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Tunisiese regering - Geskiedenis

Tunisiese regering - Geskiedenis


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TUNISIË

Tunisië is 'n ontluikende demokrasie. Die president word direk deur die mense verkies en is staats- en regeringshoof. Die eensamer parlement word direk verkies. Tunisië het onlangs sy eerste omstrede verkiesings gehou.
HUIDIGE REGERING
PresidentBen Ali, Zine El Abidine
Eerste MinisterGhannouchi, Mohamed
Min. van die staat en spesiale adviseur van die presidentBen Dhia, Abdelaziz
Min. vir landbou, omgewing en hidroliese hulpbronneHaddad, Habib
Min. vir kommunikasietegnologie en vervoerRabah, Sadok
Min. vir kultuur, jeug en ontspanningHermassi, Abdelbaki
Min. vir VerdedigingJazi, Dali
Min. vir ontwikkeling en internasionale samewerkingJouini, Mohamed Nouri
Min. vir onderwys en opleidingRouissi, Moncer
Min. vir indiensnemingLaroussi, Chadli
Min. vir infrastruktuur, behuising en stedelike beplanningGeloof, Slaheddine
Min. vir FinansiesBaccar, Taoufik
Min. vir buitelandse sakeBen Yahia, Habib
Min. vir hoër onderwys, wetenskaplike navorsing en tegnologieChaabane, Sadok
Min. vir nywerheid en energieBen Abdallah, Moncef
Min. vir die binneland en plaaslike ontwikkelingM'henni, Hedi
Min. vir geregtigheid en menseregteTekkari, Bechir
Min.-Dir. van die presidensiële kabinetOuederni, Ahmed Eyadh
Min. vir Openbare GesondheidM'barek, Habib
Min. vir godsdienssakeJeribi, Jelloul
Min. vir maatskaplike aangeleenthede en solidariteitNeffati, Chedli
Min. vir SportZouari, Abderrahim
Min. vir staatsdomeine en aangeleenthedeGrira, Ridha
Min. vir toerisme, handel en handwerkZenaidi, Mondher
Min. vir vrouesake, familie en kinderjareBen Yedder, Naziha
Goewerneur, Sentrale BankDaous, Mohamed
Ambassadeur in die VSAAtallah, Hatem
Permanente verteenwoordiger by die VN, New YorkMejdoub, Noureddine


'N Kort geskiedenis van Tunisië

Moderne Tunisiërs is die afstammelinge van inheemse Berbers en mense uit talle beskawings wat oor die millennia in die bevolking binnegedring het, gemigreer het en in die bevolking geassimileer is. Die geskiedenis in Tunisië begin met die aankoms van Fenisiërs, wat Kartago en ander Noord -Afrikaanse nedersettings in die 8ste eeu v.C. Kartago het 'n groot seemag geword en in botsing met Rome gekom om beheer oor die Middellandse See totdat dit in 146 v.C. deur die Romeine verslaan en gevange geneem is.


Geskiedenis van Tunisië

Daar word geglo dat Tunisië in die 12de eeu vC die eerste keer deur die Fenisiërs gevestig is. Daarna, teen die vyfde eeu v.G.J., het die stadstaat Kartago die gebied wat vandag Tunisië is, sowel as 'n groot deel van die Middellandse See-gebied oorheers. In 146 v.G.J. is die Middellandse See -gebied deur Rome oorgeneem en Tunisië was deel van die Romeinse Ryk totdat dit in die 5de eeu nC geval het.

Na die einde van die Romeinse Ryk is Tunisië deur verskeie Europese moondhede binnegeval, maar in die sewende eeu het Moslems die streek oorgeneem. Volgens die Amerikaanse ministerie van buitelandse sake was daar destyds 'n groot migrasie uit die Arabiese en Ottomaanse wêrelde, en teen die 15de eeu het Spaanse Moslems en Joodse mense na Tunisië begin migreer.

In die vroeë 1570's is Tunisië deel van die Ottomaanse Ryk, en dit het tot 1881 so gebly toe dit deur Frankryk beset geraak het en 'n Franse protektoraat was. Tunisië is toe deur Frankryk beheer tot 1956 toe dit 'n onafhanklike nasie geword het.

Nadat sy onafhanklikheid verkry het, bly Tunisië ekonomies en polities nou verbonde aan Frankryk en ontwikkel dit sterk bande met Westerse lande, waaronder die Verenigde State. Dit het gelei tot 'n mate van politieke onstabiliteit in die 1970's en 1980's. Aan die einde van die negentigerjare het die ekonomie van Tunisië begin verbeter, hoewel dit onder outoritêre bewind was wat aan die einde van 2010 en vroeg in 2011 gelei het tot ernstige onrus en die uiteindelike omverwerping van sy regering.


Inhoud

Die BBP per capita het in die sewentigerjare met meer as 380% gestyg (1970–1980: 280–1 369 dollar). Maar dit was onvolhoubaar en het ineengestort tot 'n kumulatiewe groei van 10% in die onstuimige tagtigerjare (1980–1990: USD 1,369-1,507), wat weer tot byna 50% kumulatiewe groei in die negentigerjare gestyg het (1990-2000: USD 1,507-2,245), wat die impak van suksesvolle diversifikasie aandui. [21]

Groeiende buitelandse skuld en die valutakrisis in die middel van die tagtigerjare het daartoe gelei dat die regering 'n strukturele aanpassingsprogram begin om pryse te liberaliseer, tariewe te verlaag en Tunisië in 1986 na 'n markekonomie te heroriënteer. finansiële instellings. Die regering het pryse geliberaliseer, tariewe verlaag, skuld-diens-na-uitvoer en skuld-tot-BBP-verhoudings verlaag, en die gemiddelde looptyd van sy buitelandse skuld van $ 10 miljard verleng. Strukturele aanpassing het addisionele lenings van die Wêreldbank en ander Westerse skuldeisers meegebring. In 1990 het Tunisië toegetree tot die Algemene Ooreenkoms oor Tariewe en Handel (GATT) en is hy lid van die Wêreldhandelsorganisasie (WHO).

In 1996 het Tunisië 'n 'assosiasieooreenkoms' aangegaan met die Europese Unie (EU) wat tariewe en ander handelshindernisse op die meeste goedere teen 2008 verwyder het. In samewerking met die assosiasieooreenkoms help die EU die regering van Tunisië Mise A Niveau (opgradering) program om die produktiwiteit van Tunisiese ondernemings te verhoog en voor te berei vir mededinging op die wêreldmark.

Die regering het ongeveer 160 staatsondernemings geheel of gedeeltelik geprivatiseer nadat die privatiseringsprogram in 1987 van stapel gestuur is. Werkloosheid het die ekonomie van Tunisië steeds geteister en is vererger deur 'n vinnig groeiende arbeidsmag. Na raming is 55% van die bevolking onder die ouderdom van 25. Amptelik is 15,2% van die Tunisiese werkmag werkloos.

In 2011, na die Arabiese Lente, sak die ekonomie terug, maar herstel dan met 2,81% BBP -groei in 2014. Werkloosheid is egter steeds een van die belangrikste kwessies, met 15,2% van die arbeidsmag wat in die eerste kwartaal van 2014 werkloos was. Die oorgang het vroeg in 2014 nuwe momentum gekry met die oplossing van 'n politieke dooiepunt, die aanneming van 'n nuwe Grondwet en die aanstelling van 'n nuwe regering. Die nasionale dialoogplatform, bemiddel deur belangrike organisasies in die burgerlike samelewing, het 'n deurslaggewende rol gespeel in die byeenkoms van alle groot politieke partye. Hierdie konsensus sal verdere hervorming in die ekonomie en die openbare sektor moontlik maak.

