Geskiedenis Podcasts

Saoedi -Arabiese regering - Geskiedenis

Saoedi -Arabiese regering - Geskiedenis


We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

SAUDI -ARABIË

Saoedi -Arabië is 'n absolute monargie. Die koning regeer met die ondersteuning van die uitgebreide koninklike familie.
HUIDIGE REGERING
KoningSaud, FAHD, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Eerste MinisterSaud, FAHD, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Eerste Dep. Eerste min.Saud, ABDALLAH, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Tweede Dep. Eerste min.Saud, SULTAN, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Min. van LandbouBalghunaym, Fahd bin Abd al-Rahman bin Sulayman
Min. van StaatsdiensFayiz, Mohammed bin Ali
Min. van handel en nywerheidYamani, Hashim bin Abdallah bin Hashim
Min. van kommunikasie en inligtingstegnologieMulla, Mohammed bin Jamil bin Ahmed
Min. van kultuur en inligtingFarsi, Fuad Abd al-Salam
Min. van verdediging en lugvaartSaud, SULTAN, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Min. van ekonomie en beplanningghusaybi, Khalid bin Muhammad
Min. van OnderwysRashid, Mohammed Ahmad al-
Min. van FinansiesAsaf, Ibrahim Abd al-Aziz al-
Min. van Buitelandse SakeSaud, SAUD al-FAYSAL, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Min. van GesondheidManei, Hamad bin Abdallah al-
Min. van hoër onderwysAngari, Khalid bin Muhammad al-
Min. van BinnelandSaud, NAYIF, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Min. van Islamitiese leidingShaykh, Salih bin Abd al-Aziz bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim
Min. van JustisieShaykh, Abdallah Mohammed Ibrahim Al al-
Min. van Arbeid en Sosiale SakeNamla, Ali bin Ibrahim
Min. van munisipale en landelike aangeleenthedeSaud, MITIB, bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Min. van Petroleum en minerale bronneNaimi, Ali Ibrahim
Min. van bedevaartsake en godsdienstige trustsMadani, Iyyad bin Amin
Min. van VervoerSuraysri, Jubara bin Eid al-
Min. van water en elektrisiteitQusaybi, Ghazi bin Abd al-Rahman al-
Min. van die staatAlaqi, Madani bin Abd al-Qadir al-
Min. van die staatAssaf, Ibrahim bin Muhammad al-, Dr.
Min. van die staatAyban, Musaid bin Muhammad al-
Min. van die staatJihani, Ali bin Talal al-, Dr.
Min. van die staatKhuwaytir, Abd al-Aziz bin Abdallah al-
Min. van die staatMani, Abd al-Aziz bin Ibrahim al-
Min. van die staatNafisa, Mutalib bin Abdallah al-
Min. van die staatSaud, ABD AL-AZIZ, bin Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Min. van die staatShaykh, Mohammed bin Abd al-Aziz al-
Min. van die staatZaynal, Abdallah bin Ahmad bin Yusif
Pres. van die Hoërraad van UlemaShaykh, Abd al-Aziz Abdallah al-
Goewerneur, Saoedi -Arabiese Monetêre AgentskapSayyari, Hamad al-
Ambassadeur in die VSASaud, BANDAR, bin Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Permanente verteenwoordiger by die VN, New YorkShubukshi, Fawzi bin Abd al-Majid al-


Saoedi -Arabië

Saoedi -Arabië, amptelik die Koninkryk Saoedi -Arabië, is 'n land in Wes -Asië wat die grootste deel van die Arabiese Skiereiland uitmaak. Met 'n oppervlakte van ongeveer 2,150,000 km2 (830,000 vierkante myl) is Saoedi-Arabië geografies die grootste soewereine staat in Wes-Asië, die tweede grootste in die Arabiese wêreld (na Algerië), die vyfde grootste in Asië en die 12de- grootste ter wêreld. Saoedi -Arabië grens in die noorde aan Jordanië en Irak, Koeweit in die noordooste, Katar, Bahrein en die Verenigde Arabiese Emirate in die ooste, Oman in die suidooste en Jemen in die suide en word geskei van Egipte en Israel deur die Golf van Aqaba. Dit is die enigste land met 'n kus van die Rooi See en 'n Persiese Golfkus, en die grootste deel van die terrein bestaan ​​uit dorre woestyn, laagland en berge.


Saoedi -Arabië: Geskiedenis

As 'n politieke eenheid het Saoedi -Arabië 'n relatief onlangse skepping. Die oorsprong daarvan was die puriteinse Wahhabi -beweging (18de eeu), wat die trou van die magtige Saud -familie van die Nejd in sentraal -Arabië verkry het. Ondersteun deur 'n groot Bedoeïen -volgelinge, het die Sauds die grootste deel van die skiereiland onder hulle beheer gebring, behalwe Jemen en die Hadhramaut in die uiterste suide. Die Wahhabi -beweging is verpletter (1811-18) deur 'n Egiptiese ekspedisie onder die seuns van Muhammad Ali. Nadat hulle in die middel van die 19de eeu herleef het, is die Wahhabi in 1891 verslaan deur die Rashid-dinastie, wat effektief beheer oor Sentraal-Arabië verkry het.

Dit was Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, bekend as Ibn Saud, 'n afstammeling van die eerste Wahhabi-heersers, wat die basis gelê het van die huidige Saoedi-Arabiese staat. Aan die begin van die herowering van die Wahhabi aan die begin van die eeu, neem Ibn Saud Riyad in 1902 en was die meester van die Nejd teen 1906. Aan die vooraand van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog verower hy die Al-Hasa-streek van die Ottomaanse Turke en brei hy spoedig sy beheer oor ander gebiede. Hy was toe gereed vir die verowering van die Hejaz, wat sedert 1916 deur Husayn ibn Ali van Mekka regeer is. Die Hejaz het Saud in 1924–25 te beurt geval en is in 1932 gekombineer met die Nejd om die koninkryk Saoedi -Arabië te vorm, 'n absolute monargie, wat onder die Islamitiese wet geheers het. In 'n groot deel van die land het koning Ibn Saud die Bedoeïene gedwing om die tradisionele maniere te laat vaar en het hulle hul vestiging as boere aangemoedig.

Olie is in 1936 ontdek deur die Arabian Standard Oil Company in besit van die VSA, wat later die Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) geword het. Kommersiële produksie begin in 1938. Saoedi -Arabië is 'n handveslid van die Verenigde Nasies. Dit het in 1945 by die Arabiese Liga aangesluit, maar dit speel slegs 'n geringe rol in die Arabiese oorloë met Israel in 1948, 1967 en 1973. 'n Ooreenkoms met die Verenigde State in 1951 het voorsiening gemaak vir 'n Amerikaanse lugbasis in Dhahran, wat gehandhaaf is tot 1962. Ibn Saud sterf in 1953 en word opgevolg deur sy oudste seun, Saud, wat gou op sy broer, kroonprins Faisal (Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud), staatmaak om finansiële en buitelandse aangeleenthede te bestuur.

Koning Saud het eers die Nasser -regime in Egipte gesteun, maar in 1956 het hy, in teenstelling met Nasser, noue betrekkinge aangegaan met die Hashemitiese heersers van Jordanië en Irak, tot dan met die tradisionele vyande van die Saoedi's. Hy het die unie in 1958 van Egipte en Sirië as die Verenigde Arabiese Republiek gekant en 'n bitter vyand geword van Nasser se pan-Arabisme en hervormingsprogram. Toe pro-Nasser-rewolusionêres in die naburige Jemen in September 1962 die nuwe imam afsit en 'n republiek verklaar, het koning Saud, saam met koning Hussein van Jordanië, hulp aan die royalistiese troepe gestuur. Die Saoedi -familie het Saud afgesit, en prins Faisal het in November 1964 koning geword.

Die betrekkinge met Egipte is in 1962 verbreek, maar na die nederlaag van Egipte deur Israel in Junie 1967 word 'n ooreenkoms gesluit tussen koning Faisal en president Nasser. Volgens die ooreenkoms sou die Egiptiese weermag uit Jemen onttrek en Saoedi -Arabië sou ophou om die Jemenitiese royaliste te help. Teen 1970 het Saoedi -Arabië al sy troepe teruggetrek, en die betrekkinge met Jemen is hervat. Saoedi -Arabië het ook ingestem om $ 140 miljoen per jaar te gee aan Egipte en Jordanië, wat in die oorlog met Israel in 1967 verwoes is. Met die oog op die terugtrekking van Brittanje uit die Persiese Golfgebied, het koning Faisal 'n vriendskapsbeleid met Iran gevoer, terwyl hy die Arabiese sjeikryke wat onder Britse bewind was, aangemoedig het om die Verenigde Arabiese Emirate te vorm. Koning Faisal handhaaf egter aansprake op die Buraimi -oases, wat ook deur die sjeik van Abu Dhabi geëis is.

