Geskiedenis Podcasts

Joegoslavië

Joegoslavië

In die 19de eeu is verskeie organisasies gestig wat hulle beywer het vir die vereniging van Slawiese volke op die Balkan. Hierdie eise het aan die einde van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog toegeneem. Op 4 Desember 1918 word 'n nuwe koninkryk van Serwiërs, Kroate en Slowene gestig. Dit sluit Serwië, Montenegro en lande uit Oostenryk-Hongarye en Bulgarye in.

Die monarg van Serwië, Peter I, was die eerste heerser van die nuwe koninkryk en Nikola Pasic het die land se premier geword. Pasic het die verskillende groepe suksesvol bymekaar gehou, maar sy dood in 1926 het politieke onrus veroorsaak. In Januarie 1929 stig die nuwe koning, Alexander I, 'n koninklike diktatuur en hernoem die land Joegoslavië.

In die dertigerjare het die Joego-Slawiese regering onder leiding van prins-regent Paul hom verbind met die fascistiese diktature van Duitsland en Italië. Op 27 Maart 1941 het 'n militêre staatsgreep egter 'n meer simpatieke regering vir die Geallieerdes tot stand gebring. Tien dae later het die Luftwaffe Joegoslavië gebombardeer en Belgrado feitlik vernietig. Die Duitse leër het binnegeval en die regering is in ballingskap gedwing.

Weerstand teen die Duitse besetting kom van twee mededingende guerrillagroepe, die Chetniks onder leiding van Drazha Mihailovic en Josip Tito en sy partydiges. Die Geallieerdes het aanvanklik finansiële bystand aan die Chetniks verleen, maar toe hulle met die Duitsers en Italianers begin saamwerk, is hierdie hulp oorgeskakel na die partisane.

Einde November 1943 kon Josip Tito 'n regering in Bosnië stig. Na die oorlog stig Tito 'n federasie van die sosialistiese republieke Serwië, Kroasië, Slowenië, Montenegro, Bosnië-Herzegowina en Masedonië. In Maart 1945 word Tito premier van Joego -Slawië. Oor die volgende paar jaar het hy 'n federasie van sosialistiese republieke gestig (Serwië, Kroasië, Slowenië, Montenegro, Bosnië-Herzegowina en Masedonië).

Tito het verskeie meningsverskille met Joseph Stalin gehad en in 1948 het hy Joegoslavië uit die Komintern geneem en 'n beleid van 'positiewe neutralisme' gevoer. Onder invloed van die idees van sy vise-president, Milovan Djilas, het Tito gepoog om 'n unieke vorm van sosialisme te skep wat insluit werkersrade vir winsdeling wat industriële ondernemings bestuur het.

Hoewel hy in 1974 lewenslank president geskep is, het Tito 'n unieke stelsel van kollektiewe, wisselende leierskap in die land ingestel.

In Joego -Slawië was die regering vanaf die einde van die oorlog goed georganiseer en stewig in die hande van die kommuniste. Dit het ontstaan ​​uit die wortels, uit die geleidelike ontwikkeling van partytjie- en guerrillavormings. Ondanks die omwentelinge en haat van oorlog en revolusie, het Joegoslavië na twee of drie jaar van vrede 'n veilige land geword. Veilig, maar skaars goed bestel. Administrasies is vinnig gestig en 'n kulturele lewe het ontstaan, maar alles binne 'n raamwerk van partyideologie. Dit was nog oorlogstyd toe ou teaters weer oopgaan en nuwes begin, en baie tydskrifte en koerante verskyn. Die inhoud daarvan is egter beheer. Alhoewel die jonger geslag van die land met entoesiasme, die lojale werkersklas en die party sterk en selfversekerd afgedank is, bly Joego-Slawië 'n verdeelde, hartseer land, materieel en geestelik verwoes.

Die konsolidasie van die nuwe regime en nuwe grond- en eiendomswette - die voortsetting van die revolusionêre proses - het meer uiting gevind in Tito se prominensie as in die van die Kommunistiese party self. Dit het nie gebeur bloot omdat Tito die hoof van die nuwe regime was nie, terwyl die Kommunistiese party nog steeds semi-wettig opereer. Nee, 'n 'Tito -kultus' het tydens die oorlog begin. Die opgewekte massas het 'n leier nodig gehad en die party was 'Bolsjewiseer' - dit wil sê, gestaliniseer. Hierdie eise en behoeftes, emosioneel en prakties, is stap vir stap in die weermag en ander hiërargieë ingebou. Eintlik is die kultus van Tito amptelik en geïnstitusionaliseer tydens die tweede sitting van AVNOJ (Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) in Jajce op 29 November 1943. Tito, 'n agent van die Komintern sedert 1937 met vetoreg oor die Sentraal Die komitee is bevestig - danksy die bolsjewisme van die party, sy eie vindingrykheid en veral die revolusionêre proses - as 'n outokratiese leier. Hy het homself van die begin af in 1937 as sodanig gedra; na Jajce troon hy homself uit deur sy eie wil, die wil van 'n revolusionêre leier.

Die kultus van Tito was nie net Tito se doen nie, maar ook die gevolg van georganiseerde politieke optrede. Dit was die produk van 'n Tito -faksie, wat geleidelik na vore gekom het binne die leierskap. Dit was ook die gevolg van 'n sekere stemming onder die mense, 'n volk onder leiding van 'n enkele totalitêre party en gewoond aan charismatiese vorste.

Dit is vanselfsprekend dat Tito nie die enigste was wat luuksheid, voorreg en eksklusiwiteit beklemtoon het nie, maar niemand kon hom in sulke sake aanpas nie. Die res van die voorste leiers, federaal, republikein, en waarskynlik ook op munisipale en distriksvlak, gedra dieselfde, inderdaad identies. 'N Nuwe heersende klas word spontaan, stelselmatig verwesenlik, en daarmee saam die onvermydelike afguns en hebsug. Die voorste leiers kon nie net die proses stop nie, maar self het hulle in die voorreg gedompel, maar ook die ergste buitensporighede reggestel.

Ongeag of hierdie artikels basies akkuraat is, nie een van ons kan altyd 'n honderd-persent korrekte beoordeling en ontleding gee voordat ons die oorsake van sekere verskynsels begryp nie, en voordat die oorsake die kans gehad het om in die bewussyn van die meerderheid. Teoretiese artikels moet nie tydens partyselvergaderings bespreek word as iets wat voorgeskryf en definitief is nie; gevolglik moet partylede gerus daaroor praat - nie as die partylyn nie, nie as iets gegewe en aksiomaties nie, maar as materiaal wat die impak daarvan op die massa -ontwikkeling van teoretiese denke moet maak ... Gevolglik is dit 'n fout om verwar gratis bespreking oor teorievrae binne 'n partyorganisasie met besluite wat reeds oor individuele aangeleenthede geneem is ... In sulke gesprekke durf ons nie, kan ons nie mense oordeel of oorhaastige besluite neem nie. Daarom, voordat 'n beslissende uitspraak gelewer word, is dit heeltemal korrek om op demokratiese wyse gesprekke te voer. Gedissiplineerde aanvaarding van 'n standpunt wat die meerderheid oor individuele kwessies inneem, kan later kom.

Die wortels van die huidige staatsaangeleenthede in die wêreld gaan terug na die imperialistiese metode wat tydens die oorlog in Teheran, Jalta, Moskou en Berlyn toegepas is, toe daar eers gepoog is om internasionale probleme op te los.