In 2015 het die Bardo National Museum -aanval gelei tot die ineenstorting van die derde grootste sektor van Tunisië se ekonomie, [22] toerisme. Tunisiese toeristewerkers in Tunis het gesê dat "toerisme dood is, heeltemal dood is", wat die erge afname in toerisme na die aanval uitdruk. [23]

Die aantal lappies neem toe as gevolg van die volgehoue ​​hoë werkloosheid (15% van die werkende bevolking), die verlies aan koopkrag van die mees benadeelde gesinne en die ontploffing van plastiekafval as gevolg van nuwe verbruiksgewoontes. Hulle trek geen voordeel uit sosiale beskerming nie - mediese dekking, aftrede. - toegestaan ​​aan beroepe met 'n wettige status en kan onderhewig wees aan die ontginning van die herwinningsbedryf [24]

Die volgende tabel toon die belangrikste ekonomiese aanwysers in 1980–2017. Inflasie onder 5% is groen. [25]

Jaar BBP
(in Bil. US $ PPP)
BBP per capita
(in US $ PPP)
BBP -groei
(werklike)
Inflasiekoers
(in persentasie)
Werkloosheid
(in persentasie)
Staatskuld
(in % van die BBP)
1980 13.6 2,127 7.4% 10.1% nvt nvt
1981 15.8 2,387 5.5% 8.9% nvt nvt
1982 16.6 2,463 −0.5% 13.7% nvt nvt
1983 18.0 2,618 4.7% 9.0% nvt nvt
1984 19.7 2,833 5.7% 8.6% nvt nvt
1985 21.5 2,991 5.7% 7.6% nvt nvt
1986 21.6 2,894 −1.5% 6.2% nvt nvt
1987 23.7 3,101 6.7% 8.2% nvt nvt
1988 24.5 3,158 0.1% 7.2% nvt nvt
1989 26.1 3,306 2.6% 7.7% nvt nvt
1990 29.0 3,560 7.1% 6.5% 16.2% nvt
1991 31.2 3,756 4.1% 7.7% 16.2% 66.4%
1992 34.5 4,065 8.0% 5.5% 16.2% 65.2%
1993 36.2 4,224 2.5% 4.0% 16.3% 66.9%
1994 38.3 4,362 3.6% 5.4% 16.3% 67.0%
1995 40.2 4,484 2.7% 6.2% 16.2% 68.8%
1996 43.7 4,808 6.9% 3.7% 16.1% 70.1%
1997 47.0 5,100 5.7% 3.6% 15.9% 69.9%
1998 49.9 5,342 5.0% 3.1% 16.1% 61.0%
1999 53.7 5,676 6.0% 2.8% 16.0% 65.0%
2000 57.3 5,993 4.3% 2.8% 15.7% 65.9%
2001 61.4 6,362 4.9% 1.9% 15.1% 54.7%
2002 63.4 6,503 1.7% 1.9% 15.3% 54.2%
2003 68.2 6,931 5.5% 2.1% 14.5% 55.1%
2004 74.3 7,476 6.0% 2.5% 14.2% 54.1%
2005 79.7 7,947 4.0% 2.4% 12.8% 52.4%
2006 86.8 8,570 5.7% 3.2% 12.5% 47.8%
2007 94.7 9,260 6.3% 3.0% 12.4% 44.8%
2008 100.8 9,763 4.5% 4.3% 12.4% 42.0%
2009 104.8 10,036 3.1% 3.7% 13.3% 40.5%
2010 108.8 10,315 2.6% 3.3% 13.0% 39.2%
2011 108.9 10,204 −1.9% 3.5% 18.9% 43.1%
2012 115.2 10,694 3.9% 5.1% 16.7% 47.7%
2013 120.0 11,020 2.4% 5.8% 15.3% 46.8%
2014 124.9 11,355 2.3% 4.9% 15.3% 51.6%
2015 127.6 11,487 1.1% 4.9% 15.4% 54.8%
2016 130.5 11,448 1.0% 3.7% 15.5% 61.2%
2017 135.4 11,755 1.9% 5.3% 15.3% 71.3%

In 1992 het Tunisië vir die eerste keer in 6 jaar weer die private internasionale kapitaalmark betree, met 'n kredietlyn van $ 10 miljoen vir ondersteuning van betalingsbalans. In Januarie 2003 bevestig Standard & amp Poor's sy beleggingsgraadgradering vir Tunisië. Die Wêreld Ekonomiese Forum 2002-03 het Tunisië die 34ste plek behaal in die Global Competitiveness Index Ratings (twee plekke agter Suid-Afrika, die leier van die vasteland). In April 2002 het Tunisië se eerste staatsobligasie-uitgifte sedert 1997 $ 458 miljoen ingesamel, met vervaldag in 2012.

Die Bourse de Tunis is onder die beheer van die staatsbeheerde Raad vir Finansiële Markte en bevat meer as 50 maatskappye. Die regering bied aansienlike belastingaansporings om ondernemings aan te moedig om by die beurs aan te sluit, en uitbreiding vind plaas.

Die Tunisiese regering het in 1993 'n verenigde beleggingskode aangeneem om buitelandse kapitaal te lok. Meer as 1,600 uitvoergerigte gesamentlike ondernemingondernemings werk in Tunisië om voordeel te trek uit relatief lae arbeidskoste en voorkeurtoegang tot die nabygeleë Europese markte. Ekonomiese bande is die naaste met Europese lande, wat die handel in Tunisië oorheers. Die geldeenheid van Tunisië, die dinar, word nie buite Tunisië verhandel nie. Gedeeltelike omskakelbaarheid bestaan ​​egter vir bona fide kommersiële en beleggingstransaksies. Sekere beperkings beperk steeds die bedrywighede wat deur Tunisiese inwoners uitgevoer word.

Die aandelemarkkapitalisasie van genoteerde maatskappye in Tunisië was in 2007 gewaardeer op $ 5,3 miljard, 15% van die BBP van 2007, deur die Wêreldbank. [26]

Vir 2007 het die buitelandse direkte belegging in 2007 2 miljard TN dinar beloop, oftewel 5,18% van die totale belegging in die land. Hierdie syfer styg met 35,7% teenoor 2006 en sluit 271 nuwe buitelandse ondernemings in en die uitbreiding van 222 ander wat reeds in die land gevestig is.

Die ekonomiese groeikoers vir 2007, met 6,3%, is die hoogste wat in 'n dekade behaal is.

Op 29 en 30 November het Tunisië 'n beleggingskonferensie gehou met landshoofde van regoor die wêreld met beloftes van $ 30 miljard om nuwe openbare projekte te finansier. [27]

Leningswaarborg [28] Wysig

Op 20 April 2012 onderteken die Amerikaanse tesourie -sekretaris [29] en die Tunisiese minister van finansies, Houcine Dimassi, 'n voornemeverklaring [30] om voort te gaan met 'n Amerikaanse leningwaarborg vir Tunisië. Die Amerikaanse regering sal hierdie leningswaarborg bied om die Tunisiese regering in staat te stel om aansienlike markfinansiering te kry teen bekostigbare tariewe en gunstige vervaldatums met die steun van 'n Amerikaanse waarborg van hoofsom en rente (tot 100 persent).

Die ondersteuning sou bestaan ​​uit die Amerikaanse waarborg van skuld in Tunisië wat deur die regering uitgereik is (of uit banklenings aan die regering van Tunisië). Hierdie waarborg sal die leenkoste van die Tunisiese regering aansienlik verminder in 'n tyd waarin marktoegang vir baie opkomende marklande duurder geword het. In die komende weke is albei regerings van voorneme om vordering te maak met 'n leningswaarborgooreenkoms wat Tunisië in staat sal stel om voort te gaan met die uitreiking van skuld.

Die seremonie het plaasgevind by die Wêreldbank onmiddellik na die vergadering van ministers van finansies van die Deauville -vennootskap met Arabiese lande in oorgang.

  • Produksie: 16,13 miljard kWh (2011) [31]
  • Produksie volgens bron:
    • fossielbrandstof: 96.8% (2010)
    • hidro: 1.7% (2010)
    • ander: 1.5% (2010)
    • 1,5 miljoen ton koring
    • 1,3 miljoen ton tamatie (16de grootste produsent ter wêreld)
    • 825 duisend ton olywe (7de grootste produsent ter wêreld)
    • 700 duisend ton gars
    • 548 duisend ton waatlemoen
    • 450 duisend ton ui
    • 426 duisend ton peper
    • 423 duisend ton aartappel
    • 241 duisend ton datum (10de grootste produsent ter wêreld)
    • 217 duisend ton wortels
    • 146 duisend ton druiwe
    • 144 duisend ton lemoen
    • 118 duisend ton perske
    • 114 duisend ton appel
    • 104 duisend ton pomelo
    • 102 duisend ton spanspek

    Benewens kleiner produksies van ander landbouprodukte, soos amandel (66 duisend ton) en suikerbeet (76 duisend ton). [32]


