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Verdrag van Amasya - Geskiedenis

Verdrag van Amasya - Geskiedenis

Verdrag van Amasya
In 1555 word die Verdrag van Amasya tussen die Ottomaanse Ryk en Persië onderteken. Dit het die oorlog tussen die partye tot 'n einde gebring. Onder sy voorwaardes erken Persië die Ottomaanse soewereiniteit oor Irak.


Vrede van Amasya

Die Vrede van Amasya (Persies: پیمان آماسیه ("Peymān-e Amasiyeh") Turks: Amasya Antlaşması) was 'n verdrag waarop op 29 Mei 1555 tussen Shah  Tahmasp van Safavid  Iran en Sultan Suleiman  the  Magnificent of the Ottoman  Ryk in die stad Amasya, na die Ottomaanse Safavid   War   ooreengekom is .

Die verdrag definieer die grens tussen Iran en die Ottomaanse Ryk en is gevolg deur twintig jaar vrede. Deur hierdie verdrag is Armenië en Georgië gelykop verdeel tussen die twee, met Wes -Armenië, Wes -Koerdistan en Wes -Georgië (insluitend Wes -Samtskhe) in Ottomaanse hande terwyl Oos -Armenië, Oos -Koerdistan en Oos -Georgië (insluitend oostelike) Samtskhe) het in Iraanse hande gebly. [1] Die Ottomaanse Ryk het die grootste deel van Irak verkry, insluitend Bagdad, wat hulle toegang tot die Persiese Golf gegee het, terwyl die Perse hul voormalige hoofstad Tabriz en al hul ander noordwestelike gebiede in die Kaukasus behou het en soos voor die oorloë, soos Dagestan en alles wat nou Azerbeidjan is. [2] [3] [4] Die aldus gevestigde grens loop oor die berge wat oostelike en westelike Georgië (onder inheemse vasalprinse) verdeel, deur Armenië en via die westelike hange van die Zagros tot by die Persiese Golf.

Verskeie buffersones is ook in die oostelike  Anatolia gevestig, soos in Erzurum, Shahrizor en Van. [5] Kars is neutraal verklaar en die bestaande vesting is vernietig. [6] [7]

Die Ottomane het voorts toegang tot Persiese pelgrims gewaarborg om na die heilige stede van Mekka en Medina, sowel as na die heilige sjia van pelgrimstogte in Irak, te gaan. [8]

Die beslissende afskeid van die Kaukasus en die onherroeplike afstigting van Mesopotamië aan die Ottomane het plaasgevind in die volgende groot vredesverdrag, bekend as die Verdrag   van   Zuhab in 1639 CE/AD. [9]

'N Ander term van die verdrag was dat die Safavids die rituele vervloeking van die eerste drie Rashidun -kaliefs, [10] Aisha en ander Sahaba (metgeselle van Mohammed) moes beëindig - wat almal deur die Soenniete hoog geag word. Hierdie toestand was 'n algemene aanvraag van Ottomaanse-Safavid-verdrae, [11] en word in hierdie geval as vernederend beskou vir Tahmasp. [12]


Vrede van Amasya

Die Vrede van Amasya (Persies: پیمان آماسیه Turks: Amasya Antlaşması ) was 'n verdrag wat op 29 Mei 1555 tussen Shah Tahmasp van Safavid Iran en Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent of the Ottoman Empire in die stad Amasya ooreengekom is na die Ottomaanse -Safavid -oorlog van 1532-1555.

Die verdrag definieer die grens tussen Iran en die Ottomaanse Ryk en is gevolg deur twintig jaar vrede. Deur hierdie verdrag is Armenië en Georgië gelyk verdeel tussen die twee (met Wes -Armenië en Wes -Georgië in Turkse hande terwyl Oos -Armenië en Oos -Georgië in Iraanse hande gebly het), het die Ottomaanse Ryk die grootste deel van Irak verkry, insluitend Bagdad, wat hulle gegee het toegang tot die Persiese Golf, terwyl die Perse hul voormalige hoofstad Tabriz en al hul ander noordwestelike gebiede in die Kaukasus en soos voor die oorloë behou het, soos Dagestan en alles wat nou Azerbeidjan is. [1] [2] [3] Die aldus gevestigde grens loop oor die berge wat oostelike en westelike Georgië (onder inheemse vasalprinse) verdeel, deur Armenië en via die westelike hange van die Zagros tot by die Persiese Golf.

Verskeie buffer- of neutrale gebiede is ook in Oos -Anatolië gevestig, soos in Kars, waar die bestaande vesting vernietig is. [4]

Die Ottomane het verder toestemming gegee dat Persiese pelgrims na die heilige plekke van Mekka en Medina sowel as na die Sjia -pelgrimstogte in Irak kon gaan. [5]

Die beslissende skeiding van die Kaukasus en die onherroeplike afstigting van Mesopotamië aan Ottomaanse Turkye het plaasgevind in die volgende groot vredesverdrag, bekend as die Verdrag van Zuhab in die middel van die 17de eeu. [6]

'N Ander term van die verdrag was dat die Safavids die rituele vervloeking van die eerste drie Rashidun -kaliefs, [7] Aisha en ander Sahaba (metgeselle van Mohammed) moet beëindig, wat almal deur die Soenniete hoog geag word. Hierdie toestand was 'n algemene aanvraag van Ottomaanse-Safavid-verdrae, [8] en word in hierdie geval as vernederend beskou vir Tahmasp. [9]


Verdrag van Brest-Litovsk: 3 Maart 1918

Vroeg in Desember 1917 is 'n wapenstilstand bereik en 'n formele skietstilstand is op 15 Desember verklaar, maar die bepaling van die terme van vrede tussen Rusland en die Sentrale Moondhede was baie ingewikkelder. Onderhandelinge begin op 22 Desember in Brest-Litovsk. Onder hul onderskeie afvaardigings was die ministers van buitelandse sake Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) van Rusland, Richard von Kuhlmann van Duitsland en graaf Ottokar Czernin van Oostenryk.

Middel Februarie breek die gesprekke uit toe 'n woedende Trotsky die terme van die sentrale magte te streng ag en hul eise vir grondgebied onaanvaarbaar is. Die geveg het kortliks hervat aan die Oosfront, maar die Duitse leërs het vinnig gevorder, en beide Lenin en Trotski besef gou dat Rusland in sy verswakte toestand gedwing sou word om aan die vyand se voorwaardes toe te gee. Onderhandelinge hervat later daardie maand en die finale verdrag is op 3 Maart 1918 onderteken.

Volgens die bepalings van die Verdrag van Brest-Litovsk erken Rusland die onafhanklikheid van Oekraïne, Georgië en Finland het Pole en die Baltiese state Litaue, Letland en Estland aan Duitsland en Oostenryk-Hongarye afgestaan ​​en Kars, Ardahan en Batum aan Turkye afgestaan. Die totale verliese was ongeveer 1 miljoen vierkante myl van die voormalige gebied van Rusland, 'n derde van sy bevolking of ongeveer 55 miljoen mense 'n meerderheid van sy steenkool-, olie- en ysterwinkels en 'n groot deel van die bedryf. Lenin noem die nedersetting bitterlik die afgrond van nederlaag, aftakeling, verslawing en vernedering. ”


Verdrag van Waitangi

Die afdeling Verdrag van Waitangi bevat materiaal wat oorspronklik gevind is op www.treatyofwaitangi.govt.nz, 'n webwerf wat deur die Verdrag -inligtingseenheid in die Staatsdienskommissie ontwikkel is. Materiaal van die webwerf is gekombineer met ander onderwerpe op NZHistory om 'n verskeidenheid funksies te verskaf oor die Verdrag van Waitangi en Waitangi Day. Sien inligting oor die verdragboekies, CD-Rom, plakkate en kinderverhaalboek wat deur SSC vervaardig is

Die Verdrag in kort

Die bondige verhaal van hoe die stigtingsdokument van Nieu -Seeland gebore is - en hoe dit voortleef. Sluit die algemene vrae -afdeling in. meer.

Lees die Verdrag

Lees die Verdrag in Engels en Maori. Ondersoek en vergelyk weergawes en vind vertalings in ander tale. meer.

Verdragsondertekenaars en ondertekeningsplekke

Die verdragsdokument van 1840 was lank op dreef, met baie reise om hoofsaaklik handtekeninge op nege verskillende velle te versamel. meer.

Waitangi -dag

Ontdek die oorsprong van die nasionale dag van Nieu -Seeland. Reis terug na 1932 toe die Verdragshuis en gronde aan die land oorhandig is. meer.

