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Hitler se buitelandse beleid en oorsprong van die WO2

Hitler se buitelandse beleid en oorsprong van die WO2


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Groot leuen

Die groot leuen (Duits: große Lüge) is 'n growwe verdraaiing of wanvoorstelling van die waarheid, veral as propagandategniek gebruik. [1] [2] Die Duitse uitdrukking is geskep deur Adolf Hitler, toe hy sy boek uit 1925 dikteer Mein Kampf, om die gebruik van 'n leuen so 'kolossaal' te beskryf dat niemand sou glo dat iemand 'die vrymoedigheid kan hê om die waarheid so berug te verdraai nie'. Hitler beweer dat die tegniek deur Jode gebruik is om die verlies van Duitsland in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog aan die Duitse generaal Erich Ludendorff, wat 'n prominente nasionalistiese politieke leier in die Weimarrepubliek was, te blameer. Die historikus Jeffrey Herf sê die Nazi's het die idee van die oorspronklike groot leuen gebruik om die sentiment teen Jode te keer en die Holocaust teweeg te bring.

Herf beweer dat Joseph Goebbels en die Nazi-party eintlik die propaganda-tegniek van groot leuens gebruik het wat hulle beskryf het-en dat hulle dit gebruik het om jarelange antisemitisme in Europa in massamoord te omskep. [3] Herf voer verder aan dat die groot leuen van die Nazi's hul voorstelling was van Duitsland as 'n onskuldige, beleërde land wat terugval op 'n 'internasionale Jood', wat die Nazi's die skuld gegee het dat hulle die Eerste Wêreldoorlog begin het. Nazi -propaganda herhaaldelik die bewering dat Jode die mag agter die skerms in Brittanje, Rusland en die Verenigde State gehou het. Dit het bewerings versprei dat die Jode 'n "uitroeiingsoorlog" teen Duitsland begin het, en dit het hierdie bewerings gebruik om te beweer dat Duitsland die reg het om die Jode as selfverdediging te "vernietig". [4]

In 1943 het Die New York Times bydraer Edwin James beweer dat Hitler se grootste leuen sy revisionistiese bewering was dat Duitsland nie in 1918 in oorlog verslaan is nie, maar eerder deur interne groepe verraai is. [5] Hierdie steek-in-die-rug-mite is versprei deur regse groepe, waaronder die Nazi's. [6]

In die 21ste eeu is die term toegepas op Donald Trump se pogings om die Amerikaanse presidentsverkiesing in 2020 omver te werp. 'Die groot leuen' in hierdie geval is die valse bewering dat die verkiesing van hom gesteel is deur groot bedrog, en die omvang van die voorstanders van die eis het uiteindelik uitgeloop op Trump -ondersteuners wat die Amerikaanse hoofstad aanval. [7] [8]


Moltman en Hillgruber Edit

Die argument vir wat hierdie doelwitte letterlik beteken het, kom uit die 1960's deur historici Gunter Moltman en Andreas Hillgruber [1] wat in hul onderskeie werke beweer dat dit Hitler se droom was om 'Eutopia' te skep en uiteindelik die Verenigde State uit te daag. Hierdie tesis plaas hierdie twee historici in die 'Globalists' -kategorie, met die opposisie' Continentalists '. Bewyse vir hierdie bewerings kom uit die voorbereiding van Duitsland op oorlog in die jare 1933-1939 met 'n toenemende belangstelling in vlootbou en Hitler se besluit om oorlog te verklaar teen die VSA na die aanval op Pearl Harbor, wat Hitler se vasberadenheid toon. Die globaliste gebruik dit as 'n argument vir hoe Hitler se ideologie gevorm is, dit wil sê dat die VSA slegs verslaan kon word as Duitsland Europa sou verower en met Brittanje verbonde was. Daar word met algemene instemming gesê dat hierdie standpunt wat Hitler uitgespreek het, geskryf is met die gedagte dat die VSA vir Duitsland min belang het en geen bedreiging vir haar bestaan ​​inhou nie. Opgemerk deur toesprake en opgetekende gesprekke, beskou Hitler na 1930 die Verenigde State as 'n 'ongerepte staat', wat nie in staat was om oorlog te ontketen nie en ekonomies met Duitsland mee te ding as gevolg van die uiterste gevolge van die Groot Depressie. Selfs aan die einde van die dertigerjare, soos die kontinentaliste argumenteer teen die verowering van die wêreld, lyk dit asof Hitler steeds die mag van die VSA in die wêreld verontagsaam en glo dat slegs deur Duits-Amerikaanse burgers die VSA kan herleef en floreer. Dit kan lig werp oor waarom Hitler die besluit geneem het om oorlog te verklaar teen die Verenigde State na Pearl Harbor, en in die laat dertigerjare steeds gefokus het op Europese uitbreiding.

Terwyl Hildebrand glo dat Hitler 'n noukeurige voorbedagte rade gehad het Stufenplan (stap-vir-stap) vir Lebensraum, Beweer Hillgruber dat hy daarna die interkontinentale verowering beoog het. [2] Net so glo Noakes en Pridham [3] dat die neem van Mein Kampf en die Zweites Buch saam het Hitler 'n vyf-fase heroprusting gehad en her-militarisering van Rynland, Oostenryk, Tsjeggo-Slowakye en Pole om Duitse satelliete te word, Frankryk te verslaan of haar te neutraliseer deur 'n Britse alliansie, Lebensraum in Rusland en uiteindelik wêreldoorheersing. Goda [4] stem saam en glo dat sy uiteindelike doel die nederlaag en omverwerping van die Verenigde State was, teen wie se bedreiging hy die Britse Ryk sou waarborg in ruil vir 'n vrye hand om na te streef Lebensraum in die ooste. Hitler het langtermynplanne vir Frans Noord-Afrika gehad en in 1941 begin om 'n basis voor te berei [ waar? ] vir 'n trans -Atlantiese aanval op die Verenigde State. [ aanhaling nodig ] Donald Cameron Watt, wat in 1990 geglo het dat Hitler geen langtermynplanne het nie, [5] stem nou saam met Goda en meen dat Hitler geweier het om toegewings te gee aan die Spaanse en Italiaanse leiers Francisco Franco en Benito Mussolini om 'n verslane Frankryk te versoen. dat sulke voorbereidings kan voortgaan. [6]

Jochen Thies Edit

Daar is ander argumente vir die geval van die globaliste Jochen Thies het opgemerk dat planne vir wêreldoorheersing gesien kan word in Hitler se ideologie om mag te toon. Die skepping van manjifieke geboue en die gebruik van propaganda om Duitse sterkte te demonstreer, tesame met die boodskap om 'n Ryk te skep wat duisend jaar duur, toon duidelik Hitler se aspirasies vir die toekoms. Alhoewel dit 'n swak argument is om duidelik te maak dat hierdie boodskappe 'n gevolg is van die Nazi -ideologie wat daarop gemik is om volgelinge te skep en die moraal te versterk, is die idee van 'globale karakter' met betrekking tot oorlog. Daar is geen twyfel dat Hitler gedroom het oor die toekoms van sy geboorteland en tydens die voorbereiding op oorlog, moes gedink het oor die gevolge van die oorwinning oor die USSR. Sy stryd, soos hy in sy boek sou verwys Mein Kampf, het uiteindelik 'n wêreldwye karakter aangeneem, aangesien hy sy land op baie fronte oor die hele wêreld oorloë gevind het. Die globalistiese ingesteldheid vir Hitler se buitelandse beleid kan ondersteun word deur die opwindende gebeure van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, saam met sy tweede boek en die debatteerbare betekenis van Lebensraum alhoewel die kontinentiste dit kan gebruik Lebensraum as bewys om dit teen te werk.

Fritz Fischer Edit

Fritz Fischer, 'n kontinentale historikus wat uitgebreide werk aan die Duitse geskiedenis gedoen het, beweer in sy boek Van Kaiserreich tot Derde Ryk: Elemente van kontinuïteit in die Duitse geskiedenis, 1871-1945 [7] dat buitelandse beleid slegs 'n deurlopende neiging was van die imperialistiese beleid van Otto von Bismarck dat Hitler 'n ryk wou hê om Duitse belange te beskerm in 'n tyd van ekonomiese onstabiliteit en druk van mededingende wêreldryke.