    Aardrykskunde

    Ligging

    Noord -Afrika, grens aan die Middellandse See, tussen Algerië en Libië

    Geografiese koördinate

    Kaartverwysings

    totaal: 163 610 vierkante kilometer

    land: 155,360 vierkante kilometer

    water: 8 250 vierkante kilometer

    Gebied - vergelykend

    effens groter as Georgië

    Area vergelyking kaart

    Grondgrense

    totaal: 1 495 km

    grenslande (2): Algerië 1034 km, Libië 461 km

    Kuslyn

    Maritieme eise

    territoriale see: 12 nm

    aangrensende sone: 24 nm

    eksklusiewe ekonomiese sone: 12 nm

    Klimaat

    gematig in die noorde met sagte, reënerige winters en warm, droë somerswoestyn in die suide

    Terrein

    berge in die noordelike warm, droë sentrale vlakte, halfjarige suide, smelt in die Sahara in

    Hoogte

    hoogste punt: Jebel ech Chambi 1,544 m

    laagste punt: Shatt al Gharsah -17 m

    gemiddelde hoogte: 246 m

    Natuurlike hulpbronne

    petroleum, fosfate, ystererts, lood, sink, sout

    Grondgebruik

    landbougrond: 64,8% (geraamde 2018)

    permanente gewasse: 15,4% (geraamde 2018)

    permanente weiding: 31,1% (geraamde 2018)

    bos: 6,6% (geraamde 2018)

    ander: 28,6% (geraamde 2018)

    Besproeiingsgrond

    Totale hernubare waterbronne

    4,615 miljard kubieke meter (beraamde 2017)

    Bevolkingsverspreiding

    die oorgrote meerderheid van die bevolking is in die noordelike helfte van die land geleë, die suide bly grootliks onderbevolk soos op hierdie bevolkingsverspreidingskaart getoon

    Natuurlike gevare

    oorstromings van aardbewings droogtes

    Omgewing - internasionale ooreenkomste

    partytjie by: Biodiversiteit, klimaatsverandering, klimaatsverandering-Kyoto-protokol, klimaatsverandering-Parys-ooreenkoms, omvattende kerntoetsverbod, woestynstelling, bedreigde spesies, omgewingsaanpassing, gevaarlike afval, seereg, mariene storting-Londen-konvensie, verbod op kerntoetse, osoonlaag Beskerming, skeepsbesoedeling, vleilande

    geteken, maar nie bekragtig nie: Marine Life Conservation

    Aardrykskunde - let op

    strategiese ligging in Sentraal -Middellandse See Malta en Tunisië bespreek die kommersiële ontginning van die kontinentale rak tussen hul lande, veral vir olie -eksplorasie


    Tunisië - Geskiedenis en kultuur


    Invloede uit die Midde -Ooste, Europa en Afrika word in Tunisië aangetref, met net soveel ou ruïnes as Griekeland. Tunisië is moontlik 'n oorwegend Moslemland, maar dit is ook 'n progressiewe nasie waar ander godsdienste en kulture wyd gerespekteer word. Gesin en gasvryheid is die belangrikste kulturele waardes in Tunisië.

    Geskiedenis

    Gedurende die 8ste en 9de eeu vC het die Fenisiërs die eerste van die vele beskawings geword wat hul stempel op Tunisië getrap het. Dit was die Feniciërs wat die eerste keer Tunisië se bekendste stad Kartago gestig het, wat uiteindelik met Rome sou meeding as die mees dominante stad aan die Middellandse See. Die gloriejare van Kartago word die beste uitgebeeld in die Carthage National Museum (Colline de Byrsa, Cartago 2016).

    Kartago het egter uiteindelik beheer oor sy ryk aan die Romeine verloor ná die Puniese oorloë. Die Romeinse era van die stad duur van 146 vC tot die 5de eeu nC. Na die val van die Romeinse Ryk val Tunisië eers in die hande van die Vandale, daarna die Bisantyne, en uiteindelik die Arabiere, wat die land teen die 7de eeu nC ten volle beheer het. Die Arabiere het die Berber -bevolking van Tunisië tot Islam bekeer en Tunis, die huidige hoofstad van die land, as een van die rykste en magtigste stede in die ryk gevestig.

    Die Barbary -state het Tunisië ingeneem as deel van hul 16de -eeuse seerowervesting, maar is gou verdryf deur die Ottomaanse Turke, wat Tunisië regeer het en stabiliteit in die gebied gebring het tot in die 19de eeu. Frankryk het gedurende die vroeë 1880's die gebied binnegeval en dit 'n Franse protektoraat gemaak.

    Tunisië het 'n belangrike slagveld geword van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog as die Franse gebied van Vichy, en die onafhanklikheidsbeweging wat gedurende die vroeë 20ste eeu in die gebied toegeneem het, bereik sy hoogtepunt gedurende die 1950's. Tunisië het uiteindelik 'n volledig onafhanklike republiek geword in 1956. Die Bardo Museum (Le Bardo, Tunis 2000), die grootste van Tunisië, beeld die land se lang stryd om onafhanklikheid en sy onstuimige geskiedenis onder sy verskillende heersers uit.

    Afgesien van 'n paar konfrontasies tussen die Tunisiërs en die Franse gedurende die 1960's en 1970's, het die land relatief vreedsaam en verdraagsaam gebly tot op 17 Desember 2010. Op daardie dag het 'n jong Tunisiese straatverkoper met die naam Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi homself aan die brand gesteek protes teen wat hy glo onbillike teistering deur die polisie en konfiskering van sy ware was. Dit het die Tunisiese rewolusie geloods, wat die land se jarelange president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, verdryf het en die Arabiese Lente -revolusies in Noord -Afrika en die res van die Arabiese wêreld begin het.

    Kultuur

    Tunisiërs is bekend vir hul verdraagsame kultuur en die warm gasvryheid wat aan alle besoekers bewys word, ongeag die agtergrond of geloof. Dit is redelik maklik om alkohol in Tunisië te vind, en baie vroue kies om nie kopdoeke te dra nie. In ruil daarvoor moet besoekers ewe begrip van hul Tunisiese leërskare hê en nie te dun klere dra nie. Knieë en skouers moet altyd bedek wees as u Islamitiese godsdienstige monumente besoek.

    Europese, Midde -Oosterse en Afrikaanse invloede speel almal 'n belangrike rol in Tunisië se nasionale identiteit. Arabiese, Andalusiese en Turkse ritmes is te hoor in Tunisiese musiek, en baie geboue in Tunis het helder geverfde deure en vensters langs hul pragtige hekke in Europese styl. Alloucha, die bekendste tapyt van hoë gehalte in Tunisië, word in Kairouan vervaardig. Die Cap Bon -omgewing is bekend vir sy klei -kunsvlyt.


    Oorsig

    In Tunisië is 'n nuwe regering op 2 September 2020 ingesweer. Die eerste minister, Hichem Mechichi, sê dat sy prioriteit is om die ekonomiese en sosiale situasie aan te spreek, die openbare finansies te herbalanseer (deur gesprekke met leners) en hervormings begin om subsidies te verminder. en programme wat organisasies soos staatsondernemings ondersteun. In April 2021 het Tunisië internasionale vennote van hervormingsprogramme voorsien, maar die regering moet nog 'n omvattende, gedetailleerde strategie voorlê om die land se diep ekonomiese en finansiële uitdagings die hoof te bied, wat nou weerspieël word in ongekende vlakke van begrotingstekort en openbare skuld.

    Selfs voor COVID-19 is Tunisië se kapasiteit vir ekonomiese veerkragtigheid leeggelaat deur jare se besluitelose openbare beleid en groeiende proteksionisme. Openbare dienste het reeds agteruitgegaan. Na 'n poging om die regering te verander - deur die president van die Republiek verwerp, Kais Saied - lei die premier van die land die regering met 'n kabinet waarin die helfte van die ministers meer as een pos beklee.

    Makro -ekonomiese konteks

    Namate 2020 tot 'n einde gekom het, word die diepte van die impak van die pandemie op die Tunisiese ekonomie duideliker. Tunisië het 'n skerper afname in ekonomiese groei beleef as die meeste van sy plaaslike eweknieë, nadat hulle hierdie krisis betree het met stadige groei en stygende skuldvlakke. Die BBP -groei het in 2020 met 8,8% gekrimp. Werkloosheid het toegeneem van 15% voor die pandemie tot 17,8% teen die einde van die eerste kwartaal van 2021. Boonop beïnvloed dit steeds vroue (24,9%) en jongmense tussen 15 en 24 jaar ( 40,8%) in die besonder.

