Geskiedenis Podcasts

The Mystery of Herxheim: Is 'n hele dorp gekanibaliseer?

The Mystery of Herxheim: Is 'n hele dorp gekanibaliseer?

Vanaf 5300 vC ontwikkel 'n Linearbandkeramik of Linear Pottery culture (LBK) in die omgewing van Herxheim in Suidwes -Duitsland, een wat beskryf kan word as 'n idilliese nedersetting uit die Steentydperk. Die huise was dieselfde, die rudimentêre plase was dieselfde, die klein dorpie was relatief veilig vir indringers en roofdiere. Tog, omstreeks 4950 vC, het die gemeenskap skielik verdwyn. Die stad is verlate en laat stukkende erdewerk, honderde geslagte lyke en 'n groot hoop bene agter. Navorsers is vandag nie seker wat gebeur het nie, maar tekens dui daarop dat 'n toename in rituele opoffering, en moontlik kannibalisme, iets daarmee te doen gehad het.

Kaart van die webwerf van Herxheim. ( hierdie bene van myne.wordpress.com)

In 2009 het 'n argeologiese opgrawing van 'n dorp uit die Steentydperk 'n massagraf opgegrawe met honderde menslike oorskot, wat aan minstens 500 mense behoort en moontlik meer as 1 000 mense. Die bene was van mans, vroue en kinders, sowel as babas en fetusse. Gereedskapmerke op die bene toon dat die vleis versigtig afgeskraap is terwyl groter bene gebreek is, moontlik om by die murg te kom. Selfs die skedels was gebreek asof hulle die brein beter wou onttrek.

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Die slagwerk het alles plaasgevind kort na die dood van die slagoffers en is duidelik gedoen deur iemand wat geweet het wat hulle doen. Alhoewel die slagwerk met dieselfde praktyk gedoen is om beeste of skape te slag, is dit nie seker wat van die menslike vlees geword het nie. Sommige meen dat die dorpenaars van Herxheim die vleis geëet het; ander sê dat dit saam met die bene begrawe sou gewees het as deel van die ritueel.

Argeoloog ontdek die begrafnis. ( museum-herxheim.de)

"Ons verwag dat die aantal dooies twee keer so hoog sal wees," sê Andrea Zeeb-Lanz, projekleier van die Cultural Heritage Agency wat by Herxheim werk. So 'n groot aantal is baie eienaardig vir 'n klein dorpie met slegs 10 geboue. Deur middel van koolstof-14-ontleding bevestig dat die bene wat op die Herxheim-terrein gevind is, die laaste inwoners van die nedersetting is. Ontleding van die artefakte wat in die put gevind is, het egter aan die lig gebring dat die slagoffers nie inboorlinge van die dorp was nie. Hulle kom inderdaad uit die hele Europa, insluitend die Moselrivier (ongeveer 100 myl) en die Elbe (ongeveer 400 myl). Kenners het hierdie afwyking afgelei deur die fragmente van erdewerk, dikwels baie fyn erdewerk, wat tussen elke slagoffer se ribbes lê. Die erdewerk was buitengewoon goed vervaardig, maar doelbewus stukkend geslaan. Die skerwe, sowel as nuwe klipblaaie en meulstene, is met die gebreekte bene gemeng en in die put gestort. Die dooies is nie in die geveg doodgemaak nie, hulle was nie sieklik nie en hulle was nie ondervoed nie. Baie was nie eers oud nie.

'' N Mens kan jou ook voorstel dat mense vrywillig hierheen gekom het om ritueel opgeoffer te word, 'het Zeeb-Lanz gesê.

Herxheim begrafnis ( hierdie bene van myne.wordpress.com)

Niemand is seker hoe so 'n klein dorpie oor so 'n kort tyd, miskien 50 jaar, so gewild kon geword het nie. Dat meer as 1000 mense oor groot afstande na Herxheim die pelgrimstog gemaak het, verteenwoordig 'n belangrike logistieke en kommunikatiewe prestasie. Maar teen 4950 v.C. het alles wat mense na Herxheim lok, skielik geëindig.

"50 jaar is die maksimum," het Zeeb-Lanz gesê. 'Dit kon alles binne net twee jaar of selfs vyf weke gebeur het.'

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Navorsingsleier Zeeb-Lanz glo dat die antwoord op die Herxheim-raaisel in die skedels van die slagoffers lê. Die breek van die skedels is voltooi deur 'n geoefende hand. Nadat die vel afgeskil is, is elke skedel versigtig gebreek, sodat die onderste derde verwyder is, wat 'n soort doppie of drinkbak agtergelaat het. Gegewe die brose aard van menslike skedels en die basiese klipgereedskap wat die slagter tot sy beskikking gehad het, kon slegs 'n deskundige dit gedoen het. Die skedelkappe/koppies is daarna met ingewikkelde simbole uitgekap. Geskiedkundiges kan nie die betekenis van hierdie tekens ontsyfer nie, maar dit is duidelik dat die mense nie doodgemaak is weens honger nie. Dit was deel van 'n ritueel, waarskynlik van godsdienstige betekenis. Al die skedels is op een plek opgehoop.

Skedel gevind in die argeologiese terrein van Herxheim. ( CC BY-SA 3.0 )

'Maar waarskynlik het niemand daaruit gedrink nie. Die rande is vandag nog so skerp dat 'n mens jou lippe daarop kan sny, ”het Zeeb-Lanz gesê. 'Hoe meer navorsing gedoen word, hoe meer geheimsinnig word hierdie plek.'

Baie opspraakwekkende artikels wat op Herxheim gepubliseer word, verkondig kannibalisme, maar Zeeb-Lanz, leier van die opgrawing, waarsku teen sulke verstommende gevolgtrekkings. 'Ons moet nie vergeet dat dit nie 'n reuse -nedersetting was nie. Wie sou dit alles geëet het? ”


Die verhaal agter die verdwyning van mense uit die dorp Anjikuni

Volgens die legende het 'n Kanadese pelsjager Joe Labelle op 'n volmaan -winternag in November 1930 na die dorp Anjikuni aan die oewer van die Anjikuni -meer in die Kivalliq -streek, Nunavut, Kanada gegaan.

Tot sy afgryse het hy nie een persoon of dier in die dorp gesien nie. Labelle was baie keer in die dorp vir skuiling tydens sy reise. Hy het ongeveer 2000 tot 2500 mense daar gesien woon.

Hy was nog altyd hartlik ontvang deur die inwoners. Nou kon hy niemand in die omgewing sien nie. Daarna het hy elke hut nagegaan en voedselvoorrade en voorraad gevind. Hy het ook die klere van die dorpenaars in hul huise gevind. Selfs hul gewere is langs die kante van die deur gebêre.

Hy het selfs potte vol kos sien hang op lang koue vure. Die kajakke was ook buite die huise. Daar was geen voetspore op die sneeu wat 'n idee sou gee van waar die Inuits gegaan het nie.

Geskokte Labelle is na die naaste telegraafkantoor en hy het 'n boodskap aan die Canadian Mountain Police gestuur. Die polisie het opgedaag en die dorp deeglik deursoek.

Wat hulle later gevind het, was skrikwekkend. Elke graf in die begraafplaas van die dorp was leeg. Bietjie ver van die dorp af het hulle sewe sleehonde gevind wat doodgemaak is en onder die sneeu begrawe is.

Inuïte van ander dorpe het berig dat hulle 'n blou lig sien wat later in die donker vervaag. Baie ondersoeke is gedoen. Die navorsing het aan die lig gebring dat die dorp waarskynlik twee maande voordat Joe ontdek het, verlate was. Niemand het die Inuïete geken of gevind nie.

Labelle beskryf sy ontstellende ontdekking aan verslaggewers:

'Ek het dadelik gevoel dat daar iets fout is ... Met die oog op halfgaar geregte, het ek geweet dat dit versteur is tydens die voorbereiding van aandete.

In elke kajuit vind ek 'n geweer wat by die deur leun en geen Eskimo gaan nêrens sonder sy geweer nie ... ek het verstaan ​​dat iets vreesliks gebeur het. "

By ondersoek is beweer dat die verhaal van die geheimsinnige verdwynings nie waar is nie. Daar is gesê dat Joe Labelle nuut in die land was en dat hy nog nooit die plek besoek het nie.

Hy het nooit die aantal inwoners geken nie. Die feit is egter dat die Mounties wel leë huise met klere en voedselvoorrade op die kuslyn van Anjikuni gevind het.

Die vraag is dus waar die mense verdwyn het en hul noodsaaklike voorrade en gewaardeerde gewere agtergelaat het.