In 1972 eis die regering van Saoedi -Arabië strenger teuels in sy oliebedryf sowel as deelname aan die oliekonsessies van buitelandse ondernemings. Aramco ('n konglomeraat van verskeie Amerikaanse oliemaatskappye) en die regering het in Junie 1974 'n ooreenkoms bereik, waardeur die Saoedi's 'n meerderheid van 60% van die maatskappy se toegewings en bates sou neem. Die konsep van deelname is deur die Saoedi -Arabiese regering ontwikkel as 'n alternatief vir nasionalisering. Koning Faisal het 'n aktiewe rol gespeel in die organisering van die Arabiese olie -embargo van 1973, teen die Verenigde State en ander lande wat Israel ondersteun het namate die Amerikaanse oliepryse die hoogte ingeskiet het, die Saoedi -inkomste het toegeneem. Die betrekkinge met die Verenigde State het verbeter met die ondertekening (1974) van vuurwapenooreenkomste tussen Israel en Egipte en Israel en Sirië (beide bemiddel deur die Amerikaanse minister van buitelandse sake, Henry Kissinger) en deur die besoek (Junie 1974) van president Richard M. Nixon vir Jidda.

As gevolg van die groter rykdom van Saoedi-Arabië, sy soeke na stabiliteit en sy verbeterde betrekkinge met Westerse lande, het die land in die sewentigerjare 'n uitgebreide militêre opbou begin. Op 25 Maart 1975 word koning Faisal vermoor deur sy neef prins Faisal. Kroonprins Khalid (Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud) word toe die nuwe koning en beklemtoon Islamitiese ortodoksie en konserwatisme terwyl hy die land se ekonomie, sy sosiale programme en opvoedkundige strukture uitbrei. Saoedi -Arabië het die ooreenkoms van 1979 tussen Israel en Egipte aan die kaak gestel en diplomatieke betrekkinge met Egipte beëindig (sedert hernu). Saoedi -leiers was gekant teen beide die linkse en radikale bewegings wat in die Arabiese wêreld aan die groei was, en het in die sewentigerjare troepe gestuur om te help om linkse revolusies in Jemen en Oman te onderdruk.

Saoedi -godsdienstige belange word bedreig deur die val van Iran se sjah in 1979 en deur die groei van Islamitiese fundamentalisme. In November 1979 het Moslem -fundamentaliste wat die Saoedi -regering omverwerp, die Groot Moskee in Mekka beset. Na twee weke se geveg het die beleg geëindig, met 'n totaal van 27 Saoedi -soldate en meer as 100 rebelle dood. Drie en sestig rebelle is later in die openbaar onthoof. In 1980 het Sjiïtiese Moslems 'n reeks onluste gelei wat deur die regering neergelê is, wat beloof het om die verspreiding van Saoedi -rykdom te hervorm. Saoedi-Arabië het Irak gedurende die 1980's ondersteun in die Iran-Irak-oorlog. In Mei 1981 het hy by die Persiese Golf -nasies aangesluit by die stigting van die Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) om ekonomiese samewerking tussen die deelnemende lande te bevorder. Khalid sterf in Junie 1982 en word opgevolg deur sy halfbroer, prins Fahd bin Abdul Aziz.

Teen die vroeë 1980's het Saoedi -Arabië volle eienaarskap van Aramco verkry. Saoedi-steun van Irak in die oorlog tussen Iran en Irak het in die middel van die tagtigerjare toenemend problematies geraak omdat Iran se dreigemente, veral rakende oliebelange, byna tot Saoedi-verstrengeling in die oorlog gelei het. Iranse pelgrims het in 1987 tydens die hajj in Mekka oproer gemaak, wat botsings met Saoedi -veiligheidstroepe veroorsaak het. Meer as 400 mense is dood. Hierdie voorval, saam met Iraanse vlootaanvalle op Saoedi -skepe in die Persiese Golf, het veroorsaak dat Saoedi -Arabië die diplomatieke betrekkinge met Iran verbreek het.

Toe Irak Koeweit in Augustus 1990 binneval, het koning Fahd ingestem dat Amerikaanse en internasionale koalisietroepe op Saoedi -bodem gestasioneer word. Duisende Saoedi -troepe het aan die Persiese Golfoorlog (1991) teen Irak deelgeneem. Die land het die koninklike familie van Koeweit en meer as 400 000 Koeweitse vlugtelinge opgeneem. Alhoewel daar min grondgevegte in Saoedi -Arabië plaasgevind het, is die stede Riyadh, Dhahran en die omliggende gebiede gebombardeer deur Irakse missiele. Koalisietroepe het Saoedi -Arabië laat in 1991 grootliks verlaat, en 'n paar duisend Amerikaanse troepe het oorgebly. In 1995 en 1996 het terroristebomaanvalle in Riyadh en Dharan verskeie Amerikaanse soldate doodgemaak.

Na die Golfoorlog keer koning Fahd terug na 'n konserwatiewe Arabiese standpunt, versigtig vir groter Westerse samewerking. Hervormings wat in die nasleep van die Golfoorlog ingestel is, sluit in die herlewing van die Raadgewende Raad, of Shura, met die reg om regeringshandelinge te hersien, maar nie te herroep nie, die bekendmaking van 'n handves van regte en 'n hersiening van die prosedures vir die keuse van die koning. Hierdie maatreëls het die mag van die koninklike familie egter basies onaangeraak gelaat. In 1995 stig die koning 'n Hoogste Raad vir Islamitiese Sake, saamgestel uit lede van die koninklike gesinne en ander aanstellings, in 'n oënskynlike poging om 'n teengewig te vestig vir die Ulemas -raad, 'n adviesorgaan van hoogs konserwatiewe Moslem -teoloë.

Aan die einde van die negentigerjare het kroonprins Abdullah, die koning se halfbroer en die troonopvolger sedert 1982, effektief die land se heerser geword weens die swak gesondheid van koning Fahd. Onder die kroonprins was die land meer openlik gefrustreerd en kritiek op die Amerikaanse steun aan Israel. 'N Verdrag met Jemen wat grensgeskille van die dertigerjare beëindig het, is in 2000 onderteken, en vroeg in die volgende jaar het albei nasies hul troepe uit die grensgebied onttrek in ooreenstemming met die verdrag.

Die Saoedi-regering het die gebruik van Amerikaanse basisse in die land beperk tydens die invalle van Afghanistan (2001) en Irak (2003) onder leiding van die VSA, en teen September 2003 is alle Amerikaanse gevegsmagte uit die land onttrek. Ook in 2003 het 'n dekreet die Raadgewende Raad die bevoegdheid gegee om nuwe wette voor te stel sonder om eers sy toestemming te vra. Die stap is moontlik deels te wyte aan seldsame protesoptredes ten gunste van hervorming van die regering, en die koninkryk is ook geskud deur gewelddadige voorvalle, waaronder 'n massiewe motorbomaanval teen 'n woonbuurt in Riyad, waarby Islamitiese militante betrokke was. Sulke terreuraanvalle het tot in 2005 voortgeduur.

Die land het in Februarie -April 2005 verkiesings vir munisipale rade gehou, sodat kiesers (slegs mans) die helfte van die raadslede kon kies, terwyl die res van die lede nog aangestel is. Koning Fahd sterf in Augustus 2005 en word opgevolg deur Abdullah. In November 2009 het gevegte in N Jemen na Saoedi -Arabië versprei toe die Jemenitiese Sjiïtiese rebelle (Houthi's) die grens oorgesteek het. Saoedi -magte het teen die rebelle geveg en probeer om hulle terug te ry na Jemen en weg van die grens af eindig die konflik teen Februarie 2010, met die rebelle teruggetrek in Jemen (en 'n wapenstilstand daar gevestig).