    Armoede en kwesbaarheid sal na verwagting toeneem en 'n neiging in armoedevermindering die afgelope paar jaar omkeer. 'N Reeks telefoniese onderhoude, wat deur die National Institute of Statistics (INS) en die Wêreldbank gevoer is, toon bewyse dat die pandemie hul eetgewoontes verander. Armer huishoudings het die hoeveelheid voedsel wat hulle verbruik het, verminder of begin eet met minder voorkeur. Om die stygende voedselpryse die hoof te bied of om werkverliese te vergoed, het huishoudings óf spaargeld aangeneem, finansiële hulp van buite aanvaar, óf geld by familielede geleen en uitstaande verpligtinge uitgestel.

    In 2020 het uiterste armoede - gemeet aan die internasionale armoedegrens van US $ 1,90 per dag - steeds onder 1% in Tunisië gebly, maar armoede gemeet binne die US $ 3,20 per dag het na raming toegeneem van 2,9% tot 3,7%. Die persentasie van die bevolking wat beskryf word as 'kwesbaar' om in armoede te beland, sou ook toegeneem het. Deur 'n drempel van US $ 5,50 per persoon per dag te gebruik, sal die aantal armes en kwesbares saam toegeneem het van 16,7% tot 20,1% van die land se totale bevolking van ongeveer 11,7 miljoen (Wêreldbank 2021, 2019).

    Die tekort op die lopende rekening bly hoog op 6,8% van die BBP in 2020, maar het verbeter (van 8,5% in 2019), aangesien invoer vinniger as uitvoer gedaal het. Hierdie faktore ondersteun die volgehoue ​​groei in forexreserwes, wat teen Januarie 2021 op US $ 8,3 miljard gestaan ​​het (gelykstaande aan 158 dae invoerdekking) teen $ 7,4 miljard teen einde 2019. Gedurende die eerste maande van 2021 het die handelstekort met 10%gekrimp. Die uitvoer van goedere het met 23% gestyg en die invoer het met 13,7% gestyg vergeleke met dieselfde tydperk in 2020. Intussen het die saldo van dienste gegaan van 'n positiewe saldo van 523 miljoen dinars tot 'n negatiewe saldo van 177,5 miljoen, 'n daling van 134%, maar die betalings het met 17% toegeneem, wat gelei het tot 'n inkrimping van 6,8% van die lopende rekening. Tendense in die eerste maande van hierdie jaar is positief, aangesien hoër uitvoer - hoofsaaklik uit industriële produksie - bydra tot laer eksterne finansieringsbehoeftes en die druk op reserwes verminder. Maar eksterne risiko bly beduidend.

    Daarteenoor het die fiskale tekort 10% van die BBP bereik, vererger deur 'n afname in inkomste as gevolg van die vermindering van ekonomiese aktiwiteit en maatreëls om belasting uit te stel, tesame met die koste van die COVID-19-reaksieprogram. Die loonrekening het in 2020 gestyg tot ongeveer 17,5% van die BBP, wat bydra tot druk op uitgawes en dui op 'n gebrek aan vordering om die staatsdiensvergoeding te bevat. Hierdie ontwikkelings vererger skuldkwetsbaarhede. Openbare skuld sal na verwagting styg van 72% van die BBP in 2019 tot 87% van die BBP in 2020, wat ver bo die maatstaf van die opkomende mark se skuldlas van 70% van die BBP is.

    Gedurende die eerste kwartaal van 2021 het belastinginkomste met 13% (JJJ) toegeneem. Aan die ander kant het die nie-belastinginkomste (-77%) skerp gedaal. As gevolg hiervan het die totale inkomste (belasting en nie-belasting) met 1,7%gestyg. Terselfdertyd het uitgawes met 2,3%gedaal ondanks die styging in lone (+4,7%), bestuurskoste (+7,9%) en rente op skuld (+1,2%). Die daling in subsidies en intervensies (-13,4%), sowel as beleggingsuitgawes (-38%), het besparings van 475 miljoen dinars (US $ 1,73 miljoen) moontlik gemaak.

    In die algemeen het die begrotingstekort met 27,7% afgeneem, in ooreenstemming met die doel om die begrotingstekort van 2021 tot 6,6% van die BBP te verminder.

    Na 'n inkrimping van 8,8% in 2020, sou die groei aanvanklik na ongeveer 4% in 2021 versnel het. Die gemengde prestasie van die eerste kwartaal dui op 'n paar tekens van herstel (veral in industriële sektore), maar die impak van die pandemie op groei het tot in hierdie jaar voortgeduur . Markdienste ly aan gesondheidsmaatreëls, beperkings op reis en die stadige inenting. Politieke, sosiale en ekonomiese onsekerheid bly hoog Vroeë ekonomiese voorspellings kan afwaarts aangepas word.

    Vanaf 2022 sal die groei na verwagting terugkeer na 'n meer gedempte baan van ongeveer 2%, wat weerspieël Tunisië se swak beleggingsklimaat en stadige strukturele transformasie. Die tekort op die lopende rekening sal na verwagting effens toeneem namate die vraag na invoer begin herstel en uitvoere slegs stadig begin neem, gegewe die land se volgehoue ​​strukturele beperkings en politieke onsekerheid. Die fiskale tekort sal na verwagting in 2021 tot ongeveer 8% van die BBP toeneem en geleidelik op mediumtermyn afneem, met risiko's van die afslag as gevolg van 'n groeiende loonrekening, subsidies en onderpresterende staatsondernemings (SOE's).

    Die vooruitsigte vir hervormings om ekonomiese herstel te ondersteun, is uitdagend: Omdat die bevolking reeds gespanne is deur die ongekende skok van COVID-19, was daar enige ruimte om die fiskale vooruitsigte te verbeter-deur beide die loonrekening en die koste van ongerigte subsidies - is verminder deur verhoogde vlakke van sosiale en politieke spanning. Strukturele hervormings wat gemaak is om die prestasie van die SOE aan te spreek, die betwisbaarheid van die mark te verhoog en korrupsie te bekamp, ​​is nou nog meer nodig as voorheen, maar nasionale politieke dialoog en inkoop vir sulke hervormings moet nog na vore kom. Veiligheidsrisiko's is 'n verdere kommer vir die land se vooruitsigte.

    Na die toename in armoede in 2020, sal dit na verwagting vanaf 2021 weer begin daal, maar in 'n stadige tempo en met belangrike risiko's wat verband hou met die tempo van die ekonomiese herstel en die vermoë van die owerhede om die bevolking te demp van die impak COVID -19 binne die konteks van 'n streng begroting.

    Die huidige landvennootskapsraamwerk (GPF) eindig in die Wêreldbank se fiskale jaar 21 (FY21) en 'n nuwe sal in FY22 voorberei en aangeneem word. 'N Nuwe Sistematiese Landdiagnose (SCD) word voorberei en sal in FY21 voltooi word, voor die voorbereiding van die nuwe GPF vir FY22 – FY26.

    Die uitdagings wat die COVID-19-krisis bied, bevestig die noodsaaklikheid om steun aan Tunisië aan te pas in die fonds vir hulp, herstrukturering en veerkragtig herstel. Die Bank het 'n vinnige en buigsame reaksie op die COVID-19-pandemie verskaf deur sy operasionele en beleidsinstrumente te gebruik en in noue vennootskap met regerings en ander ontwikkelingsagentskappe te werk. Bankondersteuning het die herstrukturering van ses projekte ingesluit, insluitend 'n COVID-19-reaksiekomponent, sowel as 'n nuwe COVID-19-noodoperasie (ter waarde van US $ 20 miljoen) waarvoor $ 100 miljoen aan ekstra finansiering in Maart 2021 uitgereik is om bekostigbare en billike toegang tot COVID-19-entstowwe in Tunisië. Die ekstra finansiering sal die Tunisiese regering se nasionale COVID-19-inentingstrategie ondersteun, wat teen einde 2021 50% van die bevolking wil inent en help om die belangrikste aspekte van die verspreiding van entstowwe te versterk. 'N Nuwe noodbeskermingsprojek vir maatskaplike beskerming is ook in Maart uitgereik om die impak van die pandemie op die kwesbaarste aan te spreek. Die projek bied kontantoordragte aan ongeveer 1 miljoen kwesbare Tunisiese huishoudings om hulle te help om die ekonomiese impak van die COVID -krisis te hanteer.