Die saak van die verdwynende Anjikuni -stam is onder die lêers van onopgeloste sake gestapel.


Resensie van Resident Evil Village

'N Grimmig pragtige versameling moordenaar-gruwelike set-stukke, met 'n paar van die mees onvergeetlike groteske vyande in die geskiedenis van Resi.

Wat is dit? 'N Eerste-persoon-oorlewings-gruwelspel.
Verwag om te betaal & pond50/$ 60
Ontwikkelaar Capcom
Uitgewer In-huis
Beoordeel op RTX 2080 Super, Intel i7-9700K, 16 GB RAM
Multispeler Word later bygevoeg
Skakel Amptelike webwerf

Resident Evil Village begin met 'n toneel van binnelandse saligheid, terwyl ons held Ethan Winters (terugkeer van Resident Evil 7) en sy vrou Mia aandete berei en na hul pasgebore baba, Rosemary, omsien. Dan gebeur daar iets ergs en ek sal nie sê wat nie, want dit is nogal skokkend en binnekort bevind Ethan hom verlore in 'n afgesonderde dorpie in 'n sneeustorm, op soek na sy ontvoerde kind. Dit is 'n skerp, skielike intro, maar effektief, wat onmiddellik die spel hoog stel en Village se wrede, sadistiese toon stel.

Daar word nooit uitdruklik gesê waar die dorp waar die spel sy naam vandaan kom nie, maar 'n paar leidrade dui daarop dat dit êrens in die winterse berge van Roemenië geleë is. Die dorpie self is 'n skurwe, onstuimige verspreiding van hout- en baksteenhuise, landerye van die boer en af ​​en toe 'n kerk. Daaroor hang 'n gotiese kasteel met enorme torings wat in die mis strek, en daar is ook spore van antieke ruïnes, wat dui op 'n lang en vreemde geskiedenis. Dit is 'n wonderlike omgewing, bedompig van atmosfeer, bedreiging en raaisel, en 'n plek waar ek elke donker, smerige hoek wou verken.

Ethan is 'n vervelige ou wat altyd verward lyk oor wat aangaan, en nooit iets interessants te sê het nie. Dit maak hom 'n effens onopmerklike protagonis, maar sy uiterste normaliteit doen verhoog die eksentrisiteit van die dorp se talle vreemdelinge. Die Baker -familie van die vorige wedstryd was 'n relatief gegronde klomp ghouls, maar hier het Capcom die monsterlikheid van sy antagoniste ernstig verhoog. Terwyl Ethan op Rose jaag, gaan hy te staan ​​teen 'n onmoontlik lang en glansryke vampier, 'n vreemde mutante visman, 'n moordenaar-porseleinpop en ander verskillende vreemdelinge.

Wat ek van Village hou, is dat dit nooit net een soort gruwelspel is nie. Elke skurk se leër het 'n heel ander indruk van die genre, van asemlose, aksiebelaaide oorlewing teen hordes vyande, tot 'n stadiger brandende, sielkundige merk van afgryse. Dit is 'n speletjie vol goeie, onvergeetlike idees, wat voortdurend slim, verrassende nuwe maniere uitdink om jou hartklop te verhoog en jou uit jou gemaksone te ruk. En dit slaag daarin om dit byna die hele duur van die spel aan te hou.

Wat ek van Village hou, is dat dit nooit net een soort gruwelspel is nie

Elke afdeling is so verskillend dat Village amper die gevoel van 'n gruwelbundel het. Dit kan weliswaar soms strydig laat voel, asof al die dele flouerig aan mekaar vasgemaak is. U het dikwels die idee dat Capcom eers die idees vir die spel se vele briljante set-ups gehad het, en dan besluit hoe om dit alles op die laaste minuut aan te sluit. Maar dit is die moeite werd vir die verskeidenheid wat hierdie benadering bied. U weet regtig nooit watter nuwe vreemdheid die ontwikkelaar volgende vir u gaan inhou nie.

Dit maak dit nie net die mees gevarieerde Resident Evil tot nog toe nie, maar waarskynlik die engste. Een van die beste voorbeelde hiervan is die herehuis van Donna Beneviento, 'n poppemaker en een van die heersers van die dorp. In haar krakende, stowwerige ou huis & mdash, wat besaai is met tientalle onheilspellende, swartoogpoppe in verskillende toestande van verval, word jy gedwing deur 'n reeks briljant gekonstrueerde oomblikke van onderskat, uiters gespanne afgryse, wat uitloop op 'n ontmoeting wat moontlik die skrikwekkendste kan wees 'n enkele oomblik in Resident Evil se geskiedenis.

In 'n ander afdeling word u gejag deur Lady Dimitrescu, die bogenoemde verhewe vampier. Haar kasteel uit die 15de eeu is 'n weelderige doolhof van versierde, vergulde gange en skaduryke vertrekkamers, weelderig versier en saggies verlig deur kerse. Dit is 'n ongelooflike atmosferiese omgewing, en die indrukwekkende Lady D wat op jou neerkom (hurk om deur deure wat te veel vir haar is, te druk) is opwindend. Terwyl sy agtervolg, moet jy op soek na voorwerpe om die hoofhek te ontsluit, wat 'n bietjie raaisel behels en, in ware Resi -styl, die gebou geestelik kan karteer.

Castle Dimitrescu is miskien die beste vertoonvenster van Resident Evil se indrukwekkende beeldmateriaal en mdash, maar die hele spel is net onwelvoeglik mooi. Die omgewings is ryklik gedetailleerd en pragtig verlig, met 'n tasbare laag vuil en tekstuur op elke voorwerp en oppervlak. Dit loop glad, selfs by hoë resolusies, en straalopsporing sorg vir wonderlike beligting en weerkaatsings. Die karaktermodelle is ook skouspelagtig, met ekspressiewe, oortuigende animasie wat die rolverdeling vreeslik lewendig maak. Die Engelse stemspel is 'n bietjie hammy, maar dit pas meestal by hierdie absurde, egomaniese karakters.

Die kasteel- en poppemakerhuis is een van die reeks se onvergeetlikste stukke. Maar ek wens hulle het meer uit sommige van hulle gedruk. In een opsig waardeer ek hoe Capcom die drang weerstaan ​​om sy idees droog te melk, en dit entoesiasties eenkant toe gooi om iets nuuts aan die speler voor te stel. Dit laat dinge deurgaans vars en onvoorspelbaar voel. Maar soms kom ek aan die einde van een van hierdie rye en dink "Is dit dit?" Soms wens ek net dat die speletjie my meer tyd sou gee om dit alles in te week voordat ek na die volgende kamer van die spookhuis sou skuif.

Elders is die afgryse meer onmiddellik. Terwyl Resident Evil 7 'n soort gereelde vyand gehad het, bevat die slikagtige Molded & mdashVillage 'n verskeidenheid woeste gruwels wat Lycans genoem word. Hierdie wilde, snaakse wesens kom in verskillende vorme voor, en u moet u taktiek gereeld verander om dit te beveg. Die standaard grunt Lycan is nie te sterk nie, maar hulle is rats en atleties, en kan skielik van ver af na jou toe spring en teen mure en lere klim, wat sorg vir dramatiese, vinnige gevegte.

Ek het gevind dat die gewone Lycans te weerwolfagtig was om te teken dat hulle regtig bang was, maar latere herhalings is baie meer intimiderend. Daar is 'n paar werklik deurmekaar wesens in die laaste helfte van Village, insluitend rukende biomeganiese gruwels met bore vir arms, ouens met stukke geroeste metaal wat as 'n geïmproviseerde wapenrusting daaraan vasgeskroef is, en ander soortgelyke grimmige voorbeelde van Clive Barker-agtige liggaamshorror. Dit laat die lewendige klonte swart slym van RE7 in vergelyking baie lam lyk.

Daar is 'n paar wesens wat deurmekaar geraak het in die laaste helfte van Village

Alhoewel 'n groot deel van die dorp in noue, smal ruimtes afspeel, word dit soms oopgemaak in groter arena's met die oog op gevegte. Hier vind u plofbare vate om groepe vyande na te lok, dakke om op te klim, huise om in te glip en meubels om deur deure te sleep om die vloei van Lycans te stuit. Hierdie afdelings is aangrypend, maar is minder interessant as die oomblikke waarop u nie veel of glad nie met u wapen hoef af te skiet nie. Village is 'n ordentlike eerstepersoonsskieter, maar wanneer Capcom fokus op atmosfeer en spanning oor aksie, is dit 'n beter spel.