Niemand in hierdie land of in die wêreld was verbaas toe die Westerse moondhede te Teheran, Jalta, Moskou en Berlyn die oplossing vir wêreldprobleme op hul gewoond manier benader nie. Maar vir almal wat die gerug dat die U.S.S.R. die beskermer van klein volke was, gekrediteer het, was dit 'n ware morele slag, as die eerste sterk twyfel oor die Sowjetunie en die korrektheid van Moskou se beleid. Van Teheran tot vandag toe pronk Moskou met sy imperialistiese majesteit. Vandag kan ons met vrymoedigheid beweer dat die hele Sowjetse buitelandse beleid - wat gewone propaganda -truuks opsy gesit het, soos hul beweerde stryd om vrede en die res - 'n uitstekende bydrae tot internasionale spanning gelewer het.

Dit was mos nou Moskou wat kolonies in die hart van Europa geskep het waar daar eens onafhanklike state soos Tsjeggo -Slowakye, Pole, Hongarye, Roemenië, Bulgarye, ensovoorts was. Om nie eers te praat van die slawerny van die Baltiese lande voor die oorlog nie.

Die USSR het Noord -Korea in 'n aggressiewe oorlog gedwing om Suid -Korea onder die knie te kry terwyl ander hul hande vuil maak. Deur dit te sê, verminder ek nie die verantwoordelikheid van die Westerse moondhede nie. Hulle is net so verantwoordelik vir die situasie in Korea sedert die oorlog in 1950 begin het.

terreine van belang.

Na twee of drie dae is ek gevra om na die Wit Paleis te kom, waar ek Kardelj en Rankovic met Tito sien wag het. Terwyl ek gaan sit, vra ek koffie, kla oor gebrek aan slaap. Toe Tito opstaan ​​om dit te bestel, het hy my aangegryp. Ons slaap ook nie. "Op 'n stadium het ek vir hom gesê:" Ek kan verstaan. U het baie vermag en u beskerm dit. Ek het iets begin en verdedig dit. Maar ek wonder oor hierdie twee (ek bedoel Kardelj en Rankovic). Waarom is hulle so hardkoppig? "

Tito het opgemerk dat daar skynbaar geen beweging rondom my was nie, aangesien dit inderdaad nie was nie. Ek het gesê dat dit my enigste bedoeling was om sosialisme verder te ontwikkel. Tito se weerlegging bestaan ​​daarin om daarop te wys dat die 'reaksie' - die bourgeoisie - nog steeds baie sterk in ons land was en dat allerhande kritici skaars kon wag om ons aan te val. As voorbeeld noem hy Sokrates, 'n satire, Net gepubliseer deur Branko Copic, waarin kiesers 'n hond met die naam Sokrates kies, baie onbesorg oor die voorwerp van hul keuse, omdat hulle oortuig is dat dit 'van die hoogste' af opdrag gegee is. niemand het saamgestem nie Kardelj het bygevoeg dat 'n paar dae tevore die begrafnis van 'n politikus uit die ou regime - ek vergeet wie - deur 'n paar honderd burgers bygewoon is! president van die Nasionale Vergadering na vore gekom het, was

dat ek dit self moes toesien, sodat dit nie sou lyk asof dit onder druk of deur administratiewe onttrek was nie

metodes. Uiteindelik het Tito my gevra om my bedanking in te dien, en besluit beslis: "Wat moet wees, moet wees." Terwyl ons totsiens gesê het, steek hy sy hand uit, maar met 'n blik van haat en wraakgierigheid.

Toe ek huis toe kom, het ek my bedanking in bitterheid neergeskryf. Terselfdertyd het ek my bestuurder, Tomo, gevra om my motors by die White Palace af te lewer. Ek het twee gehad - 'n Mercedes en 'n Jeep, wat ek in afgesonderde gebiede gebruik het. Twee dae later het Luka Leskosek, my begeleier, die tasse kom soek wat aan die Mercedes behoort het. In my haas het ek hulle vergeet, en nou voel ek ongemaklik omdat my voorletters daarop gegraveer is.

In die loop van ons gesprek het Tito opgemerk dat my "saak" die grootste gevolge van die wêreld het sedert ons konfrontasie met die Sowjetunie. Ek het geantwoord dat ek nie meer die verslae van Tanjug gelees het nie; hulle is nie meer na my gestuur nie. 'Hou hulle vas en kyk self', het Tito gesê. Dieselfde dag het ek na Tanjug gegaan om na die buitelandse persverslae oor my saak te kyk. Onwillig het die nuusagentskap my verplig. Die omvang en verskeidenheid verslae het 'n tweeledige uitwerking: ek was beïndruk en aangemoedig, maar terselfdertyd verleë en gepla dat Westerse "kapitalistiese" propaganda so duidelik bevooroordeeld was in my guns.

Selfs die mees vreesaanjaende droom word vergeet, maar dit was geen droom nie. Die Derde Plenum was die werklikheid, 'n ydele en skandelike werklikheid vir almal wat deelgeneem het. My hoofaanklaers, Tito en Kardelj, hoewel hulle skynbaar bekommerd was oor die eenheid van partye, was in werklikheid besorg oor hul eie aansien en mag. Om die gevaar te veroorsaak, het hulle skuldgevind. Nadat hulle hul mening uitgespreek het, was dit die beurt aan die taai, skerpsiende kragbrekers - onder wie Minic en Stambolic, Pucar en Mannko, Blazo Jovanovic en Maslaric; toe kom die party swakkelinge, soos Colakovic, en die histeries boetvaardige "selfkritici", soos Vukmanovic, Dapcevic, Vlahovic, Crvenkovski en selfs Pijade - ja, Pijade ook, wat tot op die dag dat die plenum geskeduleer was, soet was. sy lippe oor my artikels. Dit kon alles voorsien gewees het. Ek het dit voorsien. Maar die werklikheid is altyd anders, beter of slegter. Hierdie werklikheid was aakliger, meer skaamteloos.

Ek was meer intellektueel as emosioneel voorbereid op die plenum en die uitspraak daarvan, seker dat ek reg was, maar tog sentimenteel vasgebind was aan my kamerade. Maar ook dit is 'n oorvereenvoudiging; die innerlike werklikheid was meer kompleks. My afsydigheid, my ongeërgdheid teenoor funksies en eerbewyse - teenoor mag self - het my intellektuele gereedheid, die rypheid van my begrip gehelp. Boonop het ek in die voorafgaande maande heeltemal siek geword, maar ek het funksies prysgegee en ek het gelees en geskryf.

Ek het destyds die belangrikheid van mag, veral vir die uitvoering van politieke idees, geweet en weet dit vandag nog duideliker. Maar destyds word ek afgeweer deur die mag, wat meer 'n doel op sigself was as 'n middel tot 'n doel, en my walging het in verhouding toegeneem namate ek na die 'onsosialistiese', ondemokratiese aard daarvan kyk. Ek kon nie sê wat eerste gekom het nie, walging of insig; dit lyk asof dit mekaar aanvul en uitruil. Selfs voordat die plenum geskeduleer was, wou ek 'n gewone persoon wees, en ek wou my van die mag onttrek tot intellektuele en morele onafhanklikheid. Dit was duidelik dat ek myself mislei het. Dit was slegs gedeeltelik omdat die topleiding van 'n totalitêre party nie in staat is om 'n lid uit sy geledere te bevry nie, behalwe vir 'verraad'. My dwaling was net soveel te danke aan my eie onversetlikheid, my persepsies wat aanhou volwasse word en my gevoel van morele verpligting om dit bekend te maak.

