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Stille Oseaan -oorlog

Stille Oseaan -oorlog


Stille Oseaanoorlog - Geskiedenis

Ek het verlede jaar die NetMagazines "5 tydskrifte vir $ 30" ooreenkoms probeer, en dit is regtig. Ek het dit gedoen vir American Heritage, wat $ 20 op sigself kos.

Books on Tape het meer as 120 (!) Oudioboeke oor die Tweede Wêreldoorlog.

Reeds voor Pearl Harbor het president Franklin D. Roosevelt en die Amerikaanse militêre hoofde ooreengekom oor 'n gemeenskaplike strategie met Groot -Brittanje: Duitsland, die magtigste en gevaarlikste van die asmagte, moet eers verslaan word. Slegs genoeg militêre hulpbronne sou aan die Stille Oseaan bestee word om die Japannese wes van 'n verdedigingslinie Alaska-Hawaii-Panama te hou.

Die mededinging om beperkte hulpbronne tussen die geallieerde bevelvoerders van die Europese en Stille teater was eintlik minder intens as wat verwag kon word. Die Stille Oseaan was 'n vlootoorlog, en min Amerikaanse offensiewe vlootmag was nodig in die Atlantiese Oseaan, behalwe landingsvaartuie. Afgesien van die U-bote, het die Duitsers geen bedreiging in Atlantiese waters ingehou nie. U-boot-verdediging het hoofsaaklik baie klein, vinnige begeleide vaartuie vereis. Dan is ook byna die hele Britse vloot in die Atlantiese Oseaan ontplooi. Dus kan Amerikaanse offensiewe vlootmag - veral die taakmagte vir vinnige vervoer - toegewyd wees aan die Stille Oseaan -oorlog.

Meer as afstand skei die twee oorloë; hulle verskil fundamenteel in strategie en opdrag en in die aard van die geveg. In Europa is die oorlog beplan en uitgevoer in kombinasie met magtige bondgenote. Strategiese besluite moes aangevoer word deur die Amerikaanse en Britse stafhoofde, en soms selfs deur president Roosevelt en premier Winston Churchill. Operasionele beplanning is uitgevoer, ten minste op die hoër vlakke, deur gekombineerde Anglo-Amerikaanse personeel. In die Stille Oseaan het die Verenigde State ook bondgenote gehad - Australië en Nieu -Seeland. Tog was die verhouding tussen die VSA en die geallieerde magte daar baie hoër as in Europa, en gevolglik was strategie en beplanning byna geheel en al in Amerikaanse hande.

Eisenhower, die opperbevelhebber in Europa, het geen eweknie in die Stille Oseaan gehad nie. Vanaf die begin van die oorlog was wedywering tussen die weermag en die vloot die konflik. Die twee dienste het meegeding om bevel, gebied en hulpbronne. In die uitgestrekte Stille Oseaan, 'n oseaan vol duisende koraal -eilande, moes daar genoeg ruimte vir albei gewees het. Maar onderlinge wedywerings en groot afstande het verhinder dat 'n enkele verenigde bevelvoerder genoem kon word, totdat generaal Douglas MacArthur in die laaste dae van die oorlog die opperbevelhebber van die Allied Powers (SCAP) geword het. In plaas daarvan is die Stille Oseaan verdeel in gebiedsopdragte. Die twee belangrikste was MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) en Admiral Chester Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas (POA). POA is op sy beurt onderverdeel in Noord -Stille Oseaan, Sentraal -Stille Oseaan en Suid -Stille Oseaan -opdragte. Nimitz het persoonlik die bevel oor die Sentraal -Stille Oseaan behou.

Gevegte in die Stille Oseaan was anders as om in Europa te veg. Die veldtogte in Europa is gekenmerk deur groot grondmagte wat oor die land in die hart van die vyand se land ry. Beide in MacArthur se SWPA en Nimitz se POA, was die Stille Oseaan-oorlog 'n oënskynlik eindelose reeks amfibiese landings en veldtogte met eilande, waar vlootmag, lugmag en skeepvaart, eerder as groot en swaar grondmagte, uiters belangrik was.

Maar vir die soldate en mariniers wat die ontelbare strande aangerand het, was die Stille Oseaan -oorlog selfs meer wreed en dodeliker as die oorlog in Europa. Japannese verdedigers het altyd ingegrawe, hul bunkers versterk met klapperblokke en geveg totdat hulle vermoor is. Hulle het amper nooit oorgegee nie. Op Betio in die Tarawa -atol in November 1943 het die mariniers 3,301 slagoffers gely, waaronder 900 dood in aksie, vir 'n bietjie koraal 3 myl lank en 800 meter breed. By Iwo Jima in Februarie en Maart 1945 verloor die mariniers bykans 6,000 dood en meer as 17,000 gewondes en veg hulle vir vyf weke om 'n eiland van minder as vyf myl lank te neem. By Iwo het geen bataljon minder as 50 persent slagoffers gely nie, en baie het selfs groter verliese gely. In die suidweste van die Stille Oseaan was die slagoffers van MacArthur proporsioneel minder. Deur op die groter landmassas van Nieu -Guinee en die Filippyne te veg, het hy meer beweegruimte gehad en kon hy byna altyd 'slaan' waar hulle nie is nie.


Op die berugte oggend van 7 Desember 1941 het Japannese vegvlieëniers finale reëlings getref vir hul dood. Die vlieëniers het afskeidsbriewe neergeskryf en in koeverte gegooi saam met hare en vingernaels wat hul geliefdes vir hul begrafnisse kon gebruik. . lees meer

Hoewel Tony King op 94-jarige ouderdom skerp en waaksaam is, is 'n deel van hom in die somer van 1945 vir ewig vasgekeer. Hy reis daarheen as hy daarvan praat-selfs terwyl hy in 'n rolstoel naby die venster in sy kamer sit San Francisco woonstel. King se oë verdof terwyl hy syne vertel . lees meer


51d. Oorlog in die Stille Oseaan


Hierdie beeldhouwerk, geleë in Arlington, Virginia, toon die opheffing van die Amerikaanse vlag oor Iwo Jima en is opgedra aan alle mariniers wat hul lewe gegee het ter verdediging van die Verenigde State.

Die verslaan van Duitsland was slegs 'n deel van die Amerikaanse missie.

Pearl Harbor was slegs die begin van Japannese aanvalle op Amerikaanse besittings in die Stille Oseaan. Twee dae nadat hulle Pearl Harbor aangeval het, het hulle Guam in beslag geneem, en twee weke daarna het hulle Wake Island verower. Voordat 1941 tot 'n einde gekom het, het die Filippyne aangeval.

Onder leiding van generaal Douglas MacArthur was die Amerikaners vol vertroue dat hulle die eilande kon hou. 'N Hewige Japannese aanval het anders bewys. Nadat hulle teruggetrek het na vestings by Bataan en Corregidor, het die Verenigde State geen ander keuse gehad as om die Filippyne oor te gee nie. Voordat generaal MacArthur deur president Roosevelt ontbied is, het hy belowe: "Ek kom terug."

Voordat hy egter teruggekeer het, het die Japannese die Bataan Death March toegedien, 'n wrede 85-myl wat Amerikaanse en Filippynse krygsgevangenes afgedwing is. 16 000 siele het langs die pad omgekom.

In Junie 1942 het Japan gehoop om Midway Island, 'n Amerikaanse vesting ongeveer 1000 myl van Hawaii, te vang. Midway kon gebruik word as 'n opvoerplek vir toekomstige aanvalle op Pearl Harbor. Die Verenigde State baat nog steeds daarby om Japannese radioboodskappe te ontsyfer. Amerikaanse vlootbevelvoerders onder leiding van Chester Nimitz het dus geweet die aanval kom.

Vliegtuiggeveg het die stryd by Midway beslis. Nadat die rook verdwyn het, is vier Japannese vliegdekskepe vernietig. Die plan om Midway te vang, het in duie gestort, en Japan het in die proses baie van sy aanvallende vermoëns verloor. Na die Slag van Midway moes die Japanners terugval en hul besittings verdedig.


In 1941 was genl Douglas MacArthur genoodsaak om die Filippyne oor te gee, maar het sy beroemde belofte gemaak van "I will return." Drie jaar later het hy sy belofte om die eilande te bevry nagekom.