Dit lyk egter of die ontwikkelaar die belangstelling in raaisels amper heeltemal verloor het. Daar is 'n paar in Village, maar dit is uiters maklik, met oplossings wat jou altyd in die gesig staar. Ek vind dit effens teleurstellend as iemand wat nog altyd die boosaardige, ingewikkelde raaisels in Resident Evil -speletjies geniet het. Dit sorg wel vir 'n fopspeletjie, met minder onderbrekings in die vloei van verkenning en geveg. Maar ek soos hierdie onderbrekings, en ek voel dat Village sou kon baat by 'n bietjie meer serebrale belasting. Ek het nie een keer in die 11 uur wat ek geneem het, vasgesit nie.

Ethan het baie min bondgenote in die dorp, en hulle is geneig om dood te gaan net lank nadat hy hom ontmoet het. Maar 'n geheimsinnige karakter bekend as The Duke is 'n konstante vriendelike teenwoordigheid. Hy is 'n handelaar met 'n vreemd raaiselagtige persoonlikheid, en dit lyk altyd of hy 'n stap voor jou is. Draai 'n hoek in 'n nuwe gebied en jy sal hom daar vind, rustig op 'n sigaar blaas en in spanning wag op jou munt. Hy verkoop wapens, ammunisie, vervaardiging van bloudrukke en ander nuttige dinge, en hy sal enige skat koop wat jy toevallig opneem, insluitend die kristalliseerde oorblyfsels van base, wat altyd 'n netjiese prys behaal.

Die hertog kan ook wapens opgradeer en rou bestanddele in maaltye verander wat u gesondheid, verdediging en bewegingsnelheid permanent verhoog. As u die dorp verken, sal u 'n verskeidenheid wild teëkom, waaronder varke, skape, hoenders en af ​​en toe visse wat in 'n stroom rondspat. Skiet hulle en hulle sal vleis laat val, wat The Duke dan kan gebruik om een ​​van hierdie heerlike feeste met 'n stat te bevorder. Dit is een van die vele opsionele take en afleidings wat Village help om effens minder lineêr te voel as die vorige wedstryd, selfs al volg die verhaal 'n streng voorgeskrewe pad.

As ek The Duke raakloop, kry ek dieselfde gevoel van verligting as ek 'n veilige kamer vind in die ou Resident Evil -speletjies. Dit is 'n kans om asem te haal, te hergroepeer, u deurmekaar voorraad op te ruim en by die nabygeleë tikmasjien te stoor. Ja, tikmasjiene is terug, maar u het nie lint nodig om dit te gebruik nie. Voorraadbestuur is 'n belangrike oorweging in Village, maar beperk tot wapens, ammunisie en gesondheidsartikels. Daar is geen bokse met towerkuns in hierdie speletjie nie, so as 'n wapen of 'n ander lywige voorwerp te veel ruimte in beslag neem, moet u dit verkoop of betaal om die voorraad groter te maak.

Belangrike items soos deursleutels en voorwerpe wat nodig is om raaisels op te los, beslaan geen voorraadruimte nie, en word in 'n aparte, ononderbroke spyskaart gestoor, en dit is 'n belangrike manier waarop Village die klassieke Resident Evil -formule vaartbelyn maak. Treasure beslaan ook geen voorraadruimte nie, sodat u soveel kristalskedels kan dra as wat u wil. Ek moet erken dat ek die ou stelsel mis, waar 'n sleutel opgetel kan word om 'n wapen of 'n ander nuttige item op te offer. Maar dit beteken wel dat minder tyd in spyskaarte of teruggekeer word om items te vind, wat weer die algehele tempo van die spel verhoog.

In vergelyking met RE7, het Village 'n baie meer interessante struktuur. 'N Groot, oop plein in die middel van die dorp dien as 'n spilpunt, waarvandaan al die belangrikste plekke in die spel vertrek, gesluit deur 'n reeks sleutels. Dit is 'n veilige gebied, soortgelyk aan die hoofsaal van die polisiestasie van RE2, en u besoek dit gereeld. Hier kry u maklike toegang tot The Duke, sowel as die ingange na die lêplek van elke skurk. Die dorp verberg ook verskeie opsionele gebiede, wat ekstra storiebesonderhede, skaars skatte en minibusse bevat. Dit beloon u omdat u die tyd geneem het om van die gebaande weg af te dwaal en te verken.

Alhoewel Resident Evil 7 die gevoel van 'n sagte herlaai gehad het, wat slegs die groter mitologie van die reeks effens raak, bevat Village 'n paar groot onthullings wat elke wedstryd in die reeks agterna beïnvloed. As u 'n fan van hierdie verhale is en u voel dat die afgelope paar wedstryde lig was op nuwe inligting oor hierdie heelal en karakters, sal Village nie teleurstel nie. Maar die belangrikste is dat dit nie een van die Resi -vervolgverhale is wat u met 'n stomme nuwe verhaal bombardeer nie. Hierdie onthullings is groot en belangrik, maar sit rustig op die agtergrond en laat Ethan se verhaal op sy eie staan.

As u die verhaal voltooi, word 'n winkel oopgemaak waar u 'n verskeidenheid ekstras kan koop met 'n geldeenheid in die spel wat verdien word deur prestasies te ontsluit. Dit sluit in die terugkeer van The Mercenaries, 'n gunsteling arcade-/tydaanval -modus. In Village se opvatting kan u tussen rondtes items en wapens by The Duke koop. Maar andersins bly dit getrou aan die modus wat deur Resi 4. gewild geword het. Daar is ook 'n nuwe spel+ -modus waarmee u u wapens en karakteropgraderings kan oordra na 'n tweede, moeiliker spel.

Village kan soms voel asof 'n halfdosyn verskillende gruwelspeletjies bymekaar sit. Maar die sterkte en verskeidenheid van sy idees, die kwaliteit van die kunsrigting en die donker stimulerende atmosfeer maak dit meer as goed. Dit is 'n gewaagde en eksperimentele gruwelspel, maar ook 'n spel wat in die reeks se eertydse glorie en veral Resident Evil 4. In hierdie reeks is baie Mikami se heruitvinding van 2005, van die raaiselagtige handelaar- en wapenopgraderings, tot die landelike omgewing en korrupte dorpenaars. Maar uiteindelik is Village sy eie spel met sy eie identiteit, en die elemente wat hy uit vroeëre vervolgverhale leen, definieer dit nooit. Dit is 'n kwaliteit horror -speletjie in sy eie reg, en bewys dat Resident Evil nog 25 jaar kan opwind, verras en skrik.


14 Marple

Hercule Poirot was moontlik die bekendste karakter wat Agatha Christie geskep het, maar dit was nie die enigste nie, en ook nie die enigste interessante en boeiende speurder nie. Juffrou Marple speel ook 'n rol in Christie se romans as 'n skerpsinnige ou dame wat gereeld by moordmisteries betrokke is.

Die vertoning Marple Dit bevat twee aktrises wat die rol inneem, en beide bring hul eie sjarme en uniekheid aan die karakter. Boonop is die gevalle waarin Miss Marple verskyn, van die interessantste en ingewikkeldste in die geskiedenis van die Britse televisie.


Dodelike rantjie

Hierdie vrae is die kern van a nuwe artikel in The New Yorker deur Douglas Preston, asook 'n daaropvolgende webinar bespreking gelei deur Preston en Princeton Universiteit antropoloog Agust & iacuten Fuentes en aangebied deur die School for Advanced Research in New Mexico.

Die verhaal van Roopkund illustreer die behoefte aan veelvuldige bewyse by die ondersoek van die verlede. Die bene alleen is verbasend: dit behoort aan mans en vroue, meestal jong volwassenes, wat blykbaar in verskeie aanvalle gesterf het, miskien oor dekades of honderde jare.

Die mondelinge geskiedenis wat deur die dorpenaars in die omgewing oorgedra word, bied meer beligting. Die meer is op 'n pelgrimstog na Nanda Devi, 'n manifestasie van die Hindoe -godin Parvati. Volgens die plaaslike legende het 'n verre koning Nanda Devi eens kwaad gemaak en haar droogte in sy koninkryk laat ontketen. Om die godin te paai, vertrek die koning op 'n pelgrimstog wat hom en sy gevolg verby Roopkund geneem het, in die huidige deelstaat Uttarakhand. Maar die dwase koning het dansers en ander luukshede meegebring en die woede van Nanda Devi verskerp. Sy het 'n vreeslike haelstorm opgetower en die hele partytjie doodgemaak, volgens die legende.