Die Derde Plenum is gehou in die gebou van die Sentrale Komitee, wat dit 'n all-party karakter gegee het. (Alle sessies van die Sentrale Komitee was voorheen by Tito's in die Wit Paleis gehou.) Die verrigtinge is ook per radio uitgevoer om 'n openbare en nasionale karakter te gee. Ek het daar gestap met Stefica aan my sy; Dedijer het ons deel van die pad vergesel.

Ek het gevoelloos, liggaamloos aangekom. 'N Ketter, sonder twyfel. Een wat deur gister se naaste kamerade op die brandstapel verbrand moes word, veterane wat saam beslissende, belangrike gevegte gevoer het. In die konferensiesaal het niemand my na 'n sitplek gewys nie, en ek het vir my 'n plek gevind op die hoek van 'n vierkantige tafel. Enigiemand het soveel as 'n woord met my gewissel nie, behalwe as dit amptelik vereis is. Om die tyd te bestee en die feite aan te teken, het ek notas geneem van die toesprake. Hierdie het ek verbrand sodra die woordelikse aantekeninge uit die plenum gepubliseer is.

Alhoewel ek geweet het dat die vonnis reeds bereik is, kon ek nie die aard of erns van my straf ken nie. In die geheim het ek gehoop dat die Sentrale Komitee my nie uit die party sou verdryf nie, miskien nie eers uit die plenum nie, selfs al het ek my opinies weerhou en daarvan afstand gedoen. Maar al my demokratiese en vriendskaplike hoop is in die wiele gery sodra die wedstryd aangesluit het. Tito se toespraak was 'n stuk bytend onverdraagsame demogogie. Die berekening wat dit gedefinieer en verwoord het, was nie by 'n teëstander wat eenvoudig in die oë van die oë afgedwaal het of ontrou was nie, maar met iemand wat die beginsel self verraai het.

Terwyl Tito aan die woord was, het die respek en liefde wat ek vir hom gevoel het, oorgegaan op vervreemding en afstoting. Daardie korpulente, sorgvuldig uniforme liggaam met sy pofferige, geskeerde nek het my met afsku vervul. Ek het Kardelj gesien as 'n klein en inkonsekwente man wat idees wat tot gister toe ook syne was, geringskat het, wat antirevisionistiese tirades uit die begin van die eeu aangewend het, en wat beweerde anti-Tito en teenparty-opmerkings van my uit private gesprekke aangehaal het en buite konteks.

Maar ek het niemand gehaat nie, selfs nie hierdie twee nie, wie se ideologiese en politieke rasionalisasies so vasbeslote, so grootmoedig was, dat die res van my selfgestileerde kritici hulself as heftig beledig het - die Titoiste aggressief en die boetes histeries. In plaas daarvan om dit met haat en woede van my eie te eis, het ek my in my leë verwoesting agter my morele verdediging teruggetrek.

Hoe langer die plenum aangegaan het met sy eentonige tromslag van dogma, haat en wrok, hoe meer bewus het ek geword van die totale gebrek aan oop, beginselvaste argument. Dit was 'n stalinistiese vertoonproef, suiwer en eenvoudig. Bloedloos was dit moontlik, maar nie minder stalinisties in elke ander dimensie nie - intellektueel, moreel en polities.

Op 9 Augustus het president Tito in Praag aangekom vir 'n amptelike besoek en 'n entoesiastiese ontvangs ontvang van groot menigtes langs die roete van die lughawe na die Praagse kasteel. Ek kon die herinnering aan sy verwelkoming in Moskou twintig jaar tevore nie onderdruk nie. Tydens ons gesprekke het Tito volle steun uitgespreek vir ons beleid en ons saak. Soos baie politici wêreldwyd, het hy geglo dat die Bratislava -konferensie 'n teken was van die Sowjet -terugtog. Ons het nietemin ooreengekom dat die Sowjets ons op verskeie maniere sal bly teister en probeer om die omvang van ons hervormings te vertraag en te verklein. Ek het vir hom gesê dat dit al sedert Maart en April aan die gang was, dat ons oor ons skouers moes kyk voordat ons omtrent besluite belangrike besluite kon neem.

Ons stelsel is slegs gebou vir Tito om te bestuur. Noudat Tito weg is en ons ekonomiese situasie kritiek word, is daar 'n natuurlike neiging tot groter sentralisering van mag. Maar hierdie sentralisering sal nie slaag nie, want dit sal in stryd wees met die etnies-politieke magsbasisse in die republieke. Dit is nie klassieke nasionalisme nie, maar 'n meer gevaarlike, burokratiese nasionalisme wat gebaseer is op ekonomiese eiebelang. Dit is hoe die Joego -Slawiese stelsel sal begin ineenstort.


Joegoslavië

Joegoslavië ( / ˌ j uː ɡ oʊ ˈ s l ɑː v i ə / Serbo-Kroaties: Jugoslavija / Југославија [juɡǒslaːʋija] Sloweens: Jugoslavija [juɡɔˈslàːʋija] Masedonies: Југославија [juɡɔˈsɫavija] [A] lit. 'Suid -Slawiese land') was die grootste deel van die 20ste eeu 'n land in Suidoos -Europa en Sentraal -Europa. Dit het ontstaan ​​na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog in 1918 [B] onder die naam van Koninkryk van Serwiërs, Kroate en Slowenië deur die samesmelting van die voorlopige staat Slowenië, Kroate en Serwië (wat gevorm is uit gebiede van die voormalige Oostenryk-Hongaarse Ryk) met die Koninkryk Serwië, en vorm dit die eerste unie van die Suid-Slawiese volk as 'n soewereine staat, na eeue waarin die streek deel was van die Ottomaanse Ryk en Oostenryk-Hongarye. Petrus I van Serwië was sy eerste soewerein. Die koninkryk het op 13 Julie 1922 internasionale erkenning gekry tydens die Conference of Ambassadors in Parys. [2] Die amptelike naam van die staat is verander na Koninkryk van Joegoslavië op 3 Oktober 1929.

Joegoslavië is op 6 April 1941 deur die As -magte binnegeval. In 1943 word 'n Demokratiese Federale Joegoslavië deur die Partisaanse weerstand uitgeroep. In 1944 erken koning Peter II, toe in ballingskap, dit as die wettige regering. Die monargie is daarna in November 1945 afgeskaf. Joego -Slawië is in 1946 herdoop tot die Federale Volksrepubliek Joego -Slawië, toe 'n kommunistiese regering tot stand gekom het. Dit het die gebiede Istrië, Rijeka en Zadar uit Italië verkry. Die partydige leier Josip Broz Tito regeer die land as president tot sy dood in 1980. In 1963 word die land weer hernoem, aangesien die Sosialistiese Federale Republiek van Joego -Slawië (SFRY).