Verdrag tydlyn

'N Kronologie van belangrike gebeurtenisse in die totstandkoming van die Verdrag en die blywende impak daarvan op die Nieu -Seelandse samelewing.

Die verdrag in die praktyk

Sedert dit in 1840 onderteken is, het die Verdrag steeds 'n kragtige (indien soms subtiele) invloed op die nasionale verhaal uitgeoefen. meer.

Te Wiki o Te Reo Māori - Māori Taalweek

Ontdek die belangrike wortels van die Maori -taal en die klank van te reo. Leer die 100 noodsaaklike Maori -woorde wat elke Nieu -Seelander behoort te ken. meer.

Verdrag biografieë

Wie was die belangrikste rolspelers wat betrokke was by die opstel van die Verdrag? meer.


Die Nasionale Onafhanklikheidsoorlog

Na die Mondros -wapenstilstand is die meerderheid van die Ottomaanse lande onder die seëvierende lande gedeel. Gevolglik het verskillende verdedigingsfronte en versetorganisasies in Anatolië en Thracië begin verskyn. Die Turkse volk moes hierdie versetpogings verander in 'n beweging van volle onafhanklikheid, wat slegs onder leiding van Mustafa Kemal bereik kon word. Toe Mustafa Kemal op 19 Mei 1919 as inspekteur van die weermag in Samsun beland, het die vierjarige nasionale onafhanklikheidsoorlog begin. Die omsendbrief wat op 22 Junie 1919 in Amasya uitgereik is, was 'n oproep tot en verklaring van nasionale bevryding. Dit is gevolg deur die Erzurum- en Sivas -kongresse. In die Erzurum -kongres het die Turkse volk sy vasberadenheid vir nasionale onafhanklikheid aan die hele wêreld geopenbaar: Mandate en beskerming is onaanvaarbaar.

Die Entente -state beset Istanbul op 16 Maart 1920 en ontbind die Ottomaanse parlement. Sommige afgevaardigdes is gearresteer, en sommige het na Ankara gegaan om by die stryd om nasionale onafhanklikheid aan te sluit.

Die Turkse Groot Nasionale Vergadering (TGNA) is op 23 April 1920 in Ankara ingehuldig en Mustafa Kemal is tot president van die Vergadering verkies. Hierdie vergadering sou voortaan die stryd om nasionale onafhanklikheid in die naam van die nasie voer. Nadat die aangewese Mustafa Kemal -opperbevelhebber begin het, het oorlog op alle fronte teen imperialistiese magte begin. Intussen, op 10 Augustus 1920, onderteken die Istanbul -regering die Sevres -verdrag wat baie streng bepalings vir die Turke bevat.

Mustafa Kemal en die Ankara -regering het die Sevres -verdrag nie erken nie. Onder die bevel van Kazım Karabekir in Oos -Anatolië is 'n stryd begin, en hierdie poging is met sukses afgehandel. As gevolg hiervan is die G & uumlmr & uuml -ooreenkoms met Armenië op 2 Desember 1920 onderteken. Dit was die eerste internasionale ooreenkoms waartoe die TGNA 'n party was. Die probleme aan die oostelike front is heeltemal opgelos met die Moskou -verdrag wat op 16 Maart 1921 met Rusland onderteken is en die Kars -ooreenkoms wat onderteken is met Armenië, Azerbeidjan en Georgië op 13 Oktober 1921. Aan die westelike front het die Griekse magte wat İzmir beset het op 15 Mei 1919 en begin vorder in die Egeïese streek, is teruggedryf tydens die Eerste en Tweede İn & oumln & uuml gevegte (Januarie-April 1921), en hulle het later 'n verpletterende nederlaag gely in die Sakarya Pitch Battle (Augustus-September 1921). Die Franse magte is ook teruggetrek uit Adana en sy omgewing in ooreenstemming met die Ankara -ooreenkoms (Oktober 1921) wat met Frankryk onderteken is. Daarna is al die magte en hulpbronne van die land voorberei op 'n algemene offensief aan die westelike front. Die Griekse magte is in die Groot Offensief en die Slag van die Hoofkommandant (Augustus 1922) gelei. Izmir is op 9 September 1922 bevry. Hierdie militêre sukses het die proses van die stigting van 'n nuwe Republiek bespoedig. Die Mudanya -wapenstilstand is onderteken tussen die Ankara -regering en die Entente -state (11 Oktober 1922), en daar is ooreengekom dat 'n konferensie later in Lausanne gehou sou word om oor die bepalings van die vredesverdrag te onderhandel. Die bykomende uitnodiging wat die entente -state aan die Istanbul -regering gerig het, het egter 'n einde gemaak aan die sultanaat. Die TGNA het die Kalifaat van die sultanaat geskei en die sultanaat op 1 November 1922 afgeskaf. Gevolglik het die laaste Ottomaanse sultan Mehmet VI (Vahideddin) op 17 November 1922 van Istanbul vertrek.

Die Vredesverdrag van Lausanne (24 Julie 1923): Die onderhandelinge in Lausanne, waaraan die regering van Ankara as enigste verteenwoordiger deelgeneem het, het op 21 November 1922 begin. Die Minister van Buitelandse Sake İsmet Pasha (İn & oumln & uuml) was die voorsitter van die Turkse afvaardiging tydens onderhandelinge wat in Februarie 1923 opgeskort is, veral as gevolg van die meningsverskil oor die toekoms van kapitulasies. Die gesprekke is egter hervat op İsmet Pasha & rsquos se nota van 23 April 1923. Die ondertekening van die vredesverdrag wat bestaan ​​uit 143 artikels, 17 bylaes, protokolle en verklarings, het die nasionale onafhanklikheidsoorlog afgesluit. Die TGNA -regering is dus amptelik erken, Turkye en nasionale grense is vasgestel, kapitulasies is opgehef, die Ottomaanse skuld herstruktureer, en gevolglik is die politieke en ekonomiese onafhanklikheid en die reg op soewereiniteit van Turkye amptelik erken. Die verdrag wat op 24 Julie 1923 in Lausanne, Switserland onderteken is, is op 23 Augustus 1923 deur die TGNA bekragtig.


Süleyman I

Selim se laaste jare is in Istanbul deurgebring om die oppergesag van die sultanaat te versterk, deur die aansien en inkomste uit sy oosterse oorwinnings te benut. Dit was dus eers tydens die lang bewind van sy seun en opvolger, Süleyman I (regeer 1520–66), genaamd "die Pragtige" in Europa en "die Wetgewer" (Kanuni) onder die Ottomane, dat die fondamente wat Selim gelê het, volledig was gebruik om die klassieke Ottomaanse staat en samelewing te vestig en om belangrike nuwe verowerings in die Ooste en Wes te verower. As gevolg van sy pa se beleid en suksesse het Süleyman die troon aangeneem met 'n posisie wat voor of daarna deur enige sultan ongeëwenaard is. Hy was sonder verset en het baie beheer oor die devşirme klas, sowel as oor die oorblyfsels van die Turkse bekendes. Die verowering van die Arabiese wêreld het die inkomste van die tesourie verdubbel sonder om belangrike bykomende finansiële verpligtinge op te lê, wat Süleyman met rykdom en mag gelaat het in die Ottomaanse geskiedenis. Alhoewel Süleyman nooit ten volle gebruik gemaak het van die geleenthede wat hy gelaat het nie, en in werklikheid met die proses van Ottomaanse agteruitgang begin het, was sy heerskappy nog steeds die hoogtepunt van Ottomaanse grootsheid en is dit nog altyd beskou as die goue era van die Ottomaanse geskiedenis.

Die belangrikste slagvelde van die Ottomaanse uitbreiding in Europa onder Süleyman was Hongarye en die Middellandse See. Die swak suidoostelike Europese vyande van Süleyman se voorgangers is vervang deur die magtige Habsburgse dinastie, wat versterk is deur die beroep van die pous in Europa teen die bedreiging (vir Christene) van Islam. Süleyman se belangrikste Europese bondgenoot was Frankryk, wat probeer het om Ottomaanse druk in die suide te gebruik om die druk van die Habsburgers op die oostelike grense te verminder. Die landoorlog met die Habsburgers was gesentreer in Hongarye en is in drie hooffases gevoer. Van 1520 tot 1526 het die onafhanklike Hongaarse koninkryk die direkte swaarkry van die Ottomaanse aanval gedra en as buffer tussen die twee groot ryke gedien, maar die swak koning Lodewyk II van Hongarye en Bohemen en feodale anargie en wanbestuur het 'n verenigde verdediging onmoontlik gemaak. 'N Splitsing onder Hongaarse adellikes oor die kwessie van die aanvaarding van die Habsburgse bewind, gekombineer met sosiale en nasionale verdeeldheid wat deur die Reformasie gestimuleer is, verswak die opposisie teen die Ottomaanse aanval verder. As gevolg hiervan kon Süleyman Belgrado in 1521 inneem, wat die weg oopmaak vir 'n grootskaalse opmars noord van die Donau. Die enigste werklike leër wat die Hongaarse edeles kon opdoen, is in 1526 tydens die Slag van Mohács gerig, en die dood van Lodewyk II het die laaste hoop op Hongaarse eenheid en onafhanklikheid beëindig.