    Die lening van Tunisië se eerste veerkragtigheids- en herstelfinansiering (US $ 175 miljoen) se lening is goedgekeur in Junie 2020, uitbetaal in Desember 2020, en het bygedra tot die krisisreaksie van die regering van Tunisië deur die volgende: (i) die uitbreiding van permanente en tydelike kontantoordragte na ongeveer 36% van die bevolking (ii) tydelike aanvullings van klein pensioene vir ongeveer 1,2% van die bevolking (iii) die instelling van tydelike werkloosheidsvoordeel tot 2,7% van die bevolking en (iv) ondersteuning aan selfstandige en informele werkers vir ongeveer 0,3% van die bevolking.

    Die Bank is deel van 'n goed gekoördineerde vennootskap van groot ontwikkelingsinstellings wat ontwerp is om die reaksie van Tunisië op die krisis wat die pandemie gehelp het, te ondersteun. Die finansiële en tegniese pakket bevat: (i) parallelle, beleidsgebaseerde bedrywighede wat voorberei is deur die Wêreldbank, die Duitse Ontwikkelingsbank, die Franse Ontwikkelingsagentskap, die Japanse Internasionale Samewerkingsagentskap en die African Development Bank, in noue samewerking met die Europese Unie.

    Pyplyn: Die uitleenvolume vir FY22 dek vier beleggingsleningsprojekte met verbintenisse van tot $ 450 miljoen. Verdere programmering sal gedefinieer word deur die nuwe CPF, wat na verwagting in die vroeë 22 FY afgehandel sal word.

    Die huidige portefeuljeverpligtinge van Tunisië beloop 2,1 miljard dollar vir 17 aktiewe IBRD -projekte, waarvan 1,1 miljard dollar onuitbetaal bly. Daar is 13 finansieringsprogramme vir beleggingsprojekte (ter waarde van $ 1,44 miljard), twee resultate -programme ($ 480 miljoen), een ontwikkelingsbeleidfinansieringslening ($ 175 miljoen) en drie toelaes ($ 15,6 miljoen).

    Tunisia Economic Resilience and Inclusion (TERI) Umbrella 2.0 Trustfonds: Die TERI -sambreelprogram word ingestel om die werk van die regering, die Wêreldbank en skenkerintervensies te stroomlyn en te harmoniseer, hul strategieë aan te pas en hul sinergieë te benut om die hervormingsagenda van Tunisië doeltreffender te ondersteun. Die program sal voortbou op die sinergieë tussen die bestaande Multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTF's)-Moussanada, Compact with Africa en TRACE-en ondersteun MDTF-spesifieke gebiede. Sy ingryping fokus op: (i) 'n meer effektiewe en veerkragtige openbare sektor, wat ontwerp is om dienste aan individuele burgers en die privaatsektor te verbeter ) die verbetering van dienste aan burgers vir sosiale, ekonomiese en streeksinsluiting.


    Tunisië

    Aardrykskunde: Amptelik bekend as die Republiek van Tunisië (Al Jamhuriyah at-Tunisiyah in Arabies), lê Tunisië bo -aan die Afrika -kontinent, grens aan die Middellandse See langs die noordelike en oostelike sye. Honderd sewe en dertig kilometer suidwes van Sicilië is Tunisië twee uur per vliegtuig vanaf Parys of Genève en slegs 45 minute per vliegtuig vanaf Rome. Met Algerië in die weste en suide en Libië in die suidooste, het Tunisië 1 298 kilometer kuslyn. Met 'n oppervlakte van 163,610 vierkante kilometer en 'n bietjie groter as die Amerikaanse deelstaat Georgia, en Tunisië, is die kleinste van die Noord -Afrikaanse lande. Wat geskiedenis en kultuur betref, is Tunisië egter waarskynlik die rykste. Strategies geleë op die kruispad van die Middellandse See, Afrika en die Midde -Ooste en net 'n entjie van Europa af, was Tunisië lankal die toneel van interaksies tussen talle stamme en mense van Afrika, Asië en Europa, aangesien hulle met mekaar handel gedryf het. , afkomstig uit en soms oorwinnings van mekaar se beskawings, en het hulle persoonlike en kollektiewe fortuine opgebou.

    Kulturele agtergrond en geskiedenis: Tunisië is die tuiste van 'n indrukwekkende verskeidenheid kultuurtradisies en argeologiese skatte wat die groot verskeidenheid mense agtergelaat het wat deur die loop van die tyd in hierdie noordelike hoek van Afrika gewoon het en die inheemse Berbers en ander Afrikaanse stamme en die indringers en handelaars wat deur die eeue aangekom het. : Vandale, Bisantyne, Fenisiërs, Romeine, Jode, Arabiere, Andalusiërs en Spanjaarde, Ottomaanse Turke en die Franse. Met 'n bevolking van 98 persent Arabiese Soennitiese Moslems, ongeveer 1 persent Europese Christene en ongeveer 1 persent Joods en ander, is Tunisië vandag een van die min lande in Noord -Afrika of die Midde -Ooste waar mense van verskillende godsdienste in onderlinge verdraagsaamheid en respek leef. Die afgelope jaar het die Tunesiese regering spesiale voorsorg getref om die Joodse bevolking van Tunisië te beskerm, wat teen die jaar 2000 tot ongeveer 1 persent van sy grootte verminder het weens emigrasies, hoofsaaklik na Israel en Frankryk, na voorvalle van geweld in Tunisië wat verband hou met Arabiese Joodse botsings in die Midde -Ooste. Ondanks hierdie periodieke terugslae vir etniese vrede wat so onlangs as 1985 plaasgevind het, het die hedendaagse Tunisië 'n reputasie om die belange, behoeftes en smaak van die verskillende mense wat in die land besoek en woon, suksesvol te akkommodeer.

    Argeologiese skatte gevind in die noordooste Cap Bon gebied van Tunisië, oorkant Sisilië by Kerkouane en Kelibia, dui twee ou Puniese (Fenisiese) dorpe aan dat hoogs ontwikkelde beskawings eeue voor die geboorte van Christus langs die noordoostelike kus van Tunisië wortel geskiet het. Die Fenisiese stad Kartago (nou 'n voorstad van Tunis, die hoofstad van Tunisië) is in 814 v.C. deur koningin Dido, ook genoem Elyssa, suster van die Fenisiese koning Pygmalion van Tirus, 'n ou stad aan die huidige Libanese kus. Die Puniese ruïnes in Kartago, Kelibia en Kerkouane is ryklik toegerus met argitektoniese skatte en oorblyfsels van gereedskap en aardewerk wat Fenisiërs uit alle klasse gebruik het, en is 'n elegante herinnering daaraan dat goed ontwikkelde beskawings al duisende jare in Tunisië bestaan. Ten spyte van & mdashor miskien vanweë die rykdom en sorg waarmee hierdie stede gebou is en die verskillende beroepe wat deur hulle volke beoefen is, is die Puniese stede deur die Romeinse indringers verwoes tydens drie baie bloedige oorloë wat die Feniciërs teen Rome in die drie eeue voor Christus gevoer het. Net voor die begin van die Christelike era het die Romeine hul eerste kolonie op die vasteland van Afrika gevestig in "Ifriqiya", hulle naam vir die huidige Tunisië.

    The Roman colony of Ifriqiya flourished from 146 B.C. until 439 A.D., with an economy based on trade and agriculture. (Sections of the 90-mile Roman aqueduct that once carried water from Zaghouan to urbanites in the Roman-rebuilt Carthage are still visible today in the countryside outside Tunis.) The Romans, susceptible themselves to conquest, were overtaken in 439 A.D. by Vandals in boats that were pressed out of Spain. Less than a century after the Vandal conquest, Carthage was retaken in 533 A.D. by the Byzantines, Christian invaders from Emperor Justinian's Constantinople, the city destined to later become Istanbul, Turkey. The Byzantines, too, lasted only a century in Tunisia, succumbing to an Arab Muslim invasion at Sbeitla in 647.

    The years 647-698 A.D. marked the start of the Arab Muslim era in Tunisia. The city of Kairouan in the central Sahel region was founded in 670, and Carthage was taken by the Arabs in 698. Islam continued to expand over the next several centuries throughout what is now Tunisia with the establishment of the Dynasty of the Aghlabides and the construction of the Zitouna (Olive) Mosque in Tunis. Kairouan became the political and intellectual center of the Maghreb (North Africa) at this time. The Aghlabides were followed by the Fatimide and Ziride Dynasties from 909-1159, and from 1159-1230 the Almohades unified the countries of the Maghreb with the Andalusian Muslims in what is now Spain.