Die ses republieke wat deel uitmaak van die SFRY was die SR Bosnië en Herzegowina, SR Kroasië, SR Masedonië, SR Montenegro, SR Serwië en SR Slowenië. Serwië bevat twee sosialistiese outonome provinsies, Vojvodina en Kosovo, wat ná 1974 grootliks gelyk was aan die ander lede van die federasie. [3] [4] Na 'n ekonomiese en politieke krisis in die 1980's en die opkoms van nasionalisme, breek Joego -Slawië langs die grense van sy republieke, eers in vyf lande, wat tot die Joegoslaviese oorloë gelei het. Van 1993 tot 2017 het die Internasionale Strafhof vir die voormalige Joegoslavië politieke en militêre leiers uit die voormalige Joegoslavië verhoor vir oorlogsmisdade, volksmoord en ander misdade wat tydens die oorloë gepleeg is.

Na die breuk vorm die republieke Montenegro en Serwië 'n verminderde federale staat, die Federale Republiek Joegoslavië (FRJ), wat van 2003 tot 2006 bekend staan ​​as Serwië en Montenegro. Hierdie staat streef na die status van die enigste regsopvolger van die SFRY, maar die ander voormalige republieke het hierdie bewerings teëgestaan. Uiteindelik aanvaar dit die mening van die Badinter Arbitrasiekomitee oor gedeelde opvolging [5] en in 2003 word die amptelike naam daarvan verander na Serwië en Montenegro. Hierdie staat het ontbind toe Montenegro en Serwië elk in 2006 onafhanklike state geword het, terwyl Kosovo in 2008 sy onafhanklikheid van Serwië uitgeroep het.


Erkenning

Amerikaanse erkenning van Serwiese onafhanklikheid, 1881.

Die Verenigde State erken die Koninkryk Serwië op 14 Oktober 1881 as 'n soewereine nasie met die ondertekening van konsulêre en kommersiële ooreenkomste tussen die twee nasies.

Amerikaanse erkenning van die onafhanklikheid van die koninkryk van Serwiërs, Kroate en Slowene, 1919.

Op 7 Februarie 1919 erken die Verenigde State die Koninkryk van die Serwiërs, Kroate en Slowenië deur 'n verklaring wat deur die Amerikaanse waarnemende minister van buitelandse sake, Frank Polk, aan die pers bekend gemaak is. Die Verenigde State beskou hierdie nuwe staat as die opvolgerstaat van die Koninkryk Serwië.


Tito se Joegoslavië

Josip Broz Tito, leier van die kommunistiese Joego -Slawië.

As die heerser van Joego-Slawië stuur Josip Tito die land op 'n koers wat onafhanklik was van die Sowjetunie en die ander kommunistiese state van die Oosblok uit die Koue Oorlog. Trouens, soms was sy betrekkinge met die USSR redelik ysig. Terselfdertyd het Tito 'n paar bande met die Weste behou, wie se hulp sy regime gehelp het om te oorleef. Tito se regime was aanvanklik hoogs gesentraliseer, maar onder druk van leiers van Joegoslavië se samestellende state, was Tito genoodsaak om magte prys te gee. Uiteindelik het hy magte oorgedra tot die punt dat die land slegs deur hom en sy persoonlikheidskultus bymekaar gehou is.

Ekonomie van Tito se Joegoslavië

Die ekonomie van Joego -Slawië onder Tito funksioneer anders as dié van ander kommunistiese state. Tito het sy eie stempel op die kommunisme geplaas deur 'n beleid te begin wat bekend staan ​​as selfbestuur. Onder hierdie ekonomiese model het die werkers self die bedryf van nywerhede deur werkersrade beheer. Onder hierdie model het Joegoslavië die heropbou ná die Tweede Wêreldoorlog bestuur. Die gevolg was 'n vinnige ekonomiese groei en 'n aansienlike styging in die lewenstandaard. Tito se model van selfbestuur was egter geensins 'n resep vir 'n utopiese samelewing nie. Alhoewel werkers in teorie die nywerhede in Joego -Slawië beheer, was die werklikheid dat volle deelnemende demokrasie in die werkplek nie gevorm kon word nie weens die monopolie van die Joego -Slawiese Kommunistiese Party.


Joegoslavië: Geskiedenis

Joegoslavië het ontstaan ​​as gevolg van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. In 1914 was slegs Serwië (wat die huidige Noord-Masedonië en Kosovo insluit) en Montenegro onafhanklike state Kroasië, Slowenië en Bosnië en Herzegovina behoort tot die Oostenryk-Hongaarse monargie. (Die vorige geskiedenis van die ses komponente van Joego -Slawië word in hul onderskeie artikels meer breedvoerig behandel.)

Slawiërs vestig hulle (6de tot 7de eeu) op die Balkan en word in die 9de eeu gekersten. Slowenië was onder die Frankiese (8ste eeu), Beierse (9de eeu) en Oostenrykse (14de eeu) heerskappy tot 1918. 'n Kroaties koninkryk bestaan ​​van die 10de tot die 11de eeu. daarna onder Hongaarse bewind tot aan die einde van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Bosnië was onafhanklik van die 12de tot die 15de eeu toe dit onder Turkse bewind geval het. Aan die einde van die 19de eeu. dit het oorgedra na Oostenryk-Hongarye, en die formele anneksasie daarvan (1908) was een van die irritasies wat tot die Eerste Wêreldoorlog gelei het.

Die streek Masedonië is betwis tussen die Bisantyne, Bulgare en ander totdat dit in 14de eeu deur Serwië verower is, en net soos Serwië het dit die Turke (laat 14de eeu) te beurt geval. Serwië het tydens die Balkanoorloë beheer oor die streek verkry. 'N Serviese koninkryk het ontstaan ​​(13de eeu.) En het onder Stephen Dušan (r. 1331–55) die magtigste Balkanstaat geword. Nederlaag (1389) op Kosovo -veld het Serwië van die 14de tot die 19de eeu onder Turkse oorheersing gebring, en Serwië was teen 1459 veilig in Turkse hande.

Ten tyde van die nederlaag op Kosovo -veld, was Montenegro nou die feitlik onafhanklike prinsdom Zeta in die Serwiese ryk. Die bergagtige vorstedom het die Turke steeds weerstaan, maar teen 1499 was die grootste deel daarvan verower deur Venesië, wat die hawe van Kotor gehou het, en die Montenegryse vorste het hul oorblywende vesting uit Cetinje beheer. Montenegro se onafhanklikheid is in 1799 deur die Ottomaanse Ryk erken, en in 1829 verleen die Turke aan die Serwië outonomie onder 'n oorerflike prins. Montenegro en Serwië is tydens die kongres van Berlyn (1878) deur die Europese moondhede as onafhanklik erken. Serwië word in 1882 tot 'n koninkryk uitgeroep, en dit kom uit die Balkanoorloë (1912–13) as 'n groot Balkan -mag.

'N Beweging vir die eenwording van die Suid-Slawiërs (sien ook Pan-Slavisme) is gelei deur Serwië en was 'n belangrike oorsaak van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. sodoende het die Eerste Wêreldoorlog begin neerslaan. Serwië en Montenegro is deur die Sentrale Magte oorval, maar Serwiese troepe is ontruim na Korfu, Griekeland wat deur die Geallieerdes besit word, waar verteenwoordigers van die Suid-Slawiese volke (Julie 1917) hul voorgestelde unie onder Serwiese koning Peter I verklaar het Montenegro se laaste monarg, Nicholas I, is in 1918 afgesit, en Montenegro is verenig met Serwië. In Desember 1918 word die Koninkryk van die Serwiërs, Kroate en Slowene formeel uitgeroep.