Die tweede periode van Ottomaanse-Habsburgse verhoudings (1526–41) word gekenmerk deur Hongaarse outonomie onder die Hongaarse anti-Habsburgse koning John (János Zápolya), wat die heerskappy van die sultan aanvaar het in ruil vir die reg om die inheemse administrasie en militêre verdediging voort te sit . Die Habsburgse prins Ferdinand (later die Heilige Romeinse keiser Ferdinand I), broer van keiser Karel V, beset die noordelike gebiede van Hongarye met die steun van die ryker Hongaarse adellikes wat Habsburgse hulp teen die Turke verlang het. Vir alle praktiese doeleindes het hy dit by Oostenryk geannekseer voordat hy onderneem het om die res van Hongarye in 1527–28 te verower. In reaksie hierop keer Süleyman terug van Anatolië om die Habsburgers uit die hele Hongarye te verdryf en beleër Wene in 1529, 'n poging wat misluk het vanweë die moeilikheid om 'n groot mag tot dusver van die belangrikste sentrums van Ottomaanse mag te voorsien.

Wene was dus die belangrikste Europese skans teen verdere vooruitgang van die Moslem. Onder die bestaande voorwaardes vir voorsiening, vervoer en militêre organisasie, het die Ottomane die grens bereik van hul moontlike uitbreiding in die Weste, aangesien die winterbasis wat die uitbreidingspoging ondersteun het, in Istanbul gehandhaaf moes word vanweë die voortdurende bedreiging van militêre optrede teen die Safavids in die Ooste. Die beleg van Wene het egter Süleyman se heerskappy van Hongarye verseker en het Ferdinand verhinder om 'n nuwe aanval op die gebiede wat deur John beheer is tot 1540 te loods. Protestante (1532), die resultaat was slegs tydelik, en Ferdinand was nooit seker van die steun van die onafhanklike Duitse vorste en die ander Europese heersers wat hulp beloof het nie. Selfs Karel V was te besig met die probleme van die Reformasie en met Frankryk om baie aandag aan die Ottomane te skenk. Toe Süleyman 'n tweede Oostenrykse veldtog (1532) begin, kon hy die keiserlike leër nie in konflik lok nie en moes hy hom tevrede stel met verwoestende groot dele van die Habsburgse koninkryk.

Teen die vrede van 1533 het Ferdinand sy aansprake op sentraal -Hongarye laat vaar en John se heerskappy daar as Ottomaanse vasaal erken, terwyl Süleyman ingestem het om Ferdinand as heerser van Noord -Hongarye te aanvaar in ruil vir die betaling van 'n jaarlikse huldeblyk. Die reëling duur tot 1540, toe John sterf en sy heerskappy aan Ferdinand oorlaat in weerwil van sy ooreenkoms met die sultan. Toe Ferdinand sy erfenis met geweld wou aanneem, het Süleyman Hongarye in 1541 beset en geannekseer - onder die dekmantel om die saak van John se babaseun, John Sigismund Zápolya, te bekamp en dit vir die eerste keer onder direkte Ottomaanse administrasie en besetting te plaas. So begin die derde en laaste tydperk van die Ottomaanse en Habsburgse verhoudinge, wat gekenmerk word deur voortdurende grenskonflik-afwykings aan beide kante, maar voorkom lang periodes van oop oorlog. Christelike historici het Francis I van Frankryk daarvan beskuldig dat hy Ottomaanse uitbreiding na Sentraal -Europa aangemoedig het om die druk van Habsburg op hom te verlig. Maar die Ottomaanse vooruitgang moet minder toegeskryf word aan Franse openinge as aan Süleyman se eie ambisies, tesame met sy vrees vir Habsburgse bewind in Hongarye en 'n moontlike alliansie tussen die Habsburgers, Hongare en Safavids.

Die sultan beskou die Franse koning grootliks as 'n versoeker vir kommersiële gunste, wat toegestaan ​​is in die Capitulations -verdrag van 1536, 'n ooreenkoms waardeur Franse onderdane die vryheid gebied het om te reis en handel te dryf in die sultan se heerskappye en onderdane van ander state wat dit wil doen dieselfde was nodig om die Franse beskerming te verseker. Franse en ander handelaars en reisigers in die Ottomaanse Ryk is toegelaat om onder sake van hulself onder Franse wette en howe te bly en spesiale voorregte verleen in sake wat Ottomaanse onderdane betref. So is die grondslag gevestig van die Franse oorheersing in die Levant (gebied langs die oostelike Middellandse See), wat tot die moderne tyd gebly het. Die Kapitulasies was 'n model vir latere ooreenkomste tussen die Ottomane en die ander Europese moondhede, wat dit daarna gedurende die eeue van Ottomaanse swakheid gebruik het om die handel in die Ottomaanse heerskappy te oorheers en om die inheemse Moslems en Jode uit die mark te dryf. guns van hul godsdiensgenote Griekse en Armeense proteges. Die dooiepunt tussen die Ottomane en Habsburgers in Noord-Hongarye is gekenmerk deur eeue lange konflikte langs die landgrens. Periodieke Ottomaanse aanvalle in Sentraal-Europa en gevolglike Europese anti-Moslem propaganda het gelei tot Christelike vooroordeel teenoor Moslems in die algemeen en baie Turke in die besonder, baie Europeërs wat simpatie gehad het met die Christelike minderheidsonderdane van die Turke, 'n sentiment wat tot in die moderne tyd geduur het.

Georganiseerde militêre konflik verskuif na die see, met die Ottomane wat vir die eerste keer as 'n groot vlootmag verskyn het. Die agteruitgang van die Venesiese vloot het daartoe gelei dat Karel V volledige beheer oor die Middellandse See gesoek het, en as sy vlootbevelvoerder die groot Genoese seeman Andrea Doria aangewys het en sodoende die steun van die magtige Genoese vloot gekry het. Süleyman reageer in 1522 deur die Knights of Rhodes, 'n Christelike godsdienstige en militêre orde, uit Rhodes te verdryf, maar in 1530 vestig Charles hulle op Malta, waaruit hulle seerowerings op Ottomaanse skepe en oewers reël en in 1535 Tunis verower. Terwyl Süleyman in Anatolië beset was, het Doria 'n aantal hawens in die Morea verower en die Ottomaanse kus begin aanval, die meeste seelyne van kommunikasie tussen Istanbul en Alexandrië verbreek en duisende Moslem -pelgrims verhinder om Mekka en Medina te bereik. In reaksie hierop skryf Süleyman in 1533 in by sy diens as groot-admiraal Khayr al-Dīn (onder Europeërs bekend as Barbarossa), 'n Turkse kaptein wat 'n groot seerowervloot van "see-ghazi's" in die westelike Middellandse See gebou het en dit gebruik het om Algiers te vang (1529) en ander Noord -Afrikaanse hawens. As deel van die ooreenkoms met Barbarossa het die Ottomane Algiers by die ryk geannekseer as 'n spesiale timar provinsie permanent aangestel by die groot admiraal om die vloot te ondersteun. Ottomaanse landtroepe is gestuur om Algiers te verdedig teen Habsburg -aanvalle, wat waarskynlik die hoofrede was dat Barbarossa ingestem het om by die sultan aan te sluit. Barbarossa het 'n kragtige Ottomaanse vloot gebou wat die Habsburgers op gelyke voet konfronteer. In 1537 het hy 'n groot aanval op Suid -Italië geloods, met 'n beloofde Franse aanval in die noorde, met die doel om 'n gesamentlike verowering van Italië te verwag. Maar Frankryk, uit vrees vir 'n vyandige Europese reaksie op sy alliansie met die ongelowiges, het die afleiding weerhou. Doria organiseer en lei daarna 'n geallieerde Europese vlootmag teen die Ottomane, maar dit is in 1538 tydens die Slag van Préveza aan die Albanese kus gerig. Venesië het toe die Morea en Dalmatië, sy laaste besittings in die Egeïese See, oorgegee en sodoende 'n Ottomaanse vlootoorheersing in die oostelike Middellandse See verseker wat drie dekades lank ongebreek gebly het.