Hierdie verhaal is moontlik nie ver van die waarheid nie. Sommige van die slagoffers by Roopkund het skedelbreuke wat lyk soos die gevolg van traumatiese trauma, navorsing gevind het. Die huidige beste raaiskoot oor wat met die meeste dooies gebeur het? Hulle is gevang op die rant bo die meer in verskriklike storms, waarvan sommige moontlik dodelike hael insluit. Die meeste slagoffers het waarskynlik gesterf weens blootstelling en onderkoeling wat hulle in en om die meer beland het omdat hul liggame óf afdraand gerol het óf hul oorskot teen die heuwel neergesak het in die gereelde mini-lawines wat algemeen op die helling voorkom.


China bou hele dorpe in 'n ander land se gebied

In Oktober 2015 het China aangekondig dat 'n nuwe dorpie, genaamd Gyalaphug in Tibetaans of Jieluobu in Chinees, in die suide van die Tibet -outonome streek (TAR) gestig is. In April 2020 reis die sekretaris van die Kommunistiese Party van die TAR, Wu Yingjie, oor twee passe, albei meer as 14.000 voet hoog, op pad om die nuwe dorp te besoek. Daar het hy die inwoners-almal Tibetane-aangesê om 'wortels neer te sit soos Kalsang-blomme in die grensland van sneeu' en 'die helder vyfsterrooi vlag hoog op te lig'. Film van die besoek is op plaaslike TV -kanale uitgesaai en op die voorblaaie van Tibetaanse koerante geplak. Dit is nie buite China aangemeld nie: honderde nuwe dorpe word in Tibet gebou, en dit lyk nie anders nie.

In Oktober 2015 het China aangekondig dat 'n nuwe dorpie, genaamd Gyalaphug in Tibetaanse of Jieluobu in Chinees, in die suide van die Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) gestig is. In April 2020 reis die sekretaris van die Kommunistiese Party van die TAR, Wu Yingjie, oor twee passe, albei meer as 14.000 voet hoog, op pad om die nuwe dorp te besoek. Daar het hy die inwoners-almal Tibetane-aangesê om 'wortels neer te sit soos Kalsang-blomme in die grensland van sneeu' en 'die helder vyfsterrooi vlag hoog te lig'. Film van die besoek is op plaaslike TV -kanale uitgesaai en op die voorblaaie van Tibetaanse koerante geplak. Dit is nie buite China aangemeld nie: honderde nuwe dorpe word in Tibet gebou, en dit lyk nie anders nie.

Gyalaphug is egter anders: dit is in Bhoetan. Wu en 'n aantal amptenare, polisie en joernaliste het 'n internasionale grens oorgesteek. Hulle was sedert die vroeë tagtigerjare in 'n gebied van 232 vierkante myl wat China geëis het, maar internasionaal beskou as deel van die Lhuntse-distrik in die noorde van Bhoetan. Die Chinese amptenare het besoek afgelê om hul sukses, ongemerk deur die wêreld, te vier met die aanplant van setlaars, sekuriteitspersoneel en militêre infrastruktuur op 'n gebied wat internasionaal en volgens die geskiedenis Bhutanese is.

Oor hierdie projek: Navorsing oor hierdie verhaal en die kaarte daarvan is deur Robert Barnett, Matthew Akester, Ronald Schwartz en twee Tibetaanse navorsers wat gevra het om anoniem te bly. Geproduseer as deel van 'n deurlopende samewerkende navorsingsprojek oor beleidsontwikkelings oor Tibet, met materiaal wat verkry is uit amptelike Chinese mediaberigte, Chinese blogs, verslae van die Bhutanese Nasionale Vergadering, Indiese mediaberigte en open source-karteringdienste, insluitend OpenStreetMap en Map With AI. Opmerking: skakels in hierdie verhaal is hoofsaaklik na mediaberigte in Chinees of Tibetaanse taal. Plekname word gegee volgens gebruik in Bhoetan, waar bekend, of is afkomstig van Tibetaanse vertalings van Chinese verslae, wat onbetroubaar kan wees. Chinese name word tussen hakies in die foto -onderskrifte gegee.

Hierdie nuwe konstruksie is deel van 'n groot poging van die Chinese president Xi Jinping sedert 2017 om die Tibetaanse grenslande te versterk, 'n dramatiese eskalasie in China se langdurige pogings om Indië en sy buurlande langs hul Himalaja-grense uit te oefen. In hierdie geval het China nie die grond nodig wat hulle in Bhoetan vestig nie: sy doel is om die Bhutanese regering te dwing om grondgebied af te staan ​​wat China elders in Bhoetan wil hê, om Beijing 'n militêre voordeel te gee in sy stryd met Nieu -Delhi. Gyalaphug is nou een van drie nuwe dorpe (twee reeds bewoon, een in aanbou), 66 myl nuwe paaie, 'n klein waterkragstasie, twee administratiewe sentrums van die Kommunistiese Party, 'n kommunikasiebasis, 'n pakhuis vir ramphulp, vyf militêre of polisiekantore, en wat vermoedelik 'n groot seintoring is, 'n satellietontvangstasie, 'n militêre basis, en tot ses veiligheidsplekke en buiteposte wat China gebou het in wat dit sê, is dele van Lhodrak in die TAR, maar wat eintlik in die ver noord van Bhoetan.

Dit behels 'n meer uitdagende strategie as enigiets wat China in die verlede aan sy landgrense gedoen het. Die vestiging van 'n hele gebied in 'n ander land gaan veel verder as die voorwaartse patrollie en af ​​en toe padbou wat in 1962 tot oorlog met Indië gelei het, militêre botsings in 1967 en 1987 en die dood van 24 Chinese en Indiese soldate in 2020. Boonop , oortree dit openlik die bepalings van die stigtingsverdrag van China met Bhoetan. Dit ignoreer ook dekades van protesoptredes deur die Bhutanese teen Beijing oor baie kleiner oortredings elders aan die grense. Deur die uitlokkende taktiek wat dit in die Suid -Chinese See gebruik het, in die Himalajas te weerspieël, waag Beijing sy verhoudings met sy bure, wie se behoeftes en belange dit altyd beweer het om te respekteer, en bedreig sy reputasie wêreldwyd.

Die hoofadministrasiegebou in Gyalaphug, soos gesien in 2020. Op die bord bo die gebou staan: "Die Party and Serve-the-Masses Center."
Wu Yingjie, die sekretaris van die TAR -party, ontmoet dorpenaars voor die kantoor van die dorpsadministrasie in Gyalaphug in April 2020. Tibet Daily TV -skermkiekies

China se konstruksie -ryvlak in Bhutan is byna heeltemal ongemerk deur die buitewêreld. Bhoetan moet weet, en ander regerings in die streek sal waarskynlik daarvan bewus wees dat China aktief is aan die noordelike grense van Bhoetan, maar moontlik nie die volle omvang van die aktiwiteit besef het nie of gekies het om stil te bly. Tog is inligting oor die rit weggesteek in amptelike Tibetaanse en Chinese taalkoerantberigte wat in China, op Chinese sosiale media en in Chinese regeringsdokumente gepubliseer is. Daar is 'n enkele opslag in hierdie Chinese verslae: Hulle noem nooit dat hierdie konstruksiewerk, wat deur satellietbeelde bevestig word, in betwiste gebiede plaasvind nie, wat nog te sê in Bhoetan.

China het al probeer om paaie na Bhoetan in te bou - maar veral in sy westelike gebiede en met beperkte sukses. In 2017 het China se poging om 'n pad oor die Doklam-plato in die suidweste van Bhutan te bou, langs die trijunction met Indië, 'n 73 dae lange gesigstryd tussen honderde Chinese en Indiese troepe veroorsaak en moes dit laat vaar word. In November verlede jaar het 'n Indiese media berig dat 'n dorp met die naam Pangda deur die Chinese regering in subtropiese woud net binne die suidwestelike grens van Bhoetan gebou is. (China het die bewering ontken.) Dit is egter moontlik, soos sommige ontleders bespiegel het, dat Bhoetan die gebied stilweg aan China afgestaan ​​het, maar dit nie aan die buitewêreld bekend gemaak het nie.

Die werk aan Gyalaphug het egter vyf jaar vroeër as Pangda begin, is baie meer gevorderd in die ontwikkeling daarvan en behels die vestiging van hele distrikte, nie net 'n enkele dorp nie. Die Gyalaphug -saak behels egter 'n ander dimensie, een wat baie sensitiewer is: dit is in 'n gebied van buitengewone godsdienstige belang vir Bhoetan en sy mense.