Aan die begin van 2011 het Saoedi-Arabië betreklik klein protesoptrede teen antieregering beleef in vergelyking met ander Arabiese nasies, en dit is soms baie demonstrasies waarby Sjiïete betrokke was, sterk onderdruk. Betogings en konfrontasies het tot in 'n beperkte mate voortgeduur tot in 2012. Saoedi -magte het ook gehelp om demonstrasies teen die regering in die naburige Bahrein te onderdruk. Terselfdertyd het die regering geld ingesamel op bonusse van staatsamptenare, lae-inkomste-behuising en godsdienstige organisasies. Later in die jaar het die koning aangekondig dat vroue, wat beperkte burgerregte in die land gehad het, na 2011 toegelaat sal word om aan munisipale verkiesings deel te neem en in die Raadgewende Raad sal dien.

Koning Abdullah sterf in Januarie 2015 en word opgevolg deur kroonprins Salman, sy halfbroer. Saoedi-magte het Arabiese lugaanvalle teen Houthi-rebelle en hul bondgenote in Jemen gelei sedert die president van Jemen in Maart 2015 genoodsaak is om uit die land te vlug. lugblokkades van Jemen, ballistiese raketaanvalle van Houthi teen Saoedi -Arabië, en 'n hommeltuigaanval van 2019 op Saoedi -fasiliteite wat Iran daarvan beskuldig word. Die teregstelling van sjeik Nimr al-Nimr, 'n Sjiïtiese geestelikes, as deel van die massa-teregstelling van 47 veroordeelde gevangenes in Januarie 2016, is bitter veroordeel deur Iran Saoedi-Arabië het toe die diplomatieke betrekkinge met Iran verbreek.

In Junie 2017 noem koning Salman sy seun Mohammed bin Salman kroonprins en vervang hy sy neef en voormalige erfgenaam Mohammed bin Nayef. Die koning het voorheen sy seun minister van verdediging en hoof van 'n raad aangestel wat toesig hou oor die ekonomie. Saoedi -Arabië, saam met die Verenigde Arabiese Emirate, Bahrein, Egipte en 'n paar ander nasies, verbreek diplomatieke en ekonomiese bande met Katar in Junie 2017 en beskuldig dit daarvan dat hulle jihadiegroepe ondersteun en destabiliseer die streek wat Katar die nasies se beskuldigings en eise verwerp . In November het 'n anti -korrupsie -poging gelei tot die ondersoek van 'n paar honderd prominente Saoedi's, van wie baie groot nedersettings betaal het en dat die veldtog, wat in Januarie 2019 beëindig is, gedeeltelik begenadig is (terwyl hulle ook onder toesig van die regering was). as 'n poging van Mohammed bin Salman, beskou as die land se de facto heerser, om sy mag te konsolideer. Die land het daardie maand ook probeer om die premier van Libanon, Saad Hariri, te laat bedank, in 'n moontlike poging om Hizbollah in diskrediet te bring, en het beweeg om dissidente in die buiteland en in die buiteland te onderdruk.

Die moord op die Saoedi -joernalis Jamal Khashoggi in die Saoedi -konsulaat in Istanbul, Turkye, het in Oktober 2018 daartoe gelei dat die Saoedi's die Saoedi's herhaaldelik aan die kaak gestel en ontken het, aangesien die Saoedi's eers ontken het dat daar 'n moord plaasgevind het en dan verskeie kere hul storie oor die moord voor die aankondiging van arrestasies in die saak. Die moord het internasionale woede uitgelok en die reputasie van die land en Mohammed bin Salman benadeel. Die Saoedi's ontken dat hy kennis dra van die moord, maar Turkse amptenare beskuldig verskeie van sy veiligheidsamptenare van betrokkenheid, en 'n VN -ondersoek het gesê (2019) dat daar geloofwaardige bewyse is van die kroonprins se betrokkenheid. In Maart 2020 is die koning se volbroer en die voormalige kroonprins gearresteer; die twee is as moontlike mededingers vir die kroonprins se opvolging beskou.

Die Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6de uitg. Kopiereg © 2012, Columbia University Press. Alle regte voorbehou.

Sien meer ensiklopedie -artikels oor: Politieke geografie van die Arabiese skiereiland


Politiek van Saoedi -Arabië

Inhoud

Inleiding

Saoedi -Arabië is 'n absolute monargie, met 'n basiese wet, maar geen politieke partye, vakbonde of ander vorme van politieke verenigings nie. Die land se basiese bestuurstelsel - 'n alternatief vir 'n grondwet - is in 1992 ingestel na talle oproepe tot politieke hervorming. Die basiese bestuurswet bestaan ​​uit 83 artikels, almal saamgestel deur 'n spesiale komitee wat destyds deur die koning en die minister van binnelandse sake gereël is. Die artikels is gebaseer op Sharia (Islamitiese wet). Die wet noem die Koran, die Moslem -heilige boek en die Sunnah, die leerstellings en dade van die profeet as die basiese bron van bestuur.

Daar is geen werklike skeiding tussen die magte van die drie regeringsafdelings nie - die wetgewende, die uitvoerende en die geregtelike.


Die monargie

Die koning is die staatshoof, die premier en die opperbevelhebber. Hy kombineer wetgewende, uitvoerende en geregtelike funksies. Koninklike besluite het die bevoegdheid om enige geregtelike of administratiewe besluit te herroep. Alhoewel die drie owerhede in die land as geregtelik, uitvoerend en regulatories erken word, is die koning die uiteindelike arbiter vir hierdie owerhede, gebaseer op artikel 44 van die basiese bestuurswet.

Die koninklike familie oorheers die regering, en die meeste sleutelposisies in die land word deur lede van die gesin beklee. Die outoritêre aard van die regering beperk alle verenigings streng sonder amptelike lisensie of toesig.

Benewens die koning, wat oor groot magte beskik, neem 'n paar invloedryke lede van die koninklike familie en die hoër raad van godsdiensgeleerdes deel aan die vorming van politieke besluite. Godsdiensgeleerdes het 'n sterk greep op interne aangeleenthede.

Volgens artikel 5 van die basiese bestuurswet, sal die heersers van Saoedi -Arabië gekies word uit die seuns van die stigter, Ibn Saud (koning Abdulaziz), en hul afstammelinge. Die volgorde van opvolging op die troon volg op agnatiese senioriteit. Sedert 2006 besluit die Allegiance Council (Hayat al-Baya), bestaande uit die oorlewende seuns van stigter koning Ibn Saud, sy kleinseuns wie se vaders oorlede is, ongeskik of onwillig is om die troon op te neem, en die seuns van die koning opvolging op die troon. Die koning dra die titel van die bewaarder van die twee heilige moskees (Khadim al-Haramain al-Sharifain) in Mekka en Medina, wat die status van Saoedi-Arabië in die Islamitiese wêreld beklemtoon.

Die Huis van Saud

Die eerste Saoedi -staat is in 1744 gestig, toe Muhammad ibn Saud (oorlede 1765), emir van die oase van Diriya in Najd (in die middel van die skiereiland) 'n ooreenkoms aangegaan het met 'n godsdienstige hervormer van daardie tydperk, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (oorlede 1792 ). Die vakbond het ten doel gehad om 'n Islamitiese koninkryk te skep wat beheer word deur 'n streng interpretasie van Islam, wat gereeld Wahhabisme genoem word. Die eerste Saoedi-staat stort in 1818 in duie weens aanvalle van die Ottomaanse Ryk, veroorsaak deur die voortdurende uitbreiding van Al Saud / al-Wahhab na gebied onder Ottomaanse beheer (Diriya is uitgevee en nooit herbou nie). Die verdrag tussen die godsdienstige figure en die Al Saud bly egter van krag.

Binne ses jaar (in 1824) het die tweede Saoedi -staat gestig is. Uiteindelik (in 1891) stort hierdie staat in duie na ernstige interne twis onder Al Saud -emirs en druk deur die Ottomane en naburige mededingende emirs, wat uiteindelik lei tot die ballingskap van die Al Saud -emir in Koeweit.

Die derde Saoedi -staat is in 1932 gestig, na 'n periode van dertig jaar van territoriale verowering deur Abdulaziz Al Saud (Ibn Saud 1876-1953), met die steun van Groot-Brittanje, solank sy eie belange in die kusgebiede in die Persiese Golf, in Oman en Jemen, bedien is.

Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (gebore 1924) bestyg die troon in 2005 as die sesde koning van Saoedi -Arabië. Na sy dood op 23 Januarie 2015 word hy opgevolg deur sy halfbroer Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (gebore 31 Desember 1935).

Die uitvoerende gesag

In teorie tree die Ministerraad op as die amptelike uitvoerende tak van die regering. In die praktyk word alle ministers by koninklike bevel aangestel en afgedank. Die ministers word elke vier jaar aangestel en bevat baie lede van die koninklike familie. Tans is daar 22 regeringsministers.