Martin Broszat Redigeer

Martin Broszat, 'n funksionalistiese historikus, is al baie keer opgemerk om te wys op 'n ideologiese buitelandse beleid wat aangevuur word deur antisemitisme, anti-kommunisme en Lebensraum. Hy sê dat Hitler opgetree het in die rigting van hierdie drie ideale om gewildheid in sy regime aan te wakker en die ongelooflike transformasie wat hy aan die bewind gekom het, voort te sit. Wat buitelandse beleid betref, beteken dit die vernietiging van die Verdrag van Versailles en die hereniging van Duitse gebiede wat verlore is ná die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, asook die uitroei van Jode en kommuniste regoor die wêreld. Hy lewer bewyse van voorbereidings wat in 1938 getref is om grond in die Ooste van Europa in te neem, wat pas by die ideologie van kolonisasie, ekonomiese onafhanklikheid en die skepping van die Derde Ryk. Broszat bied 'n kontinentale saak aan deur te verklaar dat Hitler nog steeds van Eutopia droom toe hy Pole voor 1939 nie by sy planne ingesluit het nie, en fokus op Tsjeggo -Slowakye en Oostenryk, maar in plaas daarvan maklik bereikbare gebiede. Broszat betoog in hierdie opsig teen die verowering van die wêreld en merk op dat die eskalerende ideologiese radikalisme van die Nazi's se antisemitiese opvattings hulle verhinder het om 'n ernstige poging te begin om die wêreld oor te neem. Duitsland bevind hom onwillig in 'n wêreldoorlog, nie 'n Europese nie.

A. J. P. Taylor Edit

In 1961 vervaardig A. J. P. Taylor 'n boek met die titel Die oorsprong van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, [8] wat 'n heeltemal ander beeld gee van hoe die Nazi se buitelandse beleid gevorm en uitgevoer is. Taylor se tesis was dat Hitler nie 'n demoniese figuur van populêre verbeelding was nie, maar in buitelandse aangeleenthede 'n normale Duitse leier, en die buitelandse beleid van die Weimar -republiek vergelyk met die van Hitler, dit wil sê die vernietiging van die Verdrag van Versailles en haar vorige wil hê gebiede terug, maar op vreedsame wyse, nie aggressief nie. Sy argument was dat Hitler Duitsland die sterkste mag in Europa wou maak, maar hy wou nie of beplan oorlog nie. Die uitbreek van die oorlog in 1939 was 'n ongelukkige ongeluk wat deur almal se foute veroorsaak is. Daarbenewens het Taylor Hitler as 'n aangrypende opportunis uitgebeeld sonder enige oortuigings behalwe die strewe na mag en om van die Joodse vraag ontslae te raak. Hy het aangevoer dat Hitler geen langtermynplan gehad het nie en dat sy buitelandse beleid 'n dryfveer was en die kans aangegryp het soos hulle hulself gebied het. Hy gee die skuld aan die streng beperkings van Versailles, wat vyandigheid onder Duitsers veroorsaak het, en toe Hitler van 'n groter Duitsland preek, het die publiek in sy woorde geglo en was hy bereid om dit te aanvaar.

Die gedagte dat hy 'n begaafde opportunis was, het egter baie bewyse gehad, alhoewel Taylor die langtermynbeplanning heeltemal uitskakel, maar slim genoeg was om geleenthede aan te gryp. Hy het byvoorbeeld die versoeningsbeleid van Brittanje en Frankryk gebruik om dit doelbewus in Maart 1935 te trotseer toe hy diensplig in die weermag en die stigting van die Luftwaffe aangekondig het. Hy het op die Oostenrykse regering gedobbel om hom nie teë te staan ​​nie toe hy Wene in Maart 1938 binneval nadat hy besef het dat Brittanje en Frankryk nooit sou ingryp nie. Hy gebruik die geleentheid van die konferensie in München in September 1938 om Brittanje en Frankryk sy eise te laat aanvaar Lebensraum in Tsjeggo -Slowakye. Hy het die onderbreking in die betrekkinge tussen Brittanje-Frankryk en die Sowjetunie gebruik om die Nazi-Sowjet-nie-aggressie-verdrag te onderteken om sy toekomstige optrede teen Pole en Nederland-België te versterk. Taylor se mening oor hierdie debat het opskudding en wydverspreide weerlegging veroorsaak, maar die hele argument oor die aard van die Nazi -buitelandse beleid is uit sy werk geskep.


Hierdie dokument is geskryf deur Stephen Tonge. Ek is baie dankbaar vir sy vriendelike toestemming om dit op die webwerf te plaas.

Kort opsomming

1933 Duitsland het die Volkebond verlaat.
1934 Poging tot Nazi -staatsgreep in Oostenryk verpletter.
Pole en Duitsland sluit 'n alliansie.
1935 Duitsland het die militêre klousules van die Verdrag van Versailles verbreek
1936 Duitse troepe het die Rynland weer beset.
As-Rome-Berlyn onderteken
1938 Anschluss met Oostenryk.
Sudetenland oorhandig aan Duitsland as gevolg van die München -konferensie.
1939 Die res van die Tsjeggiese lande wat deur die Duitsers beset is.
Duitsland het Pole binnegeval.
Tweede Wêreldoorlog begin.

Hitler se buitelandse beleid doelwitte

Toe Hitler aan bewind kom, was hy vasbeslote om weer van Duitsland 'n grootmoondheid te maak en Europa te oorheers. Hy het sy idees uiteengesit in 'n boek met die naam Mein Kampf (My stryd) wat hy in 1924 in die gevangenis geskryf het. Sy hoofdoelwitte was

  1. Om die Verdrag van Versailles wat Duitsland opgelê is na haar nederlaag in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog te vernietig. Hitler het gevoel dat die verdrag onregverdig was en die meeste Duitsers ondersteun hierdie siening.
  2. Om alle Duitssprekendes in een land saam te snoer. Na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog het daar Duitsers in baie lande in Europa gewoon bv. Oostenryk, Tsjeggo -Slowakye, Pole. Hitler het gehoop dat hy deur 'n vereniging in een land 'n magtige Duitsland of Grossdeutschland sou skep.
  3. Om ooswaarts na die Ooste uit te brei (Pole, Rusland) om grond vir Duitsland te verkry (Lebensraum- leefarea).

Sy taktiek was om die bedreiging van geweld te gebruik om sy doelwitte te bereik. Hy het besef dat sy moontlike vyande, Frankryk en Brittanje, huiwerig was om oorlog te voer en bereid was om 'n kompromie aan te gaan om 'n herhaling van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog te vermy. Hy was ook 'n opportunis wat gereeld vir sy eie voordeel voordeel getrek het uit geleenthede.

Sy suksesse in die buitelandse beleid in die dertigerjare sou hom 'n baie gewilde figuur in Duitsland maak. Soos een Duitse politieke teenstander beskryf het:

Almal het gedink dat daar 'n mate van regverdiging was in die eise van Hitler. Alle Duitsers het Versailles gehaat. Hitler het hierdie haatlike verdrag opgeskeur en Frankryk op sy knieë gedwing …. mense het gesê: 'Hy het moed gekry om risiko's te neem'

1933-4

Hitler protesteer daarteen dat die Geallieerdes nie ontwapen het na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog nie en hy verlaat die ontwapeningskonferensie en die Volkebond in 1933. Hy verskerp die program van geheime herbewapening.

In 1934 sluit Duitsland en Pole 'n alliansie, die eerste van sy berugte tien jaar lange nie-aggressie-ooreenkomste. Dit het destyds 'n verrassing in Europa veroorsaak. Die alliansie het die diplomatieke isolasie van Duitsland verbreek, terwyl dit ook die reeks anti-Duitse alliansies in Oos-Europa in Frankryk verswak het. Pole en Duitsland sou die volgende vyf jaar hartlike betrekkinge geniet. Soos baie van sy ooreenkomste, was dit egter 'n taktiese skuif en Hitler was nie van plan om die ooreenkoms op lang termyn na te kom nie.

In Julie 1934 is 'n poging van Oostenrykse Nazi's om die regering in hul land omver te werp, verpletter. Die Oostenrykse premier Dollfuss is dood in die poging. Hitler ondersteun eers die poging tot staatsgreep, maar ontken die aksie toe dit duidelik was dat dit sou misluk. Italië het met groot vyandigheid gereageer op die vooruitsig dat Oostenryk in Nazi -hande sou val en troepe na die grens met Oostenryk gehaas.

In Januarie 1935 die Saar gestem om na Duitsland terug te keer. Hierdie streek is deur die Verdrag van Versailles onder die beheer van die Volkebond geplaas. Dit het die Franse in staat gestel om sy steenkoolvelde vir 15 jaar te ontgin. Die stemming om na Duitsland terug te keer, is ondersteun deur meer as 90%. Dit was 'n groot propaganda -hupstoot vir Hitler wat kon beweer dat sy beleid die steun van die Duitse volk het.

In Maart, met die voorwendsel dat die ander moondhede nie ontwapen het nie, kondig Hitler aan dat Duitsland weer diensplig sal instel en 'n leër van 36 afdelings sal stig. Hy het ook gesê dat Duitsland 'n lugmag gaan bou (die Luftwaffe) en brei haar vloot uit. Al hierdie aksies was in stryd met die bepalings van die Verdrag van Versailles, maar was baie gewild in Duitsland.
Brittanje, Italië en Frankryk het die Stresa voor om teen hierdie optrede te protesteer, maar geen verdere maatreëls getref nie. Hierdie verenigde front teen Duitsland is verder verswak toe Italië inval Ethiopië.