Süleyman het sy ambisies in Europa na 1541 nie nagestreef nie, hoofsaaklik vanweë sy toenemende beheptheid met probleme in die Ooste. Hy het Safavid propagandiste en ondersteuners in die ooste van Anatolië genadeloos onderdruk en die Oezbeekske ryk Transoxania gestimuleer om Iran aan te val. Iran het in wanorde verval ná die dood van Ismāʿīl en die toetreding van sy babaseun Ṭahmāsp I, maar Süleyman kon slegs voordeel trek uit die situasie tydens periodes van vrede in Europa. Hy het persoonlik drie veldtogte na die noordweste van Iran gelei, in 1534–35, 1548–50 en 1554, en hoewel hy Safavid -gebiede in die suidelike Kaukasusreeks en in Irak verower het, kon hy nooit die Iraanse leër vang en verslaan nie. Aanbodprobleme het hom altyd gedwing om gedurende die wintermaande na Anatolië terug te trek, sodat die Perse Azerbaijan met moeite kon terugvind. Süleyman het uiteindelik wanhoop om sy ontwykende vyande te verslaan en het in 1555 ingestem met die Vrede van Amasya, waardeur hy Irak en Oos -Anatolië behou het, maar afstand doen van Ottomaanse aansprake op Azerbeidjan en die Kaukasus en het ingestem om Persiese pelgrims van Sjiïe toe te laat om Mekka en Medina te besoek, asook hul eie heilige plekke in Irak. Dieselfde geografiese probleme wat die Ottomaanse verowerings in Sentraal -Europa beperk het, het Wes -Azerbeidjan dus die praktiese beperking van Ottomaanse uitbreiding in die Ooste gemaak, wat die uiteindelike uitskakeling van die Safavid -gevaar kon voorkom.

Süleyman was ietwat meer suksesvol in die herstel van die ou internasionale handelsroetes deur sy Midde -Oosterse besittings. Om die Portugese vloot, wat deur die Safavids uit hul hawens in die Persiese Golf voorsien is, teen te werk, bou hy groot vlootbasisse by Suez (1517) en, sodra hy Irak inneem, in Basra (1538), vestig hy garnisoene en vloote wat nie net die Portugese vlootaanvalle, maar het hulle ook in die oostelike see aangeval. As gevolg hiervan het die ou handelsroete in die 16de eeu 'n deel van sy vorige volume herwin. Die Ottomane kon dit egter nooit volledig herstel nie, omdat Portugal met behulp van 'n seeroete steeds hoër pryse in die Ooste kon betaal en teen laer pryse in Europa kon verkoop, sonder om die heffings en plaaslike heffings te hef op goedere wat per land gestuur word deur die Ottomaanse gebied. Daar moet op gelet word dat dit, in teenstelling met die mites wat deur baie Europese historici gehandhaaf word, die Ottomane was wat baklei het om die ou handelsroete in die Midde -Ooste oop te hou, maar die roete was eers gesluit toe die Kaapse roete deur die meer Portugese oorgeneem is. magtige vloot van die Engelse en Nederlandse.


Laer paleolitiese kampeerplekke wat jag versamel, vorm die eerste bekende nedersettings op die gebied van die hedendaagse Abchazië. Die vroegste voorbeelde is opgegrawe op die terreine van Iashkhtva, Gumista, Kelasuri en Ochamchire. Bo -paleolitiese kultuur vestig hoofsaaklik die kuslyn. Mesolitiese en neolitiese tydperke het groter permanente nedersettings meegebring en was die begin van boerdery, veeteelt en die vervaardiging van keramiek. Die vroegste artefakte van die megalitiese kultuur het in die vroeë 3de millennium vC verskyn en tot in die Bronstydperk voortgegaan as die sogenaamde dolfyne van Abchazië, tipies bestaande uit vier regop massastene en 'n kapsteen, waarvan sommige 50 ton weeg. 'N Dolman van die argeologiese terrein van Eshera is die beste bestudeerde prehistoriese monument van hierdie tipe. In die Laat Bronstydperk het die ontwikkeling van meer gevorderde bronswerktuie plaasgevind en het tot in die Ystertydperk voortgegaan as deel van die Colchiaanse kultuur (ongeveer 1200-600 v.G.J.), wat die grootste deel van die huidige westelike Georgië en 'n deel van die noordooste van Anatolië dek.

Die geskrewe geskiedenis van Abchazië begin grootliks met die koms van die Milesiese Grieke na die kus Colchis in die 6de-5de eeu vC. Hulle stig hul maritieme kolonies langs die oostelike oewer van die Swart See, met Dioscurias as een van die belangrikste handelsentrums. Daar word vermoed dat hierdie stad vernoem is na die Dioscuri, die tweeling Castor en Pollux van die klassieke mitologie, wat later ontwikkel het tot die hedendaagse Sukhumi. Ander opvallende kolonies was Gyenos, Triglitis en later Pityus, waarskynlik naby die hedendaagse kusdorpe, onderskeidelik Ochamchire, Gagra en Pitsunda.

Die mense van die streek was opvallend vanweë hul aantal en verskeidenheid, soos klassieke bronne getuig. Herodotus, Strabo en Plinius waardeer die menigte tale wat in Dioscurias en ander dorpe gepraat word. Die bergagtige terrein was geneig om plaaslike mense van mekaar te skei en te isoleer en het die ontwikkeling van tientalle verskillende tale en dialekte aangemoedig wat die etniese samestelling van die streek bemoeilik. Selfs die mees ingeligte hedendaagse skrywers is baie verward wanneer hulle hierdie mense noem en opspoor en verskaf slegs baie beperkte inligting oor die geografie en bevolking van die binneland. Boonop was sommige klassieke etniese name vermoedelik kollektiewe terme, en daar het ook aansienlike migrasies in die streek plaasgevind. Verskeie pogings is aangewend om hierdie mense te identifiseer met die etniese terme wat klassieke skrywers gebruik. Die meeste geleerdes identifiseer Plinius die Ouere Apsilae van die 1ste eeu en Arrian's Abasgoi van die 2de eeu met die waarskynlik onderskeidelik proto-Abkhaz- en Abaza-sprekers, terwyl Georgiese geleerdes hulle as protokartveliese stambenamings beskou. Die identiteit en oorsprong van ander mense (bv. Heniochi, Sanigae) die woning in die gebied betwis word. Argeologie kon selde 'n sterk verband tussen die oorblyfsels van materiële kultuur en die ondeursigtige name van mense wat deur klassieke skrywers genoem word, verbind. Kontroversies duur dus steeds voort en 'n reeks vrae bly oop.

Die inwoners van die streek was besig met seerowery, slawehandel en ontvoering van mense vir losprys. Strabo beskryf die gewoontes van Achaei, Zygi en Heniochi in syne Aardrykskunde soos volg: [1]

Hierdie mense bestaan ​​deur seerowery. Hulle bote is skraal, smal, lig en in staat om ongeveer vyf en twintig man te hou, en selde dertig. Die Grieke noem hulle camaræ. . Hulle rus vloot toe wat uit hierdie kameras bestaan, en as meesters in die see val hulle soms lasvate aan, of val 'n gebied of selfs 'n stad binne. Soms help selfs diegene wat die Bosporus beset, hulle om skuilplekke vir hul vaartuie te voorsien en voorsien hulle van die nodige hulpmiddels en middele om hul buit te verwyder. As hulle na hul eie land terugkeer, sonder dat hulle geskikte plekke het om hul vaartuie aan te lê, lê hulle hul kameras op hul skouers en dra hulle op na die woude, waaronder hulle woon, en waar hulle 'n swak grond bewerk. As die seisoen aanbreek vir navigasie, bring hulle dit weer na die kus. Hulle gewoontes is dieselfde, selfs in 'n vreemde land, want hulle is bekend met beboste stukke, waarin hulle dag en nag te voet ronddwaal om die inwoners te vang en hulle tot slawerny te red.