Die Vredeskonferensie in Parys (sien Neuilly, Verdrag van Saint-Germain, Verdrag van Trianon, Verdrag van) het die nuwe staat erken en sy gebied vergroot ten koste van Oostenryk en Hongarye met Bosnië, Kroasië, Slowenië en ander gebiede. Koning Alexander, wat vanaf 1918 regent was vir sy ongeldige vader, het die troon bestyg by Petrus I se dood (1921). Om homself te beskerm teen die Hongaarse en Bulgaarse eise vir die hersiening van verdrag, het Joegoslavië (1920, 1921) bondgenootskappe aangegaan met Tsjeggo -Slowakye en Roemenië, en die drie state vorm die Klein Entente in noue samewerking met Frankryk. Met die westelike buurland, Italië, was die betrekkinge van die eerste plek gespanne oor die Fiume -vraag (sien Rijeka). Alhoewel dit in 1924 afgehandel is met Fiume wat aan Italië gegee is, het die Italiaanse nasionaliste steeds die hoop gewek om 'n deel van die hele Dalmatië toe te eien, wat in die geheim in 1915 deur die Geallieerdes aan Italië beloof is in ruil daarvoor dat hulle by die Eerste Wêreldoorlog aansluit. Joegoslaviese nasionaliste , aan die ander kant, beweer dele van Venezia Giulia op etniese gronde, en die verhoudings het gespanne gebly.

Interne probleme was nog skerper. Laat in 1920 word die Serwiese Pašić premier en verkry die inwerkingstelling van die gesentraliseerde grondwet van 1921. Die Kroate, onder leiding van Radić, eis outonomie. In 1928 is Radić in die parlement doodgeskiet. Nadat die Kroate (1928) 'n aparte parlement in Zagreb opgerig het, het koning Alexander in 1929 'n diktatuur uitgeroep, die parlement ontbind en die naam van die koninkryk verander in Joegoslavië (soms gespel Jugoslavië). Die koninklike diktatorskap het amptelik in 1931 geëindig, maar die nuwe parlementêre grondwet het voorsiening gemaak vir 'n verkiesingsprosedure wat die regering se oorwinning verseker het. Probleme met Kroaties en Masedoniese nasionaliste het (1934) uitgeloop op Alexander se sluipmoord in Marseille, Frankryk. Sy seun, Peter II, het opgevolg onder die regentskap van Alexander se neef, prins Paul. Die Kroaties -probleem is gretig uitgebuit deur Hongarye en Italië, wat veralbewegings teen die Serwiese sentraliste aangemoedig het.

Die geleidelike toenadering van prins Paul tot die asmagte het dus die paradoksale effek gehad dat dit gelei het tot die herstel (1939) van 'n meer demokratiese regering en die vestiging van Kroaties outonomie. In Maart 1941 het Joego -Slawië die Axis Tripartite Pact nagekom. Twee dae later het 'n bloedlose militêre staatsgreep die regent verdryf. Die nuwe regering het 'n beleid van neutraliteit afgekondig, maar in April 1941 val Duitse troepe, bygestaan ​​deur Bulgaarse, Hongaarse en Italiaanse magte, Joegoslavië binne. Die Duitsers was vinnig opvallend en het 'n week later saam met die Italianers in Albanië aangesluit, maar georganiseerde verset was verby. 'N Kroaties poppestaat is uitgeroep onder leiding van Ante Pavelić, hoof van die Ustachi ('n fascistiese Kroaties separatiste -organisasie, sien Kroasië). Dalmatië, Montenegro en Slowenië is verdeel tussen Italië, Hongarye en Duitsland Serwies -Masedonië word aan Bulgarye toegeken. Servië is opgerig as 'n marionetstaat onder Duitse beheer. Wreedhede is gepleeg deur die besettingsmagte van die as en deur die Ustachi.

Terwyl Petrus II 'n ballingskapregering in Londen tot stand gebring het, het baie Joego -Slawiese troepe steeds weerstand gebied in hul bergvestings. Daar was twee hoof weerstandsgroepe: die chetniks onder Mihajlović en 'n leër onder die Kommunistiese Tito. In 1943 het 'n burgeroorlog tussen die twee faksies uitgebreek, waarvan die tweede meer kompromisloos was in sy opposisie teen die as. Tito is ondersteun deur die USSR, en hy het ook die steun van Groot -Brittanje gewen. Koning Petrus moes die militêre bevel van Mihajlović na Tito oorplaas. Einde Oktober, 1944, is die Duitsers uit Joegoslavië verdryf. Die Sowjet -leër het Belgrado binnegegaan. Tito se raad vir nasionale bevryding is saamgevoeg (November 1944) met die koninklike regering. In Maart 1945 word Tito premier. Omdat hulle nie werklike mag gehad het nie, het die nie-kommunistiese lede van die regering bedank en is hulle in hegtenis geneem. In November 1945 het nasionale verkiesings - waarvan die opposisie onthoud het - tot 'n oorwinning vir die regering gelei. Die konstituerende vergadering het 'n federale volksrepubliek uitgeroep.

Die grondwet van 1946 verleen wye outonomie aan die ses nuutgeskepte republieke, maar die werklike mag bly in die hande van Tito en die Kommunistiese party. Die geallieerde vredesverdrag (1947) met Italië het Joego -Slawië die oostelike deel van Venezia Giulia toegeken en Trieste as 'n vrye gebiedskonflik met Italië oor Trieste tot stand gebring, het geëindig in 'n skeidingsooreenkoms (1954). Binne Joego -Slawië is 'n kragtige sosialiseringsprogram ingewy. Opposisie is verpletter of geïntimideer, en Mihajlović is tereggestel. Noue bande is gehandhaaf met die USSR en die Cominform tot 1948, toe 'n breuk tussen die Joegoslaviese en Sowjet -kommunistiese partye plaasgevind het en Joegoslavië uit die Cominform verdryf is.

Die Tito -regering het 'n onafhanklike kursus in buitelandse betrekkinge begin volg. Ekonomiese en militêre hulp is uit die Weste ontvang. In 1954 sluit Joegoslavië 'n militêre verdedigingsverdrag (onafhanklik van die NAVO) met Griekeland en Turkye. Meer hartlike betrekkinge met die USSR is in 1955 hervat, maar nuwe breuke het ontstaan ​​as gevolg van Sowjet -ingryping in Hongarye (1956) en Tsjeggo -Slowakye (1968). In die binneland van Joego -Slawië se nasionale kommunisme of Titoïsme was die staking van landbou -kollektivisering (1953) en die sentralisering van administratiewe en ekonomiese kontroles. Belangrike ekonomiese mag is aan werkersrade gegee, en die republieke is onderverdeel in kommunes. In 1966 word Aleksander Ranković, die vise-president en jare lange medewerker van Tito, gesuiwer omdat hy 'n netwerk van geheime agente onderhou het en teen hervorming gekant was. Wrywing met die Rooms -Katolieke Kerk eindig met 'n ooreenkoms met die Vatikaan in 1966.

Yugoslavs under Tito possessed greater freedom than the inhabitants of any other Eastern European country. Intellectual freedom was still restricted, however, as the jailings and harassment of Milovan Djilas and Mihaljo Mihaljov showed. In the early 1970s, agitation among the nationalities revived, particularly among the Croats, and controls over intellectual life were stiffened. The autonomy of the six republics and two autonomous provinces of Serbia slowly increased through the 1970s as the economy began to stagnate. With the death of Tito in 1980, an unwieldy collective leadership was established. The economic problems and ethnic divisions continued to deepen in the 1980s, and the foreign debt grew significantly.