Die koninklike hof (al-Diwan al-Maliki) is die kantoor van die koning waarvolgens belangrike wetgewende aangeleenthede beding word. Die belangrikste persone wat wetgewing beïnvloed, is invloedryke lede van die koninklike familie, predikante, sommige adviseurs en lede van die hoër raad van godsdienstige geleerdes. Stamleiers kan ook invloedryk wees op die hoogste vlakke van besluitneming. Burgers kan ook 'n beroep op die koninklike hof doen oor aangeleenthede waarin hulle die hulp van die koning nodig het, byvoorbeeld om burokratiese probleme te oorkom.

Wyle koning Fahd bin Abdulaziz het die Wet van die Ministerraad in 1992 uitgevaardig. Die wet identifiseer die Ministerraad as die regulerende gesag en die Koning as die Eerste Minister. Die wet bestaan ​​uit nege hoofstukke en 83 artikels. Koninklike dekrete stel ministers aan, aanvaar bedankings en onthef ministers en adjunkministers van hul pligte. Die pligte van die predikante word bepaal in artikels 57 en 58 van die basiese bestuurswet. Besluite oor die verrigtinge van die Ministerraad word finaal ná die goedkeuring van die King. Predikante bly vir vier jaar in hul poste of totdat hulle deur die koning verlig is.

Artikel 24 van die Wet van die Ministerraad identifiseer die Raad as die uiteindelike uitvoerende gesag, met volle jurisdiksie oor alle uitvoerende en bestuursaangeleenthede, insluitend die monitering van die implementering van regulasies, verordeninge en besluite wat die oprigting en organisering van openbare instellings opvolg die implementering van die algemene ontwikkelingsplan en die vorming van komitees vir toesig oor ministers en regeringsagentskappe.

Die Wetgewende

Die eensamer wetgewer word die Majlis al-Shura (raadplegende raad) genoem, wat 150 lede en 'n voorsitter het, wat almal deur die monarg aangestel is vir 'n termyn van vier jaar, waarvan die helfte minstens nuwe lede moet wees.

Die Majlis al-Shura het deur verskeie fases gegaan voordat die huidige struktuur daargestel is. Die stigter, koning Ibn Saud, het 'n beroep op die oprigting van die Majlis gemaak toe hy in 1924 Mekka binnegekom het. Majlis al-Shura is beskeie gestruktureerd en is deur die jare gevorm volgens 'n basiese wet met 'n klein aantal adviseurs van hoogstens twaalf. Die stigting van die Ministerraad in 1953 het die funksies van die ou Majlis al-Shura oor verskillende ministeries en administrasies versprei. Uiteindelik het die raad beperkte krag en doeltreffendheid gelaat totdat koning Fahd bin Abdulaziz die basiese wet van die Majlis al-Shura in 1992 afgekondig het.

Die wet beskryf in 30 artikels die basiese funksies van die raadskomitees en die reëls vir vloerdebatte. Die koning het die mag om die Majlis te herstruktureer en op te los soos hy dit nodig ag. Aanvanklik het die Majlis al-Shura 60 lede en 'n spreker, en dit is geleidelik vergroot tot 120 lede en nou tot 150 lede wat deur die koning gekies is. Daar is twaalf komitees in die Majlis al-Shura/Majlis, wat handel oor menseregte, onderwys, kultuur, inligting, gesondheid en sosiale aangeleenthede, dienste en openbare dienste, buitelandse sake, veiligheid, administrasie, Islamitiese aangeleenthede, ekonomie en nywerheid, en finansies.

Twaalf vrouelede dien as deeltydse adviseurs in die huidige raad, maar in 2011 het koning Abdullah toegelaat dat vroue in die volgende termyn, in 2013, as volwaardige lede aangestel word.

Die primêre funksie van die Majlis al-Shura is om die koning te adviseer oor beleidsaangeleenthede, hetsy intern of internasionaal en oor verdrae. Bespreking van beleide kan in die raad begin word in reaksie op 'n koninklike bevel of 'n oproep van lede of burgers. 'N Raadsbesluit word met 'n meerderheid amptelik gemaak en word dan aan die premier (die koning of sy adjunk) gestuur vir oorweging deur die ministerraad. As beide rade (die adviesraad en die ministerraad) oor 'n besluit ooreenkom, word die besluit aan die koning gestuur vir sy goedkeuring. In die geval van 'n meningsverskil besluit die Koning wat gepas is. Dit verg minstens tien lede van die Majlis al-Shura om 'n wet, 'n beleid of 'n konsepwysiging voor te stel. Wette, internasionale verdrae en ooreenkomste en toegewings word bestudeer deur die Majlis, afgekondig en gewysig by koninklike besluit, en gepubliseer in die Amptelike Koerant (al-Jarida al-rasmiya) voordat dit in werking tree.

Die Geregtelike

Die regstelsel in Saoedi -Arabië is gebaseer op Sharia (Islamitiese wet). Artikel 46 van die basiese bestuurswet identifiseer die regbank as 'n onafhanklike gesag. Die beslissings van die regters is nie onderhewig aan enige ander gesag as die Islamitiese jurisdiksie nie. In werklikheid het die Koning egter die mag om in te gryp en enige geregtelike verrigtinge deur koninklike besluite te beïnvloed.

Die Hoogste Raad van Justisie verteenwoordig die regterlike tak van die regering. Dit bestaan ​​uit twaalf regters, wat almal deur die koning aangestel is, volgens aanbevelings van die raadslede. Die koning dien as die laaste uitweg van appèl en het die bevoegdheid om te vergewe. Die Hoogste Raad is gemagtig om regters aan te stel, te bevorder en oor te dra.

Die Saoedi -hofstelsel bestaan ​​uit vier vlakke van howe. Die talrykste en mees basiese is die Sharia -howe, wat die meeste sake in die regstelsel aanhoor. Op die tweede vlak is die algemene howe wat uitspraak lewer oor kriminele sake, skadevergoeding, persoonlike en familieregsake en vaste eiendom. Op die derde vlak word siviele eise gereeld by die goewerneurskantore ingedien om geskille deur middel van arbitrasie op te los. As dit misluk, word die sake by die howe ingedien. Die appèlhof is die vierde en laaste vlak van howe. Drie of meer regters besleg geskille, by meerderheidsbeslissing. Die Raad van Griewe verhoor sake rakende die regering. Die derde tak van die regstelsel bestaan ​​uit die verskillende komitees binne die regeringsministeries en sakekamers wat beslis oor spesifieke regsgeskille, soos arbeidsaangeleenthede.

Plaaslike regering

Saoedi -Arabië is verdeel in dertien provinsies, elk verder verdeel in goewerneurs, wat op hul beurt in munisipaliteite verdeel is. Die dertien provinsies is Mekka (Makka), Riyadh, die Oostelike Provinsie (al-Mintaqah al-Sharqiya of al-Sharqiya), Asir, Medina (al-Madina), Jazan, al-Qassim, Tabuk, Hail, Najran, al- Jawf, al-Baha en die Noordelike Grense (Mintaqat al-Hudud al-Shamaliya).

'N Koninklike besluit in 1992 het die Wet van die Provinsies uitgevaardig. Elke provinsie word bestuur deur 'n goewerneur en 'n adjunk, wat op aanbeveling van die minister van binnelandse sake by koninklike bevel aangestel word. Die meeste goewerneurs en hul afgevaardigdes is lede van die koninklike familie. Die goewerneur is aanspreeklik teenoor die minister van binnelandse sake. Die goewerneur en sy adjunk het die administratiewe aangeleenthede van hul onderskeie goewerneurs, volgens artikel 7 van die wet van die provinsies. Die meeste provinsiale kantore is gereeld oop vir die publiek wanneer lede van die plaaslike gemeenskap hul versoeke en 'n beroep op die goewerneur kan indien om dit te hersien of in te gryp.

In 2005 is plaaslike verkiesings in 178 munisipaliteite gehou vir die helfte van die setels in die munisipale raad. Slegs manlike burgers bo die ouderdom van 21 jaar is toegelaat om te stem en verkiesbaar te wees. In 2011 het koning Abdullah aangekondig dat vroue in die volgende munisipale verkiesings in 2015 mag staan ​​en stem. Die administrasie van alle munisipale bestuur is onder die ministerie van munisipale en landelike aangeleenthede.