Gebiede wat deur China in Bhoetan geëis word

China eis vier gebiede in die weste van Bhoetan, drie in die noorde en Sakteng in die ooste. Die gebiede wat dit aktief in die noorde beweer, is die Beyul Khenpajong en die Menchuma -vallei, hoewel amptelike Chinese kaarte ook die gebied Chagdzom as deel van China toon. Sedert 1990 bied China aan om 495 vierkante kilometer (191 vierkante myl) van sy eise in die noorde prys te gee as Bhoetan 269 vierkante kilometer (104 vierkante myl) van sy gebied in die weste lewer (dele van Doklam, Charithang, Sinchulungpa, Dramana en Shakhatoe) na China. Bhoetan het in die 1980's of kort daarna sy aanspraak op die Kula Khari -gebied (dikwels as Kulha Kangri) afgestaan, en sy vroeëre aanspraak toegeskryf aan 'n kartografiese fout.

Let wel: Plaasname word eers gegee volgens gebruik in Bhoetan, gevolg deur Chinese name tussen hakies. Chinese name vir gebiede wat geëis word, stem selde ooreen met die plaaslike Bhutanese name, wat slegs hier as leiding gegee word. China het nie 'n kaart gepubliseer met die gebied wat dit beweer in die gebied van Sakteng nie, en 'n minimale skatting van die gebied wat China geëis het, word hier getoon. Buitelandse beleidskaart gebaseer op navorsing deur Robert Barnett en sy span

Die gebied, wat tradisioneel bekend staan ​​as die Beyul Khenpajong, is een van die heiligste plekke in Bhoetan, waar die meerderheid van die bevolking Tibetaanse Boeddhistiese tradisies volg. Die woord Beyul means “hidden valley,” a term used in traditional Tibetan literature for at least seven areas high in the Himalayas ringed by mountain ridges and, according to legend, concealed by the legendary tantric master Padmasambhava in the eighth century and only discoverable by those with heightened spiritual powers. The Beyul Khenpajong is the most famous such valley in Bhutan, described in Bhutanese literature and myth since at least the 15th century. Jigme Namgyal, the father of the first king of Bhutan’s current ruling dynasty, was born on the eastern perimeter of the Beyul, only 75 miles as the crow flies northeast of Bhutan’s now-capital, Thimphu. Given its incomparable importance for the Bhutanese and for Tibetan Buddhists in general, no Bhutanese official would ever formally relinquish this area to China, any more than Britain would yield Stonehenge or Italy Venice.

Buitelandse beleid contacted the spokesperson for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the Bhutanese mission to the United Nations and the prime minister’s office, and both the Chinese Embassy in Washington and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing for a response to this story. We received no response from the Chinese government, which rarely comments on stories before publication. The Indian government said it had no comment. The Bhutanese government did not respond to multiple inquiries.

In the face of raw Chinese power, Bhutan appears to have chosen to maintain what the Bhutanese political commentator Tenzing Lamsang has previously characterized as a “disciplined silence.” As a “small country stuck between two giants,” he said, Bhutan’s strategy is “to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing either side.”

Satellite Evidence of Chinese Development in Northern Bhutan

Slide to view before and after images of the site.

Top: The first road built by China across Bhutan’s northern border runs from Lagyab in Lhodrak (Luozha) county in the TAR to Mabjathang in the Beyul, which is part of Kurtoe in Bhutan’s Lhuntse district. The first image, taken on Dec. 25, 2003, shows the future site of the road the second shows it as it was on Jan. 8, 2021. Work on the road started from Lagyab in 2015, and by 2017 a basic gravel road was open. Bottom: The village of Gyalaphug, 2.5 miles south of Bhutan’s border with China, has been key to China’s settlement of the Beyul. The first image, from December 2003, shows the site long before construction the second shows it in January 2021. Google Earth

Apart from wandering ascetics, seasonal nomads, and a handful of refugees from Tibet in the late 1950s, the Beyul has been uninhabited for centuries. At an average altitude of 12,000 feet, until now it has had no buildings, roads, or settlements apart from two small temples abandoned decades ago, stone huts for shepherds, and perhaps three basic shelters or campsites used by Bhutanese frontier troops. Entering the Beyul from Tibet, now part of China, involves a journey across passes the height of Mont Blanc few other than mountaineers would normally attempt it. The second enclave now being settled by China in northern Bhutan is even higher: The Menchuma Valley, 1.2 miles to the east of the Beyul and 19 square miles in size, is at an altitude of 14,700 feet at its lowest point, apart from one ravine. Like the Beyul, it lies inside the Kurtoe subdistrict of Lhuntse and until now has never had settlements, roads, or buildings.

Bhutan’s border guards are posted in the Beyul each summer, but their task is primarily to defend Bhutanese herders in encounters with their counterparts from Tibet. From the mid-1990s onward, these encounters became more aggressive: The Bhutanese accuse the Tibetans of cattle rustling collecting timber constructing shelters driving huge, consolidated flocks of yaks across traditional Bhutanese grazing lands and demanding that Bhutanese herders pay taxes to them for grazing there.

By 2005, this led Bhutanese herders to withdraw to the south of the Beyul, and the Bhutanese soldiers posted there, who depend on the herders for supplies, went with them to the south, where neither they nor the herders would have known of the construction work in the northern Beyul. In Thimphu, officials probably assumed that these clashes between herders were minor provocations by Beijing. Such incidents had become commonplace in all the areas of Bhutan claimed by China, and there was no precedent suggesting they might escalate to major construction, still less settlement it could hardly have been imaginable that China would take such a step.

Today all of the Menchuma Valley and most of the Beyul are controlled by China. Both are being settled. Together, they constitute 1 percent of Bhutan’s territory if it were to lose them, it would be comparable to the United States losing Maine or Kentucky. If Bhutanese troops try to reenter these areas, they will have to do so on foot and, given the lack of infrastructure on their side, would be immediately beyond the reach of supplies or reinforcements. The Chinese troops would have a barracks close at hand, would be motorized, and would be only three hours’ drive from the nearest town in China.

This map, titled “Illustrative Map of the Border Between China and Bhutan and the Disputed Area (the 1980s),” has been circulating since the 1980s within China. It is annotated with extensive historical details about China’s claims to areas of Bhutan. The map is frequently reproduced and discussed on Chinese websites and in social media. It is not clear where the information used was obtained from, but the level of detail suggests it may have been leaked or obtained from an official source. (Note: In the left corner of this version, it says, “Edited by Leefengw in December 2005.” The right corner says, “Free/liberate Southern Tibet.” These details were evidently added to a later version.)

China’s claim to these areas is recent. Both the Beyul and the Menchuma Valley were shown as parts of Bhutan on official Chinese maps until at least the 1980s. They still appeared as parts of Bhutan on official Chinese tourist maps and gazetteers published in the late 1990s. Still today, even the maps published on China’s official national mapping site, tianditu.gov.cn, vary widely as to which parts of the Beyul are claimed by China and which are not.

China has not publicly explained or even mentioned its claim to the Menchuma Valley, but since the 1980s it has spoken volubly of its claim to the Beyul. At that time, according to a number of Chinese writers and activists, Chinese officials discovered a ruling by the Jiaqing Emperor (reigned 1796-1820) granting grazing rights in the Beyul to herders belonging to the monastery of Lhalung in western Lhodrak in southern Tibet. This document has yet to be seen publicly and has not so far been found in Tibetan records. It may exist, but reciprocal cross-border grazing was the norm in the Himalayas and in the Beyul before the Chinese invasion and annexation of Tibet in the 1950s.

China has long renounced the 19th-century claims by Qing emperors—repeated by Mao Zedong in the 1930s—to sovereignty over Bhutan and other Himalayan states. Relations between China and Bhutan have been amicable since the early 1970s, when Bhutan supported China’s entry into the United Nations. As one Chinese official put it recently, the two countries are “friendly neighbors linked by mountains and rivers.” But as with China’s other Himalayan neighbors, the legacies of colonialism and conflict have left behind uncertain borders. Since 1984, China and Bhutan have held 24 rounds of talks to settle their disagreements over those mountains and rivers, and this April they agreed to hold the 25th round “at an early date.” (The 24th round was held in August 2016, just before the main construction work in the Beyul began.) Bhutan has shown remarkable flexibility in these talks—early on, probably in the 1980s, Thimphu quietly relinquished its claim to the 154-square-mile Kula Khari (sometimes written as Kulha Kangri) area on its northern border with China, describing that claim as due to “cartographic mistakes.”

In December 1998, China signed a formal agreement with Bhutan, the first and so far only treaty between the two nations. In that document, China recognized Bhutan’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity and agreed that “no unilateral action will be taken to change the status quo on the border.” The construction of roads, settlements, and buildings within the Beyul and the Menchuma Valley is clearly a contravention of that agreement.