In 1987, Slobodan Milošević, a Serbian nationalist, became the Serbian Communist party leader. To the alarm of the other republics Milošević and his supporters revived the vision of a Greater Serbia, which would consist of Serbia proper, Vojvodina, Kosovo, the Serb-populated parts of Croatia, large sections of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and possibly Macedonia (now North Macedonia). In early 1989, Serbia rescinded Kosovo's autonomy and sent in troops to suppress the protests of Kosovo's largely Albanian population. Slovenia and Croatia elected non-Communist governments in early 1990 and, threatening secession, demanded greater autonomy. Serbia and Montenegro were the only republics to retain Communist leadership Milošević was elected president of Serbia in 1989.

After attempts by Serbia to impose its authority on the rest of the country, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991. Fighting immediately broke out as the federal army (controlled largely by Serbs) moved into Slovenia. A fragile peace was negotiated by a European Community (EC) delegation, but fighting soon resumed. By the end of July, 1991, however, all federal forces had left Slovenia, although fighting continued throughout the summer between Croatian forces and the federally backed Serbs from Serb areas of Croatia. In Sept., 1991, Macedonia declared its independence, and the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted for independence that October.

In Jan., 1992, with Serbs holding 30% of Croatia, a cease-fire was negotiated in that republic, and the United Nations sent in a peacekeeping force. In that same month the EC recognized Croatia and Slovenia as independent states, and in April the EC and the United States recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty. The Serbs, with about 30% of the population, seized 65% of the latter republic's territory and proclaimed the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croats, with about 20% of the population, seized about half the remainder of the land and proclaimed the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. The poorly armed Muslims, who comprised more than 40% of the population, held the rest of the republic's territory, including the capital. In a campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out mostly by the Serbs, thousands of Muslims were killed, and many more fled Bosnia or were placed in Serb detention camps.

In May, 1992, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro and called for an immediate cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Macedonia was widely recognized the following year (though Greece withheld recognition and imposed an embargo until after an agreement was reached with Macedonia in 1995). Although Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Yugoslavian federation, the EC announced in June, 1992, that the new government could not claim the international rights and duties of the former Yugoslavia, because those rights and obligations had devolved onto the different republics. This opinion was affirmed by the United Nations in Sept., 1992.

The United Nations also imposed a naval blockade on Yugoslavia, which along with the sanctions resulted in severe economic hardship, including hyperinflation for a time. After Serbia reduced its support for the Bosnian Serbs, the United Nations eased sanctions against Yugoslavia. In late 1995 Yugoslavia (in the person of President Milošević of Serbia) participated in the talks in Dayton, Ohio, that led to a peace accord among Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (Yugoslavia). Milošević became president of all Yugoslavia in 1997.

Tensions increased in Kosovo in 1997 and 1998, as a period of nonviolent civil disobedience against Serbian rule gave way to the rise of a guerrilla army. In Mar., 1999, following mounting repression of ethnic Albanians and the breakdown of negotiations between separatists and the Serbs, NATO began bombing military targets throughout Yugoslavia, and thousands of ethnic Albanians were forcibly deported from Kosovo by Yugoslav troops. In June, Milošević agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, and NATO peacekeepers entered the region. Demonstrations in the latter half of 1999 against Milošević failed to force his resignation. Meanwhile, Montenegro sought increased autonomy within the federation and began making moves toward that goal.

In July, 2000, the national constitution was amended to permit the president to hold office for two terms and to institute direct presidential elections the changes were designed to permit Milošević to remain in power beyond a single term and reduce Montenegrin influence in the federal government. When elections were held in September, however, Milošević was defeated by Vojislav Koštunica, who was supported by a coalition of 18 opposition parties (Democratic Opposition of Serbia DOS). The election commission initially refused to certify Koštunica as the outright victor, but Milošević conceded after a general strike was called, demonstrators took over the federal parliament building, and Russia recognized Koštunica.

A coalition consisting of the DOS and Montenegrin Socialists formed a national government, and in early Serbian elections (Dec., 2000) the DOS won control of the Serbian parliament. Koštunica replaced several top military officers—a move designed in part to placate Montenegro—but he initially refused to hand Milošević over to the international war crimes court in the Hague. In early 2001 Milošević and some of his associates in the former government were arrested on various charges. The former president was turned over to the war crimes tribunal by the Serbian government in June, prompting the Montenegrin Socialists to resign from the federal coalition. Relations between Koštunica and Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjić became strained, with the former concerned more about preserving the federation with Montenegro and the latter about winning Western foreign aid and reforming the economy.

By 2002 Montenegro's drive for greater autonomy had developed into a push for independence, and a referendum on the issue was planned. In Mar., 2002, however, Serbian and Montenegrin representatives, under pressure from the European Union and other nations opposed to immediate Montenegrin independence (fearing that it could lead to further disintegration and fighting), agreed on a restructured federal union, and a constitutional charter for a state community was adopted by the Serbian, Montenegrin, and federal parliaments by Feb., 2003. Following the federal parliament's approval of the charter, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reconstituted as Serbia and Montenegro.

Most governmental power shifted to the two republics, as the union became a weak federal republic. Although the two republics shared a common foreign and defense policy, they had separate currencies and customs regulations, and after three years either republic could vote to leave the union. Svetozar Marović, of Montenegro, was elected president of the union in March, and was its only president.

Despite the increased autonomy accorded Montenegro, Montenegrin leaders generally avoided any moves that would be supportive of the union and continued to call for Montenegro's independence. In May, 2006, after three years had passed, Montenegrin voters approved independence in a referendum, and Montenegro declared its independence on June 3. The government of Serbia and Montenegro then dissolved itself and, on June 5, Serbia declared itself a sovereign state and the political heir to the union. Serbia's proclamation brought to an end the prolonged dissolution of Yugoslavia into the constituent republics that had been established by Tito following World War II.

Die Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Kopiereg © 2012, Columbia University Press. Alle regte voorbehou.

Sien meer ensiklopedie -artikels oor: Former Yugoslavian Political Geography


Yugoslavia Flag Map and the Flag Meaning

The design of the flag consists of three equal horizontal bands, blue, white and red. The flag was first used by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1943. In the Second World War, a red star was placed in the center by the victorious Yugoslav Partisans, and it was used until the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

The Yugoslavian flag consists of three colors, blue (top), white (middle) and red (bottom). The design and colors are based on the Pan-Slavic colors adopted in Prague at the 1848 Pan-Slav congress. After the end of World War I in 1918, the Southern Slavs became a single state of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, later known as Yugoslavia. The monarchy chose the pan-Slav design to symbolize the newly established unity of all the South Slavs. The red star in the middle of the flag symbolizes communism.