Volgens The Georgian Chronicles was die eerste inwoners van wat nou Abchazië is en die hele westelike Georgië Egrosiërs, die afstammelinge van Egros, seun van Togarmah, kleinseun van Japhet, seun van Noag, wat afkomstig was uit die land wat bekend staan ​​as Arian-Kartli. [2]

Saam met die res van Colchis is Abchazië verower deur Mithridates VI Eupator van Pontus tussen ongeveer. 110 en 63 vC, toe geneem deur die Romeinse bevelvoerder Pompeius en opgeneem in die Romeinse Ryk in 61 nC. Die Romeinse heerskappy hier was vaag en volgens Josephus kon 'n Romeinse garnisoen van 3000 hopliete en vloot van 40 vaartuie slegs die hawens beheer. Die Griekse nedersettings het gely onder die oorloë, seerowery en aanvalle van plaaslike stamme (tydens een daarvan is Dioskurias en Pityus in 50 nC afgedank). [3]

Met die ondergang van die Romeinse Ryk het die stamme wat in die streek woon, 'n mate van onafhanklikheid verkry en hul heersers benoem wat deur Rome bevestig sou word. In die 3de eeu nC het die Lazi -stam die grootste deel van Colchis oorheers en die koninkryk Lazica, plaaslik bekend as Egrisi, gevestig. Volgens Procopius is die Abasgi -hoofmanne ook deur die Lazic -konings onderwerp.

Colchis was 'n toneel van die langdurige wedywering tussen die Oos -Romeinse/Bisantynse en Sassanidiese ryke, wat uitloop op die Lazic War van 542 tot 562. Die oorlog het gelei tot die agteruitgang van Lazica, en die Abasgi in hul digte woude het 'n mate van outonomie gewen onder die Bisantynse gesag. Gedurende hierdie era het die Bisantyne Sebastopolis in die streek gebou. Hulle land, wat by die Bisantyne bekend was as Abasgia, was 'n belangrike bron van eunugs vir die ryk totdat Justinianus I (527-565) die kastrasie van seuns verbied het. Die mense was heidens en het bome en bome aanbid totdat 'n sending deur die keiser Justinianus I omstreeks 550 die mense tot die Christendom bekeer en 'n kerk gebou het. [4] [5] Maar biskop Stratophiles van Pytius het die Raad van Nicaea al in 325 bygewoon. [6] Bisantyne het defensiewe versterkings gebou wat tot vandag toe gedeeltelik oorleef het as die Kelasuri -muur. [7]

Namate die Abasgi in relatiewe sterkte toegeneem het, het die naam Abasgia 'n groter gebied aangedui wat bevolk is deur verskillende etniese groepe, waaronder Mingrelian- en Svan-sprekende Suid-Kaukasiese stamme, en ondergeskik aan die Byzantynse aangestelde prinse (Grieks: archon, Georgies: eristavi) who resided in Anacopia and were viewed as major champions of the empire's political and cultural influence in the western Caucasus. The Arabs penetrated the area in the 730s, but did not subdue it about then the term Abkhazeti ("the land of the Abkhazians") first appeared in the Georgian annals, giving rise to the name Abkhazia, which is used today in most foreign languages. Through their dynastic intermarriages and alliance with other Georgian princes, the Abasgian dynasty acquired most of Lazica/Egrisi, and in the person of Leo established themselves as "kings of the Abkhazians" in the 780s. [8] With the Khazar help, Leo ousted the Byzantines and expanded his kingdom, transferring his capital to the Georgian city of Kutaisi. Although the nature of this kingdom's ruling family is still disputed, most scholars agree that the Abkhazian kings were Georgian in culture and language. In order to eliminate the Byzantine religious influence, the dynasty subordinated the local dioceses to the Georgian Orthodox patriarchate of Mtskheta. [9] [10]

The kingdom is frequently referred in modern history writing as the Egrisi-Abkhazian kingdom due to the fact that medieval authors viewed the new monarchy as a successor state of Egrisi and sometimes used the terms interchangeably.

The most prosperous period of the Abkhazian kingdom was between 850 and 950, when it dominated the whole western Georgia and claimed control even of the easternmost Georgian provinces. The terms "Abkhazia" and "Abkhazians" were used in a broad sense during this period – and for some while later – and covered, for all practical purposes, all the population of the kingdom regardless of their ethnicity. [11] In 989, the Bagratid ruler Bagrat III came to power in Abkhazia which he inherited from his mother Guranduxt Anch'abadze. In 1008 Bagrat inherited K'art'li from his father and united the kingdoms of Abkhazia and Georgia into a single Georgian feudal state. [12]

This state reached the apex of its strength and prestige under the queen Tamar (1184–1213). On one occasion, a contemporary Georgian chronicler mentions a people called Apsars. This source explains the sobriquet 'Lasha' of Tamar's son and successor George IV as meaning "enlightenment" in the language of the Apsars. Some modern linguists link this nickname to the modern Abkhaz words a-lasha for "clear" and a-lashara for "light", identifying the Apsars with the possible ancestors of the modern-day Abkhaz, though the exact identity and location of this tribe is unclear.

According to the Georgian chronicles, Queen Tamar granted the lordship over part of Abkhazia to the Georgian princely family of Shervashidze. According to traditional accounts, they were an offshoot of the Shirvanshahs (hence allegedly comes their dynastic name meaning "sons of Shirvanese" in Georgian). The ascendancy of this dynasty (later known also as Chachba by the Abkhaz form of their surname) in Abkhazia would last until the Russian annexation in the 1860s.

The Genoese established their trading factories along the Abkhazian coastline in the 14th century, but they functioned for a short time. The area was relatively spared from the Mongol and Timur's invasions, which terminated Georgia's "golden age". As a result, the kingdom of Georgia fragmentized into several independent or semi-independent entities by the late 15th century. The Principality of Abkhazia was one of them, and was formed around 1463. [5] The Principality of Abkhazia, whereas it acted as an independent state, was officially a vassal of the Kingdom of Imereti, following a treaty signed in 1490 splitting Georgia into three nations. [13] The Abkhazian princes engaged in incessant conflicts with the Mingrelian potentates, their nominal suzerains, and the borders of both principalities fluctuated in the course of these wars. In the following decades, the Abkhazian nobles finally prevailed and expanded their possessions up to the Inguri River, which is today's southern boundary of the region. Several medieval historians like Vakhushti and a few modern ones claimed that the Kelasuri Wall was built by prince Levan II Dadiani of Mingrelia as a protection against Abkhaz. [14]

In the 1570s, the Ottoman navy occupied the fort of Tskhumi on the Abkhazian coastline, turning it into the Turkish fortress of Suhum-Kale (hence, the modern name of the city of Sukhumi). In 1555, Georgia and the whole South Caucasus became divided between the Ottoman and Safavid Persian empires per the Peace of Amasya, with Abkhazia, along with all of western Georgia, remaining in the hands of the Ottomans. As a result, Abkhazia came under the increasing influence of Turkey and Islam, gradually losing its cultural and religious ties with the rest of Georgia. According to the Soviet historical science, Turkey, after the conquest has aimed at obliterating the material and spiritual culture of Abkhazia and forcibly convert the population to Islam, which led to numerous insurrections (in 1725, 1728, 1733, 1771 and 1806) [15]

Towards the end of the 17th century, the principality of Abkhazia broke up into several fiefdoms, depriving many areas of any centralized authority. The region became a theatre of widespread slave trade and piracy. According to some Georgian scholars (such as Pavle Ingorokva), it was when a number of the Adyghe clansmen migrated from the North Caucasus mountains and blended with the local ethnic elements, significantly changing the region's demographic situation. In the mid-18th century, the Abkhazians revolted against the Ottoman rule and took hold of Suhum-Kale, but soon the Turks regained the control of the fortress and granted it to a loyal prince of the Shervashidze family.

Russia annexed eastern Georgia in 1800 and took over Mingrelia in 1803. Kelesh Ahmed-Bey Shervashidze, the last pre-Russian ruler of Abkhazia had a long and successful reign. He controlled his nobles, his kinsmen commanded Poti and Batum and his fleet cruised the coast from Anapa and Batum. His invasion of the Principality of Mingrelia in 1802 contributed to Mingrelia becoming a Russian protectorate. Keleshbey died in 1808 and was succeeded by his eldest son Aslan-Bey Shervashidze. Kelesh also had a younger son, Sefer Ali-Bey Shervashidze, who lived in Mingrelia, was or became a Christian and was married to the Mingrellian ruler's sister. The Russians or Mingrelians claimed that Aslan-Bey had murdered his father. In August 1808, three months after Kelesh's death, a Mingrelian force failed to take Sukhumi. In February 1810 Russia recognized Sefer-Bey as hereditary prince of Abkhazia. In June of that year a Russian fleet captured Sukhumi and Aslan-Bey fled. Sefer-Bey, who ruled until 1821, was unable to control the countryside, things became disorganized and there were a number of revolts involving Aslan-Bey.