Detail from the official Tibetan-language map of the TAR, published by the Chinese authorities in 1981. It shows the border of Bhutan with Lhodrak county in Tibet, with the border marked by the Namgung La and the Bod La passes. The Beyul and the Menchuma Valley are south of those passes and so were outside Tibet and China, according to this map. English annotation by Robert Barnett

China’s interests in the Beyul are not primarily about its relations with Bhutan, which Beijing appears to view in terms of opportunities it can offer China in its strategic rivalry with India. In part, Beijing wants Bhutan to open full relations with China, which would allow it to have a diplomatic presence in Thimphu. This would offset India’s influence in Bhutan, an aim that China has largely achieved in Nepal. Bhutan, however, conscious of the fragility of its landlocked position between the two giants of Asia, has continued to avoid opening full relations with any major power apart from India, with which it has long been allied.

But China’s principal aim in the Beyul is clear from its stance in talks with the Bhutanese government: Ever since 1990, China has offered to give up its claim to 495 square kilometers (191 square miles) of the Beyul if Thimphu will give China 269 square kilometers (104 square miles) in western Bhutan. Those areas—Doklam, Charithang, Sinchulungpa, Dramana, and Shakhatoe—lie close to the trijunction with India and are of far greater strategic importance to China than the Beyul, offering China a foothold only 62 miles from India’s geographic weak point, the 14-mile-wide Siliguri Corridor that connects the Indian mainland to its northeastern territories.

Bhutan initially accepted in principle the Chinese offer of a deal over the Beyul. But negotiations stalled over the details of territory China wanted in the west, and Chinese pressure began to increase. In 2004, the incursions escalated: A top Bhutanese official said Chinese soldiers had come to Tshoka La at the southern tip of the Beyul. That summer, the Chinese began building six roads close to Bhutan’s western borders four of the roads crossed into Bhutan. When Bhutan protested, China replied that it was “overreacting” but agreed as a gesture of goodwill to stop the road-building it resumed a year later. For three years from 2006, there were no border talks between the two governments. During this time, there were at least 38 incursions by Chinese soldiers across Bhutan’s western borders and seven formal protests by Thimphu to Beijing.

Chinese officials knew the Beyul to be of great spiritual significance to the Bhutanese. Despite offers from China of substantial economic aid, however, Bhutan did not accept the trade-off: It could not afford to prejudice relations with India. In 2013, before it began construction work in the Beyul, China arranged a joint survey of the valley by Chinese and Bhutanese experts. But this, too, did not lead Thimphu to accept the deal. China stepped up pressure in the western sector further, leading to the Doklam standoff in 2017. Today, China’s offer to trade the Beyul for the western border areas still stands. But with little likelihood of Bhutanese concessions, the Chinese presence in the Beyul could well become permanent.

In Chinese, the term for so-called salami-slicing tactics—slowly cutting off piece by piece of other nations’ territory—is kan shi, or “nibbling like a silkworm.” It’s serious business: The belief that India was gnawing at fragments of China’s territory drove Mao to launch the 1962 Sino-Indian War. And the converse of the phrase is jing tun, “swallowing like a whale.” The small bites of the silkworm can turn into crushing jaws.

For 20 years, China’s nibbling in the Beyul was carried out not by soldiers but by four Tibetan nomads. They were from a village called Lagyab, 4 miles north of the border with Bhutan, and their families had grazed in the Beyul in summers before China annexed Tibet in the 1950s. Since then, as with millions of other Tibetans, their lives, education, and economic prospects have been determined by the Chinese state, and in 1995, they agreed when called on by their village leader to dedicate themselves to the motherland: They were to go and live year-round in the Beyul. Together with 62 yaks, they walked over the passes and set up camp at a site called Mabjathang on the northern bank of the Jakarlung, one of the two major valleys in the Beyul. Scores of articles, interviews, and photographs have since appeared in the Chinese press celebrating the four nomads’ dedication to recovering what “has been the sacred land of our country since ancient times.” They were to remain in the Beyul for the next quarter-century, as China tried and failed to get Bhutan to accept the border trade-off.

In following summers, other herders joined them to carry border markers up to peaks and to paint the Chinese national flag, the hammer and sickle, or the word “China” in Chinese on prominent rocks within the Beyul. On one occasion in 1999, 62 of the herders came together and drove 400 yaks down to the far south of the Beyul to reinforce China’s claim to the area. These actions were the basis of China’s initial pressure on Bhutan to accept its offer of a package deal.

In 2012, China sent a team to carry out the first survey of land and resources in the Beyul. “Since history,” the surveyors wrote in a report for China’s State Forestry Administration on arriving in the Beyul, “no one knows the status of its resources it has been shrouded in a veil of mystery.” A week later, when the survey was completed, they declared that the Beyul was “no longer a mysterious place.” The settlement of the Beyul was about to begin.

Since 2015, China has constructed six new roads in the Beyul (shown here in January 2021) and one in the Menchuma Valley. The roads, which have all been built south of the Bhutanese border (marked in yellow), cover approximately 66 miles so far. Source: Google Earth. Red road outline and labels added by Robert Barnett

In October 2015, workers were brought in from Tibet and parts of China to begin building the road that by mid-2016 would become the first known instance of construction across Bhutan’s northern border and first road to enter the Beyul. Linking Lagyab with Mabjathang, the 29-mile road crossed a 15,700-foot-high mountain pass called the Namgung La into Bhutan. It took two years to complete and cost 98 million yuan ($15 million), according to the Tibet Daily, but cut the journey time from nine hours on foot or horseback to two by car or truck. In 2016, a communications base station was built in Mabjathang. That same year, work began on the construction of buildings at a site 1.2 miles upriver from Mabjathang and 2.5 miles south of the Bhutanese border with Tibet. Officials named the site Jieluobu in Chinese. They seemed unsure what it should be called in Tibetan, writing its name sometimes as Gyalaphug and at other times as Jiliphug. By 2017, as the first houses at Gyalaphug were completed, the number of residents rose to 16.

In January 2017, China’s then-ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, visited Bhutan. “I bring a deep appreciation from the Chinese people,” he said. “I am so happy to see the talks on the border have made progress. We maintained peace and tranquility on our border area, and the discussion is going on.” Some 112 miles to the northeast, the road to the Beyul was nearing completion, and Chinese construction crews had started work on building Gyalaphug. In 2017 alone, the Chinese government spent 45 million yuan ($6.9 million) on infrastructure construction in the village, where the remoteness makes everything hugely expensive getting a single bag of cement to Gyalaphug costs 450 yuan ($69).

In October 2018, the village was formally opened, and four new residents arrived, bringing the total to 20. By January 2021, four more blocks had been built for residents, each containing five identical homes, with 1,200 square feet per household. Another 24 households were due to move in during 2020.

Chinese Settlement and Infrastructure in Northern Bhutan

Since 2015, China has established three villages, seven roads, and at least five military or police outposts in the Beyul and the Menchuma Valley. These are documented in official Chinese reports and videos. The other sites shown here are visible on satellite images and are possible security infrastructure or outposts but have not been conclusively identified. Official Chinese maps until at least the 1980s showed its border with Bhutan as running through the Namgung La and Bod La passes but now include the Beyul and the Menchuma Valley as parts of China. (Most official Chinese maps also claim the Chagdzom area.) Bhutan’s definition of the border, which is generally accepted internationally, runs about 2 miles north of the Namgung La.

Border relocation villages Confirmed Chinese security outposts Possible Chinese security sites

Foreign Policy map based on research by Robert Barnett and his team

Explore the Chinese Settlements

Click through the gallery below for details on the 12 sites mapped above.