Politieke partye

Die Saoedi -weermag

Die groot hoeveelheid geld wat Saoedi-Arabië aan sy weermag bestee, beteken dat die land een van die bes toegeruste gewapende magte in die streek het. Sy betrokkenheid by die burgeroorlog van Jemen wat 'n internasionale koalisie gelei het, het sy magte waardevolle ervaring in die front gegee. Die versuim om die Houthi -rebelle te verslaan, het egter ook vrae laat ontstaan ​​oor hoe effektief 'n vegmag die Saoedi -weermag eintlik is.

In 2019 het Saoedi -Arabië 25 uit 137 lande ingedeel in die jaarlikse GFP -oorsig. In daardie jaar word die aantal mense wat militêre ouderdom bereik het, geraam op 583,161 personeel, terwyl militêre uitgawes op $ 70 miljard geraam is. Volgens die Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2018, was militêre uitgawes 8,8 persent van die BBP, vergeleke met 10,3 persent in 2017 en 9,9 persent in 2016.

Die Saoedi-leër was tydens die Eerste Golfoorlog (1991) vir die eerste keer besig met luggevegte, toe 'n Saoedi-vlieënier wat 'n McDonnell Douglas F-155 Eagle gevlieg het, twee Irakse Dassault Mirage-vliegtuie, wat na Saoedi-gebied gekom het, opspoor en afskiet met behulp van die Amerikaanse vervaardigde Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Vir diegene wat die gebeurtenis gesien het, was die Saoedi's se gevorderde tegnologiese militêre vermoëns en hul vermoë om binne koalisies te veg, duidelik. Dit toon egter ook dat die land staatmaak op buitelandse militêre ondersteuning, wat lank voor 1991 begin het en tot vandag toe voortduur.

Die eerste groter 'internasionale' konflik waarin die Saoedi-weermag betrokke was, was die stryd tussen Jemenitiese regeringsmagte en Houthi-rebelle in 2009, wat na bewering klein invalle deur grondtroepe en lugaanvalle deur F-15-vegvliegtuigbomwerpers ingesluit het. Verslae dui daarop dat die Saoedi -grondtroepe swaar weerstand ondervind het deur Houthi's, wat tot aansienlike, maar onbevestigde, Saoedi -verliese gelei het.

Saoedi -troepe het Bahrein in 2011 binnegekom, onder leiding van die Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), saam met magte van die Verenigde Arabiese Emirate, om die bewind van koning Hamad te ondersteun teen 'n hoofsaaklik Sjiïtiese veldtog vir demokratisering, en die Saoedi's bly daar tot vandag toe .

In 2014 het Saoedi -Arabië beskeie lugmagte toegewy aan die koalisie -lugveldtog teen die ekstremistiese Islamitiese Staat in Irak en Sirië wat in 2014 begin het.

In Maart 2015 het Saoedi -Arabië, onder leiding van 'n koalisie van verskeie Arabiese state, 'n veldtog van lugaanvalle teen Sjiïtiese Houthi -rebelle geloods. Dit het troepe van die voormalige president van Jemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, geassosieer om die regime van president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi na Sanaa terug te bring.

In die lig van die Saleh-gesteunde Houthi-offensief, het Hadi uit die land gevlug vir veiligheid in Saoedi-Arabië en internasionale hulp versoek om sy regering te herstel.

Die Saoedi -regering beskuldig Iran daarvan dat hy die rebelle ondersteun om sy invloed op die Arabiese Skiereiland te versprei. Na drie maande se bombardemente het die Saoedi -leierskap egter nie sy doelwitte bereik nie.

Indeks Nommer Ranglys uit 137
Totale militêre personeel 230,000 -
Aktiewe personeel 230,000 -
Reserwe personeel 0 -
Totale vliegtuigsterkte 848 12
Vegvliegtuie 244 12
Aanval vliegtuie 325 9
Vervoer vliegtuie 49 16
Totale helikoptersterkte 254 18
Flight trainers 207 12
Bestryding tenks 1,062 24
Gepantserde vegvoertuie 11,100 4
Vuurpyl projektors 122 29
Totale vlootbates 55 -
Fregatte 7 -

Saoedi -Arabië se militêre sterkte in 2019. Bron: GFP -oorsig.

Oil revenues have always permitted the Saudi government to equip the armed forces with advanced, expensive weaponry, be it aircraft, naval vessels or main battle tanks. However, as all this equipment has to be incorporated into units and personnel has to be trained, foreign militaries that already use the equipment and support personnel of the related arms industry have to work closely with the Saudi government. There are also continual rumors of corruption surrounding the massive arms deals and related deals with contractors.

Like other Arab armed forces, especially those of the GCC, the recruitment of technologically sophisticated personnel is difficult because of shortcomings in the country’s educational system. According to analysts of the Washington, D.C.-based think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the demographic base is apparently too small to sustain the large armed forces.

According to CSIS, the Saudi regular armed forces total some 125,000 men, plus 100,000 in the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Paramilitary forces are estimated to have another 130,000 men in uniform: 30,000 in the Border Guard, 20,000 in the Drug Enforcement Agency, 25,000 in the Civil Defence Administration, 30,000 in the Special Emergency Forces, 10,000 in the Petroleum Installation Security Force, and some 10,000 in the Special Security Forces.

These figures do not add up to cumulative military power because organizations and units are specially tasked to keep an eye on each other to safeguard the status quo of the Kingdom.

The American military presence was reduced before 2003, first under the pressure of Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and later because the Saudi government did not want to be involved in the invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, American support elements, such as tankers, radar planes, and intelligence assets, still use the country’s extensive facilities. In 2013 it was revealed that US armed drones were stationed in the south of the country, presumably for surveillance and attack missions over Yemen, against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Royal Saudi Army and National Guard

Given the opaque nature of Saudi governance, it is difficult to obtain exact figures on the size of the Saudi armed forces. The Saudi army is estimated to have about 100,000 active service personnel. Its main equipment includes an estimated 1,000 tanks, including the late-version General Dynamics Land Systems Abrams M1A2. At the beginning of this decade, there was talk of a pending deal with the German government to purchase some 270 Krauss-Maffei-Wegmann (KMW) Leopard 2 tanks.

Germany suspended this deal after Riyadh executed 47 prisoners, including a respected Shiite cleric, in early 2016. However, Saudi Arabia showed interest in the acquisition of Pakistani Al-Khalid tanks, trials of which have already been conducted. There are estimated to be more than 3,000 armored personnel carriers.

The Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) is seen as a “Praetorian Guard,” consisting of well-paid and well-trained troops, forged out of tribes loyal to the monarchy, the Al Saud family. The SANG is tasked with the direct protection of the royal family and the country’s vital support systems, such as the oil infrastructure and the main religious sites. Its size can measure its relative importance: with an estimated 100,000 personnel, it is as large as the regular armed forces and is equipped with thousands of armored vehicles.

Royal Saudi Navy

The navy has an estimated 17,000 men, including some 4,000 marines. Although organizationally divided into western and eastern fleets, in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, the Saudi naval forces seem especially positioned and projected against Iran’s.

The major surface vessels consist of three French-built al-Riyadh frigates, versions of La Fayette-class vessels, four French-built Medinah-class frigates, four US-manufactured Badr-class corvettes, and dozens of smaller patrol boats.

In December 2014, the US government notably approved the sale of Mark 41 (MK 41) vertical missile launchers, a system with which no vessel in Saudi service is currently compatible, triggering rumors that a contract for a new class of large-surface combatant vessels will soon see the light.

The large Iranian force of three Kilo-class medium-size and dozens of Iranian-built midget submarines is regularly cited as stirring Saudi interest in acquiring its own underwater capability. Dutch, German, and French submarine yards have in the past also been mentioned as potential providers of these costly systems. No concrete steps have so far been reported.

Royal Saudi Air Force

The Saudi air force has about 20,000 men in uniform – not to count an estimated 16,000 men in the separately organized Air Defence Force, with the latest model of Patriot missiles. The air force draws its inventory mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom. With more than 200 Boeing F-15s in interception and ground attack roles, the Saudi air force is the third-largest user of these planes, after the US and Japanese air forces. In the al-Yamamah and al-Salam programs, the UK sold the Kingdom some 80 Panavia Tornado bombers and 27 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter-bombers.