Eilandhopping was die strategie wat die Amerikaanse bevel gebruik het. In plaas van om elke Japannese versterking in te neem, het die Verenigde State selektief 'n pad gekies wat Amerikaanse vlootmagte al hoe nader aan die Japannese vasteland sou beweeg. In Oktober 1944 keer MacArthur terug na die Filippyne vergesel van honderd skepe en gou is die eilande bevry. Die inhegtenisneming van Iwo Jima en Okinawa het die weg gebaan vir 'n algehele aanval op Japan. Ondanks groot verliese het die Japannese geweier om oor te gee. Hulle verskerp die aanvalle op Amerikaanse skepe met selfmoordmissie kamikaze -vlugte.

In April 1945 sterf president Roosevelt aan 'n breinbloeding, en Harry Truman word onverwags verlaat om die uitslag van die oorlog in die Stille Oseaan te bepaal.


Inhoud

Die konflik staan ​​ook bekend as die 'Saltpeter War', die 'Ten Cents War' (met verwysing na die omstrede tien centavo-belasting wat deur die Boliviaanse regering opgelê is) en die 'Tweede Stille Oseaan-oorlog'. [12] Dit moet nie verwar word met die pre-Columbiaanse Saltpeter-oorlog in die huidige Mexiko nie, en ook nie die 'Guano-oorlog' soos die oorlog op die Chincha-eilande soms genoem word nie. [13] Die oorlog het die "Tacna-Arica-geskil" grotendeels opgelos (of ingestel, afhangende van u standpunt), en is soms ook onder die naam bekend, hoewel die besonderhede dekades geneem het om dit op te los.

Wanu (Spaans guano) is 'n Quechua -woord vir kunsmis. [14] Kaliumnitraat (gewone soutpeter) en natriumnitraat (Chili soutpeter) is stikstofbevattende verbindings wat gesamentlik na verwys word as salpeter, salpeter, saliter, caliche of nitraat. Hulle word as kunsmis gebruik, maar het ander belangrike gebruike.

Atacama is 'n Chileense streek suid van die Atacama -woestyn, wat meestal saamval met die betwiste provinsie Antofagasta, wat in Bolivia bekend staan ​​as Litoral.

Die Atacama -grensgeskil tussen Bolivia en Chili oor soewereiniteit in die kusgebiede tussen ongeveer die parallelle 23 ° en 24 ° Suid was slegs een van verskeie langdurige grenskonflikte in Suid -Amerika, aangesien die gebied onafhanklikheid verkry het in die 19de eeu, aangesien onsekerheid die afbakening kenmerk grense volgens uti possidetis in 1810, veral in afgeleë, dunbevolkte gedeeltes van nuut onafhanklike nasies. [15]

Die droë klimaat van die Peruaanse en Boliviaanse kus het die ophoping en behoud van groot hoeveelhede guano-afsettings en natriumnitraat van hoë gehalte moontlik gemaak. In die 1840's het Europeërs die waarde van guano en nitraat as kunsmis en die rol van soutpeter in plofstof geken. Die Atacama -woestyn het ekonomies belangrik geword. Bolivia, Chili en Peru was in die gebied met die grootste reserwes van 'n bron wat deur die wêreld vereis is. Tydens die oorlog op die Chincha-eilande (1864-1866) het Spanje, onder koningin Isabella II, probeer om 'n voorval waarin Spaanse burgers in Peru betrokke was, te ontgin om sy invloed op die guano-ryke Chincha-eilande te herstel.

Vanaf die Chileense silwerstormloop in die 1830's, is die Atacama in die vooruitsig gestel en bevolk deur Chileense. [16] Chileense en buitelandse ondernemings in die streek het uiteindelik hul beheer uitgebrei na die Peruaanse soutpeterwerke. In die Peruaanse streek Tarapacá was Peruane 'n minderheid, agter beide Chileense en Boliviane. [17]

Grensverdrag van 1866 Redigeer

Bolivia en Chili het die grensverdrag van 1866, "of die" Verdrag van wedersydse voordele ", wat 24 ° S" van die kus van die Stille Oseaan tot by die oostelike grense van Chili "as die onderlinge grens beding het. Beide lande het ook ooreengekom om die belastinginkomste uit minerale -uitvoer uit die gebied tussen 23 ° en 25 ° S. Die tweeledige belastinginvordering het ontevredenheid veroorsaak, en die verdrag het slegs agt jaar geduur.

Geheime Verdrag van Alliansie van 1873 Redigeer

In Februarie 1873 onderteken Peru en Bolivia 'n geheime alliansieverdrag teen Chili. [18] Die laaste klousule het dit geheim gehou solank albei partye die publikasie daarvan as onnodig beskou het, totdat dit in 1879 onthul is. Argentinië, wat lank in 'n geskil met Chili betrokke was oor die Straat van Magellan en Patagonië, is in die geheim uitgenooi om by die verdrag aan te sluit , en in September 1873 het die Argentynse Kamer van Afgevaardigdes die verdrag goedgekeur en 6,000,000 Argentynse peso vir oorlogsvoorbereidings. [19] Uiteindelik het Argentinië en Bolivia nie ooreengekom oor die gebiede van Tarija en Chaco nie, en Argentinië was ook bang vir 'n alliansie van Chili met Brasilië. Die Argentynse senaat het die goedkeuring uitgestel en toe verwerp, maar in 1875 en 1877, nadat grensgeskille met Chili opnuut opgevlam het, het Argentinië probeer om by die verdrag aan te sluit. [20] By die aanvang van die oorlog, in 'n hernieude poging, bied Peru Argentinië die Chileense gebiede van 24 ° tot 27 ° S aan as Argentinië die verdrag nakom en in die oorlog veg. [21] [22]

Geskiedkundiges, waaronder G. Bulnes, [23] Basadre, [24] en Yrigoyen [25], is dit eens dat die werklike bedoeling van die verdrag was om Chili te verplig om sy grense aan te pas volgens die geopolitieke belange van Argentinië, Peru en Bolivia, soos Chili was militêr swak voor die aankoms van die Chileense ysterklere Almirante Cochrane en Blanco Encalada.

Chili is eers oor die pakt ingelig, toe hy daarvan te hore gekom het, aanvanklik vlugtig deur 'n lekkasie in die Argentynse kongres in September 1873, toe die Argentynse senaat die uitnodiging bespreek om by die Peru-Bolivia-alliansie aan te sluit. [19] Die Peruaanse bemiddelaar Antonio de Lavalle verklaar in sy memoires dat hy dit eers in Maart 1879 verneem het, en Hilarion Daza is eers in Desember 1878 van die verdrag ingelig. [26]

Die Peruaanse historikus Basadre verklaar dat een van Peru se redes vir die ondertekening van die verdrag was om 'n Chileense-Boliviaanse alliansie teen Peru te belemmer wat die streek Arica aan Bolivia sou gegee het (byna alle Boliviaanse handel het voor die oorlog deur die Peruaanse hawens van Arica gegaan) en Antofagasta na Chili oorgeplaas. [27] Die Chileense aanbiedings aan Bolivia om trou te verander, is verskeie kere gemaak, selfs tydens die oorlog [28] en ook ten minste ses keer van die Boliviaanse kant. [27]

Op 26 Desember 1874 kom die onlangs geboude ysterbeklede Cochrane in Valparaíso aan en bly in Chili tot die voltooiing van die Blanco Encalada. Dit het die magsbalans in die Suidelike Stille Oseaan na Chili gebring. [29]

Geskiedkundiges verskil oor hoe hulle die verdrag moet interpreteer. Sommige Peruaanse en Boliviaanse historici beskou dit vanaf die begin as regmatig, verdedigend, omstandig en deur Chili bekend. Omgekeerd beskou sommige Chileense historici die verdrag as aggressief teen Chili, wat die oorlog veroorsaak, wat bedoel is om deur Peru beheer te neem van die Boliviaanse salitreras en vir Chili weggesteek is. Die redes vir sy geheimhouding, die uitnodiging aan Argentinië om by die ooreenkoms aan te sluit en die weiering van Peru om neutraal te bly, word steeds bespreek. [30]

Grensverdrag van 1874 Redigeer

In 1874 vervang Chili en Bolivia die grensverdrag van 1866 deur die grens op 24 ° S te hou, maar gee Bolivia die bevoegdheid om alle belastinginkomste tussen 23 ° en 24 ° S in te vorder. -jaarwaarborg teen belastingverhogings op Chileense handelsbelange en hul uitvoer.