'N Faktor wat Hitler gehelp het, was die houding van die Engelse. Hulle het gevoel dat Duitsland baie streng behandel is in Versailles en dat daar baie simpatie met die Duitse optrede was. Die herinnering aan die gruwels van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog was ook nog baie sterk in Brittanje. Hulle was ook baie anti-kommunisties en was meer bekommerd oor Stalin.

Die Britte het hul eie belange beskerm en 'n vlootooreenkoms met Hitler gesluit wat die Duitse vloot tot 35% van Brittanje beperk het. Daar is geen beperking op die aantal duikbote wat Duitsland kan ontwikkel nie.

Die Rynland 1936

Ingevolge die Verdrag van Versailles is die Duitsers verbied om vestings of stasietroepe in die Rynland of binne 50 kilometer van die regteroewer van die rivier op te rig. In 1935 toe Mussolini aanval Ethiopië, Ignoreer Hitler internasionale protes en ondersteun Mussolini. Dit het die internasionale isolasie van Duitsland beëindig en die Italianers het aangedui dat hulle die Duitse invloed in Oostenryk aanvaar en die uiteindelike remilitarisering van die Rynland.

Die meeste mense het verwag dat die Duitsers troepe na die Rynland sou stuur, die vraag was wanneer? Op 7 Maart 1936, in een van sy vele Saterdag -verrassings, kondig Hitler aan dat sy troepe die Rynland binnegekom het.

Die Britte was nie bereid om stappe te neem nie. Daar was baie simpatie in Brittanje vir die Duitse optrede. Sonder Britse steun sou die Franse nie optree nie. Die Franse het die Maignot -lyn, 'n reeks forte aan die Duitse grens en voel veilig daaragter.

Die krag wat Hitler na die Rynland gestuur het, was klein, maar hy het gedobbel en gewen.

Die agt-en-veertig uur na die opmars na die Rynland was die senutergendste in my lewe. As die Franse dan in die Rynland sou optrek, sou ons met ons sterte tussen ons bene moes terugtrek, want militêre hulpbronne tot ons beskikking sou heeltemal onvoldoende gewees het vir selfs matige weerstand. ”

Hy het die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat Brittanje en Frankryk swak was en dat hy met aggressiewer optrede kon wegkom.

Alliansie met Mussolini 1936

In Junie 1936 het die Spaanse burgeroorlog uitgebreek. Beide Hitler en Mussolini het hulp gestuur aan Generaal Franco wat veg teen die volksverkose regering van Spanje. Hierdie nouer samewerking tussen die twee Fascistiese diktators het gelei tot 'n alliansie wat bekend staan ​​as die Rome-Berlyn-as. Dit was 'n ooreenkoms om 'n gesamentlike buitelandse beleid te voer. Albei het ingestem om die verspreiding van kommunisme in Europa te stop. Hierdie verhouding het in 1939 nouer geword met die ondertekening van “Die pakt van staal”.

Oostenryk 1938

Hitler wou al lank die geboorteland onder Duitse beheer bring. Daar was 'n Nazi -party in Oostenryk en baie in Oostenryk het die unie van albei lande ondersteun. Alhoewel daar in 1934 'n mislukte staatsgreeppoging was, het Duitsland sy invloed in Oostenryk teen 1938 uitgebrei.

In Februarie 1938 het die Oostenrykse premier, Schuschnigg, ontmoet Hitler by Berchtesgaden in die Alpe. Tydens die vergadering is die Oostenrykse kanselier bedreig en is hy gedwing om vooraanstaande Oostenrykse Nazi's in sy regering te plaas.

Met sy terugkeer na Oostenryk het Schuschnigg probeer om op te hou om die Duitse invloed te versprei deur 'n referendum op te roep. Hierdie woedende Hitler en Schuschnigg moes noodgedwonge bedank. Duitse troepe is deur die nuwe Nazi -premier uitgenooi na 8221 Seyss-Inquart.

Hitler keer met triomf na Wenen terug waar hy deur euforiese skare begroet is. Dit was die stad waar hy voor die Eerste Wêreldoorlog as af en toe gewoon het. Hitler het Oostenryk in die Ryk opgeneem as die provinsie van Ostmark. Hierdie gebeurtenis het bekend gestaan ​​as die Anschluss.

Weer het die Britte en Franse niks gedoen nie. Die nuwe premier in Brittanje was Neville Chamberlain. Hy wou voorkom dat nog 'n Europese oorlog uitbreek. Hy het besluit om 'n beleid te volg Versoening.

Versoening was 'n beleid om aan Hitler se redelike eise te voldoen om oorlog te voorkom. Dit was destyds 'n baie gewilde beleid in Brittanje.

Die Sudetenland (Tsjeggo -Slowakye) 1938

Die volgende teiken vir Hitler was die land Tsjeggo -Slowakye. Dit is gestig na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Dit was die enigste demokrasie in Oos -Europa en beskik oor 'n goeie leër. Dit bevat ook 'n aantal nasionale minderhede (dit was die bynaam “ klein Oostenryk-Hongarye ”), waaronder 'n groot Duitse minderheid in 'n gebied wat bekend staan ​​as die Sudentenland. Hitler het die Duitsers wat daar woon aangemoedig om teen die Tsjeggiese bewind te betoog. Die leier van die Sudeten German Party was Konrad Henlein.

Hitler het besluit om die griewe van die Sudeten -Duitsers te gebruik om die gebied onder Duitse beheer te bring. Hy het in die geheim die datum van 1 Oktober vir oorlog met Tsjeggo -Slowakye bepaal as die probleem nie opgelos is nie. Gedurende die somer van 1938 het die krisis vererger. Die Sudeten -Duitsers wat deur Nazi -propaganda gesteun word, het geroer vir groter outonomie (onafhanklikheid).

Chamberlain het gehoop om oorlog te vermy en was van mening dat daar 'n mate van regverdiging was in die Duitse vraag na die streek. Hy vlieg na Duitsland en ontmoet Hitler twee keer, by Berchtesgaden en Slegte Godesberg. Alhoewel dit lyk asof 'n ooreenkoms bereik is, stel Hitler nuwe eise en dit lyk asof Europa op die rand van oorlog is.

Mussolini was swak voorbereid op 'n oorlog en het 'n konferensie van Brittanje, Frankryk, Duitsland en Italië voorgestel. Dit ontmoet by München op 28 September. Die Tsjegge is nie eers genooi nie. Die Britte en Franse het ingestem tot die eise van Hitler en dit het gelyk asof die bedreiging van oorlog afgeweer is. Chamberlain en Daladier, het die Franse premier, helde verwelkom toe hulle teruggekeer het huis toe. Die Tsjegge was bitter oor die verlies van grondgebied, insluitend die meeste van hul grensversterkings, en was nou feitlik magteloos om die Duitsers te weerstaan.

In Maart 1939 het Hitler die res van die Tsjeggiese lande oorgeneem nadat hy die Slowake onafhanklikheid onder Duitse beskerming te verklaar. Die Tsjeggiese president, Hacha is na Berlyn uitgenooi en is gedreig dat Praag gebombardeer sou word as hy nie met die Duitse besetting instem nie. Dit was aansienlik die eerste nie-Germaanse land wat Hitler in beslag geneem het. Hierdie beroep het die publieke opinie in Brittanje woedend gemaak en die einde van die versoening aangedui. In dieselfde maand het die Duitssprekende stad van Memel was beslag gelê op Litaue.

Pole 1939

Die besetting van die res van Tsjeggo -Slowakye het daartoe gelei dat Brittanje Pole gewaarborg het dat sy haar sou help as sy aangeval word. Ingevolge die Verdrag van Versailles het die nuutgeskepte deelstaat Pole die Duitssprekende hawe gekry Danzig en grond bekend as die Poolse gang om dit toegang tot die see te gee.

Hitler wou Pole vernietig om lewensruimte te kry (Lebensraum) .Hitler eis die Duitssprekende stad van Danzig uit Pole en die bou van 'n snelweg om Oos -Pruise met die res van die Ryk te verbind.

Die vraag na Danzig was nie die eintlike probleem vir Hitler nie. Hy het gesê

Verdere suksesse kan nie meer bereik word sonder dat bloed vergiet word nie en#8230Danzig is glad nie die onderwerp van die geskil nie. Dit is 'n kwessie van uitbreiding van ons leefruimte in die ooste en daar is geen sprake van die spaar van Pole nie.

Hy het die Pole daarvan beskuldig dat hulle die Duitse minderheid in ander dele van Pole mishandel het. Nazi -propaganda oordryf sterk verhale oor aanvalle op die Duitse minderheid. Die Pole het geweier om die stad van Danzig.

'N Baie verrassende alliansie!

Namate die somer toeneem, het die spanning toegeneem. Sowel Brittanje as Frankryk en Duitsland het probeer om die steun van die USSR te kry in geval van oorlog. Stalin het Brittanje en Frankryk nie vertrou nie en het gevoel dat hulle Hitler aanmoedig om Rusland aan te val. Hy was baie kwaad oor die München -ooreenkoms.

