie, die mense wou nie die oorlog hê nie; hulle het geen belang gehad in die rusies van die Balkan-moondhede nie,

Die idee van oorlogsskuld is dus gedek deur ander wat baie beter in sulke dinge vertroud is. Rusland het baie op die spel (vanuit hul perspektief) in die Balkan -moondhede. Net soveel as wat Duitsland gedoen het. Dit lyk vir die moderne oog vreemd, maar destyds nie soveel nie.

En toe het dinge erger geraak. Revolusie! Die Tsare is in Maart 1917 uitgeskop en is vervang deur die Russiese Republiek.

Ek het nog nooit gesien hoe die abdikasie van Nicholas II (nie uitgeskop word nie) en die totstandkoming van die Russiese Republiek dinge sou vererger (FYI tussen die gedeeltes, die refrein ' en dan word dinge erger ' word herhaal. Boonop van al die slegte geskiedenis, is dit ook 'n slegte geskiedenis).

Revolusie! Die Russiese Republiek is in die Rooi Oktober deur die Bolsjewiste uitgeskop om die Russiese Sowjet -Federatiewe Sosialistiese Republiek te stig, onder leiding van Vladmir Lenin. Hulle het vrede gesluit met die Duitsers en Oostenrykers, en die mag vir die volgende paar jaar gekonsolideer, deur elke onderneming wat hulle moontlik het, te sosialiseer en daarna die USSR te stig.

Gaan ons nie oor die burgeroorlog praat nie? Waarskynlik, ja, dit maak alles erger, maar omdat dit eintlik 'n sinvolle saak is, het dinge regtig erger geword. dit is heeltemal verlig. Jammer admiraals Denikin en Kolchak, julle is uit die geskiedenis geskryf.

Hoe dan ook, baie vroeg in die Sowjetgeskiedenis keer Lenin die koers om en begin met NEP, wat redelik suksesvol was. Dit is later deur Stalin omgekeer - maar vir die tyd wat dit in NEP was, was dit nogal kapitalisties van aard.

So ek gaan hier stop. Die ander goed, dit is ook 'n slegte geskiedenis van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, en bevat baie belangrike dele oor glasnost, of dit sal net naby wees aan die oortreding van reël 2.

Bronne wat jy sê? Hier is 'n paar: 'n Geskiedenis van Rusland: 8ste uitgawe, wat 'n paar jaar lank 'n konstante metgesel was.

Herinneringe van 'n rewolusionis, wat 'n goeie blik op Rusland in die 19de eeu het, vanuit die oogpunt van 'n hoërklasman wat die stelsel wou omverwerp.


Slawerny tydens die rewolusie

Afro -Amerikaanse slawe en vrymanne het aan beide kante van die Revolusionêre Oorlog geveg, en baie is hul vryheid belowe in ruil vir diens.

Leerdoelwitte

Beskryf die verskillende gevolge wat die Revolusionêre Oorlog op Afro -Amerikaanse slawe gehad het

Belangrike wegneemetes

Kern punte

  • Afro -Amerikaanse eenhede veg vir die kontinentale leër nadat George Washington die verbod op swart werwing opgehef het.
  • Afro -Amerikaanse slawe het ook saam met Britse troepe geveg nadat hulle aan hul koloniale meesters ontsnap het.
  • Baie Afro -Amerikaners wat ontsnap het of vryheid belowe is in ruil vir diens in die weermag aan weerskante, is uiteindelik aan die einde van die oorlog teruggekeer na slawerny.

Sleutel terme

  • George Washington: Een van die stigtervaders van die Verenigde State, wat tydens die Amerikaanse Revolusionêre Oorlog gedien het as die opperbevelhebber van die kontinentale leër en later as die eerste president van die nuwe republiek.

Afro -Amerikaners - slaaf en vry - het tydens die Revolusionêre Oorlog aan beide kante gedien. Baie Afro -Amerikaners beskou die Amerikaanse rewolusie as 'n geleentheid om te veg vir hul eie vryheid en vryheid van slawerny. Die Britte het slawe van Patriot -meesters gewerf en vryheid belowe aan diegene wat dien.