Initially, the Russian control hardly extended beyond Suhum-kale and the Bzyb area, with the rest of the region chiefly dominated by the pro-Turkish Muslim nobility. In a series of conflicts with the Ottoman Empire and the North Caucasian tribes, the Russians acquired possession of the whole Abkhazia in a piecemeal fashion between 1829 and 1842, but their power was not firmly established until 1864, [5] when they managed to abolish the local princely authority. The last prince of Abkhazia, Michael Shervashidze (Chachba), was exiled to Russia where he soon died. [16] The two ensuing Abkhaz revolts in 1866 and 1877, the former precipitated by the heavy taxation and the latter incited by the landing of the Turkish troops, resulted in the next significant change in the region's demographics. As a result of harsh government reaction allegedly 60% of the Muslim Abkhaz population, although contemporary census reports were not very trustworthy — became Muhajirs, and emigrated to the Ottoman possessions between 1866 and 1878. In 1881, the number of the Abkhaz in the Russian Empire was estimated at only 20,000. [17] Furthermore, a great deal of the population was forcibly displaced to Turkey (Muhajirs) and in 1877 the population of Abkhazia was 78,000, whereas at the end of the same year there were only 46,000 left. [15]

Large areas of the region were left uninhabited and many Armenians, Georgians, Russians and others subsequently migrated to Abkhazia, resettling much of the vacated territory. [18] According to Georgian historians Georgian tribes (Mingrelians and Svans) had populated Abkhazia since the time of the Colchis kingdom. [19] According to the census carried out in 1897 Abkhaz constituted 60-65% of the Sukhumi district's population (about 100,000 Sukhum district occupied almost the same territory as present'day Abkhazia in 1897), the majority of the rest being Georgian. [20] [21] [22] However the Encyclopædia Britannica reported in 1911 that in the Sukhumi district (population at the time 43,000 it did not cover all the territory of present-day Abkhazia in 1911 as some of it had been transferred to Kuban governorate) two-thirds of the population were Mingrelian Georgians and one-third were Abkhaz. [23] Those Abkhaz, who did not convert to Christianity, and who remained in Abkhazia were declared by the Russian government a "refugee population" and deprived of the right to settle in the coastal areas. [24] [25]

Meanwhile, in 1870, bound peasants, including slaves, were liberated in Abkhazia as a part of the Russian serfdom reforms. The peasants got between 3 and 8 ha and had to pay huge redemption payments (the landowners got up to 275 ha) furthermore, according to a contemporary Russian official, peasants were mostly left with rocky mountain slopes and low-lying bogs. The liberation in Abkhazia was more problematic than elsewhere as it failed to take into account fully the distinction between free, partly free and unfree peasants in the Abkhazian society. [26]

This reform triggered the moderate development of capitalism in the region. Tobacco, tea and subtropical crops became more widely grown. Industries (coal, timber) began to develop. Health resorts started to be built. A small town of Gagra, acquired by a German prince Peter of Oldenburg, a member of the Russian royal family, turned to a resort of particular tourist interest early in the 1900s (decade).

After the abolition of the autocephalous status of the Georgian Church (1811) begins the process of Russification and the Abkhaz Church. An attempt to transfer service from Georgian into Slavic, there is also a desire to introduce as an antagonist of the Georgian - Abkhazian (Apsua) identity. Against this trend, actively advocated the advanced Abkhazian society, trying to convince Russian officials that Abkhazia historically, in their culture, religion, etc., is an integral part of Georgia. In 1870, in a memo to deputies of the Abkhazian nobility and Samurzakan (Emhvari B., M. Marchand, Margani T., K. Inal-ipa) to the Chairman of the Tiflis Committee of caste landed for Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky emphasized that " Abkhazia ancient times was part of the former Georgian kingdom . " The note provides evidence to support the common historical destiny of the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples, who are, according to the authors, "important witnesses accessories Abkhazia to Georgia" and expressed the hope that they (Abkhazians) are not are "excluded from the overall family of the Georgian people, to which from time immemorial belonged to." 4 In 1916, the Tbilisi visited the Abkhazian delegation consisting of M-princes Shervashidze M. Emhvari, A. Inal-ipa, and representatives of the peasantry P. Anchabadze, B. Ezugbaya and A. Chukbar. On behalf of the Abkhaz people, they petitioned for economic and cultural development of the region and raised the question of the transformation of the Sukhumi district into a separate province. "If this is impossible", told delegates, then in any case do not connect it (Sukhum district) to any other province, except Kutaisi. Equally urgent was the demand of the deputation is not separated from the exarchate of Georgia Sukhumi bishoprics, which has always been an inseparable part of the Georgian Church. [ aanhaling nodig ]

In the Russian revolution of 1905, most Abkhaz remained largely loyal to the Russian rule, while Georgians tended to oppose it. As a reward for their allegiance, tsar Nicholas II officially forgave the Abkhaz for their opposition in the 19th century and removed their status of a "guilty people" in 1907. This split along political divisions led to the rise of mistrust and tensions between the Georgian and Abkhaz communities which would further deepen in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The Bolshevik coup in October 1917 and the ensuing Russian Civil War forced the major national forces of South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – to unite into fragile federative structures. Abkhaz leaders created, on November 8, 1917, their own post-revolutionary body, Abkhaz People's Council (APC), but Abkhazia became embroiled into a chaos of the civil unrest. It was torn between supporters of the short-lived Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, a pro-Bolshevik faction, a pro-Turkish nobility, and a pro-Georgian Menshevik group.

In March 1918, local Bolsheviks under the leadership of Nestor Lakoba, a close associate of Joseph Stalin, capitalized on agrarian disturbances and, supported by the revolutionary peasant militias, kiaraz, won power in Sukhumi in April 1918. The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, which claimed the region as its part, sanctioned the suppression of the revolt and, on May 17, the National Guard of Georgia ousted the Bolshevik commune in Sukhumi.

Meanwhile, a short-lived Transcaucasian federation came to an end and the independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) was proclaimed on May 26, 1918. On June 8, a delegation of the APC negotiated, in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, a union with Georgia, which gave autonomy to Abkhazia. All domestic affairs were to be under the jurisdiction of the APC, while the central government established the office of Minister of Abkhazian Affairs and the post of the Governor-General of Abkhazia. Abkhaz deputies gained three of 28 seats preserved for ethnic minorities in Georgia's parliament.

The relations between the central and autonomous authorities were soon clouded by the abortive landing, on June 27, 1918, of a Turkish force supported by the Abkhaz nobles, J. Marghan and A. Shervashidze. Georgia responded with the arrest of several Abkhaz leaders and the limitation of the autonomous powers of the APC that precipitated some sympathies from the Abkhaz to the Russian White forces which engaged in the sporadic fighting with the Georgians in the north of Abkhazia. The reaction was even harsher when the Abkhaz officers of the Georgian army, Commissar Marghania and Colonel Chkhotua, staged a failed coup in October 1918. On October 10, the APC was disbanded and Abkhazia's autonomy was abrogated for six months. A new Abkhaz People's Council, elected in February 1919, adopted an act of Abkhazia's autonomy within the framework of the DRG, which was also supported by the Soviet government. [5] The status was confirmed in the Constitution of Georgia adopted on February 21, 1921, on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Georgia.

Despite the 1920 treaty of non-aggression, Soviet Russia’s 11th Red Army invaded Georgia on February 11, 1921, and marched on Tbilisi. Almost simultaneously, 9th (Kuban) Army entered Abkhazia on February 19. Supported by the local pro-Bolshevik guerillas, the Soviet troops took control of most of Abkhazia in a series of battles from February 23 to March 7, and proceeded into the neighbouring region of Mingrelia.

On March 4, Soviet power was established in Sukhumi, with the formation of the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazian SSR), subsequently recognized by the newly established Communist regime of the Georgian SSR on May 21. [5] On December 16, however, Abkhazia signed a special "union treaty" delegating some of its sovereign powers to Soviet Georgia. Abkhazia and Georgia together entered the Transcaucasian SFSR on December 13, 1922 and on 30 December joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abkhazia's ambiguous status of Union Republic was written into that republic's April 1, 1925 constitution. Paradoxically, an earlier reference to Abkhazia as an autonomous republic in the 1924 Soviet Constitution [27] remained unratified until 1930 when Abkhazia's status was reduced to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the Georgian SSR. [5] Except for a few nobles, the Abkhaz did not participate in the 1924 August Uprising in Georgia, a last desperate attempt to restore the independence of Georgia from the Soviet Union.