Alhoewel Duitsland en die Sowjetunie tot 1939 bittere vyande was, was die wêreld verstom toe hulle verneem dat hulle 'n ooreenkoms bereik het 23 Augustus 1939. Dit was 'n Tien jaar nie-aggressie verdrag. Beide lande het baat gevind by hierdie ooreenkoms. Vir die Sowjetunie het dit haar meer tyd gegee om voor te berei op die oorlog, en sy het baie gebiede in Oos -Europa gekry. Duitsland is verseker dat as sy Pole sou aanval, sy nie 'n tweeledige oorlog hoef te ondergaan nie.

Nazi -Sowjet -nie -aggressie -verdrag

Geheime bykomende protokol.

In die geval van 'n territoriale en politieke herrangskikking van die gebiede wat aan die Poolse staat behoort, sal die invloedsfere van Duitsland en die USSR ongeveer begrens word deur die lyn van die riviere Narev, Vistula en San.

Die vraag of die belange van beide partye die instandhouding van 'n onafhanklike Poolse staat wenslik maak en hoe so 'n staat beperk moet word, kan slegs beslis word in die loop van verdere politieke ontwikkelings.

Beide regerings sal hierdie vraag in elk geval deur middel van 'n vriendelike ooreenkoms oplos.

Hitler het gehoop dat die nuus van die verdrag met Rusland Frankryk en Brittanje sou keer om oorlog toe te gaan as Duitsland Pole aanval. Hy was verbaas toe Brittanje en Pole 'n onderlinge verdedigingsverdrag gesluit het. Mussolini het hom meegedeel dat Italië onvoorbereid was op oorlog en dat hy die inval in Pole uitgestel het. 'N Helling van diplomatieke aktiwiteite het niks bereik nie en op 1 September val Duitsland Pole binne. Op 3 September verklaar Brittanje en Frankryk oorlog teen Duitsland.

Hierdie materiaal mag vrylik vir nie-kommersiële doeleindes gebruik word in ooreenstemming met die toepaslike statutêre toelaes en verspreiding aan studente.
Herpublikasie in enige vorm is onderhewig aan skriftelike toestemming.


Invloed op Hitler

Adolf Hitler is in die tronk gesit ná die mislukking van die München Putsch, 1924 © Hitler het reeds in 1919 sy politieke loopbaan begin en is beïnvloed deur hierdie soort Pan-Duitse denke. Maar hy was nog nie duidelik oor waar die uitbreiding sou plaasvind nie, en ook nie oor watter alliansies hy nodig sou hê om dit te bereik nie.

Om mee te begin was hy nie vyandig teenoor Rusland nie, en beskou Brittanje en Frankryk as die belangrikste vyande van Duitsland. Gedurende 1919 blameer hy die politici van Duitsland voor die oorlog dat hulle Oostenryk-Hongarye teen Rusland ondersteun het.

Maar teen 1920 het hy aangevoer dat ''n alliansie tussen Rusland en Duitsland eers kan ontstaan ​​as die Jood verwyder word', en teen 1924, toe hy kom skryf Mein Kampf, het hy tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat Rusland die teiken sou wees vir Duitsland se strewe om te verkry Lebensraum. So, hoe het hierdie verandering van benadering tot stand gekom?

Hitler se siening oor Rusland gedurende hierdie vroeë jare is sterk beïnvloed deur Alfred Rosenberg, wat in 1920 by die Nazi -party aangesluit het en die redakteur van sy koerant geword het, die Völkischer Beobachter. Rosenberg was 'n Baltiese Duitser wat in Moskou studeer het toe die Russiese rewolusie in 1917 uitbreek en Rusland in November 1918 na Duitsland verlaat.

So het hy die Bolsjewistiese revolusie in die eerste plek beleef en het hy oortuig dat dit die werk van die Jode was. Hitler beskou Rosenberg as 'n kenner van Rusland en word ewe oortuig van die verband tussen Bolsjewisme en die Jode.

Hitler. raak ewe oortuig van die verband tussen Bolsjewisme en die Jode.

Teen 1922 het dit duidelik geword dat die Bolsjewistiese regime in Rusland daar was om te bly. Dit is inderdaad duidelik uit 'n onderhoud wat Hitler in Desember 1922 gegee het, dat hy toe besluit het dat 'n alliansie met 'n Bolsjewistiese Rusland nie ter sprake is nie. Duitsland sou beter saam met Brittanje en Italië, wat blykbaar teen die Franse hegemonie in Europa was, teen Rusland werk, wat op sy beurt die noodsaaklike van Duitsland kan wees Lebensraum.

Hitler se siening oor Rusland is verder verskerp deur sy kontakte met Baltiese Duitse ballinge in München. Max-Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, 'n kontakpersoon van August Winnig, die Duitse kommissaris in die Baltiese provinsies wat verantwoordelik was vir die organisering van die Free Corps, en generaal Ludendorff, die voormalige leier van Oberost.


Inhoud

Militêre rol in die buitelandse beleid Redigeer

Na die totstandkoming van die Duitse Ryk in 1871, is diplomatieke betrekkinge deur die keiserlike regering hanteer, eerder as deur laer-vlak regerings soos die Pruisiese en Beierse regerings. Tot 1914 oorheers die kanselier tipies besluite oor buitelandse beleid, ondersteun deur sy minister van buitelandse sake. Die magtige Duitse leër het afsonderlik verslag gedoen aan die keiser en het toenemend 'n belangrike rol gespeel in die vorming van buitelandse beleid wanneer militêre alliansies of oorlogvoering ter sprake was. [3]

In diplomatieke terme gebruik Duitsland die Pruisiese stelsel van militêre attaches verbonde aan diplomatieke plekke, met hoogs talentvolle jong offisiere wat die sterkpunte, swakpunte en militêre vermoëns van hul toegewese nasies moes evalueer. Hierdie beamptes gebruik noukeurige waarneming, gesprekke en betaalde agente om verslae van baie hoë gehalte op te stel wat 'n aansienlike voordeel vir die militêre beplanners bied. [4]

Die militêre personeel het al hoe sterker geword, die rol van die Minister van Oorlog verminder en homself toenemend in besluite oor buitelandse beleid laat geld. Otto von Bismarck, die keiserlike kanselier van 1871 tot 1890, was geïrriteerd deur militêre inmenging in buitelandse beleidsaangeleenthede - in 1887 het die weermag byvoorbeeld probeer om die keiser te oortuig om oorlog teen Rusland te verklaar; hulle het Oostenryk ook aangemoedig om Rusland aan te val. Bismarck het nooit die weermag beheer nie, maar hy het hewig gekla en die militêre leiers het teruggetrek. In 1905, toe die Marokko -aangeleentheid aan die gang was met die internasionale politiek, het die hoof van die Duitse generaal -staf, Alfred von Schlieffen, 'n voorkomende oorlog teen Frankryk gevra. Op 'n kritieke punt in die Julie -krisis van 1914 het Helmuth von Moltke, die stafhoof, sonder om die keiser of kanselier te vertel, sy eweknie in Oostenryk aangeraai om dadelik teen Rusland te mobiliseer. Tydens die Eerste Wêreldoorlog stel veldmaarskalk Paul von Hindenburg en generaal Erich Ludendorff toenemend buitelandse beleid, werk direk saam met die keiser-en vorm inderdaad sy besluitneming-en laat die kanselier en burgerlike amptenare in die duister. Die historikus Gordon A. Craig sê dat die deurslaggewende besluite tydens die oorlog in 1914 deur die soldate geneem is en dat hulle byna 'n volledige minagting van politieke oorwegings getoon het. [5]

Bismarck Edit

Bismarck se buitelandse beleid na 1871 was vredesgerig. Duitsland was tevrede - hy het alles wat hy wou hê, sodat sy hoofdoel vrede en stabiliteit was. Vreedsame betrekkinge met Frankryk het egter in 1871 moeilik geword toe Duitsland die provinsies Elsas en Lorraine geannekseer het. Die Duitse publieke opinie het daarop aangedring om Frankryk te verneder, en die weermag wou sy meer verdedigbare grense hê. Bismarck het teësinnig toegegee - Frans sou nooit vergeet of vergewe nie, het hy bereken, so kan net so goed die provinsies inneem. (Dit was 'n verkeerde aanname - na ongeveer vyf jaar het die Franse rustig geraak en dit as 'n geringe kwessie beskou.) "Terugskouend is dit maklik om te sien dat die anneksasie van Elsas-Lorraine 'n tragiese fout was." [7] [8] Nadat die anneksasie plaasgevind het, was die enigste beleid wat sinvol was om Frankryk te isoleer, sodat dit geen sterk bondgenote gehad het nie. Frankryk het egter Berlyn se planne bemoeilik toe dit bevriend raak met Rusland. In 1905 val 'n Duitse plan vir 'n alliansie met Rusland deur omdat Rusland te na aan Frankryk was. [9]