Artikel 4 verbied uitdruklik belastingverhogings op Chileense ondernemings vir 25 jaar:

Die uitvoerpligte wat gehef kan word op minerale wat in die gebied waarna in die voorafgaande artikels verwys word, ontgin, mag nie die geldende bedra nie, en die Chileense burgers, die nywerheid en die kapitaal word aan geen ander bydraes onderwerp nie, behalwe dié wat tans bestaan . Die bepalings in hierdie artikel duur vyf en twintig jaar.

Alle geskille wat ingevolge die verdrag ontstaan, sal deur arbitrasie besleg word.

Oorsake van oorlog Redigeer

Die Amerikaanse historikus William F. Sater gee verskeie moontlike en versoenbare redes vir die oorlog. [31] Hy beskou die oorsake as huishoudelik, ekonomies en geopolitiek. Verskeie skrywers stem daarmee saam, maar ander ondersteun sy argumente slegs gedeeltelik.

Sommige historici beweer dat Chili verwoes is deur die ekonomiese krisis van die 1870's [32] en op soek was na 'n plaasvervanger vir sy silwer-, koper- en koringuitvoer. [33] Daar word aangevoer dat die ekonomiese situasie en die siening van nuwe rykdom in nitraat die ware redes was vir die Chileense elite om oorlog te voer teen Peru en Bolivia. [33] [34] Volgens Sater het die houer van die Chileense nitraatmaatskappye, die Chileense president, Aníbal Pinto, 'gebulde' om oorlog te verklaar om die eienaar van die CSFA te beskerm en dan beslag te lê op die salitreras van Bolivia en Peru. Verskeie lede van die Chileense regering was aandeelhouers van CSFA, en hulle het vermoedelik die dienste van een van die land se koerante gehuur om hul saak te beklemtoon. [31]

'N Ander Amerikaanse historikus, David Healy, [35] verwerp die tesis, en Fredrick B. Pike noem die bewering' absurd '. [36] Die ekonomiese ontwikkeling wat die oorlog vergesel en gevolg het, was so merkwaardig dat marxistiese skrywers geregverdig voel om te beweer dat Chili se groot militêre avontuur deur selfsoekende kapitaliste aangewakker is om hul land uit die stagnasie van sake te bring wat in 1878 begin het sedert die oorlog het Chili die ekonomiese middele gegee om volwassen te word. Sater verklaar dat hierdie interpretasie sekere belangrike feite oor die hoof sien. Die Chileense beleggers in Bolivia het korrek gevrees dat Daza, die Boliviaanse diktator, die oorlog as 'n verskoning sou gebruik om hul beleggings te onteien. Onder hulle was Melchor de Concha y Toro, die polities magtige president van die Chileense Camara de Diputados, Jerónimo Urmeneta, [37]: 105 en Lorenzo Claro, 'n Chileense stigter van die Banco de Bolivia en 'n prominente lid van die Nasionale Party. 'N Santiago -koerant beweer dat Melchor de Concha y Toro president Pinto 2 000 000 Chileense peso's aangebied het om die geskil te beëindig en na die grens van 1874 terug te keer. "Met ander woorde," skryf W. Sater, "daar was net soveel magtige belange wat daarteen gekant was om die Compañía de Salitres te help, net soos diegene wat die korporasie wou help." [38] B. Farcau maak ook beswaar teen die argument: "Aan die ander kant ondersteun die jammerlike toestand van die Chileense weermag by die uitbreek van die oorlog, soos in die volgende hoofstuk bespreek sal word, amper nie 'n bewuste teorie nie, opsetlike aggressie. ” [39]

Sater noem ander bronne wat verklaar dat die ware oorsake van die konflik nie ekonomies nie, maar geopolitiek was, 'n stryd om beheer oor die suidoostelike deel van die Stille Oseaan. In 1836 het die Peruaanse regering probeer om die handel in die Suidelike Stille Oseaan te monopoliseer deur skepe te beloon wat direk na Callao gevaar het, tot nadeel van Valparaíso. [40] Peru het probeer om die ooreenkoms wat tussen Spanje en Chili bereik is, te belemmer om sy nuwe oorlogskepe wat tydens die Chincha -eilandeoorlog gebou is, te bevry. Sater noem die Duitse minister in Chili, wat aangevoer het dat die oorlog met Peru en Bolivia "vroeër of later sou uitgebars het [en] onder enige voorwendsel." Hy was van mening dat Bolivia en Peru 'n "bittere afguns" teen Chili en sy materiële vordering en goeie regering ontwikkel het. [41] Frederik B. Pike verklaar: "Die fundamentele oorsaak vir die uitbarsting van vyandelikhede was die toenemende mag en aansien en die ekonomiese en politieke stabiliteit van Chili, aan die een kant, en die swakheid en die politieke en ekonomiese agteruitgang van Bolivia, Die oorlog-en die uitkoms daarvan-was net so onvermydelik soos die konflik tussen die Verenigde State en Mexiko tussen 1846 en 1848. In beide gevalle was 'n betreklik goed bestuurde, energieke en ekonomies uitbreidende land onweerstaanbaar versoek deur naburige gebiede wat was onderontwikkel, wanbestuur en yl beset. ” [42]: 128

'N Ander rede, volgens Sater, was Peru se begeerte om die nitraatwerke te monopoliseer en toe te pas om sy nitraatmonopolie te versterk, wat vereis dat die Boliviaanse en Chileense salitreras deur Peru beheer word. [43] So onbenydenswaardig soos Chili se situasie in die 1870's was, was die situasie in Peru baie erger. Die 1870's was vir Peru se ekonomie ''n dekade van krisis en verandering'. [44] Nitraatontginning het gestyg terwyl guano -uitvoer, die bron van aansienlike inkomste vir Peru, afgeneem het van 575,000 ton in 1869 tot minder as 350,000 ton in 1873, en die Chincha -eilande en ander guano -eilande amper uitgeput was. [44]

William Edmundson skryf in 'N Geskiedenis van die Britse teenwoordigheid in Chili, [45] "Peru het sy eie redes om die geskil aan te gaan. Rory Miller (1993) voer aan dat die uitputting van guano -hulpbronne en swak bestuur van die ekonomie in Peru 'n krisis veroorsaak het. Dit het daartoe gelei dat Peru sy buitelandse skuld in gebreke gestel het. in 1876. In daardie jaar [1875] het die Peruaanse regering besluit om 'n lening van sewe miljoene pond aan te skaf, waarvan vier miljoene pond bestem was vir die aankoop van privaat eienaars [salitreras]. en Peru weer in wanbetaling in 1877. "

Om die inkomste uit guano te verhoog, het Peru in 1875 'n monopolie op nitraathandel geskep. Sy doel was om pryse te verhoog, uitvoer te bekamp en mededinging te belemmer, maar die meeste groter nitraatondernemings was gekant teen die monopolie op die verkoop van nitraat. [44] Toe hulle onsuksesvol was, het Peru in 1876 begin om nitraatprodusente te onteien [46] en om nitraatvergunnings soos dié van Henry Meiggs in Bolivia ("Toco", suid van die Loarivier) te koop. [44] Die CSFA was egter te duur om aangekoop te word. [47] Soos die Peruaanse historikus Alejandro Reyes verklaar, moes die Boliviaanse salitreras beheer word, wat gelei het tot die internasionalisering van die konflik, aangesien dit in besit was van Chileense en Europese handelaars. [43] Aangesien die Chileense maatskappy op 14 Februarie 1879 in Antofagasta opgeveil sou word, is daar geag dat die Peruaanse konsul die hoogste bieër sou wees. [48]

Volgens Sater beskou sommige bronne egter die oorlogsverklarings tussen Chili en Peru as 'n produk van gewilde binnelandse magte. Die Peruaanse president moes oorlog verklaar om sy posisie te behou. Sater noem die Britse minister in Lima, Spencer St. John: "die mededingende partye kan probeer om politieke kapitaal te maak uit jaloesie vir die nasionale eer, en sy eksellensie [Peruaanse president Prado] kan gedwing word om plek te maak vir die gewilde sentiment. " [49] Die Chileense president Pinto was onder soortgelyke druk. [50] Bruce Farcau is van mening dat dit blykbaar die hoofoorsaak vir die oorlogsuitbraak is: "Die argument dat die houding van die mense in die streek net ryp was vir oorlog, lyk die beste by die rekening." [39]

