Geskiedenis Podcasts

Robert Oppenheimer - Geskiedenis

Robert Oppenheimer - Geskiedenis

Robert Oppenheimer

1904- 1967

Fisikus

Die vader van die atoombom, die Amerikaanse fisikus J. Robert Oppenheimer, het die Harvard-, Cambridge- en Gottingen -universiteit bygewoon, waaruit hy in 1927 sy doktorsgraad behaal het.

Byna 15 jaar lank het Oppenheimer gevorderde fisika by Berkeley en Cal Tech geleer, terwyl hy navorsing gedoen en studente geïnspireer het. By die uitbreek van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog is Oppenheimer versoek om die Manhattan -projek, wat uit Los Alamos werk, te lei.

Alhoewel hy en sy handgekose kollegas suksesvol was, het hy afgeraai om die atoombom te gebruik om Japan te verslaan. Na die oorlog was hy 'n sterk ondersteuner van internasionale pogings om atoomenergie te beheer.

Oppenheimer het probleme ondervind met die opkoms van McCarthyism, en in 1953 is sy veiligheidsmagtiging deur president Eisenhower opgeskort.

Oppenheimer het sy werk by Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study voortgesit en is in 1963 met die Enrico Fermi -toekenning vereer.


Hierdie maand in fisika geskiedenis


Ondanks sy lang geskiedenis van diens namens die Amerikaanse regering, was daar teen die vroeë vyftigerjare toenemende agterdog van Oppenheimer. Die fisikus het verskeie kommunistiese kennisse gehad wat uit die dertigerjare dateer, en het 'n paar van sy vriende as Sowjet-agente betrek tydens 'n ondersoek in 1942-getuienis wat hy later erken het dat dit ''n weefsel van leuens' was. Sy uitgesproke opposisie teen die ontwikkeling van die waterstofbom wat op 1 November 1952 behaal is, het min vermoedens uit die weg geruim, en die AEC het 'n toenemende lêer saamgestel van die beweerde twyfelagtige aktiwiteite van Oppenheimer. Begin Desember het die AEC -verteenwoordigers alle geheime papiere en dokumente van die Algemene Advieskommissie uit die kantoor van Oppenheimer in Princeton verwyder.

Oppenheimer se probleme word verder vererger deur die aanvang van die McCarthy -era. 'N Sleutelkomponent van die Republikeinse Party -platform in 1952 was die noodsaaklikheid om die federale regering te bevry van' subversiewe 'wat vermoedelik die stelsel binnegedring het, tesame met 'n opknapping van lojaliteit- en sekuriteitsprogramme. Senator Joseph McCarthy se oproep om 'n taai anti-kommunistiese optrede tydens die byeenkoms van daardie jaar het 'n staande toejuiging ontvang. Toe Dwight D. Eisenhower ingesweer word as die 34ste Amerikaanse president, word McCarthy voorsitter van die subkomitee vir ondersoeke van die senaat, met 'n wye mag om ondersoekende teikens te kies. Ander aanstellings in die nuwe administrasie het geen tyd gemors om 'n nuwe veiligheidsbeleid bekend te maak waarvolgens 'n staatswerknemer nie net as 'lojaal' beoordeel moes word om sy / haar agtergrond te dien nie, 'duidelik in ooreenstemming met die belange van die nasionale sekuriteit. "

In Desember 1953, net vier dae voor Kersfees, word Oppenheimer daarvan beskuldig dat hy in die verlede met kommuniste omgegaan het, dat hy die naam van Sowjet -agente vertraag het en dat hy die bou van die waterstofbom teëgestaan ​​het. 'N Volgende veiligheidsverhoor deur die AEC verklaar hom onskuldig aan verraad, maar beslis dat hy nie toegang tot militêre geheime moet hê nie, en sy kontrak as 'n AEC-adviseur-sy enigste skakel met die liggaam-is beëindig. Die AEC het sy besluit en menings op 29 Junie 1954 uitgereik met 'n stem van 4 tot 1 om Oppenheimer se sekuriteitsklaring terug te trek, met verwysing na 'fundamentele karakterdefekte' en kommunistiese verenigings 'ver buite die draagbare grense van omsigtigheid en selfbeheersing. moet verwag word van een wat die hoë posisies beklee "wat hy sedert 1942 beklee het.