The support aircraft, including tankers and radar planes, match the cutting-edge quality of the fighters and bombers. But there is also criticism. CSIS concluded that the air force in the 1990s developed significant gaps that it is now struggling to plug. In a lengthy analysis, the think tank reported that “a lack of overall readiness, and poor aircrew and maintenance to aircraft ratios, severely reduced the effectiveness of its F-15s and Tornados”. Monthly training hours, CSIS continued, “for the F-15, dropped to 6 hours. They have since risen back to 9, but need to be 12-18. Long-range mission and refueling training also dropped sharply, but is slowly being brought up to standard”.

Supposedly, there was also a “failure to develop effective joint warfare capabilities, realistic joint warfare training capabilities, and transform joint warfare doctrine into fully effective war-fighting plans to support the land-based Air Defence Force, and the Army, National Guard, and Navy.”

This neatly illustrates that money will accomplish only so much.

Saudi Strategic Missile Force

The secrecy surrounding the Saudi missile force stationed in the south of the country has been gradually lifted. For example, commercially available satellite imagery contributed to revealing that the country had bought in the 1980s Chinese conventional Dong Feng-3 missiles with an estimated range of 2,500 km with a 2,000 kg warhead these are reported to suffer from poor accuracy. The missiles are meant as means of retaliation in case of escalating conflict with Iran or Israel.

In April 2014, one of the missile launchers, of which a few dozen are estimated to be operational, was publicly paraded. Photos of them appeared on a Saudi military web forum. Images of models of the DF3 and personnel of missile units also surfaced on social media. In 2007 another sale of Chinese missiles , in this case, the more accurate DF-21 was reported.

The Saudi-American deal

A week before American President Donald Trump made his first foreign trip to the Middle East in May 2017. The United States announced an arms deal with Saudi Arabia worth $110 billion. The White House described the deal as a long-term enhancement for Saudi and GCC security against the Iranian threats. The package included four frigates, the Terminal High Altitude Air Defence (THAAD) system, 150 Black Hawk helicopters, and precision-guided bombs. A month later, several American media described the deal as ‘fake news.’ According to the Brookings Institute, ‘there are many letters of interest or intent, but not contracts … None of the deals identified so far are new. All began in the Obama administration.’


Saudi Arabia: Islam's Heartland

Islam has profoundly affected the history and development of the Arabian Peninsula and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular.

In the 18th century, a religious scholar of the central Najd, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, joined forces with Muhammad bin Saud, the ruler of the town of Diriyah, to bring the Najd and the rest of Arabia back to the original and undefiled form of Islam.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the heartland of Islam, the birthplace of its history, the site of the two holy mosques and the focus of Islamic devotion and prayer. Saudi Arabia is committed to preserving the Islamic tradition in all areas of government and society. Islam guides not only the lives of the people, but also the policies and functions of the government. The Holy Qur'an is the constitution of the Kingdom and Shari'ah (Islamic law) is the basis of the Saudi legal system.

Saudi Arabia is a leader in the pursuit of worldwide Islamic solidarity. It hosts the Muslim World League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, institutions dedicated to preserving Islamic interests.

In many respects, the Kingdom has been responsive to the needs of the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia contributes generously to the Islamic Development Fund, which provides assistance for community infrastructure projects to the Islamic Development Bank, headquartered in Jeddah, and to the Islamic Organization for Science, Technology and Development. Saudi Arabian leaders also work tirelessly to promote peace and stability in Muslim and Arab countries and throughout the world.


Women’s and Girls’ Rights

In late July, Saudi Arabia’s Council of Ministers promulgated landmark amendments to the three laws that will begin to dismantle the country’s discriminatory male guardianship system.

The changes to the Travel Documents Law permit “anyone holding Saudi nationality” to obtain a Saudi passport, allowing women over 21 to obtain their own passports without their male guardian’s permission for the first time. In mid-August, Saudi authorities announced further changes to regulations allowing women over 21 to travel abroad freely without permission from their male guardian.

The reforms also included important advances for women on civil status issues, whereby a woman can now register her children’s births with the civil status office, which was previously restricted to fathers or paternal relatives, as well as inform the office of a death, marriage, or divorce. The changes allow women, along with their husbands, to be considered a “head of household” with respect to their children, which should improve Saudi women’s ability to conduct government business on their children’s behalf.

Finally, changes to the Labor Law clarified that a “worker” can be female as well as male and introduced a new protection against discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, disability, or age. This major advance should make it illegal for private employers to demand that potential female employees obtain approval of their male guardian to work.

Despite the changes, Saudi women still must obtain a male guardian’s approval to get married, leave prison, or obtain certain healthcare. Women also continue to face discrimination in relation to marriage, family, divorce, and decisions relating to children (e.g. child custody). Men can still file cases against daughters, wives, or female relatives under their guardianship for “disobedience,” which can lead to forcible return to their male guardian’s home or imprisonment. Women’s rights activists who fought for these important changes remain in jail or on trial for their peaceful advocacy.


Saudi Arabia Government

chief of state: King and Prime Minister SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (since 23 January 2015) Crown Prince MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (born 31 August 1985) note - the monarch is both chief of state and head of government

head of government: King and Prime Minister SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (since 23 January 2015) Crown Prince MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (born 31 August 1985)

cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the monarch every 4 years and includes many royal family members

elections/appointments: none the monarchy is hereditary an Allegiance Council created by royal decree in October 2006 established a committee of Saudi princes for a voice in selecting future Saudi kings

Citizenship Criteria:

citizenship by descent only: the father must be a citizen of Saudi Arabia a child born out of wedlock in Saudi Arabia to a Saudi mother and unknown father

dual citizenship recognized: no

residency requirement for naturalization: 5 years

Legal System:

Suffrage:

Legislative Branch:

description: unicameral Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (150 seats members appointed by the monarch to serve 4-year terms) note - in early 2013, the monarch granted women 30 seats on the Council

note: composition as of 2013 - men 121, women 30, percent of women 19.9%

Judicial Branch:

highest court(s): High Court (consists of the court chief and organized into circuits with 3-judge panels except the criminal circuit, which has a 5-judge panel for cases involving major punishments)

judge selection and term of office: High Court chief and chiefs of the High Court Circuits appointed by royal decree following the recommendation of the Supreme Judiciary Council, a 10-member body of high-level judges and other judicial heads new judges and assistant judges serve 1- and 2- year probations, respectively, before permanent assignment

subordinate courts: Court of Appeals Specialized Criminal Court, first-degree courts composed of general, criminal, personal status, and commercial courts Labor Court a hierarchy of administrative courts

Regions or States:

Political Parties and Leaders:

International Law Organization Participation:

International Organization Participation:

Diplomatic Representation in the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador ABDALLAH bin Faysal bin Turki bin Abdallah Al Saud (since 28 January 2016)

chancery: 601 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037

consulate(s) general: Houston, Los Angeles, New York

Diplomatic Representation from US:

chief of mission: Ambassador Joseph William WESTPHAL (since 26 March 2014)

embassy: Collector Road M, Diplomatic Quarter, Riyadh

mailing address: American Embassy, Unit 61307, APO AE 09803-1307 International Mail: P. O. Box 94309, Riyadh 11693


Saudi Arabia - Politics

Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's official title is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The government bases its legitimacy on its interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) and the 1992 Basic Law, which specifies that the rulers of the country shall be male descendants of the founder King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al Saud. The Basic Law sets out the system of governance, rights of citizens, and powers and duties of the government, and it provides that the Koran and Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) serve as the country s constitution.

Islamic Sharia a is the law of the land in Saudi Arabia. The country has no penal code. One of the main sources of Islamic law is the hadith or ascribed sayings of the Prophet Mohamed. Saudi officials base this on their interpretation of hadith and state that this is what is expected of them as the country that hosts the two holiest mosques in Islam, in Mecca and Medina.

The Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), a semiautonomous agency--referred to by some as the religious police --has the authority to monitor social behavior and enforce morality subject to the law and in coordination with law enforcement authorities. Its members have been accused of beating, whipping, detaining, and otherwise harassing individuals. As of June 2014 the CPVPV had 12 branch offices, 129 subcommission offices, and 345 information centers throughout the kingdom.

Continuing its consistent decades-long record, Saudi Arabia received the lowest possible marks for civil and political freedoms in the annual Freedom House rankings in 2014. The countries placed alongside it were North Korea, Turkmenistan, and smattering of the most brutal African dictatorships. Among the punishments distributed is anything from hands and feet being chopped off for theft, lashes for adultery and other social misdemeanors, to beheading, which can be handed down for crimes as varied as sedition, carjacking, sorcery and drug smuggling.