Tien sent se belasting wysig

Vanaf 1866 het die Chileense ondernemers José Santos Ossa en Francisco Puelma afsettings van natriumnitraat in Boliviaanse gebiede ontgin (onderskeidelik salitreras "Las Salinas" en "Carmen Alto" 122 kilometer (128 myl) en 128 kilometer van Antofagasta) en verseker deur toegewings van die Boliviaanse president Mariano Melgarejo. In 1868 is die Britse hoofstad geassosieer en die Compagnía Melbourne Clark. Die maatskappy het 'n lisensie gekry om 'n spoorlyn van Antofagasta na Salinas te bou en is hernoem na Compañía de Salitres en Ferrocarril de Antofagasta (CSFA), met 34% Britse kapitaal [51] van Antony Gibbs & amp Sons van Londen, wat ook aandele van salitreras in Peru besit het. Die maatskappy is gevestig in Valparaíso, Chili, [52] en onder sy aandeelhouers was 'n aantal toonaangewende Chileense politici. [53] In 1871 het 'n nuwe Boliviaanse regering alle kontrakte wat deur Melgarejo onderteken is, gekanselleer, maar op 22 November 1872 het 'n Boliviaanse dekreet die regering in staat gestel om die kontrakte te heronderhandel. Op 27 November 1873 het die maatskappy van die Boliviaanse uitvoerende gesag 'n lisensie verkry om saltpeter vir 15 jaar sonder diens te ontgin, maar of die besluit die magtiging van die Boliviaanse kongres benodig, is betwis. [Notas 1] Sommige advokate het klem gelê op met vrag a dar cuenta a la próxima legislatura (Spaans vir: "moet oorweeg word tydens die volgende wetgewende sitting [van die parlement]"), maar ander op sólo en los casos de no avenimiento (Spaans vir "slegs in gevalle waar daar nie 'n skikking bereik word nie").

Peruaanse monopolie op saltpeter

In 1873 het die Peruaanse regering die Ley del estanco del salitre, wat die saliterproduksie beperk het en die regering gemagtig het om die hele produksie teen 'n vaste prys te koop. Die plan het egter misluk, en die wet is teruggetrek. In 1875 onteien die Peruaanse regering die salitreras van Tarapacá om inkomste uit guano en nitraat te verkry deur middel van 'n monopolie, en in 1876 word Antony Gibbs & amp Sons die ontvanger van die nitraathandel vir die Peruaanse regering. [54] President Mariano Ignacio Prado was "vasbeslote om die monopolie te voltooi", en in 1876 koop Peru die nitraatlisensies vir "El Toco" opgeveil deur 'n Boliviaanse dekreet van 13 Januarie 1876. [55] Die Chileense maatskappy het egter gebly die ernstigste mededinger en het Peru se monopolie duidelik verswak. [56] President Pardo, Prado se voorganger, het Gibbs aangemoedig om die monopolie te beveilig deur die produksie van die CSFA te beperk, [57] en Henry Gibbs het die raad van direkteure van die CSFA in 'n brief op 16 April 1878 gewaarsku dat sy weiering om sy uitset te beperk, sou administratiewe probleme met Peru en Bolivia meebring "omdat dit meer en meer in die belang van 'n naburige regering gemaak word dat dit so moet wees." [55]

Gibbs het in 1876 en 1877 herhaaldelik onsuksesvol probeer om Edwards, die Chileense meerderheidsaandeelhouer, te oorreed om 'n beperking in sy produksie te aanvaar. [58] [59]

Die historikus Ronald Bruce St. John in Buitelandse beleid van Peru lui, [60] "Alhoewel oortuigende bewyse wat Peru verbind het met die tien-sentavo-belasting of Bolivia se besluit om die Chileense besittings in Antofagasta te konfiskeer, nooit opgeduik het nie, moet dit erken word dat Peruaanse belange diep ekonomiese en politieke redes gehad het om oorlog te voer. "

In 1875 het die stad Antofagasta probeer om 'n belasting van 3 sent op die CSFA op te lê, maar die Boliviaanse staatsraad (Consejo de Estado), onder leiding van Serapio Reyes Ortiz, wat tydens die krisis minister van buitelandse sake sou wees, het die belasting verwerp omdat dit die lisensie van 1873 en die grensverdrag van 1874 geskend het. [61]

Op 14 Februarie 1878 het die Nasionale Kongres van Bolivia en die Nasionale Grondwetgewende Vergadering die lisensie van 1873 goedgekeur as die maatskappy 'n sent van 10 sent betaal, [62], maar die maatskappy het beswaar aangeteken deur die verdrag van 1874 te noem dat die verhoogde betalings onwettig en eis 'n ingryping van die Chileense regering. [63]

Die biblioteekraad van die CSFA beskou die belasting as 'n Peruaanse besluit om Chileense van die nitraatproduksie te verplaas, soos in 1875 in Tarapacá plaasgevind het toe die Peruaanse regering die salitreras onteien het. [64]

Nadat hy sy aanspraak op die betwiste gebiede oorgegee het in ruil vir 'n Boliviaanse belofte om die belasting nie te verhoog nie, [65] het Chili beweer dat die verdrag nie so 'n belastingverhoging moontlik maak nie. [53] Bolivia het die belasting in April 1878 opgeskort. In November het Chili bemiddeling voorgestel en gewaarsku dat Daza se weiering om die belasting te kanselleer, Chili sal dwing om die verdrag van 1874 nietig te verklaar. In Desember 1878 het Bolivia, wat reken op sy militêre alliansie met Peru, Chili uitgedaag, verklaar dat die belasting nie verband hou met die verdrag nie en dat die eis van die CSFA in Boliviaanse howe aangespreek moet word, en die belasting herleef. [52] Toe die maatskappy weier om die belasting te betaal, het Bolivia op 11 Februarie op sy eiendom beslag gelê en gedreig om dit op 14 Februarie te verkoop om die onderneming se skuld te likwideer. [66]

Invasie van Antofagasta Edit

In Desember 1878 het Chili 'n oorlogskip na die gebied gestuur. Op 6 Februarie het die Boliviaanse regering die CSFA se ontginningslisensie vernietig en beslag gelê op die eiendom. Die nuus bereik Valparaíso op 11 Februarie en daarom besluit die Chileense regering oor die besetting van die gebied Antofagasta suid van 23 ° Suid. [67] Op die dag van die beplande veiling het 200 Chileense soldate per skip by die hawestad Antofagasta aangekom en dit sonder weerstand beslag gelê. Die besettingsmagte het wydverspreide steun van die plaaslike bevolking ontvang, waarvan 93–95% Chileens was. [68] [69] [70]

Die Boliviaanse gebied tussen 23 ° Suid en die Loa -rivier, die grens met Peru, was amper een maand na die Boliviaanse oorlogsverklaring onbeset deur die Chileense magte. [71] Op 21 Maart is Cobija en daarna Calama, Tocopilla en ander gehuggies beset. Die Chileense regering het die Boliviaanse ampsdraers gevra om aan te bly, maar hulle het geweier. [72]

Peruaanse bemiddeling en Boliviaanse oorlogsverklaring Redigeer

Op 22 Februarie het Peru 'n diplomatieke span onder leiding van José Antonio de Lavalle na Santiago gestuur om as bemiddelaar tussen die Chileense en die Boliviaanse regerings op te tree. Peru het intussen sy vloot en leër beveel om vir oorlog voor te berei. [31] De Lavalle het op 4 Maart in Valparaíso aangekom. Op 27 Februarie het Daza 'n openbare manifes gemaak om die Bolivianers in te lig oor die besetting van Antofagasta en om patiotiese ondersteuning te ontbied. Op dieselfde dag het die Boliviaanse wetgewer 'n formele oorlogsverklaring teen Chili goedgekeur, hoewel dit nie onmiddellik aangekondig is nie. Op 1 Maart het Daza in plaas daarvan 'n dekreet uitgevaardig om alle handel en kommunikasie met Chili te verbied "terwyl die oorlogstoestand wat Bolivia uitlok, duur." Dit het die Chileense tien dae gegee om die Boliviaanse gebied te verlaat, tensy hulle ernstig siek of gestremd was en die Chileense meubels, eiendom en mynprodukte 'n embargo op die gebied van Chileense mynmaatskappye kon laat voortgaan om onder 'n deur die regering aangestelde bestuurder te werk, en alle embargo's as tydelik te voorsien "tensy die vyandelikhede uitgeoefen word" deur Chileense magte vereis 'n energieke vergelding van Bolivia. "

In Santiago het Lavalle gevra dat Chili onttrek aan Antofagasta om die provinsie oor te dra na 'n drieparty -administrasie van (Bolivia, Chili en Peru sonder 'n Boliviaanse waarborg om die embargo te beëindig of om die nuwe belasting te kanselleer. [73]

Op 14 Maart, in 'n vergadering met buitelandse moondhede in Lima, het Bolivia aangekondig dat daar 'n oorlogstoestand met Chili bestaan. [63] [74] Die verklaring was daarop gemik om verdere Chileense wapenaankope in Europa te belemmer en die Peruaanse bemiddeling in Chili te stuit. [75] Bolivia het 'n beroep op Peru gedoen om die alliansieverdrag te aktiveer met die argument dat die inval van Chili 'n casus foederis.