    In 1236 the Hafsides, vassals of the Almohades, declared their independence from their rulers and established a new dynasty in Tunisia that lasted until 1574, when the Ottoman Turks annexed Tunisia to their empire. Tunisia remained under Turkish control until 1705 when the Husseinite Dynasty was founded, which lasted until Tunisia became a republic on July 25, 1957.

    During the late nineteenth century as the European colonial powers spread through Africa and decided among themselves who would control which African territories, Tunisia fell to the French, who marked the consolidation of their efforts to control Tunisia with a treaty forced upon the local authorities on May 12, 1881 making Tunisia a French protectorate&mdashessentially, a colony of France. Strong Tunisian resistance to domination by the French was apparent throughout the 75 years of French colonization. The anti-colonial struggle heightened with the founding of the Destour party in 1920 and was re-energized by the neo-Destour Party, founded in 1934.

    As the countries of Africa began to declare and win their independence from the European colonizers during the post-World War II period, Tunisia was one of the first to declare independence. On March 20, 1956, Tunisia became independent of France, and one year later, on July 25, 1957, the country proclaimed itself a republic and Habib Bourguiba the first President. Tunisia's first republican constitution was adopted nearly two years later, on June 1, 1959. Four years afterward on October 15, 1963, the French evacuated the northern coastal city of Bizerte, the last foreign military base in Tunisia. Bourguiba remained President until November 7, 1987, when in a constitutional change Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali succeeded him in office, Bourguiba having been declared senile by several doctors and thus incompetent to continue to serve. Ben Ali was invested as President of the Republic on November 7, 1987, by the Tunisian parliament to serve out the rest of former President Bourguiba's term Bourguiba quietly retired, taking up residence in his home city of Monastir on the eastern Mediterranean coast for the next eleven years until his natural death in the year 2000. April 2, 1989, marked the first legislative and presidential elections under Ben Ali, during which the Head of State was officially elected President by the Tunisian electorate. On March 20, 1994 and again on October 24, 1999, Ben Ali was re-elected President of the Republic of Tunisia.

    Social Conditions: Much of Tunisia's relatively small population of 9.5 million people lives in the northern and eastern coastal cities, towns, and rural areas and the central Sahel region. The western mountain region is somewhat more sparsely populated, and even fewer Tunisians live in the southern half of the country where the Sahara desert begins, although even in the desert south settlements and towns have flourished for centuries. Approximately 65 percent of Tunisia's population lived in urban areas in 1999. With a population density of only 60 persons per square kilometer, Tunisia has made significant progress in overcoming the challenge of educating a rural population that has included sufficient numbers of nomadic herders and small farmers scattered throughout the countryside to have made the building of accessible schools genuinely problematic. By 1995 approximately two-thirds of Tunisians age 15 and older were literate (able to read and write)&mdash78.6 percent of the male population and 54.6 percent of girls and women. Literacy since that time has continued to increase. In 1999, approximately 80 percent of Tunisian males and almost 60 percent of Tunisian females ages 15 and up were literate. Youth literacy was significantly higher, with 92 percent of 15- to 24-year-olds literate in 1998. By the late 1990s the female adult literacy rate was only 70 percent of the male rate, however, as women's equality with men in terms of school enrollments and completion rates has been a very recent phenomenon, especially in the rural areas. Female participation in government and business is steadily increasing. Women's heightened status and involvement in the paid workforce is reflected in the fact that in 1997, more than 12 percent of administrators and managers were women and more than 35 percent of professional and technical workers were women.

    The Tunisian population, estimated at 9,593,402 in July 2000, had a growth rate that year of only 1.17 percent, the result of very consciously organized family-planning programs in the last decades of the twentieth century that began during the presidency of Bourguiba, Tunisia's much-beloved first President. Bourguiba did much to emancipate women and strengthen women's rights in Tunisia. In 1961 the Tunisian government introduced a policy supporting the use of birth control, and in 1967 abortions were legalized. Contraception prevalence (the percent of married women between 15 and 49 regularly using contraception) was 60 percent by the late 1990s. The total fertility rate in Tunisia in 1999 was 2.5 (i.e., a woman bearing children for her entire childbearing years at the current fertility rate would produce 2.5 children). Approximately 3 of every 10 Tunisians in 2000 was 14-years-old or younger while nearly twothirds of the population was between 15 and 64 years of age and about 6 percent of Tunisia's population was 65 or older.

    Far better off than most other African countries in terms of pre-natal care and infant and maternal health, Tunisia had an infant-mortality rate of 24 per 1000 live births in 1999, half the rate for the North African/Middle Eastern region. In 1999 the under-five-years child-mortality rate was 30 per 1000, less than half the rate of 63 for the North African/Middle Eastern region. The average life span of Tunisians in the year 2000 was 73.7 years (72.1 for men, 75.4 for women). However, with 807 doctors per one million Tunisian citizens, Tunisia still faces formidable challenges to improving its public health system to the point where all citizens of Tunisia stand a relatively equal chance of receiving high-quality healthcare. The methods used by Tunisian doctors may parallel, and in some cases surpass, those used by doctors in the West, since Tunisian doctors have benefited from substantial development assistance and medical training programs abroad as well as from medical education in Tunisia. However, this shortage of physicians means that even adequate care may be unavailable to the many patients who in the late 1990s could find themselves sitting for hours (sometimes all day, even with appointments) at the few specialized health centers that treated patients with chronic and potentially fatal diseases (e.g., the Institut Salah Azaiz in Tunis, recognized as North Africa's premier cancer treatment center by the World Health Organization). The Tunisian government acknowledges the need to expand the quality and breadth of healthcare, including through private initiatives, so that all Tunisians, regardless of social status, will be able to receive the care they require. The question of where sufficient resources are to be found to finance such an expansion remains unanswered.

    Economic Status: For centuries the Tunisian economy was primarily agricultural. However, the large service sector that developed in late-twentieth-century Tunisia, much of it attached to the vigorously growing tourist industry, led to a restructuring of the Tunisian workforce, where 23 percent of the labor force was employed in industry in 1995, about 55 percent in service jobs, and only 22 percent in agriculture. By the late 1990s the Tunisian economy enjoyed an annual growth rate of roughly 6.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), and Tunisia's annual per capita income in 1999 was about $2,100. Despite substantial exports of food and agricultural products, textiles, leather products, and petroleum, gas, and derivatives, Tunisia required an infusion of US$148 million in overseas development assistance in 1998 to meet its population's basic needs and the demands of Tunisia's rapidly developing and increasingly privatizing economic sector. Nonetheless, Tunisia's poverty rate dropped remarkably from 40 percent in 1960 to only 7 percent by 2000, thanks to a combination of diligent efforts by Tunisia's government to eradicate poverty, an improving economic climate, and substantial international development assistance. Rural poverty continues to be a challenge to overcome, however. In 1995 some 13.9 percent of the rural population lived in poverty compared with 3.6 percent in urban areas, and over 70 percent of impoverished Tunisians were rural, in part due to the challenge of spreading schools to the rural areas, a situation largely overcome by the start of the new millennium.

    The World Bank summarized Tunisia's economic situation in 2000 by noting that Tunisia had followed a state-led plan of economic development until the mid-1980s, emphasizing human-resource development and gender equity. By 1986 Tunisia faced growing financial imbalances, a poor harvest, and the collapse of oil prices. With President Ben Ali's accession to power in 1987, Tunisia revised its economic strategy and began implementing a series of economic reforms supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that were designed to maintain a stable macroeconomic structure, improve resource allocation by gradually liberalizing trade, investments, and prices, and free up private-sector resources. While the Tunisian government continued to maintain certain economic controls, state subsidies were reduced and liberalization efforts were expanded in the 1990s, and the reforms led to gradual but steady improvements in the Tunisian economy.


    Military History

    The Tunisian National Army (Arme Nationale Tunisienne - ANT), which was divided into army, air force, and naval components, had a threefold mission: to defend the country's territorial integrity against hostile foreign powers, to assist the police as necessary in maintaining internal security, and to participate actively in government-sponsored civic action programs. The government has also sought to ensure, largely with success, that the ANT had little influence in the political sphere.

    Since the late 1970s, all of the armed services have undergone expansion and modernization designed to improve their defenses against attack from potentially hostile states. Although the improvements were extremely costly, the worsened relationship with Libya and the vulnerability demonstrated by the Israeli raid have heightened concern about Tunisia's military weaknesses. The president in 1985 therefore directed his government to explore with its friends and allies in the Arab world and the West the possibility of assistance in making new large-scale purchases of aircraft, armor, and naval vessels.