My Mother and the Failed Experiment of Yugoslavia

It has become fashionable to hate the late Yugoslavia, or to diagnose it retroactively as a kind of Frankenstein assemblage of mismatched parts whose dissolution was thus inescapable and inevitably bloody. But, a few decades from now, when some historian on a think-tank sinecure looks at the devastation in America left in the wake of Trump and his troops, she might discover abundant evidence of hundreds of years of hatred and inherent American racism, with all kinds of historical inevitability leading to the catastrophe. She would be wrong, just as are those who disparage Yugoslavia, for, in both cases, there is a history of conflicting traditions and tendencies, of struggles against the worst of the people’s instincts for a better polity and a kinder country. The bad guys won in Yugoslavia and ruined what they could, as soon as they could the bad guys are doing pretty well in America, too. But nothing is inevitable until it happens. There is no such thing as historical destiny. Struggle is all.

Yugoslavia, a country of the South Slavs, was formed as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, on December 1, 1918, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. Three major empires had just disintegrated after centuries of eventful existence, allowing for the creation of obscure small states whose people experienced the post-imperial chaos as freedom. The idea of a compound state had a history and had inspired South Slav leaders who believed in the benefits of unity. In 1929, the kingdom became Yugoslavia, as King Aleksandar changed the constitution to make himself an absolute monarch. In 1934, His Majesty was promptly assassinated on a visit to Marseille. The propagandistic story had it that the King’s last words were “Take care of my Yugoslavia.” My paternal grandfather travelled to Belgrade to be there for the grandiose funeral. Both of my parents were born as subjects to a teen-age heir, Peter II, who escaped the German invasion, in 1941, to end up in the United States.

The Second World War was bloody in Yugoslavia, but was there a place in Europe where it wasn’t? The Germans found many willing servants among local fascists and nationalists whose main historical modus operandi, like that of their masters, was genocide—their descendants would be at it again a couple of generations later. But the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, illegal before the war, was versed in resistance and underground networks and sparked, under Josip Broz Tito’s leadership, a national resistance movement that outlasted the Germans, despite their efforts to extinguish it in waves of unspeakable atrocities.

Say what you will about Tito and the postwar regime that was so centered on his personality that it barely outlived him, but, under his leadership, the Party organized a resistance movement and liberated Yugoslavia. He also managed to keep the country at a safe distance from the Soviet Union, breaking away from Stalin and his absolutist control in 1948. Tito was a clever, if authoritarian, leader, positioning the country between the East and the West in such a way—making it nonaligned—that it could benefit from each side.

Tito and the Party came out as not only the winners but also as the historical force that carried Yugoslavia into the twentieth century. With the doctrine of “brotherhood and unity” to counter the post-genocidal traumas and resentment, the country strove to create a civic identity that overrode ethnicity. This took some suppression, but, in retrospect, it may have been worth it, if only for a little while. The country had a defined utopian goal toward which its citizens could strive. There was optimism a better future could be conceived of. For a few decades, the socialist Yugoslavia was a common project that everyone could work on. My parents belong to the generation that took a crucial part in that work, only to discover that it was all in vain.

It’s hard today to comprehend the magnitude of the leap into a better life that someone like my mother made in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Back in 1946, in the wake of a cataclysm, the new regime instituted gender equality and mandatory and free education, so a peasant Bosnian girl, born in a house with a dirt floor, could go to school. Had she been born a generation before, she wouldn’t have gone to school. She would’ve worked the land with her parents until she got married, whereupon she would’ve popped out children into her middle age, unless she died giving birth or from sepsis after a homemade abortion, like one of Mama’s father’s sisters. Mama’s future was entangled with Yugoslavia’s, enabling her to leave behind the poverty that had lasted for centuries.

Yugoslavia provided a framework into which my mother fully grew, having departed, at the age of eleven, from her more or less nineteenth-century childhood. She built the country as she was building herself. After the war, a practice of “Youth Work Actions” was established, in which young people in Yugoslavia volunteered to build roads and railroads as part of “youth brigades.” In 1960, while in college, Mama was one of the young women and men who spent their summer constructing a road that would connect Belgrade and Niš, part of a larger project of uniting parts of Yugoslavia by way of a highway known as the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity. She would tell her children stories of shovel-inflicted blisters and solidarity and friendship and joy, or so we imagined it, because the truth was that the youth brigades were not always given the hardest tasks. They’d shovel soil and help the professionals, but, more than anything, they’d sing patriotic songs and chant slogans in praise of hard work: “Comrade Tito, you white violet, all of youth loves you!” and “In the tunnel, in the darkness, shines a five-point star!” There would be celebratory bonfires, around which there would be more singing, and probably some comradely making out. For years, she would be proud of taking part in building the country—even if symbolically—and of the sweat she spilled with the best of the Yugoslav youth to construct the highway.

The practice of youth work actions lasted into the eighties, and she often suggested that I should do it, too, because I’d cherish the experience of sharing goals, taking part in common projects, and singing by the bonfire. I always defiantly refused. For not only did voluntary youth actions become, by the time I was young, a parody of the great ones from my mother’s youth but my teen-age politics were indistinguishable from my precocious cynicism. For one thing, I never cared for that kind of shared work-related ecstasy no blister or sunburns could ever make me proud and joyous. I thought that youth brigades were a form of forced labor whose main goal was indoctrination. I deplored what I called their “primitive patriotism.” I committed myself early to a life of contemplative, productive laziness and hated singing along with other people, being one with a collective, even at rock shows. I was what they call an individual.

After the war, to our mother’s dismay, my sister and I started referring to the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity as the Highway of Youth and Foolishness. But now I envy her I envy the sense that she was building something larger I envy the nobility and honor that comes with being part of a civic endeavor.

It was while attending a youth work action that my mother became a member of the Communist Party. Many of her friends and fellow-volunteers joined the Party, too, for it was a cool thing to do. She was a devout Party member thereafter, and it became part of her personality, as much as a religion might be for a religious person. She believed (and still does) in social justice, generosity, and a fair distribution of wealth. She believed in the system committed to making the country better Tito and the Party were that system. Before the Second World War, she liked to say, there had been only seventy-five kilometres of paved road in all of Yugoslavia, while the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity alone was more than a thousand kilometres.

Much like any other state, Yugoslavia trained its citizens by way of public rituals to be patriots, taught them to be enthusiastically obedient. While the kids of America had to (and many still do) pledge allegiance to the flag, we had Tito’s picture in every goddam classroom. From the very beginnings of Yugoslav socialism, the cultural enforcement of patriotism depended on ideological pageants like the Relay of Youth, which was important for the maintenance of Tito’s personality cult. A baton that symbolized best wishes for his birthday would start in the city of Kumrovec, his birthplace, and travel around Yugoslavia, carried by the hands of the youth, stopping in various towns and cities for a worshipful speech and rally, allowing the youth to pledge their faithfulness to their beloved leader.


The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992

Issued on October 18, 1990, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 15–90 presented a dire warning to the U.S. policy community:

Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup. [. ] A full-scale interrepublic war is unlikely, but serious intercommunal conflict will accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.

The October 1990 judgment of the U.S. intelligence community, as Thomas Shreeve noted in his 2003 study on NIE 15–90 for the National Defense University, “was analytically sound, prescient, and well written. It was also fundamentally inconsistent with what US policymakers wanted to happen in the former Yugoslavia, and it had almost no impact on US policy.” By January 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ceased to exist, having dissolved into its constituent states.