Op 14 Maart het Alejandro Fierro, die minister van buitelandse sake van Chili, 'n telegram gestuur na die verteenwoordiger van Chili in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, om die onmiddellike neutraliteit van die Peruaanse regering te versoek. Op 17 Maart het Godoy die Chileense voorstel formeel voorgelê in 'n vergadering met die Peruaanse president Prado. [76]: 147vv

Op 21 Maart tel Godoy die Chileense regering oor die geheime verdrag tussen Peru en Bolivia, wat deur die Peruaanse president Prado aan hom bekend gemaak is. [76]: 154vv

Op 23 Maart, op pad om Calama te beset, het 554 Chileense troepe en kavalerie 135 Boliviaanse soldate en burgerlikes verslaan, wat by twee verwoeste brûe langs die Topáter -drif ingegrawe is. Die Slag van Topáter was die eerste slag van die oorlog.

Toe die Chileense regering Lavalle direk en amptelik vra of daar 'n defensiewe alliansie bestaan ​​wat Peru daartoe verbind het om Bolivia by te staan ​​in 'n oorlog met Chili en of Lima van plan was om die ooreenkoms na te kom, kon Lavalle nie meer voorafgaan nie en het ja geantwoord op beide. Chileense president Pinto het wetgewende goedkeuring aangevra en ontvang om oorlog te verklaar, wat hy op 5 April 1879 gedoen het. [31] Peru reageer op 6 April, toe Prado die casus foederis. [77]

Kragte wysig

  1. ^Sater 2007, p. 58 Tabel 3
  2. ^Sater 2007, p. 45 Tabel 1
  3. ^Sater 2007, p. 51 Tabel 2
  4. ^ abcSater 2007, p. 263
  5. ^Sater 2007, p. 274
  6. ^ Machuca, Francisco. Las cuatro campñas de la Guerra del Pacífico. bl. 341.
  1. ^ abSater 2007, pp. 64–67
  2. ^ White and Grieve gewere is tydens die oorlog in Peru ontwikkel en vervaardig

Geskiedkundiges is dit eens dat die strydlustiges nie finansieel of militêr voorbereid was op die oorlog nie. [78] Nie een van die drie nasies het 'n algemene staf, [79] mediese korps, [80] of militêre logistiek nie [79] en hul oorlogskepe was in 'n betreurenswaardige toestand. [81] In Chili, byvoorbeeld, is die militêre kontingent deurlopend verminder van 3 776 (teen 1867) tot 2 400 (teen 1879) mans, [82]: 140 en geen militêre eenheid is ontplooi noord van Valparaiso, 1700 km suid van Iquique . [82]: 143 Teen die einde van die oorlog was 53% van die hoofingenieurs wat in Chileense oorlogskepe gedien het, buitelanders. Die regering van Peru was weer in gebreke, en in Bolivia het hongersnood oor die land versprei.

Volgens William Sater het Chili en Peru tydelik 2% van die manlike bevolking ingeroep, maar Bolivia slegs 1%. [83] Na die Slag van Tacna is albei die geallieerde leërs ontbind en moes hulle weer gevorm word.

Die geallieerde magte het met die eerste oogopslag 'n paar voordele bo die Chileense magte gehad. Their population and armies doubled the Chileans in numbers, and the Peruvian port of Callao's powerful artillery was impregnable for the Chilean navy and a secure haven for the Peruvian navy. In Callao, an English company offered the service of a floating dock for ships up to 3000 tonnes, and the Peruvian government used it to repair their ships at the outset of the war. [84] : 119 Those are some reasons that led the international press to expect a Chilean defeat as the war started. [85] [86] [87] Moreover, the ambivalent Argentine position and the ongoing Mapuche conflict overshadowed the Chilean perspective. [86] : 109 J. Basadre commented on the public opinion in Peru and Bolivia: "They ignored the real power of Chile and the horrors of war, and simple minded people believed that the Allied would win the war because they together were bigger than Chile." [88]

However, other observers [89] made a more in-depth analysis, which showed Chilean political and military advantages. Chile had a stable political system since 1833 that had developed and strengthened its institutions. The Chilean army and the navy had educated officers, [90] soldiers with professional experience in the Mapuche conflict, [84] : 43 and uniformly modern arms. Almost all Chilean soldiers were armed with Comblain or Gras rifles. The Chilean navy also possessed two new ironclads, which were invincible against the older Peruvian warships. Although there was interference between military and government over policy during the war, the primacy of the government was never questioned. [91] The Chilean supply line from Europe through the Magellan Strait was only once threatened unsuccessfully by the Peruvian navy.

The Allied armies were heavily involved in domestic politics and neglected their military duties, and poor planning and administration caused them to buy different rifles with different calibers. That hampered the instruction of conscripts, the maintenance of arms, and the supply of ammunition. The Peruvian navy warships manned before the war by Chilean sailors had to be replaced by foreign crews when the war began. [92] Bolivia had no navy. The Allied armies had nothing comparable to the Chilean cavalry and artillery.

Struggle for sea control Edit

Its few roads and railroad lines made the nearly waterless and largely unpopulated Atacama Desert difficult to occupy. From the beginning, naval superiority was critical. [93] Bolivia had no navy [94] and so on March 26, 1879, Hilarión Daza formally offered letters of marque to any ships willing to fight for Bolivia. [95] The Armada de Chile en die Marina de Guerra del Perú fought the naval battles.

Early on, Chile blockaded the Peruvian port of Iquique on April 5. [96] In the Battle of Iquique, on May 21, 1879, the Peruvian ironclad Huáscar engaged and sank the wooden Esmeralda Meanwhile, during the Battle of Punta Gruesa, the Peruvian Independencia struck a submerged rock and sank in the shallow waters near Punta Gruesa while chasing the schooner Covadonga. In total, Peru stopped the blockade of Iquique, and Chile lost the old Esmeralda. Nevertheless, the loss of the Independencia cost Peru 40% of its naval offensive power [97] and made a strong impression upon military leaders in Argentina and so Argentina's intervention in the war became far more remote. [98]

Despite being outnumbered, the Peruvian monitor Huáscar held off the Chilean Navy for six months and upheld Peru's morale during the early stages of the conflict. [99] : 108

The capture of the steamship Rímac on July 23, 1879 carrying a cavalry regiment (the Carabineros de Yungay) was the Chilean Army's largest loss until then. [100] That led to the resignation of Contraalmirante (Rear Admiral) Juan Williams Rebolledo, the chief of the Chilean Navy, on August 17. Commodore Galvarino Riveros Cárdenas replaced him and devised a plan to catch the Huáscar. [101]

Meanwhile, the Peruvian navy had some other actions, particularly in August 1879 during the unsuccessful raid of the Unión to Punta Arenas, at the Strait of Magellan, in an attempt to capture the British merchant ship Gleneg, which transported weapons and supplies to Chile. [102]

Capital ships of Chile and Peru at the beginning of the War of the Pacific [103]
Warship tons
(L.ton)
Horse-
krag
Speed
(Knots)
Armor
(Inch)
Main Artillery Built
Jaar
Chili
Cochrane 3,560 3,000 9–12.8 up to 9 6x9 Inch 1874
Blanco Encalada 3,560 3,000 9–12.8 up to 9 6x9 Inch 1874
Peru
Huascar 1,130 1,200 10–11 2x300–pounders 1865
Independencia 2,004 1,500 12–13 2x150–pounders 1865

The Battle of Angamos proved decisive on October 8, 1879, and Peru was reduced almost exclusively to land forces. [104] In the battle, the Chilean Navy managed to capture the Huáscar after several hours of fierce battle, even though her surviving crewmen sought to scuttle her. [104] The Chilean Navy was from then on required to carry troops for the invasion of Peru and to provide fire support for amphibious assault and other troops operating within its range. Chilean warships also had to impose a naval blockade of Peruvian ports and end the smuggling of arms from Panama into Peru via the Pacific.