In werklikheid was Lord Dunmore's Proclamation die eerste massa -emansipasie van slawe in die geskiedenis van die Verenigde State. Lord Dunmore, koninklike goewerneur van Virginia, het 'n afkondiging uitgereik wat vryheid bied aan alle slawe wat tydens die Revolusionêre Oorlog vir die Britte sou veg. Honderde slawe het ontsnap om by Dunmore en die Britse leër aan te sluit. Vyfhonderd sulke voormalige slawe van Virginia het Lord Dunmore se Ethiopiese regiment gevorm, wat waarskynlik die eerste swart regiment is wat ooit vir die Britse kroon gedien het. Afro -Amerikaners het ook baie op Britse vaartuie gedien en word meer gewillig en bekwaam beskou as hul Britse eweknieë op die dek.

Ander revolusionêre leiers was egter huiwerig om Afro -Amerikaners in hul gewapende magte te gebruik weens 'n vrees dat gewapende slawe teen hulle sou opstaan. In Mei 1775 het die Massachusetts Committee of Safety byvoorbeeld die inskakeling van slawe in koloniale leërs gestop. Die aksie is toe deur die Kontinentale Kongres aangeneem toe dit Patriot -magte oorgeneem het om die Kontinentale Weermag te vorm. George Washington het in Julie 1775 'n bevel aan werwers uitgereik waarin hulle beveel is om "geen woestyn uit die ministeriële weermag of 'n kinderwagen, neger of rondloper" in te skryf nie. Hierdie bevel is egter uiteindelik van die hand gewys toe tekort aan mannekrag die kontinentale weermag genoop het om hul geledere te diversifiseer.

George Washington het die verbod op swart werwing in die kontinentale weermag in Januarie 1776 opgehef, in reaksie op die behoefte om mannekragtekorte in die Amerikaanse weermag en vloot te vul. Baie Afro -Amerikaners, wat geglo het dat die Patriot -saak eendag sou lei tot 'n uitbreiding van hul eie burgerregte en selfs die afskaffing van slawerny, het reeds aan die begin van die oorlog by militêre regimente aangesluit. Werwing by die kontinentale weermag na die opgehefde verbod op swart werwing was ewe positief, ondanks die kommer wat die beamptes in die suide nog in die gesig gestaar het. Klein geheel-swart eenhede is in Rhode Island en Massachusetts gevorm, en baie slawe is vryheid om te dien beloof. Afro -Amerikaners het vaartuie geloods, ammunisie hanteer en selfs as vlieëniers in verskillende staatsvlote gedien. Sommige Afro -Amerikaners is van die Royal Navy gevang en deur Patriotte op hul vaartuie gebruik. 'N Ander geheel-swart eenheid kom uit Haïti met Franse magte. Minstens 5 000 swart soldate het vir die Revolusionêre saak geveg. Baie voormalige slawe wat vryheid beloof is in ruil vir hul diens in die kontinentale leër, is egter uiteindelik weer in slawerny teruggekeer.

Tienduisende slawe het tydens die oorlog ontsnap en by Britse linies aangesluit, en ander het eenvoudig op hul eie na vryheid ontsnap sonder om te veg. Baie wat ontsnap het, is later weer slawe. Dit het die produksie van plantasies tydens en na die oorlog baie ontwrig. Toe hulle hul magte uit Savannah en Charleston onttrek, het die Britte ook 10 000 slawe ontruim, nou vrymanne. Die Britte het na raming na aanleiding van die oorlog bykans 20 000 vrygelate (insluitend gesinne) saam met ander lojaliste en hul troepe ontruim. Meer as 3 000 vrymanne is in Nova Scotia hervestig, terwyl ander na die Wes -Indiese Eilande van die Karibiese eilande vervoer is. Ander het na Groot -Brittanje gereis. Baie Afro -Amerikaners wat na die oorlog saam met lojaliste na Jamaika of Sint Augustinus vertrek het, het nooit hul vryheid verkry nie.