Die Liga van Drie Keisers (Dreikaisersbund) is in 1872 onderteken deur Rusland, Oostenryk en Duitsland. Dit verklaar dat republikanisme en sosialisme algemene vyande is en dat die drie moondhede enige aangeleenthede rakende buitelandse beleid sal bespreek. Bismarck het goeie betrekkinge met Rusland nodig om Frankryk geïsoleerd te hou. In 1877–1878 het Rusland 'n oorwinnende oorlog met die Ottomaanse Ryk gevoer en probeer om die Verdrag van San Stefano daarop af te dwing. Dit het veral die Britte ontstel, want hulle was lank besig om die Ottomaanse Ryk te bewaar en 'n Russiese oorname van die Bosporusstraat te voorkom. Duitsland het die kongres van Berlyn (1878) aangebied, waardeur ooreengekom is op 'n meer gematigde vredesooreenkoms. Duitsland het egter geen direkte belangstelling in die Balkan gehad nie, wat grotendeels 'n Oostenrykse en Russiese invloedsfeer was, hoewel koning Carol van Roemenië 'n Duitse prins was. [10]

Dual Alliance (1879) met Austria-Hungary Edit

In 1879 stig Bismarck 'n dubbele alliansie van Duitsland en Oostenryk-Hongarye, met die doel om wedersydse militêre hulp in die geval van 'n aanval van Rusland, wat nie tevrede was met die ooreenkoms wat op die Berlynse kongres bereik is nie. [11] Die totstandkoming van die Dual Alliance het daartoe gelei dat Rusland 'n meer versoenende standpunt ingeneem het, en in 1887 is die sogenaamde herversekeringsverdrag tussen Duitsland en Rusland onderteken: daarin het die twee moondhede ooreengekom oor onderlinge militêre ondersteuning in die geval dat Frankryk val Duitsland aan, of in die geval van 'n Oostenrykse aanval op Rusland. Rusland het sy aandag ooswaarts na Asië gerig en was vir die volgende 25 jaar grootliks onaktief in die Europese politiek. In 1882, Italy joined the Dual Alliance to form a Triple Alliance. Italy wanted to defend its interests in North Africa against France's colonial policy. In return for German and Austrian support, Italy committed itself to assisting Germany in the case of a French military attack. [12]

German colonial empire Edit

For a long time, Bismarck had refused to give in widespread public and elite demands to give Germany "a place in the sun" through the acquisition of overseas colonies. In 1880 Bismarck gave way, and a number of colonies were established overseas building on private German business ventures. In Africa, these were Togo, the Cameroons, German South-West Africa, and German East Africa in Oceania, they were German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands. In fact, it was Bismarck himself who helped initiate the Berlin Conference of 1885. He did it to "establish international guidelines for the acquisition of African territory" (see Colonisation of Africa). This conference was an impetus for the "Scramble for Africa" and "New Imperialism". [13] [14]

Kaiser Wilhelm Edit

After removing Bismarck in 1890 the young Kaiser Wilhelm sought aggressively to increase Germany's influence in the world (Weltpolitik). [15] Foreign policy was in the hands of an erratic Kaiser, who played an increasingly reckless hand, [16] and the powerful foreign office under the leadership of Friedrich von Holstein. [17] The foreign office argued that: first, a long-term coalition between France and Russia had to fall apart secondly, Russia and Britain would never get together and, finally, Britain would eventually seek an alliance with Germany. Germany refused to renew its treaties with Russia. But Russia did form a closer relationship with France in the Dual Alliance of 1894, since both were worried about the possibilities of German aggression. Furthermore, Anglo–German relations cooled as Germany aggressively tried to build a new empire and engaged in a naval race with Britain London refused to agree to the formal alliance that Germany sought. Berlin's analysis proved mistaken on every point, leading to Germany's increasing isolation and its dependence on the Triple Alliance, which brought together Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The Triple Alliance was undermined by differences between Austria and Italy, and in 1915 Italy switched sides. [18]

Meanwhile, the German Navy under Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had ambitions to rival the great British Navy, and dramatically expanded its fleet in the early 20th century to protect the colonies and exert power worldwide. [19] Tirpitz started a programme of warship construction in 1898. In 1890, Germany had gained the island of Heligoland in the North Sea from Britain in exchange for the eastern African island of Zanzibar, and proceeded to construct a great naval base there. This posed a direct threat to British hegemony on the seas, with the result that negotiations for an alliance between Germany and Britain broke down. The British, however, kept well ahead in the naval race by the introduction of the highly advanced new Dreadnought battleship in 1907. [20]

Two crises in Morocco Edit

In the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, Germany nearly came to blows with Britain and France when the latter attempted to establish a protectorate over Morocco. The Germans were upset at having not been informed about French intentions, and declared their support for Moroccan independence. William II made a highly provocative speech regarding this. The following year, a conference was held in which all of the European powers except Austria-Hungary (by now little more than a German satellite) sided with France. A compromise was brokered by the United States where the French relinquished some, but not all, control over Morocco. [21]

The Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911 saw another dispute over Morocco erupt when France tried to suppress a revolt there. Germany, still smarting from the previous quarrel, agreed to a settlement whereby the French ceded some territory in central Africa in exchange for Germany's renouncing any right to intervene in Moroccan affairs. It was a diplomatic triumph for France. [22]

Historian Heather Jones argues that Germany's use of warlike rhetoric was a deliberate diplomatic ploy:

Another German strategy was to stage dramatic gestures, and dangerously play up the threat of war, in the belief that this would impress upon other European powers the importance of consultation with Germany on imperial issues: the fact that France had not considered it necessary to make a bilateral agreement with Germany over Morocco rankled, especially given Germany was deeply insecure about its newly acquired Great Power status. Hence Germany opted for an increase in belligerent rhetoric and, theatrically, Kaiser Wilhelm II dramatically interrupted a Mediterranean cruise to visit Tangier, where he declared Germany's support for the Sultan's independence and integrity of his kingdom, turning Morocco overnight into an international 'crisis.' [23]

The German adventure resulted in failure and frustration, as military cooperation and friendship between France and Britain was strengthened, and Germany was left more isolated. An even more momentous consequence was the heightened sense of frustration and readiness for war in Germany. It spread beyond the political elite to much of the press and most of the political parties except for the Liberals and Social Democrats on the left. The Pan-German element grew in strength and denounced their government's retreat as treason, stepping up chauvinistic support for war. [24]

First World War Edit

Ethnic groups demanded their own nation states, threatening violence. This upset the stability of multinational empires (Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey/Ottoman). When ethnic Serbians assassinate the Austrian heir, Austria decided to heavily punish Serbia. Germany stood behind its ally Austria in a confrontation with Serbia, but Serbia was under the informal protection of Russia, which was allied to France. Germany was the leader of the Central Powers, which included Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and later Bulgaria arrayed against them were the Allies, consisting chiefly of Russia, France, Britain, and in 1915 Italy. [25]

In explaining why neutral Britain went to war with Germany, Kennedy (1980) recognized it was critical for war that Germany become economically more powerful than Britain, but he downplays the disputes over economic trade imperialism, the Baghdad Railway, confrontations in Central and Eastern Europe, high-charged political rhetoric and domestic pressure-groups. Germany's reliance time and again on sheer power, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities, played a role, especially in seeing the invasion of Belgium as a profound moral and diplomatic crime. Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of 1870 — when Prussia and the German states smashed France — would mean that Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the English Channel and northwest France. British policy makers insisted that would be a catastrophe for British security. [26]

German war goals Edit

The Germans never finalized a set of war aims. However, in September 1914, Kurt Riezler, a senior staff aide to German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg sketched out some possible ideas—dubbed by historians the "September Program." It emphasized economic gains, turning all of Central and Western Europe into a common market controlled by and for the benefit of Germany. Belgium would become a vassal state, there would be a series of naval bases threatening England, Germany would seize much of Eastern Europe from Russia – as in fact it did in early 1918. There would be a crippling financial indemnity on France making it economically dependent on Germany. The Netherlands would become a dependent satellite, and British commerce would be excluded. Germany would rebuild a colonial empire in Africa. The ideas sketched by Riezler were not fully formulated, were not endorsed by Bethmann-Hollweg, and were not presented to or approved by any official body. The ideas were formulated on the run after the war began, and did not mean these ideas had been reflected a prewar plan, as historian Fritz Fischer fallaciously assumed. However they do indicate that if Germany had won it would have taken a very aggressive dominant position in Europe. Indeed, it took a very harsh position on occupied Belgian and France starting in 1914, and in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk imposed on Russia in 1918. [27] [28]

The stalemate by the end of 1914 forced serious consideration of long-term goals. Britain, France, Russia and Germany all separately concluded this was not a traditional war with limited goals. Britain, France and Russia became committed to the destruction of German military power, and Germany to the dominance of German military power in Europe. One month into the war, Britain, France and Russia agreed not to make a separate peace with Germany, and discussions began about enticing other countries to join in return for territorial gains. However, as Barbara Jelavich observes, "Throughout the war Russian actions were carried out without real coordination or joint planning with the Western powers." [29] There was no serious three-way coordination of strategy, nor was there much coordination between Britain and France before 1917.