After the Battle, despite the loss of both of their main ships, the Peruvians used simple and ingenious ruses to sink two important Chilean ships, the Loa (July 1880) and the Covadonga (August 1880), [105] but its remaining units were locked in its main port during the long blockade of Callao.

On the other hand, the Chilean Navy captured the ship Pilcomayo in November 1879 and the torpedo boat Alay in December 1880.

When Lima fell after the Battles of Chorrillos and Miraflores, the Peruvian naval officers scuttled the entire fleet to prevent its capture by the Chilean forces. [106]

Land war Edit

After the Battle of Angamos, once Chile achieved naval supremacy, the government had to decide where to strike. The options were Tarapacá, Moquegua or directly Lima. Because of its proximity to Chile and the capture of the Peruvian Salitreras, Chile decided to occupy the Peruvian province of Tarapacá first.

Arica and Iquique were isolated and separated by the Atacama Desert since the capture of the Huáscar in October 1879, neither port had naval protection needed to be adequately supplied by sea. Without any communication or withdrawal lines, the area was essentially cut off from the rest of Peru. [107] After the loss of its naval capabilities, Peru had the option to withdraw to central Peru to strengthen its army around Lima until the re-establishment of a naval balance or to build up new alliances, as hinted by the Chilean historian Wilhelm Ekdahl. However, Jorge Basadre assumes that it would have been "striking and humiliating" to abandon Tarapacá, the source of Peru's wealth. [108]

On April 30, 1879, after 13 days of marching, 4,500 Bolivian soldiers, commanded by Daza, arrived in Tacna, a town 100 km (60 mi) north of Arica. The Bolivians had come to join the Peruvian forces, commanded by Juan Buendia. The Allied forces were deployed to the places that a Chilean landing could be expected the Iquique-Pisagua or Arica-Tacna regions. There were reserves stationed at Arequipa, farther north in Peru, under Lizardo Montero, as well as in southern Bolivia, under Narciso Campero [Notes 2] The reserves were to be deployed to the coast after a landing but failed to arrive.

The land war can be seen as four Chilean military campaigns that successively occupied Tarapacá, Arica-Tacna, and Lima and a final campaign that ended the Peruvian resistance in the sierra. The occupation of Arequipa and Puno at the end of the war saw little military action.

Tarapacá Campaign Edit

The Campaign of Tarapacá began on November 2, 1879, when nine steam transporters escorted by half of the Chilean Navy transported 9,500 men and more than 850 animals to Pisagua, some 500 kilometres (310 mi) north of Antofagasta. After neutralizing the coastal batteries, the Chileans landed and attacked beach defenses in Pisagua. [110]

In the event of a Chilean landing, the Allied forces planned to counterattack the Chilean forces in a pincer movement involving advances from the north (Daza's forces coming from Arica) and from the south (Buendia's forces coming from Iquique). Although Peruvian forces marched northwards as planned after the fall of Pisagua, Daza, coming from Arica, decided in Camarones (44 km from Pisagua) to give up his part of the counterattack and return to Arica.

The Chileans meanwhile marched towards Iquique and, on November 19, 1879, defeated the Allied troops without Daza's men gathered in Agua Santa in the Battle of San Francisco and Dolores. Disbanded Bolivian forces there and the southern force retreated to Oruro, and the Peruvians fell back to Tiliviche. The Chilean army captured Iquique (80 km/50 mi south of Pisagua) without resistance. Some of the Peruvian forces that had been defeated at San Francisco retreated on Tarapacá, a little town with same name as the province, where they combined with Peruvian troops who withdrew to Tarapacá directly from Iquique.

A detachment of Chilean soldiers, with cavalry and artillery, was sent to face the Peruvian forces in Tarapacá. Both sides clashed on November 27 in the Battle of Tarapacá, and the Chilean forces were defeated, but the Peruvian forces, without lines of communication with their supply bases in Peru or Bolivia, could not maintain their occupation of the territory. Consequently, the Peruvians retreated north through harsh desert terrain to Arica and lost many troops during their withdrawal. [111] Bruce W. Farcau comments that, "The province of Tarapacá was lost along with a population of 200,000, nearly one tenth of the Peruvian total, and an annual gross income of £28 million in nitrate production, virtually all of the country's export earnings." [112] The victory afforded Santiago an economic boon and a potential diplomatic asset. [113]

Domestic policies until the fall of Iquique Edit

Die Rimac’s capture, the sinking of the Esmeralda, and the passiveness of the Chilean fleet showed that the command of the navy was unprepared for the war, and the army also had trouble with the logistics, medical service, and command. Public discontent with poor decisions led to riots, and the government had to replace the "sclerotics" [97] chief of the navy Juan Williams Rebolledo (by Galvarino Riveros), and the Chief of the army Justo Arteaga (by Erasmo Escala). After Tarapacá, the army was reorganized into divisions. Chile's foreign policy tried to separate Bolivia from Peru. Gonzalo Bulnes writes: "The target of the política boliviana was the same as before, to seize Tacna and Arica for Bolivia and put Bolivia as a buffer state between Peru and Chile, on the assumption that Peru would accept the Chilean peace conditions. The initiated called such policy 'to clear up Bolivia.'" [114] Moreover, the Chilean government had to find a border agreement with Argentina to avoid war.

After the occupation of the salpeter and guano deposits, the Chilean government restituted the oficinas salitreras, which had been nationalized by Peru, to the owner of the certificate of debt. [115] The alternative of a Chilean State Company of Salpeter was discarded as too onerous for a government waging war and lacking experienced personnel, and the creditors pressed the issue. In 1879, Chile began to exact a tax of 40 cents per "quintal métrico" (100 kg), increasing to $1.60 in 1880. [116]

As provided by the secret treaty, the allies agreed in the Protocol of Subsidies for Bolivia to bear the costs of the war. The agreement, which regulated the tax income for many years, caused resentments and fears in Bolivia, whose deployment of forces to Tacna was seen as helping Peru. Also, Bolivia knew that its army would be sent not to free the occupied region of Bolivia but to protect Peru. As Daza and his officers came to Tacna and Arica, they failed to see the expected Peruvian military strength and understood that their position of power in Bolivia was threatened by a defeat of the Allies. The Bolivian historian Querejazu suggests that Daza successfully used the Chilean offer of Tacna and Arica for Bolivia to exert pressure on Peru to get a more favorable Protocol of Subsidies.

The reason that Daza abandoned the Peruvian forces in Iquique and turned back to Arica just before the Battle of San Francisco is uncertain. Some historians say that he wanted to keep the "Regimiento Colorados" untouched since the force secured his political power in Bolivia. Daza later stated that his officers refused to continue the march through the desert, but his shameful withdrawal accelerated his downfall, and he was succeeded by Narciso Campero. In the new government, there was a strong tendency to accept the Chilean offer of Tacna and Arica, but it was eventually refused. Bolivia signed the creation of the United States of Peru and Bolivia, a political fantasy without any practical consequences. Bolivia helped Peru with money and weapons, but the Bolivian army never again intervened in the war.

In Peru, the political situation was complicated. President Prado had declared war on Chile for longstanding economical and political reasons [60] but without the funds or international credit to finance the war. He turned over the administration of the state to Vice President Luis La Puerta de Mendoza to assume for himself the command of the army. Because of the Chilean blockade, Peru could not export revenuemaking goods via its ports. As a consequence, public revenue was half of what had been expected, and spending tripled. The Peruvian government in 1879 experienced several political crisis and seven ministers of finance. General Buendía, who led the defeated allied troops in Iquique, and More, chief of the sunken warship Onafhanklikheid, were both put on trial but were eventually acquitted.

The Peruvian government was confronted with widespread rioting in Lima because of its failures. [117] On December 18, 1879, as the fall of Iquique became known in Peru, Prado went from Callao to Panama, allegedly with the duty to oversee the purchase of new arms and warships for the nation. In a statement for the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio, he turned over the command of the country to Vice President Luis La Puerta de Mendoza. History has condemned his departure as a desertion. [118] : 27 Nicolás de Piérola overthrew Puerta's government and took power on December 23, 1879. [119]

Piérola has been criticised because of his sectarianism, frivolous investment, bombastic decrees, and lack of control in the budget, but it must be said that he put forth an enormous effort to obtain new funds and to mobilize the country for the war. Basadre considered his work an act of heroism, abnegation in a country invaded, politically divided, militarily battered, and economically bloodless. [120]


USS Yorktown at Midway

The carrier USS Yorktown is hit on her portside during the Japanese bombardment in the Battle of Midway in the Pacific on 4 June 1942. The Yorktown was the only American carrier lost in the battle. Japanese losses included 4 carriers and more than 3,000 men killed or captured.