Yugoslavia—the land of South (i.e. Yugo) Slavs—was created at the end of World War I when Croat, Slovenian, and Bosnian territories that had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire united with the Serbian Kingdom. The country broke up under Nazi occupation during World War II with the creation of a Nazi-allied independent Croat state, but was reunified at the end of the war when the communist-dominated partisan force of Josip Broz Tito liberated the country. Following the end of World War II, Yugoslavian unity was a top priority for the U.S. Government. While ostensibly a communist state, Yugoslavia broke away from the Soviet sphere of influence in 1948, became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, and adopted a more de-centralized and less repressive form of government as compared with other East European communist states during the Cold War.

The varied reasons for the country’s breakup ranged from the cultural and religious divisions between the ethnic groups making up the nation, to the memories of WWII atrocities committed by all sides, to centrifugal nationalist forces. However, a series of major political events served as the catalyst for exacerbating inherent tensions in the Yugoslav republic. Following the death of Tito in 1980, provisions of the 1974 constitution provided for the effective devolution of all real power away from the federal government to the republics and autonomous provinces in Serbia by establishing a collective presidency of the eight provincial representatives and a federal government with little control over economic, cultural, and political policy. External factors also had a significant impact. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, the unification of Germany one year later, and the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union all served to erode Yugoslavia’s political stability. As Eastern European states moved away from communist government and toward free elections and market economies, the West’s attention focused away from Yugoslavia and undermined the extensive economic and financial support necessary to preserve a Yugoslav economy already close to collapse. The absence of a Soviet threat to the integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its constituent parts meant that a powerful incentive for unity and cooperation was removed.

Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia’s president from 1989, took advantage of the vacuum created by a progressively weakening central state and brutally deployed the use of Serbian ultra-nationalism to fan the flames of conflict in the other republics and gain legitimacy at home. Milosevic started as a banker in Belgrade and became involved in politics in the mid-1980s. He rose quickly through the ranks to become head of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986. While attending a party meeting in the Albanian-dominated province of Kosovo in May 1987, Serbians in the province rioted outside the meeting hall. Milosevic spoke with the rioters and listened to their complaints of mistreatment by the Albanian majority. His actions were extensively reported by Serbian-controlled Yugoslav mass media, beginning the process of transforming the former banker into the stalwart symbol of Serbian nationalism. Having found a new source of legitimacy, Milosevic quickly shored up his power in Serbia through control of the party apparatus and the press. He moved to strip the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina of their constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy within Serbia by using mass rallies to force the local leaderships to resign in favor of his own preferred candidates. By mid-1989 Kosovo and Vojvodina had been reintegrated into Serbia, and the Montenegro leadership was replaced by Milosevic allies.

The ongoing effects of democratization in Eastern Europe were felt throughout Yugoslavia. As Milosevic worked to consolidate power in Serbia, elections in Slovenia and Croatia in 1990 gave non-communist parties control of the state legislatures and governments. Slovenia was the first to declare “sovereignty” in 1990, issuing a parliamentary declaration that Slovenian law took precedence over Yugoslav law. Croatia followed in May, and in August, the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina also declared itself sovereign. Slovenia and Croatia began a concerted effort to transform Yugoslavia from a federal state to a confederation. With the administration of George H. W. Bush focused primarily on the Soviet Union, Germany, and the crisis in the Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia had lost the geostrategic importance it enjoyed during the Cold War. While Washington attempted during the summer of 1990 to marshal some limited coordination with its Western allies in case the Yugoslav crisis turned bloody, Western European governments maintained a wait-and-see attitude. At the same time, inter-republic relations in Yugoslavia spiraled out of control. Slovenia overwhelmingly voted for independence in December 1990. A Croatian referendum in May 1991 also supported full independence. Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Belgrade to meet with Yugoslav leaders and urge a political solution to no avail. Slovenia and Croatia both declared formal independence on June 25, 1991.


Serbs within the province of Croatia, armed and financed by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav National Army, revolted in August 1990. They blockaded roads and train tracks. Order quickly dissolved as the local Croatian government began trying to disarm the Serb population and dismiss them from employment. In January 1991 the Yugoslav National Army started arresting Croat officials for their anti-Serbian actions while talks aimed at avoiding civil war broke down. Armed conflicts increased as more talks between Croat leaders and Milosevic only further emphasized their differing points of view.

Finally, Croatia along with Slovenia declared independence from the Yugoslav federation on June 25, 1991. Though the Croat leaders promised equal rights for Serbs within the country, conflicts immediately broke out in Croatia. Serbs living in Croatia, about 12 percent of the population, joined with the nearby Serbian military to halt the independence move by the Croats. Serbs from Serbia and Croatia immediately began attacking Croatian targets with weapons while the Yugoslav National Army provided air support. Able to fend off the Serb forces through the rest of 1991, Croatia received official recognition as an independent nation by other European nations on January 15, 1992.

Following the path of Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina led by the Bosnian Muslims and Croats living in Bosnia and Macedonia also announced in late 1991 their intention to break from the Yugoslav federation. As a result, the war expanded to Bosnia-Herzegovina when Bosnian Serbs joined with the Serbian military to halt the move toward independence.

After engineering the control of Kosovo, Milosevic used his appeal to Serbian nationalism (a belief that a particular nation is superior to other nations) to attract support of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian Serbs attempted to establish an autonomous (the right to political independence) Serbian cultural society in Croatia. However, this effort only served to increase public support for a Croatian nationalist government that reaffirmed the sovereignty of Croatia.

As a result, the long history of ethnic differences among the Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats exploded into ethnic war over who would govern whom and what territory would be controlled. All three feared dominance by the other. They believed that dominance by one of the others would mean forced changes in their ethnic traditions.

During the winter of 1991–92, the Yugoslav National Army built artillery camps around Bosnian government-controlled areas, including the city of Sarajevo. The Serbian leader put in place by Milosevic created a Serbian national assembly in place of the Bosnian parliament. Bosnian leaders held free elections in their controlled areas. The vote was nearly unanimous for independence from Yugoslavia. In response, Serbian paramilitary groups began setting up barricades in Sarajevo and taking control of sections of Bosnia. The Yugoslav National Army also began using Bosnian territory to conduct offensive operations against Croatia, while secretly arming Bosnia Serbs and disarming the local Bosnian defense forces.

The resulting war was brutal on all sides. Serbian forces tortured, raped, and murdered Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Serb-controlled regions. Croats and Bosnian Muslims fought back with equal brutality. Homes and businesses were looted and destroyed. Churches including hundreds of mosques, museums, public buildings, architectural and historical landmarks, and cemeteries, all symbols of ethnic identity, were destroyed. Included was the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, which had housed and preserved thousands of valuable documents and artifacts chronicling the Ottoman history of Bosnia.

On April 6, 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina joined Croatia and Slovenia in gaining international recognition. The total disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation was nearly complete. In only one year after the fall of Soviet influence the previous six Yugoslav states became five independent countries. Only Serbia and Montenegro remained together as one nation called Serbia. The new nations of Slovenia and Macedonia proved somewhat stable, but conflict raged among the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats in the other three nations of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. The ethnic war would eventually be the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II.

During the following three years of war the fighting grew more unpredictable. Local paramilitary bands formed, some no more than groups of thugs, and fought neighborhood to neighborhood. It was frequently difficult to tell who—Serb, Croat, or Bosnian—was fighting whom. The once beautiful city of Sarajevo, which hosted the televised 1984 Winter Olympics, was reduced to a death trap with residents living in basements. It was destroyed. After two years of the fighting that began in Bosnia in 1992, more than two hundred thousand Bosnians died and two million more became refugees.


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