Weimar Republic Edit

The humiliating peace terms in the Treaty of Versailles provoked bitter indignation throughout Germany, and seriously weakened the new democratic regime since Paul von Hindenburg the president of Weimar Republic used article 48 to gain emergency power hence undermining democracy. However Gustav Stresemann, the foreign minister 1923–1929, achieved good relations with the major powers, and with the Soviet Union, [30] [31]

When Germany defaulted on its reparation payments, French and Belgian troops occupied the heavily industrialised Ruhr district (January 1923). The German government encouraged the population of the Ruhr to passive resistance: shops would not sell goods to the foreign soldiers, coal-mines would not dig for the foreign troops, trams in which members of the occupation army had taken seat would be left abandoned in the middle of the street. The passive resistance proved effective, insofar as the occupation became a loss-making deal for the French government. But the Ruhr fight also led to hyperinflation, and many who lost all their fortune would become bitter enemies of the Weimar Republic, and voters of the anti-democratic right. See 1920s German inflation. [32]

Germany was the first state to establish diplomatic relations with the new Soviet Union. Under the Treaty of Rapallo, Germany accorded the Soviet Union de jure recognition, and the two signatories mutually cancelled all pre-war debts and renounced war claims. In October 1925 the Treaty of Locarno was signed by Germany, France, Belgium, Britain and Italy it recognised Germany's borders with France and Belgium. Moreover, Britain, Italy and Belgium undertook to assist France in the case that German troops marched into the demilitarised Rheinland. Locarno paved the way for Germany's admission to the League of Nations in 1926. [33]

Nazi era, 1933-39 Edit

Hitler came to power in January 1933, and inaugurated an aggressive power designed to give Germany economic and political domination across central Europe. He did not attempt to recover the lost colonies. Until August 1939, the Nazis denounced Communists and the Soviet Union as the greatest enemy, along with the Jews.

Hitler's diplomatic strategy in the 1930s was to make seemingly reasonable demands, threatening war if they were not met. When opponents tried to appease him, he accepted the gains that were offered, then went to the next target. That aggressive strategy worked as Germany pulled out of the League of Nations (1933), rejected the Versailles Treaty and began to re-arm (1935), won back the Saar (1935), remilitarized the Rhineland (1936), formed an alliance ("axis") with Mussolini's Italy (1936), sent massive military aid to Franco in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), seized Austria (1938), took over Czechoslovakia after the British and French appeasement of the Munich Agreement of 1938, formed a peace pact with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union in August 1939, and finally invaded Poland in September 1939. Britain and France declared war and World War II began – somewhat sooner than the Nazis expected or were ready for. [34]

After establishing the "Rome-Berlin axis" with Benito Mussolini, and signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan – which was joined by Italy a year later in 1937 – Hitler felt able to take the offensive in foreign policy. On 12 March 1938, German troops marched into Austria, where an attempted Nazi coup had been unsuccessful in 1934. When Austrian-born Hitler entered Vienna, he was greeted by loud cheers. Four weeks later, 99% of Austrians voted in favour of the annexation (Anschluss) of their country Austria to the German Reich. After Austria, Hitler turned to Czechoslovakia, where the 3.5 million-strong Sudeten German minority was demanding equal rights and self-government. At the Munich Conference of September 1938, Hitler, the Italian leader Benito Mussolini, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier agreed upon the cession of Sudeten territory to the German Reich by Czechoslovakia. Hitler thereupon declared that all of German Reich's territorial claims had been fulfilled. However, hardly six months after the Munich Agreement, in March 1939, Hitler used the smoldering quarrel between Slovaks and Czechs as a pretext for taking over the rest of Czechoslovakia as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. In the same month, he secured the return of Memel from Lithuania to Germany. Chamberlain was forced to acknowledge that his policy of appeasement towards Hitler had failed.

Tweede Wêreldoorlog Wysig

Germany's foreign policy during the war involved the creation of allied governments under direct or indirect control from Berlin. [35] A main goal was obtaining soldiers from the senior allies, such as Italy and Hungary, and millions of workers and ample food supplies from subservient allies such as Vichy France. [36] By the fall of 1942, there were 24 divisions from Romania on the Eastern Front, 10 from Italy and 10 from Hungary. [37] When a country was no longer dependable, Germany would assume full control, as it did with France in 1942, Italy in 1943, and Hungary in 1944. Full control allowed the Nazis to achieve their high priority of mass murdering all Jewish population. Although Japan was officially a powerful ally, the relationship was distant and there was little coordination or cooperation, such as Germany's refusal to share the secret formula for making synthetic oil from coal until late in the war. [38]

Hitler devoted most of his attention during the war to military and diplomatic affairs. DiNardo argues that in Europe Germany's foreign-policy was dysfunctional during the war, as Hitler treated each ally separately, and refused to create any sort of combined staff that would synchronize policies, armaments, and strategies. Italy, Finland, Romania, and Hungary each dealt with Berlin separately, and never coordinated their activities. Germany was reluctant to share its powerful weapons systems, or to train Axis officers. There were some exceptions, such as the close collaboration between the German and Italian forces in North Africa. [39] [40]

Postwar Edit

Since 1951, Germany has been at the heart of European integration. The reunification in 1990, which saw East Germany merged into West Germany, promoted peaceful integration with its neighbors. Strong ties with the United States remain central to German foreign policy.

Within the framework of NATO and an integrated European Union Military Staff, the Federal Republic has resumed the deployment of military units to mediate in conflict regions worldwide.

Germany is one of the world's strongest supporters for ecological awareness in response to climate change and global warming.

1945–1990 Edit

"Bindung" is the German word for fixation of bond "Westbindung" is Germany's implant into Europe and the Western World.

In particular during the Cold War – but continuous into the 21st century – (West-) German foreign policy pursues the country's integration into NATO and a strong co-operation and collective security with its Western partners.

As a free democracy and market economy, the world's largest exporting nation and the world's third-richest economy (nominal GDP) (behind the U.S. and Japan), Germany shares the interest and institutions of a free and secure world trade.

Under the Hallstein Doctrine, the FRG did not have any diplomatic relations with countries in Eastern Bloc until the early 1970s, when Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik led to increased dialogue and treaties like the Treaty of Warsaw, where West Germany accepted the Oder-Neisse line as German-Polish border, and the Basic Treaty, where West and East Germany accepted each other as sovereign entities. Both Germany states were admitted to the United Nations on 18 September 1973.

German Question and German Problem Edit

Ever since the creation of the consolidated German nation state in 1871, the German Problem as to what interests, ambitions, and borders Germany would have and how it would fit into the international system, was a major concern not just for the neighbours but also for German policy-makers themselves. This Problem was temporarily suspended during the Cold War as with Germany being a divided nation, the question as to how to reunify the country (the German Question) would take precedence over other considerations. During the Cold War, both Germanys also lacked the power to challenge the system more generally. [41]

Latin America Edit

Strong foreign policy differences appeared in the 1970s regarding oppressive right-wing dictatorships in Latin America according to Felix Botta. The Brandt government denounced the military junta in Chile after 1973, and gave asylum to its political refugees. However, Schmidt’s government was hostile to left-wing terrorism and reversed policy in dramatic fashion, welcoming the anti-democratic coup in Argentina in 1976. Schmidt accepted the “Dirty War” policy of repression as necessary to fight leftist subversion in Argentina, and refused to accept any of its political refugees. Furthermore West Germany sold billions of marks worth of weapons to Argentina. [42]

1990–2001 Edit

After the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, German reunification took effect on 3 October 1990.

On 14 November 1990, Germany and Poland signed a treaty confirming the Oder-Neisse line. They also concluded a cooperation treaty on 17 June 1991. Germany concluded four treaties with the Soviet Union covering the overall bilateral relationship, economic relations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, and German support for those troops. The Kremlin accepted Russia's obligations under these treaties as successor to the Soviet Union.

2001 to present Edit

Ostpolitik policy was dramatically shaken after 2014 as Russia threatened Ukraine, seized Crimea, and sponsored fighting in eastern Ukraine bordering on civil war. Berlin denounced Moscow’s actions as a violation of international law, and took a leadership role in formulating EU sanctions. However, Germany depends heavily on Russian energy supplies via the Nord Stream pipeline, so it has proceeded cautiously and opposes American efforts to cancel Nord Stream. [43] [44]

Longstanding close relations with the United States flourished especially under the Obama Administration (2009–2017). In 2016 President Barack Obama hailed Chancellor Angela Merkel as his “closest international partner.” [45] However relations worsened dramatically during the Trump administration (2017–2021), especially regarding NATO funding, trade, tariffs, and Germany's energy dependence upon Russia. [46] [47]

In 2021 talks and meetings with Merkel and other European leaders, President Joe Biden spoke of bilateral relations, bolstering transatlantic relations through NATO and the European Union, and closely coordinating on key issues, such as Iran, China, Russia, Afghanistan, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic and multilateral organizations. [48] In early February 2021, Biden froze the Trump administration's withdrawal of 9,500 troops from U.S. military bases in Germany. Biden's freeze was welcomed by Berlin, which said that the move "serves European and transatlantic security and hence is in our mutual interest." [49]

Merkel will meet Biden in Washington on July 15, 2021, with an agenda covering COVID-19 pandemic, global warming and economic issues. Trump's opposition to the $11 billion Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline remains an unresolved issue under Biden. [50]


Who Came up With the Idea of Lebensraum?