    Contemporary Tunisian society reflects little of the military tradition that permeates the national life of the other Maghribi countries. Many scholarly observers have attributed this anomaly partly to legacies of the era before Tunisia's protectorate period and to experiences encountered during the 75 years of French domination. Political scientist Jacob C. Hurewitz has also pointed to changes that have occurred within the society, including the virtual disappearance of traditional Berber culture. Thus Bourguiba and the PSD have not had to depend on the leverage of a preeminent military establishment to settle internal disputes between contending ethnic or regional groups as have leaders in other developing countries. Neither has it required military help in unifying the large homogeneous population behind the goals and aspiration that Bourguiba and his political elite have upheld as national objectives. Even so, the national life of the country has not been entirely devoid of military experience.

    While under French control, Tunisia served France as an important source of manpower. After establishing the protectorate, the French, under a beylical decree in 1883, were granted the authority to recruit local Muslims for the purpose of forming mixed French-Muslim military units. By 1893 all Muslim males in Tunisia became subject to military duty, although it was possible for those chosen for service to provide substitutes as long as induction quotas were fulfilled. As a result, most of the recruits came from the poorer classes of Tunisian society, and illiteracy was the norm among them. Conscripted Muslim Tunisians were required to serve for three years, as were French settlers, who were subject to the conscription laws of metropolitan France.

    To assist in the pacification effort throughout the Maghrib, the French - as they had done in Algeria - formed Muslim infantry regiments of tirailleurs (riflemen) and spahis (cavalry) in Tunisia. In the late nineteenth century some of these units joined with their Algerian counterparts in aiding the French in military conquests south of the Sahara. Muslim Tunisian soldiers also formed regiments in the Foreign Legion and served in southern Tunisia as haristes (camel corpsmen). Although Muslims served in all branches of the French army, strict segregation was normal. Few Tunisian soldiers - unless they were naturalized French citizens - were able to become officers, and of those only a small number rose beyond the rank of captain. In mixed units Muslim officers were not permitted command authority, and none were given high-level staff positions anywhere in the French military organization. The infantry and cavalry units were strictly divided on ethno-religious grounds Muslim soldiers served under the command of French officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). More equality existed in artillery units, where Muslim soldiers were assigned as drivers as the French served as gunners. Most of the transportation corps consisted of Muslims under French command.

    Although recruited chiefly for military service in Africa, Tunisian members of the French army were liable for service abroad and served with courage and distinction in such divergent spots as France and Indochina. It has been estimated that of the approximately 75,000 Tunisians who served France during World War I, some 50,000 experienced combat in the trenches on the western front, where they suffered a high casualty rate. Before France collapsed under the onslaught of Hitler's troops in World War II, many Tunisian soldiers and their counterparts from Algeria and Morocco were sent to Europe to aid the French in their fight against the Germans. As part of Hitler's June 1940 armistice agreement that accompanied German occupation, France was permitted to retain 15,000 troops in Tunisia, of which roughly 10,500 were Muslims. After Allied successes in the fight to liberate North Africa in 1943, Tunisian and other North African soldiers saw action in the Italian campaign and the eventual liberation of France.

    After World War II the rise of Tunisian nationalism and the emergence of sporadic guerrilla warfare directed against French interests heralded the quest for independence. From early 1952 Tunisian guerrilla bands enjoyed considerable popular support and conducted operations primarily in the south. Their activities consisted mainly of acts of sabotage and coercion against the French community as well as against Tunisians who sympathized with the French authorities. The Tunisians involved in these demonstrations of militancy were labeled fellaghas (rebels) by the French press. As a result of an intense counterinsurgency campaign waged against them by the Foreign Legion, the fellaghas sought refuge in the central and southern mountains, buying time and increasing their strength and support from muslims who resented French administrative policies and practices. Although the fellaghas were able to strike occasionally against French authority, they were never able to muster a unified and cohesive force. It has been estimated that their strength never exceeded 3,000 men. By early 1956 most of their bands were deactivated as an act of cooperation aimed at enhancing the prospects of independence.

    In April 1956 the French transferred responsibility for Tunisia's internal security to the new Tunisian government, including indigenous elements of the police services that had operated under French control during the protectorate era. The new Tunisian government used them to track down militants connected with nationalist leader Ben Youssef, who challenged Bourguiba's leadership of the Neo-Destour Party and the country. Some of the agitators of this group were arrested, tried, and sentenced as an example of the government's intention to ensure a climate of acceptable public order for its development goals. Despite these efforts, however, the Youssefist threat was controlled only with the force of large-scale operations by the French army three months after Tunisian independence. In the matter of responsibility for defense - and the building of a national military establishment - the transfer of authority was more difficult. To support its activities in suppressing the revolution in neighboring Algeria, the French government sought to maintain its military presence in independent Tunisia, espousing the notion that both countries would share in the new state's external defense needs. This form of interdependence, however, drew a less than sympathetic response from Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour Party hierarchy. It was only after long months of negotiations that in June 1956 the French government, beset with greater concerns for the Algerian conflict, agreed to assist Tunisia in the formation of its own military arm.

    The nucleus of the new military force - the ANT - consisted of roughly 1,300 Muslim Tunisian soldiers, who were released from the French army, and some 600 ceremonial troops of the beylical guard, which the French had permitted the Tunisian bey to retain as a personal bodyguard throughout the protectorate era. These sources of military personnel were supplemented by volunteers - loyal party youth and politically reliable fellaghas of the earlier resistance movement. Key officer and NCO positions were filled by personnel carefully selected by the leadership of the Neo-Destour Party. Many of those selected had received training at Saint Cyr, the French military academy, or had served as NCOs in French Military units. All were loyal Neo-Destourians.

    By the end of 1956 the force consisted of roughly 3,000 officers and men organized in a single regiment, but its effectiveness was limited by a shortage of qualified officers. Resolution of this problem was aided through a negotiated agreement with the French, who provided spaces for 110 Tunisian officer candidates to train at Saint Cyr. Meanwhile, a school for NCOs was established at Tunis with French help, and 2,000 enlisted men were enrolled to build up the needed cadre for the NCO corps. In addition to training Tunisian personnel, France provided a modest amount of military equipment and established a small liaison unit of French army officers, who were to advise and assist in matters of command and staff procedures.

    Despite the assistance provided the new republic, independence did not remove frictions with the French. The war in neighboring Algeria and the continued occupation of bases in Tunisia by French forces-a concession of the independence agreement - served as unsettling factors for Tunisians. When the Bourguiba government pressed for the removal of its toops in mid-1957, France reacted with threats to terminate military assistance to the ANT. French intransigence led Bourguiba to turn to the United States, which had earlier concluded a bilateral agreement to supply the young republic with economic and technical assistance, and to Britain. Although they were allied with France in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Britain and the United States were willing to supply Tunisia with arms out of concern that Bourguiba might turn to Egypt for assistance.

    After settlement of the issue over arms aid, Bourguiba asked the French to evacuate their bases earlier than had been agreed in the pre-independence protocol. Tunisian public support was generated for what Bourguiba termed the "battle for evacuation," and military skirmishes between French and Tunisian forces occurred sporadically. The most serious of these encounters came in 1961 after the French had consolidated their forces at the major military installation in Bizerte. Refusal to evacuate from Bizerte led to an attack on the French base by Neo-Destourian militants, students, and volunteers from the trade unions, youth organizations and women's unions. Organized and directed by the Garde Nationale, the Bizerte confrontation was an ill-conceived and militarily inappropriate venture against professional French troops that resulted in the loss of about 1,000 Tunisian lives, most of them civilians.

    Although few ANT regulars were involved - four battalions of 3,200 men had responded earlier to the UN appeal for a peacekeeping force in the Congo crisis of 1960 - the defeat at the hands of the French was regarded by the Tunisian military establishment as a painful humiliation. Nonetheless, the so-called Battle of Bizerte sped the final withdrawal of French troops and ushered in a new era of strategic independence.


    Jews in Islamic Countries: Tunisia

    Tunisia was the only Arab country to come under direct German occupation during World War II. According to Robert Satloff, &ldquoFrom November 1942 to May 1943, the Germans and their local collaborators implemented a forced-labor regime, confiscations of property, hostage-taking, mass extortion, deportations, and executions. They required thousands of Jews in the countryside to wear the Star of David, and they created special Judenrat-like committees of Jewish leaders to implement Nazi policies under threat of imprisonment or death.&rdquo 1a

    After Tunisia gained independence in 1956, a series of anti-Jewish government decrees were promulgated. In 1958, Tunisia&rsquos Jewish Community Council was abolished by the government and ancient synagogues, cemeteries and Jewish quarters were destroyed for &ldquourban renewal. &rdquo 2



    Great Synagogue in Tunis

    The increasingly unstable situation caused more than 40,000 Tunisian Jews to immigrate to Israel. By 1967, the country&rsquos Jewish population had shrunk to 20,000.