The village of Gyalaphug (Jieluobu) has been key to the settlement of the Beyul (Baiyu) by China. Clockwise from top left: The first image shows the completion of the first phase of construction in late 2018, with two administrative blocks and two residential ones. Four more rows of houses have since been added. The second image shows villagers, political cadres, construction workers, and security personnel gathering to salute the Chinese flag and sing the national anthem at Gyalaphug on Oct. 1, 2020, China’s National Day. The third, taken in 2020, shows villagers putting Chinese flags above the doorways of homes. The last image, from 2020, shows the doorway of a typical home. Tibet News Broadcasting video screenshot Lhodrak County Party Committee via WeChat Tibet Daily video screenshots
The village of Dermalung (Demalong) is still under construction, sitting 1.2 miles along a road built in 2020 along the Jakarlung Valley after it turns to the south. In November 2020, the Chinese government put out a call for bids to construct the “Demalong Beside-the-Border Relocation Village.” Located at an altitude of 11,900 feet, the project will include “private houses,” “sports facilities,” and “community monitoring.” Clockwise from top left: The first image, from November 2020, shows the construction site and the road along the valley. The second shows a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) captain in Dermalung greeting the visiting party secretary of Lhodrak county, Zhao Tianwu, on April 17. The third image shows the construction site on Nov. 9, 2020, including a block with five houses and 10 other buildings. The final image shows the party secretary of Lhokha municipality, Xu Chengcang, meeting a security team stationed at a nearby outpost on Oct. 6, 2019. Google Earth Minjing Luozha (“Hidden Lhodrak”), Lhodrak county government social media channel Maxar Weishannanguanfang, the official WeChat platform of the Propaganda Department of the Lhokha (Shannan) Municipal Party Committee, TAR
This security post in the Menchuma (Minjiuma) Valley, seen in a satellite image on Feb. 20 and believed to hold Chinese border police, is located at the southern foot of the 16,200-foot-high Bod La pass on Bhutan’s traditional border with Tibet. The Chinese began building a road from Lhodrak in Tibet into the Menchuma Valley in 2017. Work on the road has continued since the initial pass was finished by the end of 2017 and now is far more advanced than the roads in the Beyul, with at least part of it already hard-surfaced, as seen at right in April. Maxar Technologies Minjing Luozha (Hidden Lhodrak), WeChat channel of Lhodrak County Party Committee
The Menchuma Valley (top left), as viewed from the Gang La pass in Bhutan looking north in December 2020, with the Menchuma River gorge in the foreground. The mountains of Lhodrak in Tibet are visible in the background. The farthest arrow marks the Bod La pass, the traditional border, where the new road from Tibet crosses into the Menchuma Valley. The second arrow marks the site of the security outpost at the foot of pass. The road then crosses a high plateau and climbs up the ridge before dropping down into the steep gorge of the Menchuma River. The third arrow marks the site of Menchuma village, built on a ridge 15,400 feet above sea level, 2 miles south of Bhutan’s traditional border with Tibet. The images at top right and bottom left show the party secretary of Lhokha municipality, Xu Chengcang, visiting Menchuma with his team of police and officials in October 2019. Work was already well advanced by November 2020, when the Chinese government put out a call for bids for the construction of Phase 3 of the Menchuma project. The call included building “residential housing, sports facilities, landscaping, community monitoring, and an access control system.” At least 15 families had been moved in by April, and at least 15 more are expected to move in shortly. By early this year, a village-resident cadre team had been installed in the village the image at bottom right shows a meeting it held with the Menchuma village committee and Communist Party branch on April 20. Google Earth Weishannanguanfang, the official WeChat platform of the Propaganda Department of the Lhokha (Shannan) Municipal Party Committee, TAR Minjing Luozha (Hidden Lhodrak), WeChat channel of Lhodrak County Party Committee Office
Mabjathang (Majiatang)—“the peacock plain”—is an area of grazing land on the northern bank of the upper Jakarlung, seen in December 2003 and January of this year. This was the site where four Tibetan nomads lived after they were sent to stake China’s claim to the Beyul in 1995. Clockwise from top left: The original shelter at Mabjathang, shown in the first image from December 2003, can still be seen in the second image, marked with a red square, taken this January. The building marked with a smaller red square was constructed by the nomads soon after 2003, and they lived in it for a further 15 years, until moving to the new village of Gyalaphug in 2018, 1.2 miles east of Mabjathang. The new blue-roofed buildings are identified by unofficial Chinese mappers as used by the military. The final image shows construction work in 2020 in front of the building in which the first four nomads lived until they moved to Gyalaphug. Google Earth Tibet Daily TV screen grab
In 2020, a second road was built linking China to the Beyul, shown here in September 2020. Running southwest from Lagyab township in Lhodrak county, it crosses into the Beyul over a pass called the Choekong La (Qiegongla) and down to the upper Jakarlung (Jigenong) at a location named on Chinese maps as Zhagabu, 5 miles east of Gyalaphug. From there, the road has been extended eastward along the north bank of the river. Beside the new road, two sets of buildings are marked by unofficial Chinese mappers as military sites, shown in the second image, taken in November 2020. Google Earth
Left: At the point where the upper Jakarlung makes a sharp turn to the south, a site that was completely undeveloped in 2003 named on official Chinese maps in Chinese as Qujielong or by others as Semalong, a number of buildings have been constructed, seen here in September 2020. Some maps, drawing on unofficial Chinese mapping data, have marked these buildings as a military installation. Right: A satellite image from September 2020 shows a row of buildings or tents amid construction work 270 yards south of the point where the Jakarlung turns sharply from the east to the south, 1.2 miles north of Dermalung. In September 2020, official Chinese media reported an inspection by officials of “infrastructure” at a location within walking distance of Dermalung called Dejiutang, possibly a reference to this site. Google Earth
The top left image, taken in January, shows the first-ever road into the Pagsamlung Valley, on the western side of the Beyul, built by the Chinese in 2020. The road, not yet complete, runs south from Gyalaphug for 1.9 miles and then crosses over the 15,700-foot-high Ngarab La (Eruola) pass, dropping down into the Pagsamlung Valley 1.9 miles to the southwest. A cluster of buildings, with what appear to be satellite dishes, has been built 2 miles to the southwest of the pass. Later in 2020, a second road was built from a point 4 miles east of Gyalaphug leading from the upper Jakarlung toward the Pagsamlung. In April 2020, Wu Yingjie, the TAR party secretary, inspected the security teams stationed on the Ngarab La. Footage of his visit, shown in the bottom right image, indicates that there are two outposts there—one manned by police, and another by PLA soldiers. Google Earth via Tibet Daily and cited by Baidu as from the Department of Commerce of the TAR
Just north of Gyalaphug and Mabjathang is a ridge, shown in this image from January. In 2020, a road was built up to a point on the ridge (named on some Chinese maps as Mawentang) at 15,400 feet, comprising a fenced-off area with two structures in it and a smaller building to the side. One of the buildings, with a circular pad or structure on the roof, is estimated to be over 130 feet high and is presumably a military installation of some kind. Google Earth
In 2020, the second Chinese road from Lagyab into the Beyul was extended eastward along the upper Jakarlung Valley, as shown in the first image. About a mile eastward from the point where this road enters the valley, it passes a compound with seven rectangular red-roofed buildings arranged around a square. It is presumed to be a military base or barracks, shown in the second image on Nov. 9, 2020. Google Earth and Maxar
In the upper reaches of the Pagsamlung (Basangnong) Valley just below the treeline, shown on Jan. 8, two buildings are visible near Tangwo, where the Bhutanese army had an outpost until at least the late 1970s. Some unofficial maps describe these buildings as a Chinese military outpost, naming it (probably incorrectly) as the Lhalung Lhakhang outpost. The buildings are 1.2 miles south of the new, unfinished road that runs across the Ngarab La pass from Gyalaphug. So far, there is still only a track linking the new road to the buildings in the valley. Google Earth
Near the southern tip of the Beyul, on the east bank of the Pagsamlung River, are the ruins of a temple, identified on some Chinese maps as Lhalung Lhakhang (Lalonglakangsi), 12 miles south of the Bhutanese border, shown here in January. Lhalung Lhakhang is particularly important because, according to the Bhutanese government, China is claiming territory as far south as Tshoka La (Cuogala), a pass that overlooks Lhalung Lhakhang temple from the west. The upper marker shows the remains of another temple, which some sources say was called Tsechu Lhakhang (Cijiuilakang), near the site of a Bhutanese military outpost in the 1980s. In November 2019, Zhao Tianwu, the Lhodrak party secretary, traveled to Lhalung Lhakang and the Pagsamlung hot springs, close to Tshoka La, with a team of 17 police and officials, as shown in the second image. If a Chinese outpost has been set up here, it would be the southernmost position held by Chinese security forces in the Beyul, 9 miles south of the Bhutanese border. Google Earth Minjing Luozha (Hidden Lhodrak), WeChat channel of Lhodrak County Party Committee Office

Gyalaphug was one of more than 600 new villages being built as part of a 2017 policy of “well-off border village construction” in Tibet, though as far as is known the others lie just within China’s borders. Official rhetoric requires their residents to make “every village a fortress and every household a watchpost” and terms their residents “soldiers without uniforms”—their primary task is to guard China’s borders. Satellite images and media photographs show that Gyalaphug is dominated by two double-storied administration buildings, the largest of which has been purpose-built for Communist Party meetings and village assemblies, following an obligatory design across the Tibetan Plateau. The one in Gyalaphug has a signboard on the roof with a hammer and sickle in yellow and the words “The Party and Serve-the-Masses Center” in Chinese and, in much smaller lettering, Tibetan. A giant painting of China’s national flag covers the endwall of one building a flagpole, perhaps 40 feet high, stands in the center of the village and a large red banner says, “Resolutely uphold the core position of General Secretary Xi Jinping! Resolutely uphold the authority of and centralized and unified leadership by the Party Central Committee!”