The concept of Lebensraum originated with German geographer and ethnographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), who studied how humans reacted to their environment and were especially interested in human migration. In 1901 Ratzel published an essay called "Der Lebensraum" ("The Living Space"), in which he posited that all peoples (as well as animals and plants) needed to expand their living space in order to survive.

Many in Germany believed Ratzel's concept of Lebensraum supported their interest in establishing colonies, following the examples of the British and French empires. Hitler, on the other hand, took it a step further.


Volkswagen is founded

On May 28, 1937, the government of Germany–then under the control of Adolf Hitler of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party𠄿orms a new state-owned automobile company, then known as Gesellschaft zur Vorbereitung des Deutschen Volkswagens mbH. Later that year, it was renamed simply Volkswagenwerk, or “The People’s Car Company.”

Originally operated by the German Labor Front, a Nazi organization, Volkswagen was headquartered in Wolfsburg, Germany. In addition to his ambitious campaign to build a network of autobahns and limited access highways across Germany, Hitler’s pet project was the development and mass production of an affordable yet still speedy vehicle that could sell for less than 1,000 Reich marks (about $140 at the time). To provide the design for this “people’s car,” Hitler called in the Austrian automotive engineer Ferdinand Porsche. In 1938, at a Nazi rally, the Fuhrer declared: “It is for the broad masses that this car has been built. Its purpose is to answer their transportation needs, and it is intended to give them joy.” However, soon after the KdF (Kraft-durch-Freude)-Wagen (“Strength-Through-Joy” car) was displayed for the first time at the Berlin Motor Show in 1939, World War II began, and Volkswagen halted production. After the war ended, with the factory in ruins, the Allies would make Volkswagen the focus of their attempts to resuscitate the German auto industry.

Volkswagen sales in the United States were initially slower than in other parts of the world, due to the car’s historic Nazi connections as well as its small size and unusual rounded shape. In 1959, the advertising agency Doyle Dane Bernbach launched a landmark campaign, dubbing the car the �tle” and spinning its diminutive size as a distinct advantage to consumers. Over the next several years, VW became the top-selling auto import in the United States. In 1960, the German government sold 60 percent of Volkswagen’s stock to the public, effectively denationalizing it. Twelve years later, the Beetle surpassed the longstanding worldwide production record of 15 million vehicles, set by Ford Motor Company’s legendary Model T between 1908 and 1927.


German rearmament

Hitler s aims could not be obtained without armed forces so he worked to make them suitable for war.

Hitler had to rearm to be able to succeed. They had been the only ones to disarm so there can be some sympathy for them. Treaty of Versailles --- reduced army to 100,000 men six warships of over 10,000 tonnes. No submarines or air force.

In secret meeting in 1933, it was decided that 1933-35 Germany would rearm secretly. This would include:

- 300,000 men instead of 100,000

- 1000 aircraft with secretly trained pilots

- barracks airfields and fortifications

- new air force - Luftwaffe and 2500 aircraft and 300,000 men

1933 took Germany out from league and armament conference

army to sign oath of allegiance

signed non-aggression pact with Poland to make it seem as though Germany was no threat

conscription MARCH 1935 announced publicly to have 500,000 men

Franco-Soviet pact 1935 - May

Anglo/German naval agreement 1935 June -

This let German navy to have 1/3 of tonnage of British navy and equal tonnage of submarines.

Britain let this happen because it was to happen anyway and this way, Germany would have a limitation.

Stresa Front admit conscription was bad. Guarantee to protect Austrian independence.

No one stopped German rearmament.

Britain had self-determination problems and did not want to spend on armed forces.

French did not stop because instead they put their money in building forts to defend from Germany Maginot Line.

Italy was close to taking an action. Mussolini would not allow Anchluss. Placed his men in threatening positions to warn Germans. 29 35 everything was good internationally, but by 1935 everything got uneasy.

Germans wanted the Saar because he wanted to reunite all German-speaking people. Had large resources of coal and iron and railways resources important for German economy.

1935 plebiscite - 90% of people voted to join Germany after propaganda. After this got courage do admit to conscription.

1936 March Rhineland , wanted it because it left Germany to open attack from Belgium , Holland and France . Insult to German self-respect. BIG GAMBLE. If French had marched into Rhineland , Germany would have to leave.

France was through political crisis, did not want to risk war. Big division between right winged and left winged. Britain said that Germany had only, moved into their backyard

Consequences Rhineland :

- Treaty of Versailles and Locarno treaties broken

- Germany was able to build line of forts there (west wall). So if Hitler broke treaty of

- Versailles , no military action could go against them.

- Germany protect Ruhr troops were situated on border with France .

- Weakened little entente and Franco-Czech treaty

- Rome-Berlin axis turned into pact of steel.

- Chamberlain had introduced appeasement

- Germany was no longer isolated, because of Italy and sympathy Britain and France had.

- Guarantees issued to defend Poland , Rumania and Greece .

Nazi-Soviet pact start of World War II

Tripartite axis pact Sept. 1940 Japan Italy and Germany .

Forbidden by Treaty of Versailles because of self-determination. Austrians supported him. Right wing and socialists clashed in street battles, political oppositions. Attempt by Germany failed and many leaders imprisoned. League had promised to defend country, also Mussolini and the Stresa Front.

- Nazi totalitarian state and betterment in economy

- Remilitarisation of Rhineland

- Cooperation in Spanish civil war

Weakness of other powers: Stresa Front collapse, Anglo/German naval agreement. Maginot line, remilitarisation of the Rhineland .

Russia was in Stalin s purges so was weak.

1934 - First Nazi attempt to take over, failed. Italy defended Austria . Chancellor Dolfuss killed.

Mussolini would not defend Austrians after signing Rome-Berlin axis and Anti-Comintern pact.

Austrian Nazis started trouble.

Hitler made Schuschnigg, Austrian chancellor, restore Nazi party rights and free political prisoners and appoint Seyss-Inquart to be the minister of interior to give him control of police.

England will not move a finger for Austria . France could have stopped Germany in the Rhineland .

Germany demanded postponement to plebiscite.

Seyss Inquart took over when Britain , France and Italy failed to help Austria .

Then invited Germany to restore order of opposing people.

13 march 1938 announced that Austria and Germany were now a single country.

Austrian opponents were sent to concentration camps.

Britain and France opposed but did nothing.

USSR was suspicious of Germany and Czechoslovakia and Poland prepared for a similar state.

Italy looked towards Adriatic and Mediterranean Sea . Mussolini was Hitler s pawn.


Bullock was born in Trowbridge in Wiltshire, England where his father worked as a gardener and a Unitarian preacher. [1] He was educated at Bradford Grammar School and Wadham College, Oxford where he read classics and modern history. After graduating in 1938, he worked as a research assistant for Winston Churchill, who was writing his History of the English-Speaking Peoples. He was a Harmsworth Senior Scholar at Merton College, Oxford from 1938 to 1940. [2] During World War II, Bullock worked for the European Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). After the war, he returned to Oxford as a history fellow at New College.

He was the censor of St Catherine's Society (1952-1962) and then founding master of St Catherine's College, Oxford (1962-1981), [3] [4] a college for undergraduates and graduates, divided between students of the sciences and the arts. He was credited with massive fundraising efforts to develop the college. Later, he was the first full-time Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University. [5]

In 1952, Bullock published Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, the first comprehensive biography of Adolf Hitler, which he based on the transcripts of the Nuremberg Trials. This book dominated Hitler scholarship for many years. The book characterised Hitler as an opportunistic Machtpolitiker ("power politician"). In Bullock's opinion, Hitler was a "mountebank", an opportunistic adventurer devoid of principles, beliefs or scruples whose actions throughout his career were motivated only by a lust for power. Bullock's views led in the 1950s to a debate with Hugh Trevor-Roper who argued that Hitler did possess beliefs, albeit repulsive ones, and that his actions were motivated by them. Bullock's Guardian obituary commented that "Bullock's famous maxim 'Hitler was jobbed into power by backstairs intrigue' has stood the test of time." [6]

When reviewing Hitler and Stalin in Die tye in 1991, John Campbell wrote of Hitler: A Study in Tyranny: "Although written so soon after the end of the war and despite a steady flow of fresh evidence and reinterpretation, it has not been surpassed in nearly 40 years: an astonishing achievement." [7] [8]

In subsequent works, Bullock to some extent changed his mind about Hitler. His later writings show the dictator as much more of an ideologue, who pursued the ideas expressed in Mein Kampf (and elsewhere) despite their consequences. This has become a widely accepted view of Hitler, particularly in relation to the Holocaust. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Taking note of the shift in interest among professional historians towards social history in the 1960s, Bullock agreed that in general, deep long-term social forces are decisive in history, but not always, for there are times when the Great Man is in his views decisive. In revolutionary circumstances, "It is possible for an individual to exert a powerful even a decisive influence on the way events develop and the policies that are followed." [9]

Bullock's other works included The Humanist Tradition in the West (1985), and The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, a three-volume biography of British Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. [10] He was also editor of The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought (1977), a project he suggested to the publisher when he found he could not define the word "hermeneutics". He had earlier co-edited with Maurice Shock a collection on The Liberal Tradition: From Fox to Keynes. [11]

In the mid-1970s, Bullock used his committee skills to produce a report which proved to be influential in the classroom: A Language for Life, about reading and the teaching of English, was published in 1975. [6] [12] Bullock also chaired the committee of inquiry on industrial democracy commissioned in December 1975 by the second Labour Government of Harold Wilson. The committee's report, which was also known as the Bullock Report, published in 1977, recommended worker's control in large companies with employees having a right to hold representative worker directorships.