During the Stalin years, a purge was carried out against Communist Party officials and intelligentsia of Abkhaz provenance on the orders of Lavrentiy Beria, then-the Party Secretary in Transcaucasus and himself a native of Abkhazia, in order to break a resistance to forced collectivization of land. The Abkhaz party leader Lakoba suddenly died shortly after his visit to Beria in Tbilisi in December 1936. There was a strong suspicion that he was poisoned by Beria who declared Lakoba an "enemy of the people" posthumously. The purges in Abkhazia were accompanied by the suppression of Abkhaz ethnic culture: the Latin-based Abkhaz alphabet was changed into Georgian and all the native language schools were closed, ethnic Georgians were guaranteed key official positions, many place names were changed to Georgian ones. [28] [29] In the terror of 1937-38, the ruling elite was purged of Abkhaz and by 1952 over 80% of the 228 top party and government officials and enterprise managers were ethnic Georgians there remained 34 Abkhaz, 7 Russians and 3 Armenians in these positions. [30] Between 1937 and 1953 tens of thousands of peasants from Western Georgia were settled in Abkhazia. In the 1926 Soviet census, the Abkhaz accounted for 26.4% of the region's population. The demographic engineering of the late Stalin period brought this proportion down to 17—18%. Abkhazia is mountainous and has a shortage of arable land, which made it difficult to send in new settlers. This was one of the reasons why in 1949 the Greek and Turkish minorities were deported from Abkhazia to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics, and Georgians were settled in the formerly Greek and Turkish villages. [30] [ onbetroubare bron? ] Abkhazia experienced collectivisation in 1936–1938, much later than most of USSR. [31]

Stalin's five-year plans also resulted in the resettlement of many Russians, Armenians and Georgians into the existing Abkhaz, Georgian, Greek and other minority population to work in the growing agricultural sector. The 2,700-year-old Greek population of Abkhazia was completely deported by Stalin in a single night in 1949 to Central Asia with Georgian immigrants taking over their homes. In 1959 the surviving Greeks were allowed to return. During the 1992-93 war, some 15,000 Greeks fled the turmoil in the region to Greece.

The repression of the Abkhaz and other groups ended after Stalin's death and Beria's execution (1953), [32] and Abkhaz were given a greater role in the governance of the republic. As in most of the smaller autonomous republics, the Soviet government encouraged the development of culture and particularly of literature. A new script, based on Cyrillic, was devised for Abkhaz, Abkhaz schools reopened and administration put largely in the Abkhaz hands. Ethnic quotas were established for certain bureaucratic posts, giving the Abkhaz a degree of political power that was disproportionate to their minority status in the republic. This was interpreted by some [ who? ] as a "divide and rule" policy whereby local elites were given a share in power in exchange for support for the Soviet regime. [ aanhaling nodig ] In Abkhazia as elsewhere, it led to other ethnic groups — in this case, the Georgians — resenting what they saw as unfair discrimination and disregard of the rights of majority, thereby stoking ethnic discord in the republic.

The following three decades were marked by attempts of the Abkhaz Communist elite to make the autonomous structures more Abkhaz, but their efforts constantly met resistance from the Georgians. Abkhaz nationalists attempted on several occasions, most notably in 1978, to convince Moscow to transfer the autonomous republic from Georgian SSR to the Russian SFSR. That year, the Abkhaz organised a series of indoor and outdoor rallies (including an all-ethnic meeting of Abkhaz in Lykhny) in response to the mass demonstrations of Georgians who had succeeded in winning for their language a constitutional status of the official language of the Georgian SSR. Although the Abkhaz request of the secession from Georgia was rejected Moscow and Tbilisi responded with serious economic and cultural concessions, appropriating an extra 500 million rubles (or more [31] ) over seven years for the development of infrastructure and cultural projects such as the foundation of the Abkhazian State University (with Abkhaz, Georgian, and Russian sectors), a State Folk Ensemble in Sukhumi, and Abkhaz-language television broadcasting. [28] Substantial quotas were also given to ethnic Abkhaz in educational and official positions. [31] For example, by 1990 most of government ministers and regional Communist party department heads were ethnic Abkhaz. [33] Even though these concessions eased tensions only partially they made Abkhazia prosperous even by the standards of Georgia which was one of the wealthiest Soviet republic of that time. [31] [34] The favourable geographic and climatic conditions were successfully exploited to make Abkhazia a destination for hundreds of thousands of tourists, gaining for the region a reputation of "Soviet Riviera."

The Soviet authorities invested significantly into building a modern educational system in Abkhazia. In the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet government founded many new schools and several educational and training colleges (called “Uschiliche” in Russian language). The number of locally trained professionals grew from few dozens in the 1920s to several thousands in the 1980s.

By the 1980s, Sukhumi City became a home for largest educational institutions (both higher education institutions and Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) colleges) and largest students' community in Abkhazia.

There was some decline in a number of students in the 1990s. However, between 2000 and 2019 the student's population stabilised. Since the academic year 2020-2021 the number of college and university students even showed a small increase.

Abkhaz State University (1979) has 42 departments organized into 8 faculties providing education to about 3300 students (as of 2019, est.).

According to the official statistical data, Abkhazia has 13 TVET colleges (as of 2019, est.) providing education and vocational training to youth mostly in the capital city, though there are several colleges in all major district centers. Independent international assessments suggest that these colleges train in about 20 different specialties attracting between 1000 and 1300 young people (aged between 16 and 29) (as of 2019, est.). The largest colleges are as follows:

Abkhaz Multiindustrial College (1959) (from 1959 to 1999 - Sukhumi Trade and Culinary School),

Sukhumi State College (1904) (from 1904 to 1921 - Sukhumi Real School from 1921 to 1999 - Sukhumi Industrial Technical School),

Sukhum Medical College (1931)

As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate at the end of the 1980s, ethnic tension grew between the Abkhaz and Georgians over Georgia's moves towards independence. Many Abkhaz opposed this, fearing that an independent Georgia would lead to the elimination of their autonomy, and argued instead for the establishment of Abkhazia as a separate Soviet republic in its own right. The dispute turned violent on 16 July 1989 in Sukhumi. At least eighteen people were killed and another 137, mostly Georgians, injured when the Soviet Georgian government gave in to Georgian popular demand to transform a Georgian sector of Sukhumi State University into a branch of Tbilisi State University and the Abkhaz nationalists, including armed groups, [35] demonstrated at the building where the entrance examinations were being held. [36] [37] After several days of violence, Soviet troops restored order in the city and blamed rival nationalist paramilitaries for provoking confrontations.

Georgia boycotted the March 17, 1991 all-Union referendum on the renewal of the Soviet Union proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev. However, the referendum was held in Abkhazia and 52.3% of the population of Abkhazia (virtually all the non-Georgians) took part, and participants voted by an overwhelming majority (98.6%) in favour of preserving the Union. [38] [39] Most of the non-Georgian population subsequently declined to participate in the March 31 referendum on Georgia's independence, which was supported by a huge majority of the population of Georgia. Shortly after it Georgia declared independence on 9 April 1991, under the rule of nationalist [40] and former Soviet dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Gamsakhurdia's rule became unpopular, and that December, the Georgian National Guard, under the command of Tengiz Kitovani, laid siege to the offices of Gamsakhurdia's government in Tbilisi. After weeks of stalemate, he was forced to resign in January 1992. Gamsakhurdia was replaced as president by Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister and architect of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

On 21 February 1992, Georgia's ruling Military Council announced that it was abolishing the Soviet-era constitution and restoring the 1921 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Many Abkhaz interpreted this as an abolition of their autonomous status. In response, on 23 July 1992, the Abkhazia government effectively declared secession from Georgia, although this gesture went unrecognized by any other country. The Georgian government accused Gamsakhurdia supporters of kidnapping Georgia's interior minister and holding him captive in Abkhazia. The Georgian government dispatched 3,000 troops to the region, ostensibly to restore order. Heavy fighting between Georgian forces and Abkhazian militia broke out in and around Sukhumi. The Abkhazian authorities rejected the government's claims, claiming that it was merely a pretext for an invasion. After about a week's fighting and many casualties on both sides, Georgian government forces managed to take control of most of Abkhazia, and closed down the regional parliament.

The Abkhazians' military defeat was met with a hostile response by the self-styled Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, an umbrella group uniting a number of pro-Russian movements in the North Caucasus, Russia (Chechens, Cossacks, Ossetians and others). Hundreds of volunteer paramilitaries from Russia (including the then little known Shamil Basayev) joined forces with the Abkhazian separatists to fight the Georgian government forces. Regular Russian forces also reportedly sided with the secessionists. In September, the Abkhaz and Russian paramilitaries mounted a major offensive after breaking a cease-fire, which drove the Georgian forces out of large swathes of the republic. Shevardnadze's government accused Russia of giving covert military support to the rebels with the aim of "detaching from Georgia its native territory and the Georgia-Russian frontier land". The year 1992 ended with the rebels in control of much of Abkhazia northwest of Sukhumi.