Die enigste meningsverskil kom van Henry DeWolf Smyth, wat tot die gevolgtrekking gekom het "daar is geen aanduiding in die hele verslag dat dr. Oppenheimer ooit geheime inligting bekend gemaak het nie," ondanks byna 11 jaar van konstante toesig wat DeWolf geglo het "aangevul deur entoesiastiese amateurshulp van kragtige persoonlike vyande. "Na sy mening was Oppenheimer nie 'n ondermyner van twyfelagtige lojaliteit en morele karakter nie, maar ''n bekwame, verbeeldingryke mens met normale menslike swakhede en gebreke'.

Alhoewel die pers byna eenparig gunstig was vir die meerderheidsuitspraak van die AEC, het Oppenheimer se saak 'n oorsaak geword in die wetenskaplike wêreld vanweë die implikasies daarvan oor die politieke en morele kwessies rakende die rol van wetenskaplikes in die regering. Die Federasie van Amerikaanse Wetenskaplikes het hom vinnig teëgestaan ​​met 'n protesoptog teen die verhoor, en Albert Einstein en 25 kollegas in Princeton verklaar hulself "trots om die openbare uitdrukking te gee" aan hul "vertroue in [Oppenheimer se] lojaliteit en patriotiese toewyding." Ironies genoeg is Oppenheimer in Oktober eenparig herkies as direkteur van die Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, waarvan die raad minstens een lid van die kommissie ingesluit het wat sy veiligheidsverklaring ingetrek het.

Toe die kommunistiese histerie begin verdwyn en die Koue Oorlog afneem, begin Oppenheimer herstel van die pynlike episode, en hy het die laaste jare van sy lewe sy konsep oor die verhouding tussen wetenskap en die samelewing ontwikkel. In 1963 het president Lyndon B. Johnson die AEC se Enrico Fermi -toekenning aan Oppenheimer oorhandig. Drie jaar later tree die fisikus uit die Instituut en sterf die volgende jaar aan keelkanker. By sy begrafnis het Smyth (nou 'n kongreslid) Oppenheimer se vele bydraes tot die land aangehaal en diep spyt uitgespreek oor die skamele manier waarop die regering die diens terugbetaal het: 'So 'n onreg kan nooit reggemaak word nie, so 'n klad op ons geskiedenis kan nooit uitgewis word nie . "

Stern, Philip M., Die Oppenheimer -saak: sekuriteit op die proef (1969).
Michelmore, Peter, The Swift Years: The Robert Oppenheimer Story (1969).

© 1995 - 2021, AMERIKAANSE FISIESE GENOOTSKAP
APS moedig die herverdeling aan van die materiaal wat in hierdie koerant ingesluit is, op voorwaarde dat daar aan die bron toegeskryf word en die materiaal nie afgekap of verander word nie.