    During the Six-Day War, Jews were attacked by rioting Arab mobs, and synagogues and shops were burned. The government denounced the violence, and President Habib Bourguiba apologized to the Chief Rabbi. The government appealed to the Jewish population to stay, but did not bar them from leaving. Subsequently, 7,000 Jews immigrated to France.

    In 1982, there were attacks on Jews in the towns of Zarzis and Ben Guardane. According to the State Department, the Tunisian government &ldquoacted decisively to provide protection to the Jewish community.&rdquo 3

    In 1985, a Tunisian guard opened fire on worshipers in a synagogue in Djerba, killing five people, four of them Jewish. Since then, the government has sought to prevent further tragedy by giving Tunisian Jews heavy protection when necessary. Following Israel&rsquos October 1, 1985, bombing of the PLO headquarters near Tunis, &ldquothe government took extraordinary measures to protect the Jewish community.&rdquo 4 After the Temple Mount tragedy in October 1990, &ldquothe government placed heavy security around the main synagogue in Tunis.&rdquo 5

    Djerba has one Jewish kindergarten. There are also six Jewish primary schools (three located in Tunis, two in Djerba and one in the coastal city of Zarzis) and four secondary schools (two in Tunis and two in Djerba). The government-run Essouani School and the Houmt Souk Secondary School in Djerba are the only public schools where Jewish and Muslim students study together. The Jewish students can could choose to attend classes on religion at a Jewish school in Djerba. There are also yeshivot in Tunis and Djerba.

    The community has two homes for the aged. The country has several kosher restaurants and five officiating rabbis: the chief rabbi in Tunis, a rabbi in Djerba, and four others in Tunis. The majority of the Jewish community observes the laws of kashrut.

    &ldquoMany tourists come to visit Djerba&rsquos El Ghirba Synagogue in the village of Hara Sghira. Although the present structure was built in 1929, it is believed there has been a continuously used synagogue on the site for the past 1,900 years. Tunisian Jews have many unique and colorful rituals and celebrations, including the annual pilgrimage to Djerba which takes place during Lag BaOmer. The Bardo Museum in Tunis contains an exhibit dealing exclusively with Jewish ritual objects.&rdquo 6

    &ldquoThe government promoted anti-bias and tolerance education through a series of lectures regarding religious tolerance. Jewish community leaders reported that the government actively protected synagogues, particularly during Jewish holidays, paid the salary of the grand rabbi, and partially subsidized restoration and maintenance costs for some synagogues.&rdquo 7

    On April 11, 2002, a natural gas truck exploded at the outer wall of the Ghriba synagogue on the resort island of Djerba. Tunisian officials at first said the truck accidentally struck the wall of the synagogue, but a group linked to Osama bin Laden&rsquos Al-Qaeda network claimed responsibility for carrying out what was actually a terrorist attack on the oldest synagogue in Africa. The explosion killed 17 people, including 11 German tourists. 8

    During the political unrest and protests, that began in December 2010 and continued through the early months of 2011, and resulted in the ousting of longtime Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, demonstrations were also held outside of one of Tunisia&rsquos ancient synagogues. In videos of the gather, protesters were filmed chanting, &ldquoIqbal al Yahud!&rdquo (translation: &ldquoDeath to the Jews!&rdquo). 9

    The political climate in Tunisia is uncomfortable for Jewish residents currently, with anti-semitic attacks and vandalism on the rise over the recent years. Tunisians have plundered and desecrated over 100 Jewish gravestones since the begining of 2013, and in May 2014 the Beith El synagogue in Tunisia was violently vandalized in an anti-semitic attack. On March 11, 2014, a Norwegian Cruise Line ship docked in the Port of Tunis to let off it&rsquos passengers for the day, and the Tunisian government prohibited the Israeli passengers on board from disembarking while all other passengers were allowed to get off of the ship. In retalliation, Norwegian Cruise Lines has stated that they are outraged by the situation, have cancelled all future port stops in Tunisia, and never plan on returning there again.

    The last Kosher restaurant in Tunisia&rsquos capital closed in November 2015, out of concern for the security of their patrons due to terrorist threats. After being warned by the Tunisian government, the owner shut down amid security threats against him and his establishment.

    Today, the 1,000 Jews comprise the country&rsquos largest indigenous religious minority. One-third of the Jewish population lives in and around the capital, and the remainder lives on the island of Djerba and in the neighboring town of Zarzis.

    Zarzis Synagogue

    As of 2019, the State Department reported, &ldquoJewish groups said they continued to worship freely, and the government continued to provide security for synagogues and partially subsidized restoration and maintenance costs. Government employees maintained the Jewish cemetery in Tunis but not those located in other cities, including Sousse and El Kef.&rdquo 10

    On May 21-24, 2019, a delegation from the U.S. embassy, including the Ambassador, participated in the Lag B&rsquoOmer pilgrimage to the El-Ghriba Synagogue and met with Jewish leaders. The Ambassador and embassy officials then attended a multifaith iftar near the Synagogue hosted by the minister of tourism which included the prime minister and the ministers of religious affairs and culture. At the same time, a new school for 120 girls from the Jewish community wass opened in Djerba.

    The Department also noted, &ldquoIn September, the Aleph Institute, an international Jewish organization that assists individuals in prisons, expressed concern about possible anti-Semitism in the treatment of two Jewish detainees held in the country, including Jewish citizen Ilane Racchah, who remained in pretrial detention from July 2018 to October 2019 and whose case remained pending at the end of the year. The investigative judge posted social media comments that &lsquoappear anti-Semitic&rsquo by referencing Racchah&rsquos religion and &ldquothe history of Jews and Arabs&rdquo in his judgment&hellip.Although prison officials allowed his family to bring him kosher meals, the normal visiting hours precluded the family from visiting Racchah on the Sabbath or Jewish holidays, and the limited hours prevented the family from bringing him meals in a timely manner.&rdquo

    In 2021, Edy Cohen reported disturbing trends in Tunisia, starting with Tunisian president Kais Saied accusing Israel of being at war with the Muslim world during his campaign and saying that Muslim leaders who normalize relations with the Zionists should be prosecuted for treason. Following his election, Cohen said, Saied directed his fire at Tunisian Jews, whom he has called thieves. Cohen notes he later apologized and claimed his words had been taken out of context.

    Cohen also reported that Lassaad Hajjem, the Muslim mayor of the Midoun Islands off Djerba, added the names of Islamic sites in Saudi Arabia, Al-Riad and Al-Suani, to the Jewish neighborhoods. He also placed a sign near the entrance to the Jewish neighborhoods that says: &ldquoAl-Quds [Jerusalem] is the capital of Palestine.&rdquo The sign states the distance to &ldquoAl-Quds&rdquo as 3,090 kilometers and displays the Palestinian flag. 11

    Bronne:
    1 Sergio DellaPergola, &ldquoWorld Jewish Population, 2020,&rdquo in Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin (eds.), The American Jewish Year Book, 2020, Dordrecht: Springer, (2021).
    1a . Robert Satloff, &ldquoIn Search of &ldquoRighteous Arabs,&rdquo Commentary, (July 04, 2004).
    2 Maurice Roumani, The Case of the Jews from Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue, (Tel Aviv: World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries, 1977), pp. 33 Norman Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times, (NY: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), p. 127.
    3 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982, (DC: Department of State, 1983), pp. 1290-91.
    4 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985, (DC: Department of State, 1986), p. 1321.
    5 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, (DC: Department of State, 191), pp. 1664-65.
    6 Jewish Communities of the World.
    7 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights Practices for 2009.
    8 Washington Post, (April 17 & 23, 2002).
    9 Solomonia.com
    Inskeep, Steve. &ldquoAmid security threats, Tunis's only Kosher restaurnt shutters,&rdquo NPR (November 4, 2015).
    10 &ldquo2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tunisia,&rdquo U.S.State Department, (June 10, 2020).
    11 Edy Cohen, &ldquoTunisian Jews Are in Immediate Danger,&rdquo BESA, (March 14, 2021).

    Photos: Great Synagogue - Maherdz, Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.
    Zarzis - Chesdovi, CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

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