The conflict remained stalemated until July 1993, following an agreement in Sochi, when the Abkhaz separatist militias launched an abortive attack on Georgian-held Sukhumi. The capital was surrounded and heavily shelled, with Shevardnadze himself trapped in the city.

Although a truce was declared at the end of July, this collapsed after a renewed Abkhaz attack in mid-September. After ten days of heavy fighting, Sukhumi fell on 27 September 1993. Eduard Shevardnadze narrowly escaped death, having vowed to stay in the city no matter what, but he was eventually forced to flee when separatist snipers fired on the hotel where he was residing. Abkhaz, North Caucasians militants and their allies committed one of the most horrific massacres [41] of this war against remaining Georgian civilians in the city known as Sukhumi Massacre. The mass killings and destruction continued for two weeks, leaving thousands dead and missing.

The separatist forces quickly overran the rest of Abkhazia as the Georgian government faced a second threat: an uprising by the supporters of the deposed Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the region of Mingrelia (Samegrelo). In the chaotic aftermath of defeat almost all ethnic Georgian population fled the region by sea or over the mountains escaping a large-scale ethnic cleansing initiated by the victors. Many thousands died — it is estimated that between 10,000 and 30,000 ethnic Georgians and 3,000 ethnic Abkhaz may have perished — and some 250,000 people were forced into exile.

During the war, gross human rights violations were reported on the both sides (see Human Rights Watch report), [42] and the ethnic cleansing committed by the Abkhaz forces and their allies is recognised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summits in Budapest (1994), [43] Lisbon (1996) [44] and Istanbul (1999) [45]

The economic situation in the republic after war was very hard and it was aggravated by the sanctions imposed in 1994 by the Commonwealth of Independent States. During the 1990s numerous people of all ethnicities left Abkhazia mainly for Russia. Since 1997 Russia effectively dropped these sanctions which tremendously helped republic's economy. In 1999, Abkhazia officially declared its independence, [5] which was recognized by almost no other nations.

The return of Georgians to Gali district of Abkhazia was halted by the fighting which broke out there in 1998. However, from 40,000 to 60,000 refugees have returned to Gali district since 1998, including persons commuting daily across the ceasefire line and those migrating seasonally in accordance with agricultural cycles.

After several peaceful years tourists again began to visit Abkhazia, however their number is only about a half of the pre-war number.

In 2004 presidential elections were held which caused much controversy when the candidate backed by outgoing president Vladislav Ardzinba and by Russia - Raul Khadjimba - was apparently defeated by Sergey Bagapsh. The tense situation in the republic led to the cancellation of the election results by the Supreme Court. After that the deal was struck between former rivals to run jointly — Bagapsh as a presidential candidate and Khajimba as a vice presidential candidate. They received more than 90% of the votes in the new election.

After the 1992-1993 War the Upper Kodori Valley was the only part of the country that was not controlled by the Abkhazian government. It remained under the formal control of Georgian authorities however it was mainly run by a local strongman Emzar Kvitsiani. As a result of the 2006 Kodori crisis Georgia reasserted its power in the valley. [5] Abkhazians claimed that the infiltration of the territory by Georgian armed units was a violation of the Agreement on the Ceasefire and Disengagement of Forces of May 14, 1994, however Georgia maintained that only police and security forces were employed there. Abkhaz forces occupied Kodori Valley in August 2008 as a result of an operation that coincided with the 2008 South Ossetia War.

August 2008 saw another crisis start as South Ossetia in Georgia started hostilities aimed towards secession. This violence spread somewhat into the Abkhazia region again, with added stress created by the Russian forces massing. [5] Georgia and Russia signed a cease-fire soon after requiring Russia to withdraw. [5]

Meanwhile, the efforts of Russia to isolate Georgian population in Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia continued. On 24 October 2008 the railroad bridge of Shamgon-Tagiloni, connecting the city of Zugdidi in Georgia with the Abkhazian Gali district (populated mainly by Georgians) [46] was destroyed. According to Georgian and French sources it was done by Russian army Abkhazian sources maintained it was a Georgian diversion. [47] [48] Per Georgian sources on 29 October 2008 Russian forces dismantled another bridge - the one situated between the villages of Orsantia (ru) and Otobaia and linking a total of five villages - Otobaia, Pichori (ru), Barghebi, Nabakevi (ru) and Gagida (ru) thus the local population was deprived of the opportunity to move freely in the region. [49] [50]


The Treaty of New Echota and the Trail of Tears

Aan December 29, 1835, U.S. government officials and about 500 Cherokee Indians claiming to represent their 16,000-member tribe, met at New Echota, Georgia, and signed a treaty. The agreement led to the forced removal of Cherokees from their southeastern homelands to Indian Territory west of the Mississippi River.

The Treaty of New Echota gave the Cherokees $5 million and land in present-day Oklahoma in exchange for their 7 million acres of ancestral land. Though the majority of Cherokees opposed the treaty, and Principal Chief John Ross wrote a letter to Congress protesting it, the U.S. Senate ratified the document in March 1836.

Aware of the lack of support for the treaty among the Cherokee, President Martin Van Buren proposed a two-year extension to allow the Cherokees time to move. Still, by May 1838, only 2,000 Cherokees had moved voluntarily.

That spring, the federal government sent 7,000 soldiers under General Winfield Scott to evict the remaining Cherokees. They built six forts in North Carolina to hold the captured Indians until their forced westward journey could begin.

The 1,200-mile trek, begun in October 1838, lasted six months. Along the way, an estimated 10 to 25 percent of the tribe died of disease, starvation and exhaustion. Today, their route is known as the Trail of Tears.

    from the N.C. Museum of Histroy
  • The Cherokee Indians on NCpedia
  • Resources on Native American Heritage from the State Library of North Carolina

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Jun 7, 1494 CE: Treaty of Tordesillas

On June 7, 1494, the governments of Spain and Portugal agreed to the Treaty of Tordesillas, which divided their spheres of influence in the "New World" of the Americas.

Geography, Social Studies, World History

Treaty of Tordesillas

The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas neatly divided the "New World" into land, resources, and people claimed by Spain and Portugal. The red vertical line cutting through eastern Brazil represents the divide. The treaty worked out well for the Spanish and Portuguese empires, but less so for the 50 million people already living in established communities in the Americas.

Map by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, courtesy the Library of Congress

On June 7, 1494, the governments of Spain and Portugal agreed to the Treaty of Tordesillas, named for the city in Spain in which it was created. The Treaty of Tordesillas neatly divided the &ldquoNew World&rdquo of the Americas between the two superpowers.

Spain and Portugal divided the New World by drawing a north-to-south line of demarcation in the Atlantic Ocean, about 100 leagues (555 kilometers or 345 miles) west of the Cape Verde Islands, off the coast of northwestern Africa and then controlled by Portugal. All lands east of that line (about 46 degrees, 37 minutes west) were claimed by Portugal. All lands west of that line were claimed by Spain.

Spain and Portugal adhered to the treaty without major conflict between the two, although the line of demarcation was moved an additional 270 leagues (about 1500 kilometers or 932 miles) farther west in 1506, which enabled Portugal to claim the eastern coast of what is now Brazil.

The results of this treaty are still evident throughout the Americas today. For example, all Latin American nations are predominantly Spanish-speaking countries with the sole exception of Brazil where Portuguese is the national language. This is because the eastern tip of Brazil falls east of the line of demarcation settled upon in the Treaty of Tordesillas, and was where the majority of Portuguese colonization occurred. The borders of modern Brazil have expanded since the 1506 expansion of the Treaty of Tordesillas.

Spain and Portugal were the only signatories of the treaty because at the time, they were the only European powers to establish a presence in the Americas. The treaty did not consider any future claims made by the British, French, and other European superpowers of their respective times. The British, French, and Dutch Empires did not claim parts of the Americas until years after the Treaty of Tordesillas.

More significantly, however, the Treaty of Tordesillas completely ignored the millions of people already living in established communities in the Americas. The treaty stipulated that any lands with a &ldquoChristian king&rdquo would not be colonized. Of course, by that time, Christianity had not spread broadly in the Americas. This meant that unless the land was already claimed by a Christian (European) ruler, by the terms of their treaty, Spain and Portugal could claim practically any land they managed to conquer in the Americas. The resulting conquest and colonization proved disastrous for civilizations, such as the Inca, Taino, and Aztec, along with thousands of other communities throughout the Americas.