Die volledige geskiedenis van vuil politiek: 'n vraag &A oor enigiets om te stem

Vandag, onthou u, is verkiesingsdag. Dit beteken dat ons oor 'n jaar 'n nuwe president gaan kies (asof dit regtig saak maak). Die wedloop begin warm word, aangesien kandidate hul vriendelike fineer afskud en met hul mededingers nare begin raak. (Vir wat dit werd is, aan die Republikeinse kant, Ron Paul — wat ons voorheen bespreek het — blyk te wees vooruit Fred Thompson.)

Historikus en skrywer Joseph Cummins is geen vreemdeling aan die vuil onderkant van die Amerikaanse demokratiese proses nie. Sy nuutste boek, Enigiets om te stem: vuil truuks, goedkoop skote en verrassings in Oktober, beskryf die vlekke, aanvalle en verkeerde aanwysings van die veldtog wat Amerikaanse verkiesings sedertdien tipeer George Washington‘s wen in 1789. Die uitkoms van Cummins ’s boek: veldtogte is nou nie vuiler as in die verlede nie. Hy het ingestem om ons vrae oor sy boek te beantwoord.

V: Het u uit u navorsing oorhoofse neigings onder presidentskandidate, politieke partye en veldtogte gevind?

A: Enigiets vir 'n stem het ontstaan ​​omdat ek gefassineer was deur kommentators in onlangse presidensiële wedstryde wat beweer dat die Amerikaanse politiek al hoe erger word en dat mense baie met die hand kan draai of die demokrasie die Swift Boat Veterans for Truth sou oorleef. Every election, it seemed, was getting dirtier and dirtier.

Maar is dit regtig waar? After researching every presidential contest from 1789 to 2004, my answer is that elections are not getting dirtier. They’re just as dirty as they have always been. Whether that’s a heartening trend depends on your point of view. I myself am a great fan of the unruly democratic process, which I think will always be unruly.

In terms of trends, a rough rule of thumb is that incumbent parties tend to play the most dirty tricks, perhaps because they have the ways and means to do so. It’s also true that parties with the strongest ideologies — be they Democratic or Republican — fight dirtier, possibly because they are not only pushing a candidate, but an entire way of life.

Both parties at different times in American history have been guilty of mind-boggling attempts to influence elections. In the 1880s, one of the worst decades in terms of dirty tricks, Republicans sent bagmen to Indiana — then a pivotal state — with hundreds of thousands of dollars in two dollar bills (dubbed “Soapy Sams” for their ability to grease palms) in order to purchase votes. The 1960s was the era of Democratic dirty tricks — in 1964, Lyndon Johnson oversaw one of the most corrupt elections ever, against Barry Goldwater.

In 1840, the American Whig politician Thomas Elder had a eureka moment when he wrote to a friend: “Passion and prejudice properly aroused and directed do about as well as principle and reason in any party contest.”

I think this has been the guiding dictum of presidential politics all throughout our history.

V: You describe the intense mudslinging that went on during the 19th century, with accusations being thrown around of infidelity, substance abuse, cross dressing, and treason, among others. Has campaigning gotten any more civilized over time? How have mudslinging and other forms of negative campaigning evolved throughout U.S. history?

A: I think the mudslinging definitely is still a big part of our election process, but it’s less broad and vulgar. For instance, there is less aimed at other people’s physical attributes. The 19th century was very big on that. In the election of 1800, one of the dirtiest in American history, the venomous hack writer James Callendar (secretly hired by Thomas Jefferson) assailed then-President John Adams as a “repulsive pedant” and “a hideous hermaphroditical character,” whatever that means. Later in the 19th century, Martin Van Buren was accused of wearing women’s corsets (by Davy Crockett, no less) and James Buchanan (who had a congenital condition that caused his head to tilt to the left) was accused of have unsuccessfully tried to hang himself. Oh, and Abraham Lincoln reportedly had stinky feet.