The actual population of the village is higher than shown in official figures because of temporary residents. They include an estimated 50 construction workers, technical advisors, and security forces, many of them Chinese rather than Tibetans. A special unit from the police agency overseeing borders is based in or near the village. The most important task of this police agency, one officer stationed on the western Tibetan border told a Chinese news agency, is to catch “illegal immigrants”—meaning Tibetans trying to flee to India or Nepal.

The village residents are required to form a joint defense team, probably with the border security police, that carries out patrols of neighboring mountains. A village-based cadre work team lives in the village, with cadres posted there for a year or more at a time, to provide “guidance” to the residents’ village committee and the village branch of the Chinese Communist Party. The team carries out political education of the villagers and helps with practical needs, such as improving techniques for growing mushrooms and vegetables in greenhouses in the village.


The Mystery of Herxheim: Was an Entire Village Cannibalized? - Geskiedenis

Photo Gallery: Traces of Stone-Age Cannibalism Found in Germany

Archaeologists found just such a pile -- a huge one -- when they were excavating a Stone Age settlement in the small town of Herxheim in south-western Germany. The only difference is that the bones aren't from cattle. Researchers found the carefully scraped remains of some 500 humans, and they haven't even excavated half the site. "We expect the number of dead to be twice as high," said Andrea Zeeb-Lanz, project leader of the Cultural Heritage Agency of the state of Rhineland-Palatinate.

That's a lot of corpses for a tiny Stone Age village. There were 10 buildings at most here in the last phase of the Linear Pottery culture of the European Neolithic Age around 5,000 to 4,950 years BC. The corpses weren't native to this area, researchers have discovered. They came from all over Europe -- from the area of what is now Paris, from the Moselle River 100 kilometers to the northwest and even from the Elbe River valley some 400 kilometers away. The broken bits of pottery lying between their ribs reveal their origin. It's the so-called Linear Pottery that gave the entire population group its name: decorated with linear patterns pressed into the moist clay while it was being made.

The strangers brought only the finest pottery from their home regions -- in many cases even more beautiful than the pottery they placed inside the graves of their own dead at home. But the pottery was smashed to pieces and scattered over the bones, along with brand new millstones and stone blades. Everything was hacked to pieces, broken up, mixed together and poured into pits.

The anthropolgist Bruno Boulestin conducted a close examination of the bone fragments. He published his findings from one pit eight meters long in the latest edition of Antiquity magazine. The pit contained a total of 1,906 bone fragments from at least 10 people. Two of them were infants or still-born children, one was a fetus in the 34th to 36th week of pregnancy, there were two children aged six and 15 and six adults, at least one of whom was male.

All of them -- babies, children, adults -- were butchered by expert hands while the bones were still fresh, as the breaks and cuts show. Boulestin concluded that the human bones bore the same marks as those of slaughtered livestock, and that the dead of Herxheim were prepared as meals. He believes that marks on the bones indicate that body parts were cooked on skewers. His conclusions contradict other researchers who believe the meat was taken off the bones as part of a burial ritual, and wasn't eaten.

No Signs of Battle Wounds

Who were the dead? Conquered enemies perhaps? Probably not, because the bones showed no signs of battle wounds. None of the skulls found was smashed, and there were no arrow heads between the ribs. The dead of Herxheim appear to have been in good health when they died. Their joints weren't worn down, their teech were in exceptionally good condition and there was no sign of malnutrition.

The theory of conquered enemies also seems unlikely given that the small group of Herxheim villagers is unlikely to have vanquished people hundreds of kilometers away and dragged 1,000 of them back to their little hamlet in the space of just 50 years. "One could also imagine that people volunteered to come here and be ritually sacrificed," Zeeb-Lanz told SPIEGEL ONLINE.

So what happed in Herxheim at the start of the fifth millennium BC? It's clear that the hamlet quickly came to fame. It had been a sleepy, uneventful place since the so-called Flomborn Phase around 5,300 years BC. But around the turn of the millennium something happened that caused people from all over Europe to make pilgrimages to this place -- a sensational feat of logistics and communication for that age.

Only 50 Years of Fame

Maar dit het nie lank gehou nie. By 4,950 BC everything was over. After that there were no more deaths in Herxheim because the settlement ceased to exist. It's a puzzling phenomenon for archaeologists because 50 years is an extremely short time for a place of such significance. "And 50 year is the maximum," says Zeeb-Lanz. "It could all have happened in just two years or even five weeks."

It's clear that it wasn't hunger that drove the inhabitants of this mysterious hamlet to carve up humans. What they did with their victims was part of a ritual, a religious ceremony. This includes the mysterious treatment of human skulls. First the skin was peeled off them. All it took was a cut across the length of the head and the skin could be peeled off the sides. Then a blow to the face at the front and the base of the neck at the back, and two blows each at the sides -- the result looks like a drinking vessel.

"But probably nobody drank from them. The edges are still so sharp today that one would cut one's lips on them," says Zeeb-Lanz. Archeologists found these prepared skulls piled together in one place. "The more research conduct, the more mysterious this place becomes."

But did the Herxheimers really devour the dead? It's impossible to prove that archaeologically. Boulestin is sure they did, but not all members of the excavation team agree with him. Project leader Zeeb-Lanz is careful too: "We mustn't forget that this was no giant settlement. Who is supposed to have eaten all this?"


10 Shanidar 350,000 B.C.

In the Zagros Mountains of Northern Iraq, archaeologists unearthed a Neanderthal murder victim. The specimen, named &ldquoShanidar 3,&rdquo was a 40󈞞 year old and died of a puncture wound to his ninth rib. After testing Paleolithic weapons on goat and pig carcasses, experts determined a lightweight throwing spear caused the damage. Neanderthals had long, heavy stabbing spears, but they did not have projectile technology.

The prime suspect: a modern human. Was it a territorial dispute? An accidental encounter with fatal consequences? Or were the modern humans hungry? Evidence has emerged that modern man cannibalized Neanderthals. Tool marks on Neanderthal jawbones from Les Rois cave in southwestern France match those on slaughtered reindeer remains from the area. Irregular groves in jaws mean one thing: Neanderthal tongues were sliced out&mdasha Paleolithic delicacy. Traces of pollen on remains deep within the Shanidar cave suggest that Neanderthals buried flowers with their dead. In the quest for hominid world domination, who were the real savages?


One rescuer singlehandedly led nine survivors out of the mountains.

Perhaps the most famous of the Donner Party’s saviors was John Stark, a burly California settler who took part in the third relief party. In early March 1847, he and two other rescuers stumbled upon 11 emigrants, mostly kids, who been left in the mountains by an earlier relief group. The two other rescuers each grabbed a single child and started hoofing it back down the slope, but Stark was unwilling to leave anyone behind. Instead, he rallied the weary adults, gathered the rest of the children and began guiding the group singlehandedly. Most of the kids were too weak to walk, so Stark took to carrying two of them at a time for a few yards, then setting them down in the snow and going back for others. He continued the grueling process all the way down the mountain, and eventually led all nine of his charges to safety. Speaking of the incident years later, one of the survivors credited her rescue to “nobody but God and Stark and the Virgin Mary.”


Haunting black-and-white image of wraithlike human holding a candle (which the Anasazi did not have) from “Nasty Witch Rock In Effect! Anasazi & Part 1 Full Sets,” on CVLTNation.com.

Image of Maasaw (aka Másaw), “Maasaw – God of Death,” by Carla Trujillo, collagraph print 2008, on her website.

Image of coprolite (not human) from a PowerPoint presentation (link downloads the PowerPoint file) by Ashley Moore-Rivera.

Image of Navajo Skinwalker (not an Anasazi witch, but they must have looked at least as fearsome) from “Native American Witchcraft- Thomas Scarponi,” March 26, 2013, on PSU.edu (that’s Penn State University).

Image of Darwin vs. Jesus from “BEYOND Evolution vs. Creation,” November 27, 2011, on 3-D Christianity.

Image of End Ethnic Cleansing from “Complicity in Ethnic Cleansing,” by Dr. Ron Forthofer, July 27, 2014, on The Globe Monitor.


Kyk die video: Herxheim - Vesnice neolitických kanibalů? - Neolitický kult mrtvých - Dokument (November 2021).