The regime s disregard for any accountability to its people is brazen. There are no national elections, no parties, and no parliament only a symbolic advisory chamber, known as Majlis al-Shura.

Tribal factors and longstanding traditions continued to dictate many individual appointments to positions. Unofficially, government authorities will not appoint a Bedouin tribesman to a high-ranking cabinet-level position, and Bedouins can only reach the rank of major general in the armed forces. All members of the cabinet who were tribal were not members of Bedouin tribes but urbanized Hamael tribes. Exceptions are sometimes made when a person marries into the Al Saud family.

In 1962, then-King Faisal abolished slavery in Saudi Arabia by royal decree. Decades later, migrant workers in the purportedly modern society that the kingdom has become continue to suffer extreme forms of labor exploitation that sometimes rise to slavery-like conditions. Their lives are further complicated by deeply rooted gender, religious, and racial discrimination. Employers or sponsors controlled the departure of foreign workers and residents from the country employers/sponsors were responsible for processing residence permits and exit visas on their behalf. Sponsors frequently held their employees passports against the desires of the employees, despite a law specifically prohibiting this practice. Typically, foreign workers provide sponsors with their residence permit (iqama) before traveling in exchange for their passport to ensure the worker s return to their employer after their travel.

There were Baloch, West Africans, and Rohingya Muslims from Burma however, only a portion of these communities was stateless. For example, many Rohingya had expired passports their home government refused to renew. The UNHCR estimated there were between 250,000 to 500,000 Rohingya in the kingdom some of these individuals benefited from a program to correct their residency status during the year the government issued approximately 200,000 four-year residency permits by the end of 2014. Only an estimated 2,000 individuals of Rohingya origin had Saudi citizenship. There also were between 300,000 and 400,000 Palestinian residents not registered as refugees, as well as between 750,000 and one million Syrian nationals in the kingdom, although most of these arrived prior to the 2011 outbreak of the conflict in Syria.

The Basic Law establishes absolute monarchy as the political system. The goal of the House of Saud has been to make every Saudi citizen in some way dependent on the royal family in order to convince the citizenry that their own personal well-being is tied up with the existing political system. Riyadh's continued inability to provide the standard of living expected by Saudi citizens has encouraged opponents of the regime to push for a greater say in the way affairs in the Kingdom are conducted. These calls for greater political participation are exacerbated by the moves of Saudi Arabia's neighbors, particularly Bahrain, to liberalize their political systems and encourage participation from their citizens.

Because the House of Saud is a weak regime, it is highly distrustful of its own citizens. Principal human rights issues include abuse of prisoners and incommunicado detention prohibitions or severe restrictions on freedom of speech, press, peaceful assembly and association, and religion denial of the right of citizens to change their government systematic discrimination against women and ethnic and religious minorities and suppression of workers' rights.

According to the family monarchy system enshrined in the Basic Law, only a few members of the ruling family have a voice in the choice of leaders, the composition of the government, or changes to the political system. The 2006 succession law created the Allegiance Commission, comprising 34 senior princes appointed by the king and responsible for selecting a king and crown prince upon the death or incapacitation of either. The king serves as prime minister and his crown prince serves as deputy prime minister. The king appoints all other ministers, who appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. The Consultative Council (Majlis as-Shura), a royally appointed 150-member body, advises the king.

Citizens do not have the right to change their government peacefully. The Basic Law states that the government is established on the principle of consultation (shura) and requires the king and crown prince to hold majlis meetings, open-door events where in theory any male citizen or foreigner may express an opinion or a grievance. A prince or other important national or local official can also hold a majlis. The Basic Law states that all individuals have the right to communicate with public authorities on any issue. The government interpreted this provision as a right to be exercised within traditional nonpublic means, not by the use of mass media.

Political parties are illegal. The Green Party continues to operate illegally. There was no media coverage of the party's activities. The Basic Law does not provide for freedom of association, and the government strictly limited this right in practice. The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group it considered as opposing or challenging the regime. All associations must be licensed by the MOI and comply with its regulations. Groups that hoped to change some element of the social or political order reported that their licensing requests went unanswered. The MOI reportedly used arbitrary means, such as requiring unreasonable types and quantities of information, to effectively deny associations licenses.

There are no laws that prevent minorities from participating in political life on the same basis as other citizens, but the dominant societal norms marginalize the Shia population. The Consultative Council included only five Shia members. There were no religious minorities in the cabinet. There were some Shia judges.

Criticism is strictly forbidden: in 2014, prominent opposition activist Abd al-Kareem al-Khoder joined hundreds of the country s political prisoners, when he was sentenced to eight years for demanding the changeover to a constitutional monarchy. Just days before King Abdullah s death, blogger Raif Badawi was given the first 50 of his 1,000 lashes for calling for free speech on his blog.

The courts continue to use corporal punishment as a judicial penalty, almost always in the form of floggings, a practice government officials defended as dictated by sharia. According to local human rights activists, police conducted the floggings according to a set of guidelines determined by local interpretation of sharia. The police official administering the punishment must place a book under his arm that prevents raising the hand above the head, limiting the ability to inflict pain on the person subjected to the punishment, and instructions forbid police from breaking the skin or causing scarring when administering the lashes. Courts sentenced several individuals convicted of theft to be punished by amputation, and there was one confirmed case of judicially administered amputation during 2014.

The law does not provide for freedom of association, and the government strictly limited this right. The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group it considered as opposing or challenging the regime. All associations must be licensed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development and comply with its regulations. Some groups that advocated changing elements of the social or political order reported their licensing requests went unanswered for years, despite repeated inquiries.

The law requires a government permit for an organized public assembly of any type. The government categorically forbids participation in political protests or unauthorized public assemblies, and security forces reportedly arrested demonstrators and detained them for brief periods. Security forces, nonetheless, allowed a small number of unauthorized demonstrations throughout the country, despite a 2011 Ministry of Interior statement that demonstrations were banned and that it would take all necessary measures against those seeking to disrupt order.

There are severe restrictions on foreign travel, including for women and members of minority groups. No one may leave the country without an exit visa and a passport. Women, minors (men younger than 21), and other dependents or foreign citizen workers under sponsorship require a male guardian s consent to travel abroad. According to Ministry of Interior regulations, a male guardian must apply for and collect a passport for women and minors.

Saudi Arabia has frequently used arbitrary travel bans and detentions of Saudis over the years. In many cases the Saudi interior ministry did not inform citizens that they were on a travel ban list or the reasons for the restrictions. Some learned when they attempted to travel abroad. The government reportedly confiscated passports on occasion for political reasons and revoked the rights of some citizens to travel, often without providing them notification or opportunity to contest the restriction. Most travel bans reportedly involved individuals in court cases relating to financial and real estate disputes. During the year 2016 the government banned several individuals engaged in human rights activism or political activities from foreign travel, in addition to hundreds of other travel bans promulgated by the courts.

The number of political prisoners, including detainees who reportedly remained in prolonged detention without charge, could not be reliably ascertained. In many cases it was impossible to determine the legal basis for incarceration and whether the detention complied with international norms and standards. Those who remained imprisoned after trial, including persons who were political activists openly critical of the government, were often convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and there was not sufficient public information about the alleged crimes to judge whether they had a credible claim to being political prisoners.

King Abdallah, who died in 2015, started the reform movement by allowing Saudi women to run for the country s consultative Shoura council and to enter the work force, becoming lawyers, bankers and salespeople. Some recent moves to change the status of women have angered parts of the kingdom s mostly conservative population. Traditionalists, were not used to such quick change and many were afraid, because things are moving too fast for them.

In clashes with conservative clerics back in the 1960s, after King Faisal opened a school for girls in Riyadh, and when the king opened the first TV station in Riyadh in 1965, the government prevailed. Whenever the state clashes with the (conservative) clerical establishment, the state emerges victorious.

On 05 November 2017 numerous Saudi royals and top government officials were arrested as part of an apparent anti-corruption campaign, quickly nicknamed the "Game of Tobes". The moves consolidated Prince Mohammed's control of the Kingdom's internal security and military institutions, which had long been headed by separate, powerful branches of the ruling family. The arrests were conducted mere hours after Saudi ruler King Salman announced the creation of a powerful new anticorruption committee led by his son and heir, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Well-known billionaire investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal was among those who have been detained in connection with newly-opened corruption probes.

According to Washington Post, this move was carried out during "a time of unprecedented political, social and economic upheaval in Saudi Arabia as the kingdom seeks to reform its economy and decrease its dependence on oil exports. This development led some analysts to speculate that it was part of the crown prince s plan to secure his power base.