The 20th century began this way at the 1912 Republican National Convention, Teddy Roosevelt, wearing a sombrero and smoking a cigar, cheerfully referred to William Howard Taft, the sitting President and Roosevelt’s former vice president, as “a rat in a corner.” (The rodent motif is popular — FDR liked to call Alf Landon, his 1936 opponent, “the White Mouse who wants to live in the White House.”) You won’t find this kind of thing out in the open too much today, although you still see it in some of the nastier primary campaigns, such as the hatchet job done on John McCain in 2000 by his fellow Republicans.

V: What role did the media play in early elections? What was the relationship between journalists and presidential candidates? How did it change over time?

A: The first attack I found against a newspaper came in 1800, when a Federalist poet decided that his party’s defeat at the hands of the Republicans could be blamed entirely on the media. He penned this bit of doggerel.

And lo! In meretricious dress
Forth comes a strumpet called “THE PRESS.”
Whose haggard, unrequested charms
Rush into every blaggard’s arms.

In early American elections, newspapers — then the only form of media around — played a huge role. Papers were unabashed party cheerleaders, rooting openly for their candidates and leading the way in smearing the candidate of the opposing party. Being trashed by a 19th century newspaper was no joke. They really sank their teeth into you. Even no less an authority than the New York Times (sorry) was guilty of this. In the epic William McKinley vs. William Jennings Bryan contest of 1896, the Tye, which supported McKinley, published a series of articles in which prominent alienists discussed quite seriously whether Bryan was crazy. One expert wrote: “I don’t think Bryan is ordinarily crazy … but I should like to examine him as a degenerate.”

By the latter part of the 20th century, this type of blatant electioneering for candidates had pretty much died out, although newspapers obviously still have their preferences. But certain television networks and talk radio shows, on both sides, have taken up the slack with a vengeance, and I think they are just as influential among voters as the old party newspapers were.

V: What was the ugliest campaign in history?

A: So many dirty elections, so little time… There have been stolen elections (the Rutherford HayesSamuel Tilden contest in 1876 was certainly stolen by Republicans in the South, a foreshadowing of 2000, and the Democrats may have altered the vote enough in Cook County in 1960 to let John Kennedy klop Richard Nixon). But “ugly” has a different connotation. I would have to say that 1964 was the ugliest presidential contest I have researched. President Lyndon Johnson, seeking his first elective term after taking over for the assassinated JFK, set out not just to defeat Goldwater, but to destroy him and create a huge mandate for himself.

Not that destroying Goldwater, who believed that field commanders should be given tactical nuclear weapons, was all that difficult. But Johnson’s dirty tricks were at least as bad as those of Nixon’s Watergate bagmen eight years later. He created a top secret after-hours group known as the “anti-campaign” and “the five o’clock club.” These sixteen political operatives, in close contact with the White House, set out to influence the perception of Goldwater in America’s popular culture. They put out a Goldwater joke book entitled You Can Die Laughing. They even created a children’s coloring book, in which your little one could happily color pictures of Goldwater dressed in the robes of the Ku Klux Klan.

This committee also wrote letters to columnist Ann Landers purporting to be from ordinary citizens terrified of the prospect of a Goldwater presidency. And they sent CIA agent E. Howard Hunt to infiltrate Goldwater campaign headquarters, posing as a volunteer, where he gained access to advance copies of Goldwater speeches and fed them to the White House, causing Goldwater to complain that whenever he put forth an initiative, the White House immediately trumped it.

But perhaps the ugliest thing about the 1964 election was Johnson’s treatment of the press. He remarked to an aide that “reporters are puppets,” and had his people feed them misleading information about the Goldwater campaign. One White House aide wrote a secret memo saying, “It might be healthy to get some respected columnist to give wider circulation to adverse Goldwater impact on the stock market.” A well-known financial columnist was then influenced into writing two columns on that very topic.

This was perhaps the last election in which the media could be so easily manipulated Nixon’s dirty tricks of the Watergate era were exposed by a press which had been remarkably quiescent in the face of Presidential wrongdoing for many years. Had there been a Bob Woodward en Carl Bernstein (and the public outrage necessary to support them) in 1964, Johnson could very well have been impeached. As it was, he beat Goldwater by the third highest popular vote margin in history.