The United States now had the initiative and began a two-pronged campaign to drive back the Japanese. In the south-west Pacific, General MacArthur advanced towards the Philippines. The main attack was in the central Pacific, where Admiral Nimitz fought an island-hopping campaign with his carrier battle-groups. The capture of islands such as Tarawa, Saipan and Iwo Jima saw heavy casualties on both sides.


Inhoud

The following actors played starring roles in multiple episodes and are split by the principal character they appear in relation to. Characters from the different plot strands do occasionally interact, while Sidney Phillips both serves with Leckie and is the best friend of Sledge.

    as Pfc.Robert Leckie (1920–2001) as Pfc. Sidney Phillips (1924–2015) as Pfc. Lew "Chuckler" Juergens (1918–1982) as Pfc. Wilbur "Runner" Conley (1921–1997) as Pfc. Bill "Hoosier" Smith (1922–1985) as 2nd Lt. Stone as 1st Lt. Hugh Corrigan (1920–2005) as Pfc. Ronnie Gibson as Vera Keller as Pfc. Eugene Sledge (1923–2001) as Cpl. Merriell "Snafu" Shelton (1922–1993) as Sgt. R.V. Burgin (1922–2019)
    as Pfc. Bill Leyden (1926–2008) as Mary Frank Sledge
  • Conor O'Farrell as Dr. Sledge
  • Dylan Young as Pfc. Jay De L'Eau (1923–1997) as 1st Lt. Edward "Hillbilly" Jones (1917–1944)
  • Scott Gibson as Capt.Andrew Haldane (1917–1944) as Sgt. Elmo "Gunny" Haney (1898–1979) as Sgt.John Basilone (1916–1945)
  • Joshua Bitton as Sgt. J.P. Morgan (1919–1980) as Lt. Col.Lewis "Chesty" Puller (1898–1971) as Sgt. Manuel Rodriguez (1922−1942) as Sgt. Lena Basilone (1913–1999)

Stille Oseaan was produced by Steven Spielberg, Tom Hanks, and Gary Goetzman in association with HBO Miniseries, Playtone, DreamWorks, Seven Network and Sky Movies. [8] [9] Seven and Sky both invested in the project for the right to broadcast it in Australia and the United Kingdom respectively. [10] Nine Network has previously broadcast the HBO productions of Band of Brothers. Nine had a broadcast deal with HBO's parent Warner Bros., but then HBO started to distribute its own productions separately. [11] In April 2007, the producers set up a production office in Melbourne and began casting. [12]

Originally the project was estimated at $100 million to produce, [11] but ended up costing over $200 million, making Stille Oseaan the most expensive television miniseries ever created by any network. [13] [14] [15] According to Die Sydney Morning Herald the series cost $270 million, with an estimated A$134 million of that spent in Australia. [16] The Australian newspaper Herald Sun estimates that it brought 4,000 jobs and generated A$180 million for the Australian economy. [17]

Filming of the miniseries in Australia started on August 10, 2007, [18] and finished in late May 2008. [19] From August until November 2007 [20] filming took place at locations in and around Port Douglas, Queensland including Mossman, Queensland [21] Drumsara Plantation, Mowbray National Park [21] and beaches at Rocky Point, Queensland. [21] Production then moved to rural Victoria, [22] [23] in the You Yangs near Lara (from November–December 2007), [24] then at a sand quarry on Sandy Creek Road near Geelong, Victoria until February 2008. [25] Melbourne city locations were used in late 2007 and through 2008 including Central City Studios at Melbourne Docklands (March 2008) [26] [27] Flinders Street (between Swanston and Elizabeth streets, February 1–4, 2008) [28] [29] the intersection of Swanston and Flinders streets (February 2008) [30] Flinders Street station (February 2–3, 2008). [31] Other suburban locations included Mornington Railway, Bundoora, Victoria, [32] specifically the Ernest Jones Hall at the La Trobe University campus, Bundoora (late May 2008) [33] the Railway Hotel, South Melbourne (December 2007) [34] Scotch College, Melbourne (December 2007) [34] Melbourne High School (December 2007). [34] [35]

The series's score was written by Hans Zimmer, Geoff Zanelli and Blake Neely and was released on March 9, 2010. [36]

Historian Hugh Ambrose, son of Band of Brothers author Stephen E. Ambrose, wrote the official tie-in book to the miniseries, [37] The Pacific: Hell was an Ocean Away (2011), which follows the stories of two of the featured men from the miniseries, Basilone and Sledge, as well as stories of Sledge's close friend Sidney Phillips and two men not featured in the series, marine officer Austin Shofner and US Navy pilot Vernon Micheel. The different cast provides a wider view of the Pacific theatre, allowing the book to include the fall of the Philippines, Midway, Philippine Sea and Luzon and expand the narrative to include depictions of life as experienced by prisoners of war, senior officers and the development of naval aviation. It was published in the UK and the US in March 2010 and Ambrose gave a webcast interview about the book at the Pritzker Military Library on April 15, 2010. [38] [39]

The series premiered in the US and Canada on March 14, 2010, on HBO. [40] HBO Asia premiered Stille Oseaan at 9 pm on April 3, 2010, with the first two episodes being consecutively broadcast in the first week. Singapore, Hong Kong, and Indonesia had dual language available. Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Philippines broadcasts were available in high-definition on the HBO Asia HD Channel. [41] Stille Oseaan began broadcast on April 5, 2010 on Sky Movies in the United Kingdom and Ireland. [42] In Portugal, the series was broadcast on April 5, 2010 on AXN and in HD on AXN HD two days after the original broadcast in the US. The series broadcast commenced in Australia on Channel 7 on Wednesday, April 14, 2010, at 8:30 pm. [43] In Denmark, Norway, Finland, France and Sweden, the series began broadcasting on Canal+ in Turkey, CNBC-e on April 18, 2010 in the Netherlands, on April 7, 2010 on Veronica and in Greece, on Nova Cinema on April 10, 2010. In New Zealand, the series began broadcasting on April 12, 2010 on TV One. In Italy, the miniseries began broadcast on May 9, 2010 on Sky Cinema 1 in Germany, on July 15, 2010 on Kabel eins. In Japan, the miniseries started July 18, 2010 on WOWOW. [44] In South Africa, the miniseries started broadcasting on May 5, 2010 on the Mnet channel. In the US, the rights to the series were picked up by Ovation and it started airing sometime in 2019.

Bemarking Redigeer

The first official US trailer for Stille Oseaan aired on HBO prior to the season 2 premiere of True Blood on June 14, 2009. It showed footage of the three main characters, including a conversation between Leckie and Sledge, Basilone's marriage and numerous combat scenes. The trailer concluded with "2010" displayed on-screen -alluding to and confirming the series release date. A second trailer was released on the HBO website after which the date "March 2010" is displayed, giving a more specific series release date. On January 14, 2010, Comcast added on-demand content from the series, including a scene from Stille Oseaan, interviews with the producers and character profiles. [45] Another trailer was shown in February 2010 during Super Bowl XLIV, depicting several combat scenes. An extended trailer (3:47) to the miniseries can be viewed on the series' official website.