"Knowledgeable observers of Saudi internal politics point to the many arrests of prominent clerics and intellectuals this summer as a sign of tensions inside the kingdom The latest round of arrests only reinforces the sense that the succession debate is more difficult than the king and his son want," Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution, wrote for Al-Monitor.

The targeting of Saudi Arabia's long-standing elite represents a shift from family rule to a more authoritarian style of governance based around one man, according to Durham University academic Christopher Davidson. "Going after such 'big fish' is intended by MBS and his allies in Abu Dhabi as a signal of MBS' newly-established sultanistic powers," he said, using the widely-used acronym for Mohammed bin Salman and referring to his close ties to the leaders of the United Arab Emirates. "By going after the richest, whether fellow princes or media moguls and construction magnates, MBS is demonstrating that nobody is outside his control, as he is now at the top of a more authoritarian, 'one-man regime', with the old consensus-based, dynastic monarchy of the past century having effectively collapsed at some point earlier this year."

Former CIA officer Bob Baer credited the Saudi royal family's consensus-based approach to rule for preventing a war with Iran up until now, warning Mohammed bin Salman's purge made the country's future stability less certain. "The Al Saud [ruling family of Saudi Arabia] have survived all these years, thanks to a remarkable and unbreakable consensus among their ranks and has avoided war with Iran," said Baer.

Others however considered this development a sign of actual reforms and a message to the country s elite. "Cynics are calling this a power play but it's actually a message to the people that an era of elite indulgence is coming to an end," Ali Shihabi, executive director of the Arabia Foundation think tank cited by WaPo, said, adding that this move will have a wide resonance with the masses since elite indulgence has been a sore issue for decades."


Saudi Arabia Bulldozes Over Its Heritage

F or centuries the Kaaba, the black cube in the center of Mecca, Saudi Arabia that is Islam’s holiest point, has been encircled by arched porticos erected some three centuries ago by the Ottomans, above dozens of carved marble columns dating back to the 8th century. But earlier this month, any vestiges of the portico and columns were reduced to rubble, cleared to make way for the Saudi government’s expansion of Mecca’s Grand Mosque.

The $21 billion project, launched in 2011, is designed to meet the challenges of accommodating the millions of pilgrims who visit Mecca and Medina every year. Around 2 million currently visit during Hajj alone, the annual pilgrimage that happens during the last month of the Islamic calendar. But activists charge that the recent destructions are part of a much wider government campaign to rub out historical and religious sites across the Kingdom.

Over the last few years, mosques and key sites dating from the time of Muhammad have been knocked down or destroyed, as have Ottoman-era mansions, ancient wells and stone bridges. Over 98% of the Kingdom’s historical and religious sites have been destroyed since 1985, estimates the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation in London. “It’s as if they wanted to wipe out history,” says Ali Al-Ahmed, of the Institute for Gulf Affairs in Washington, D.C.

Though the Saudi rulers have a long history of destroying historical sites, activists say the pace and range of destruction has recently increased. A few months ago, the house of Hamza, the Prophet Muhammad’s uncle, was flattened to make way for a Meccan hotel, according to Irfan Al Alawi, executive director of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation. There have even been rumored threats to Muhammad’s tomb in Medina and his birthplace in Mecca.

A 61-page report, published recently in Saudi Arabia’s Journal of the Royal Presidency, suggested separating the Prophet’s tomb from Medina’s mosque, a task “that would amount to its destruction,” Alawi says. “You can’t move it without destroying it.” Moreover, he alleges, plans for a new palace for King Abdullah threaten the library atop the site traditionally identified as the birthplace of Muhammad. Even now, signs in four languages warn visitors that there is no proof that the Prophet Muhammad was born there, “so it is forbidden to make this place specific for praying, supplicating or get [sic] blessing.”

Wahhabism, the prevailing Saudi strain of Islam, frowns on visits to shrines, tombs or religio-historical sites, on grounds that they might lead to Islam’s gravest sin: worshipping anyone other than God. In recent years, the twin forks of Wahhabi doctrine and urban development have speared most physical reminders of Islamic history in the heart of Mecca. The house of the Prophet’s first wife, Khadijah has made way for public toilets. A Hilton hotel stands on the site of the house of Islam’s first caliph, Abu Bakr. Famously, the Kaaba now stands in the shade of one of the world’s tallest buildings, the Mecca Royal Clock Tower, part of a complex built by the Bin Laden Group, boasting a 5-story shopping mall, luxury hotels and a parking garage.

Saudi officials did not respond to interview requests, but in the past, they have said that the expansion project is necessary to cater to the ever-growing number of pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, a number forecast to reach 17 million by 2025. When it’s done, the expansion of the mataf, the area where the faithful circumambulate around the Kaaba, will treble its capacity, to 150,000 people the Great Mosque will be able to hold 2.5 million.

Amir Pasic, of IRCICA, the culture organization of the 56-nation Organization of Islamic Conference, points out that the logistics for Hajj dwarf those required for a World Cup or Olympics. “Every time has the right to make changes on the existing urban set-up,” he said. “Every generation tries to develop something. The Kaaba is what’s important.”

If Mecca’s new skyline is impossible to ignore, what with 48 searchlights beaming from the top of the Clock Tower, other changes to the landscape are more insidious. “Everyone’s focused on [the two mosque expansion projects], but people are not focusing on what we’re losing in the meantime,” says Saudi activist, poet and photographer Nimah Ismail Nawwab. After blue markings appear on sites mentioned in Islamic histories, says Nawwab, then the bulldozers come–often in the dead of night. “Everything happens at night,” she told TIME by phone from Saudi Arabia. “By the next day in the morning, the monument is gone.”

It’s not just in Mecca, either. Over a year ago, the split in Mount Uhud, north of Medina, where Muhammad was said to have been carried after being wounded in the famous Battle of Uhud was filled with concrete. A fence went up at the base of the mountain, warning would-be visitors that it was just a mountain, like any other. Six small mosques in Medina where Muhammad is believed to have prayed have been locked. The seventh, belonging to Islam’s first caliph Abu Bakr, has been razed to make way for an ATM. Nawwab, along with a small group of historians and activists, has tried to raise awareness by photographing sites and starting a Twitter campaign, but says “it’s a losing battle, despite the fact that what’s being lost is not just Muslim history, but human history.”

When the Taliban blew up the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan in 2001, they were met with international condemnation. The response to the demolition activity in the Kingdom, by contrast, has been decidedly muted. “When it comes to Mecca, as far as we are concerned it’s a Saudi question,” says Roni Amelan, a spokesman for UNESCO, the United Nation’s cultural body. The Saudi government has never submitted Mecca for inclusion on the list of World Heritage Sites. As UNESCO’s mandate requires a respect for the sovereignty of individual countries, “we don’t have a legal basis to stake a position regarding it,” adds Amelan.

Muslim governments, perhaps mindful of the power of the Saudis to cut their quotas for how many pilgrims can attend Hajj, have been strikingly silent on the issue. The Organization of the Islamic Conference has also been noticeably quiet on the destruction of the Saudi campaign. One exception has been Turkey, whose Ottoman heritage has also long been under threat. In September, Mehmet Gormez, head of the Dinayet, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, told journalists that he told Saudi’s minister of Hajj that the skyscraper overshadowing the Kaaba “destroys history,” the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet Daily News reported. “History is being destroyed in the Holy Land each day,” he added.

For pilgrims old enough to remember the dangerous crush of crowds in the 1980s, the spate of new development may be welcome, offering a chance for comfort on their spiritual journey. For other Muslims, like Ziauddin Sardar, author of the recent Mecca: The Sacred City, the vigor of the Saudi campaign springs from financial jitters. “The Saudis know the oil is going to run out,” he said. “Hajj is already their second major source of income, after oil. They look at Dubai, and Qatar, and ask ‘what are we going to do?’ And they say, ‘We have Hajj, and we’re going to exploit it to the max.'”

Carla Power is the author of If the Oceans Were Ink: A Journey to the Heart of the Quran (Henry Holt: April, 2015)


Saudi Arabia agreed to allow female athletes to compete on the national team for the Olympics for the first time. One of them was Sarah Attar, who ran the women's 800 meter race at the 2012 Olympics in London wearing a headscarf. Before the Games, there was speculation that the Saudi Arabian team might be banned for gender discrimination if they didn't allow women to participate.


Kyk die video: Toespraak Mohammed VI 6 november 2011 (Mei 2022).