V: How have wars affected presidential campaigns? Has U.S. involvement in a war during an election tended to make campaigning cleaner? Dirtier?

A: Much depends on the war itself. American involvement in World War II, for instance, made things fairly easy for Roosevelt to achieve a fourth term. Generally speaking, wars actually taking place during presidential contests take over the entire dialogue of the campaign but by the same token, voters will support the incumbent. However, wars often cause administration changes in the following election (take, for example, the Mexican War of 1848, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War) which is what Republicans may be facing in 2008.

In Anything for a Vote, I list my “Ten Classic Campaign Smears” — smears that have held constant throughout the ages. Two of them illustrate the differing effect wars have had on presidential candidates. One of them is “You’re Not Tough Enough.” This perennial attack during times of military conflict — applied to the likes of Franklin Pierce, Jimmy Carter, en Bill Clinton — suggests that the candidate is not strong enough to uphold our honor in the world. Its flip side, “You’ll Drive Us Into War,” suggests that the likes of Andrew Jackson, Goldwater and George W. Bush are loose cannons who will drag us into bloody foreign wars.

I think we’ll see these charges leveled at candidates of both political parties in 2008.

V: How did presidential campaigning change, if at all, after the 19th Amendment passed? Did the presence of female voters change candidates’ strategies, tactics, or messages?

A: Well, since politicians will be politicians, there was an immediate attempt to pander to women voters in 1920, the first year that women began casting their votes for president in large numbers. One of the reasons Warren G. Harding was chosen as the Republican nominee that year was because he was considered handsome enough to appeal to women, who may or may not have known about his numerous infidelities. (Harding was the most libidinous President to come along until JFK, 40 years later.)

Politicians, both male and female, have continued to shape messages aimed straight at women, depending on the era. In 1952 het Clare Boothe Luce went around the country extolling Dwight Eisenhower as “what the fair sex looks for in a man — a combination of husband, father and son.” These days, “family values” appeals are aimed straight at women by conservative elements in presidential parties. Interestingly enough, the one woman candidate running for president, Hillary Clinton, has made a point of not identifying herself simply as a “woman candidate,” and this appears to be working, particularly with young, single women.

V: Have television and the Internet had as fundamental an impact on presidential campaigns as many people think?

A: I think television has been huge. The first election really influenced by TV was the Stevenson–Eisenhower contest in 1952. Adlai Stevenson — eloquent and intellectual — made the mistake of buying thirty minute segments of prime time, in which he addressed his audience as if they were in a lecture hall with him. But thirty minutes, as we have discovered, is an awfully long time to listen to one talking head. (Stevenson also could never stay within the alloted time limit, and audiences got used to seeing the networks cut him off in mid-sentence to return to regular broadcasting.) Eisenhower, on the other hand, concentrated on a series of man-on-the-street, twenty second spots, and won the election.

However, I think the medium creates a distancing effect — most people never get a chance to see a candidate up close and personal, which may be one reason why average turnout for a presidential election these days is perhaps 49 percent to 55 percent of eligible voters, as compared to the high 70th percentile that lasted throughout the 19th century. There is more immediacy on the Internet — and certainly a substrata of dirty tricks (i.e., the doctored John Kerry/Jane Fonda photo going around in 2000, and this year’s short-lived and spurious anti-Fred Thompson Web site) but it remains to be seen whether it will be a major force in years to come.

V: What’s your take on the 2008 race thus far? How, beyond the presence of an African American and a female candidate, does it compare to past elections? Who’s your pick to win?

A: Thus far we’ve seen a lot of fighting among candidates of each party as they jockey for position coming into what may be an incredibly short primary season. I think, all in all, that the debate has been remarkably civil with an African American candidate and a woman, with a few glitches perhaps it has shocked people into a strange and unaccustomed civility, or perhaps we as a country are finally ready for it. Ek weet nie. I frankly don’t expect it to last. If Clinton gets the nomination, as I expect her to, I think we’ll see the attacks mounting on her because she is a woman — although her opponents will probably come at it from a different angle, as some already have by claiming that she forms a cabal with her husband Bill. Alone, in other words, she could never make it.