Bullock also appeared as a political pundit, particularly during the BBC's coverage of the 1959 British general election. [13]

Late in his life, Bullock published Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (1991). A massive and influential work which he described in the introduction as "essentially a political biography, set against the background of the times in which they lived". [14] He showed how the careers of Hitler and Joseph Stalin fed off each other to some extent. Bullock comes to a thesis that Stalin's ability to consolidate power in his home country and, unlike Hitler, not to over-extend himself enabled him to retain power longer than Hitler. It was awarded the 1992 Wolfson History Prize.

American historian Ronald Spector, writing in Die Washington Post, praised Bullock's ability to write about the development of Nazism and Soviet Communism without either abstract generalization or irrelevant detail. "The writing is invariably interesting and informed and there are new insights and cogent analysis in every chapter," he wrote. [7]

Nachmani says Hitler and Stalin:

come out as two blood-thirsty, pathologically evil, sanguine tyrants, who are sure of the presence of determinism, hence having unshakeable beliefs that Destiny assigned on them historical missions—the one to pursue a social industrialized revolution in the Soviet Union, the other to turn Germany into a global empire. [15]

Bullock was decorated with the award of the Chevalier, Legion of Honour in 1970, and knighted in 1972, becoming Sir Alan Bullock and on 30 January 1976 he was created a life peer as Baron Bullock, of Leafield in the County of Oxfordshire. [16] His writings always appeared under the name "Alan Bullock".

In May 1976, Bullock was awarded an honorary degree from the Open University as Doctor of the University. [17]


Nazi racial policies

Driven by distorted views about race and eugenics, the Nazis hoped to improve German society and commerce by purging them of undesirable racial elements. After taking power in early 1933, they initiated a series of racial policies targeting minorities such as the Jews and Romany.

First policies

The first Nazi racial policies sought to extract Jews from important white-collar occupations. In April 1933, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service rescinded the employment of non-Aryan workers in government jobs. This prevented Jews from working as judges, doctors in state-run hospitals, lawyers in government departments and teachers in state schools.

This law was opposed by President Hindenburg, who objected to the mistreatment of Jewish World War I veterans. Hitler later amended the law to obtain Hindenburg’s approval.

Expulsion from the civil service did not go far enough for hard-line anti-Semites in the Nazi Party and the SA. Many in the rank and file of the party demanded tougher action against the Jews.

Anti-Jewish attacks intensify

Through the summer of 1935, the leaders of local Nazi groups launched attacks on Jewish people and property. In August 1935, Hitler ordered these ‘individual actions” be halted because they drew international condemnation and threatened the German economy. Radical elements of the SA, who beat up Jews or smashed their stores, also demanded immunity from prosecution or civil action.

There were loud calls for laws to restrict Jewish economic influence to prohibit inter-racial marriage or sexual relations even to remove the citizenship of German Jews. Some Nazis insisted the government formulate criteria to define exactly who was Jewish.

By the NSDAP’s annual rally in September, Hitler was under considerable pressure to take more decisive action against the Jewish population.

The Nuremberg decrees

Four days after the rally began, key Nazi officials were summoned to Nuremberg and told to draft anti-Jewish laws for presentation to the Reichstag. Hitler himself spent two days trying to decide on the legal definition of a Jew. Unable to make up his mind, he left it to his officials.

On September 15th Hitler addressed the Reichstag, then convened in Nuremberg. He proclaimed two new laws to define racial identity in Germany and outline the relationship between Jews and Aryan Germans:

The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour. Under this law, a ‘full-blooded’ Jew (Juden) was defined as anyone with three or four Jewish grandparents. A ‘full-blooded’ German (Deutsche-blutige) was anyone with four German grandparents. Those not in either category were ‘half-breeds’ or ‘mongrels’ (Mischlinge). This law was accompanied by propaganda charts that offered visual explanations of ethnic status. The law also outlawed marriages or extra-marital sex between Jews and non-Jews. German women under the age of 45 were forbidden to work in Jewish households as servants.

The Reich Citizenship Law. This law decreed that only those of German blood were citizens of the state, while Jews were only recognised as Staatsangehoriger (‘subjects of the state’). This measure effectively abolished their citizenship. Jews were no longer permitted to vote or hold public office. Jews already working for the government were to be ‘retired’ at the end of 1935. Mischlinge retained their citizenship only if they were practising Christians.

Effects of Nuremberg Laws

The Nuremberg Laws, as these decrees became known, were not popular with the Nazi Party’s radical anti-Semites, who thought they did not go far enough.

Nevertheless, these laws were worded broadly enough to permit wide-ranging persecution of German Jews over the next three years. Sometimes this persecution was officially sanctioned and expressed in government regulation sometimes it was unofficial, carried out by agreement rather than by law.

Jewish businesses were subject to boycotts and intimidation, then forced to close or declare bankruptcy. Once shut down, many businesses were seized by the government and sold cheaply to Germans. Employers and organisations inserted an ‘Aryan paragraph’ into their employment contracts, preventing Jews from obtaining certain jobs.

Further prohibitions

A rolling series of decrees continued to prohibit Jews from various professions and occupations. By 1938, Jews in Germany were banned from working as doctors, lawyers, teachers and journalists.

Nazi legislation also included a degree of racial segregation. Jews were barred from using public facilities such as libraries, parks and beaches. They could not enter residential or business areas deemed to be ‘Aryan zones’, nor were they allowed to claim lottery winnings, insurance payouts and state pensions.

Jews were not permitted to use state-funded hospitals or receive any education past the age of 14. Jews were forbidden to own radios and keep pets, while Jewish names were erased from World War I memorials. In Munich, the town council ordered the destruction of the city’s largest synagogue, declaring it to be a ‘traffic hazard’.

Anti-Romany policies

Jews were not the only target of Nazi racial policies. The regime also moved against Germany’s 20,000 Romany, an eastern European race scattered around the continent, most living nomadically. Long before the rise of the Nazis, the Romany or ‘Gypsies’ had been stereotyped as beggars, thieves and social parasites.

Even during the liberal democratic Weimar period, the Romany had been subject to restrictive laws. Romany were required to carry identity cards and submit for fingerprinting. They were sometimes prohibited from travelling or settling outside a certain area.

The rise of the NSDAP saw anti-Romany activity take an even deadlier turn. In July 1933, the Nazis passed the eugenics-based Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring, which authorised scientists to carry out forced sterilisations on those who might contaminate the Aryan gene pool. The law specifically mentioned “Gypsies” as potential candidates for sterilisation.

In 1934, Berlin passed laws restricting marriages between Romany and Aryan Germans, while the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 disenfranchised Romany as they had Jews. In June 1938, the Nazi regime launched Zigeuneraaufraumungswoche, or ‘Gypsy Clean-up Week’, with hundreds of Romany beaten, arrested, chased out of the country or detained in concentration camps.

'N Historikus se siening:
“The Nuremberg Laws achieved one of the main goals of the German radical right for more than half a century: the reversal of Jewish emancipation. Jews in Germany again became aliens in their own country. To mitigate the effect of the Nuremberg Laws on world opinion, and to gain their acceptance by the German public, Nazi propaganda claimed that the Nuremberg Laws marked the end of legal measures against the Jews.”
Roderick Stackelberg

1. The Nazi regime moved swiftly against Germany’s Jews, withdrawing their right to work in certain professions.

2. This did not satisfy radical anti-Semites in the Nazi Party, who by mid-1935 were demanding stronger action.

3. In September Hitler unveiled the Nuremberg Laws, which defined ‘Jewishness’ and disenfranchised all Jews.

4. A wave of further decrees through the 1930s imposed even more restrictions and prohibitions on German Jews.

5. Another target of Nazi racial policy was the Romany, who were considered an unclean, socially undesirable race.


Kyk die video: Buitelandse beleid, aanvang Tweede Wêreld-oorlog, en die Warsaw-ghetto - CTHGC. Graad 9 Eenheid 6 (Julie 2022).


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