Geen. TitelGeredigeer deurGeskryf deurOorspronklike lugdatumUS viewers
(miljoene)
1"Part One"
"Guadalcanal/Leckie"
Tim Van PattenBruce C. McKennaMarch 14, 2010 ( 2010-03-14 ) 3.08 [46]
Robert Leckie and the 1st Marines land on Guadalcanal and take part in the Battle of the Tenaru. Eugene Sledge persuades his parents to allow him to join the war. The Battle of Savo Island is briefly portrayed.
2"Part Two"
"Basilone"
David NutterBruce C. McKennaMarch 21, 2010 ( 2010-03-21 ) 2.79 [47]
John Basilone and the 7th Marines land on Guadalcanal to bolster the defenses around Henderson Field. Basilone, attempting to relocate his machine gun to a better position, bare-handedly cradles the hot barrel while in action, severely burning his arms, and continues fighting.
3"Part Three"
"Melbourne"
Jeremy PodeswaGeorge Pelecanos and Michelle AshfordMarch 28, 2010 ( 2010-03-28 ) 2.77 [48]
The 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal is relieved and arrives in Melbourne, Australia. Leckie falls in love with Stella Karamanlis, an Australian girl of Greek descent, who invites him to stay at her parents' home. Basilone receives the Medal of Honor and is sent home to sell war bonds.
4"Part Four"
"Gloucester/Pavuvu/Banika"
Graham YostRobert Schenkkan and Graham YostApril 4, 2010 ( 2010-04-04 ) 2.52 [49]
Eugene Sledge enlists in the Marines and trains for combat, while Leckie and the 1st Marine Division are put into action at Cape Gloucester. After their action on Cape Gloucester, Leckie and 1st Marine Division arrive in Pavuvu, which serves as temporary home to the 1st Marine Division. Leckie is treated for nocturnal enuresis caused by combat stress.
5"Part Five"
"Peleliu Landing"
Carl FranklinLaurence Andries and Bruce C. McKennaApril 11, 2010 ( 2010-04-11 ) 2.71 [50]
Sledge is reunited with an old friend, Sidney Phillips. Leckie integrates himself back into the front-line lifestyle. Sledge and Leckie land with the 1st Marine Division at Peleliu.
6"Part Six"
"Peleliu Airfield"
Tony ToBruce C. McKenna, Laurence Andries, and Robert SchenkkanApril 18, 2010 ( 2010-04-18 ) 2.38 [51]
The Marines move to capture Peleliu's vital airfield. Leckie is wounded by a blast concussion during the battle while trying to relay a message to the corpsman. With a face full of shrapnel and limited mobility, he is evacuated and sent to recuperate on a hospital ship as the fighting continues.
7"Part Seven"
"Peleliu Hills"
Tim Van PattenBruce C. McKennaApril 25, 2010 ( 2010-04-25 ) 2.55 [52]
Sledge and the 5th Marines move into Peleliu's Bloody Nose Ridge to face the Japanese. Andrew "Ack-Ack" Haldane is shot and killed by a Japanese sniper while assessing the area of Hill 140.
8"Part Eight"
"Iwo Jima"
David Nutter
Jeremy Podeswa
Robert Schenkkan and Michelle AshfordMay 2, 2010 ( 2010-05-02 ) 2.34 [53]
Basilone is transferred to the 5th Marine Division where he trains Marines for combat. There he meets and marries Lena Riggi. He then lands at Iwo Jima but is killed in action.
9"Part Nine"
"Okinawa"
Tim Van PattenBruce C. McKennaMay 9, 2010 ( 2010-05-09 ) 1.81 [54]
Sledge and the 1st Marine Division land at Okinawa. Sledge, now a seasoned veteran, becomes more cynical and no longer shows any compassion for the Japanese. The men are horrified to discover Okinawan civilians, including women and children, being forced to act as human shields. As he and others prepare to return home from Okinawa, they hear of a "new bomb" that "vaporized an entire [Japanese] city in the blink of an eye".
10"Part Ten"
"Home"
Jeremy PodeswaBruce C. McKenna and Robert SchenkkanMay 16, 2010 ( 2010-05-16 ) 1.96 [55]
Sledge and Leckie return home after the Japanese surrender. Sledge is still haunted by the horrors of war. Leckie starts a relationship with Vera. Basilone's widow, Lena, visits his parents and gives them his Medal of Honor.

Critical reception Edit

Stille Oseaan received widespread critical acclaim. On the review aggregation website Rotten Tomatoes, the series holds an approval rating of 91% with an average rating of 8.32 out of 10, based on 43 reviews. The website's critical consensus reads, "An honest, albeit horrifying, exploration of World War II, Stille Oseaan is a visually stunning miniseries not for the faint of heart." [56] On Metacritic, the series has a weighted average score of 86 out of 100, based on 32 critics, indicating "universal acclaim". [57]

Tyd magazine's James Poniewozik named it one of the Top 10 TV Series of 2010. [58] IGN reviewer Ramsey Isler gave the entire miniseries an 8.5 out of 10, saying "Although I don't think Stille Oseaan overtakes Band of Brothers in terms of technical execution and overall entertainment value, many of the comparisons will be moot as Stille Oseaan is a different kind of series with different goals. This series sought to look beyond the combat and it paints a full, vivid picture of the war and the people that fought it through focused, individual stories. That's a tall order for any series to fulfill, and although Stille Oseaan doesn't always come through with shining colors, it does make an admirable effort." [59] IGN also reviewed each individual episode, with Episode 9 receiving a perfect 10 out of 10 score. [60]

Awards and nominations Edit

Stille Oseaan won a Peabody Award in 2010 for "reminding us of the necessities—and the costs—of service." [61] It also won the Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Miniseries and was nominated for the Golden Globe Award for Best Miniseries or Television Film.


World War II in the Pacific Chronology Dec 1941--Aug 1945

Modern China began with the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1912. President Yuan accepted Japanese 21 points of influence. On his death in 1916, the massive country of China was divided among his subordinates and local war lords. International commercial interests had spheres of influence. The battle for national political influence was fought by backing of various coalitions of war lords, specially by Russia and Japan, traditional rivals, each of which wanted to consider China as a puppet state. By the middle 20's, Chaing Kai'shek had thrown off this communist sponsors and Chaing Tso-lin had been murdered by his Japanese backers. Chaing consolidated a national government, albeit with a communist rival Russia controlled the (outer) Mongolian Peoples Republic and Japan concentrated power north of the Great Wall.

Japan

Japan had started three previously victorious wars: Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 obtained Formosa and the Pescadores. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 gained Port Arthur and Korea. First World War gained the former German colony on the China coast and islands in the north Pacific and 21 point concessions from China. The imperial military, not under the parliamentary Diet, occupied Manchuria and governed it as the puppet state of Manchukuo. Japan was to start two more wars in the next few years.

Chronologie

1932
Jan 7 . US protests Japanese aggression in Manchuria.
Jan 29. Japs raid and bomb Shanghai, profess "destiny".
Feb18. Japanese declare Manchuria to be Manchukuo, a ward of Japan.

1933
Feb . Japan occupies Jehol province in China to be annexed to Manchukuo.
Feb 24. League of Nations calls for Japan to retire from Manchuria.

1934
Chaing attacks communist province of Kiangsi.
Long March of communists from Kiangsi
1935
More of northeast China is occupied by Japanese.
Mao Tse-tung emerges a leader from Long March, 6000 miles.
1936
Feb 26. Attempted coup gains military increased power in Japanese government.
Chiang Kai-shek declares Japan is at war with China.
Dec . Sian agreement ends civil war between communists and nationalists in China.
1937
June 7 . Formal start of Sino-Japanese War by staged attack on Marco Polo bridge in Peking.
July 28. Peking occupied.
Quick victories in northern China.
Nov . Take Shanghai in eastern China.
Dec 13. Japanese "Rape of Nanking" - 200,000 murdered - shocks the world.


The Allied offensive in the Pacific, 1944

The Allied victories in 1943 set the stage for the strategic advances of 1944, but they did not determine the exact lines of attack. MacArthur, with a firm foothold in New Guinea, was determined to move next to the Philippines, from which he had been driven after Pearl Harbor, and from there launch the final attack on the Japanese home islands. The admirals preferred to bypass the Philippines and take Formosa, which was much closer to Japan. All agreed, of course, that the naval forces that had met with such success in the Gilbert Islands should push toward the Marianas, from which the heavy B-29 bombers of the Army Air Forces could strike at Japan. It was recognized that before an invasion of the Japanese home islands became possible it would be necessary to undertake extensive aerial bombardment of the islands and cut Japan’s lines of communications to the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. All of these factors had to be taken into account in determining the lines of advance in 1944.

While military planners argued the merits of one approach over another, two main lines of attack were actually followed during 1944: (1) MacArthur’s ground forces (including Army, Marine, and Navy elements) strengthened their hold in New Guinea and eventually invaded the Philippines (2) Nimitz’s naval forces drove across the central Pacific from the Gilberts to the Marianas and then covered the landing in the Philippines. Although one line of attack was carried out primarily by ground forces and the other by naval forces, the main feature of both undertakings was the close coordination of land, sea, and air power. It was a new kind of combined operations warfare in which the Allies consistently outclassed their Japanese opponents. It made the term “amphibious” a household word throughout the English-speaking world.


Kyk die video: Stille oceaan, paaseiland 2 (November 2021).