As to the 2008 winner, I’m not sure I can predict at this point. Ask me in June. I will predict, however, that 2008 will bump one election off my Top Ten list of America’s dirtiest presidential contests of all time.


How can a book generally be considered to be a work of pop history?

If it generalizes large swathes of time, makes broad, sweeping statements, focuses on the impact of great men only, references only secondary sources, or uses expressions like ɼhanged the course of history', it is probably pop history.

I have a follow-up question, actually. Suppose you're aware that a work is pop history, and know to take it with a grain of salt.

Should you not read it? I've been working my way through the Guns of August and quite enjoying myself, knowing full well that the book is very old and that it seems to be written with a noticeable degree of pathos. Basically, pop history by your description.

And yet a couple days ago there was a thread which essentially put forth the thesis that I'm wasting my time with the book, which understandably enough has left me confused as to whether to read on.

What's your thoughts on the matter?

I feel like this is missing a whole swath of "weeabo/viaboo/byzaboo" literature. The vikings/samurai/ninjas were totally badass and awesome because they did X, where X is something they definitely did not do.

There's no hard-and-fast definition, but here are some tips for figuring out whether a book is "pop history" or not voor you read it. Once you read it, and assess the arguments, you may formulate a different opinion.

Does the book have references? This can mean footnotes and endnotes, ideally, but academics are known to write introductory textbooks or master narrative works that elide standard citation apparatus in favor of historiographical essays at the back of a book. Guy Halsall's Worlds of Arthur, for example, is a book that exists on the edge of the pop-history/academic history divide, since it does nie include footnotes but is highly up-to-date, written by an acclaimed scholar in the field, and discusses the sources at some length (and sometimes in more detail than traditional academic works!).

Who published the book? If the book was published by a university press (identified by "university press" in the title, along with the name of the institution, like Oxford, Yale, or Kansas), that means it has gone through a more extensive peer-review process than most texts. This does not mean that the review process was as thorough as it could have been, or that the book is "right" or even "up to date" on all subjects. The university presses have put out some real stinkers. And it also does not mean that a book published by a larger house like Penguin or Norton is automatically a work of pop history. Some works that are extremely historiographically important were published by more mass-market publishers Adam Tooze's Wages of Destruction, the iconic modern text on the Nazi war economy, is a Penguin product, and Ordinary Men, the crucial work on the killers of the Holocaust, was put out by Harper. The big publishing houses are happy to publish academic history if they feel that it has a good chance at a broader audience. Most academic monographs do nie have that chance and so get smaller runs from the university presses. With digital publishing, very small houses, online-only houses, or self-publishing are also options, especially for writers who expect a very small audience. This also means that cranks can get their books published more easily, though, so be judicious when you read these books.

Who wrote the book? Some people have the unfortunate tendency to correlate "written by a tenured or tenure-track professor at a major institution" with "academically sound". This is not fair in either sense professors can be wrong about all kinds of things, and some important and worthwhile works of history have been published by non-academics. The tiny academic job market means that a lot of very skilled researchers and writers don't get to be professors sometimes they languish in the adjunct ghetto, and sometimes they pick a different career path but continue their interest in history as an intense hobby. Outstanding microhistories have been published by American national park rangers with MA-History training, for example. And sometimes the writers don't even come from within the field of history: sociologists, scientists, and scholars of the humanities have all produced useful work on history in the last several decades. Maar, with all of that said, history professors have immense advantages over non-historians when they write. They have many more resources available to make them more familiar with the most up-to-date historiography. They have easy journal access through their employer. They have graduate students and departmental colleagues to bounce ideas off of (and from whom to get the seeds of new ideas). They are also on the listservs and Slack chats and Twitter threads with other professors who can provide them references in other areas. Dus, mutatis mutandis, a professor is more likely to publish a book with academic merit than a nonprofessor.

Who is reviewing the book? Generally, if a work has academic merit, it will garner reviews in the journals over the two or three years after publication. If it is more pop history, then academics will ignore it and you will only be able to find mass-market reviews like Kirkus, NYT, and so on. You don't need journal access to find this out - just type the "title of the book" and the word review into the Google and see what pops up.

What do the reviews say? As jy doen have journal access, then you have a bonanza on your hands. Finding academic reviews of your book is a golden opportunity to figure out what historians think about it. This can be absolutely crucial if you don't know what the history of an area is before you read it. For example, Stephen Greenblatt's The Swerve, a book that is about modernity and philosophy, purports to explain "how the world became modern", is published by a major publishing house, and was written by a tenured professor of the humanities. If you weren't familiar with the historiography of the European medieval or early modern eras, you might think that it was a pretty good book! But in their reviews, academics absolutely savaged it for being a regressive, polemical interpretation that ignored the last eeu of work on medieval thought and played to old stereotypes.


America's Worst President Ever

If you wanted to identify, with confidence, the very worst president in American history, how would you go about it? One approach would be to consult the various academic polls on presidential rankings that have been conducted from time to time since Harvard’s Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. pioneered this particular survey scholarship in 1948. Bad idea.

Most of those surveys identify Warren G. Harding of Ohio as the worst ever. This is ridiculous. Harding presided over very robust economic times. Not only that, but he inherited a devastating economic recession when he was elected in 1920 and quickly turned bad times into good times, including a 14 percent GDP growth rate in 1922. Labor and racial unrest declined markedly during his watch. He led the country into no troublesome wars.

There was, of course, the Teapot Dome scandal that implicated major figures in his administration, but there was never any evidence that the president himself participated in any venality. As Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, put it, “Harding wasn’t a bad man. He was just a slob.”

The academic surveys also consistently place near the bottom James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania. Now here’s a man who truly lacked character and watched helplessly as his country descended into the worst crisis of its history. He stepped into the presidency with a blatant lie to the American people. In his inaugural address, he promised he would accept whatever judgment the Supreme Court rendered in the looming Dred Scott case. What he didn’t tell the American people was that he already knew what that judgment was going to be (gleaned through highly inappropriate conversations with justices). This is political cynicism of the rankest sort.

But Buchanan’s failed presidency points to what may be a pertinent distinction in assessing presidential failure. Buchanan was crushed by events that proved too powerful for his own weak leadership. And so the country moved inexorably into one of the worst crises in its history. But Buchanan didn’t create the crisis he merely was too wispy and vacillating to get control of it and thus lead the nation to some kind of resolution. It took his successor, Abraham Lincoln, to do that.

That illustrates the difference between failure of omission and failure of commission—the difference between presidents who couldn’t handle gathering crises and presidents who actually created the crises.

In the realm of commission failure, three presidents come to mind—Woodrow Wilson, Richard Nixon and George W. Bush. Bear in mind here that nearly all failed presidents have their defenders, who argue, sometimes with elaborate rationales, that the perceived failure wasn’t really failure or that it wasn’t really the fault of this particular president. We see this in stark reality in our own time, with the ongoing debates about the presidency of the second Bush, reflected in the reaction to senator Rand Paul’s recent suggestion that GOP hawks, with their incessant calls for U.S. intrusion into the lands of Islam, contributed to the rise of the violent radicalism of the Islamic State.

The prevailing view of Bush is that his invasion of Iraq, the greatest example in American history of what is known as “preventive war,” proved to be one of the most colossal foreign policy blunders in all of American history, if not actually the greatest. According to this view, Bush destabilized the Middle East, essentially lit it on fire and fostered the resultant rise of the Islamic State and the deepening sectarian war between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the region. Where this all leads, nobody can tell, but clearly it is going to play out, with devastating consequences, for a long time to come.

But of course there are those who deny that Bush created all this chaos. No, they say, Bush actually had Iraq under control and it was his hapless successor, Barack Obama, who let it all fall apart again by not maintaining a U.S. military force in the country. This is the minority view, embraced tenaciously by many people with a need to gloss over their own complicity in the mess.

There is little doubt that history eventually will fix upon the majority view—that Bush unleashed the surge of chaos, bloodshed and misery that now has the region in its grip. As Princeton’s Sean Wilentz wrote in 2006, when Bush still sat in the Oval Office, “Many historians are now wondering whether Bush, in fact, will be remembered as the very worst president in all of American history.” And bear in mind that Bush also presided over the emergence of one of the most devastating financial crises in the country’s history.

Then there’s Nixon, whose Watergate transgressions thrust the nation into one of its most harrowing constitutional crises. There are some who argue that Nixon’s transgressions weren’t actually as egregious as many believe, particularly when viewed carefully in the context of the maneuverings and manipulations of many of his people, some of them conducted behind the president’s back. There may be some truth in this. But in the end it doesn’t matter. He was president and must take responsibility for the culture and atmosphere he created in the West Wing and the Old Executive Office Building. If his people were running around and breaking the law, he must bear responsibility, whatever his knowledge or complicity. And we know definitively that Nixon himself set the tone in his inner circle—a tone so dark, defensive and menacing that wrongdoing was almost the inevitable result. Also, there can be no dispute that the president himself stepped over the line on numerous occasions.

Which brings us to Woodrow Wilson, whose failures of commission probably had the most dire consequences of any U.S. president. His great flaw was his sanctimonious nature, more stark and distilled than that of any other president, even John Quincy Adams (who was no piker in the sanctimony department). He thought he always knew best, because he thought he knew more than anybody else. Combine that with a powerful humanitarian sensibility, and you get a president who wants to change the world for the betterment of mankind. Watch out for such leaders.

Even during his first term, with war raging in Europe, he sought to get the United States involved as a neutral mediator, fostering a peace agreement to break the tragic stalemate that had the nations of Europe in its grip. When that effort was rebuffed, he ran for reelection by hailing himself as the man who kept the United States out of the war.

But, immediately upon entering his second term, he sought to get his country into the war by manipulating neutrality policy. While proclaiming U.S. neutrality, he favored Britain by observing the British blockade of Germany (imposed, said a young Winston Churchill, to starve Germans, including German infants, into submission) and by allowing armed British merchant ships entry to U.S. ports, which in turn fostered a flow of U.S. munitions to the Allied powers. At the same time, Wilson declared that Germany would be held to a “strict accountability” for any American loss of life or property from Germany’s submarine attacks. This policy applied, said Wilson, even if affected Americans traveling or working on British or French ships. He declined to curtail what he considered Americans’ “right” to travel on vessels tied to France or Britain (but not Germany).

Wilson was warned, most notably by his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, that these lopsided policies inevitably would pull America into the war. When he ignored those warnings, Bryan resigned from the Wilson cabinet on a stand of principle.

As Bryan predicted, America did get pulled into the conflict, and it certainly appears that that was Wilson’s intention all along. Then three things happened.

First, Wilson conducted the war in ways that devastated the home front. Prices shot up into double digits, and then came a potent economic recession that lasted three years. He accepted the suppression of civil liberties by his notorious attorney general, A. Mitchell Palmer. His government nationalized many private industries, including the telegraph, telephone and railroad industries, along with the distribution of coal. Race riots erupted in numerous cities that claimed nearly 150 lives in two years.

Second, America’s entry into the war broke the stalemate, allowing the Allied powers to impose upon Germany devastating armistice terms. Third, when Wilson went to the Versailles peace conference bent on bringing to bear his humanitarian outlook and making the world safe for democracy, he promptly got outmaneuvered by the canny nationalist leaders of Britain and France, whose agenda had nothing to do with Wilson’s dreamy notions about a harmonious world born of his humanitarian vision.

The result was a humiliation of Germany that rendered another war nearly inevitable and created in that country a sump of civic resentment and venom that would poison its politics for a generation. We can’t say with certainty that Adolf Hitler wouldn’t have emerged in Germany if the stalemate of World War I had been settled through negotiations rather than diktat. But we can say that the world spawned by Wilson’s naïve war policies certainly created a political climate in Germany that paved the way for Hitler.