J. Robert Oppenheimer

J. Robert Oppenheimer het die wetenskaplike pogings gelei wat die eerste atoombom vir die Verenigde State in 1945 opgelewer het. Ondanks sy briljante prestasies by die Manhattan -projek, het Oppenheimer se bedenkinge oor atoomwapens in die algemeen gelei tot sy afsondering van die regering se wapennavorsing in die jare na die oorlog. Oppenheimer is op 22 April 1904 in New York gebore. Sy Joodse familie in Upper West Side het hom 'n vroeë lewe van welvaart gegee. Hy het die New York School for Ethical Culture bygewoon, wat hom in die geesteswetenskappe geleer het, maar hy het nog meer uitgeblink in die wetenskap. Nadat hy aan Harvard gestudeer het, het Oppenheimer na Europa gegaan en tyd aan die Universiteit van Göttingen deurgebring. Toe hy in 1929 na die Verenigde State terugkeer, neem Oppenheimer pos op die Berkeley -kampus van die Universiteit van Kalifornië. Alhoewel dit goed beskou is, het sy werk as fisikus hom nie wêreldwyd in die voorste rang geplaas nie. Nietemin het hy leierskap getoon deur die afdeling fisici in Berkeley tot een van die beste te bou. Gedurende die dertigerjare het die Groot Depressie en die opkoms van fascisme in Europa daartoe gelei dat Oppenheimer betrokke was by kampuspolitiek. Sy vriendekring het destyds 'n aantal politieke radikale ingesluit. Sulke kontakte was destyds algemeen vir lede van universiteitsgemeenskappe en Oppenheimer het geen permanente radikale sienings ontwikkel nie. Ongelukkig het hierdie verenigings dekades later teruggekeer na hom. Aan die begin van die Manhattan -projek het Oppenheimer die taak gekry om die kritieke massa uraan te bereken. Sy projekspan by Berkeley, wat die "luminaries genoem is, en#34 het Edward Teller ingesluit. Die reputasie van Oppenheimer as 'n wetenskaplike en administrateur het gelei tot sy uiteindelike aanstelling as die hoofwetenskaplike van die Manhattan -projek. Hy verhuis na Los Alamos, New Mexico, waar die belangrikste bomnavorsing gesentreer is. Gedurende sy ampstermyn het daar 'n delikate balans ontstaan ​​tussen die twee aspekte van sy werk. Die hele operasie was 'n militêre geheim, en weermagte werk op 'n basiese manier om te weet. Terselfdertyd was die wetenskaplike uitdagings enorm en die wetenskap werk die beste in 'n atmosfeer van gratis uitruil. In samewerking met generaal Leslie R. Groves, die persoon met die uiteindelike beheer oor die projek, kon Oppenheimer genoeg vryheid vir sy navorsers verkry sonder om sekuriteit in te boet. Die hoogtepunt kom in die somer van 1945. Die eerste toets is uitgevoer by Trinity in die New Mexico -woestyn op 16 Julie 1945. Twee bomme is vroeg in Augustus op Japan laat val, wat die oorlog in die Stille Oseaan vinnig beëindig het. Nadat hy die eerste toets in Trinity beleef het, het Oppenheimer geskryf dat sommige gelag het, sommige gehuil het en deur sy gedagtes 'n lyn van die Bhagavadgita af gevloei het: "I am become death: the destroyer of worlds. " His ambivalance towards the use of science want militêre doeleindes het gelei tot sy opposisie teen die ontwikkeling van 'n waterstofbom na die oorlog. Ongelukkig vir hom het die Sowjetunie sy eie atoomwapen in 1948 ontplof, wat geweldige druk op die VSA veroorsaak het om die nog groter samesmeltingswapen te ontwikkel. Sy opposisie het die vermoede laat ontstaan ​​dat hy ontrou was en dat openbare verhore in 1953 gehou is. In die latere lewe is sy reputasie herstel, maar Oppenheimer sou nooit weer die hoof van 'n groot navorsingsorganisasie wees nie. Hy sterf op 18 Februarie 1967 aan keelkanker.


KONFLIKWETENSKAPLIKE – Robert Oppenheimer

Gebore: 22 April 1904, New York
Getroud: Katherine Puening Harrison in 1940
Velde: Teoretiese fisika
Instellings: Universiteit van Kalifornië, Berkeley, Kalifornië Instituut vir Tegnologie, Los Alamos Laboratory, Instituut vir Gevorderde Studie.
Oorlede: 18 Februarie 1967 Princeton, New Jersey

In die 1930's was teoretiese fisika 'n serebrale slagveld. Europa was in 'n wetenskaplike konflik met Noord -Amerika om 'n atoombom te bou. Die wetenskap agter die splitsing van die atoom was in teorie gevestig, nou was dit tyd om dit in die praktyk te bewys. Spanne uit Duitsland, Brittanje en Amerika het in laboratoriums gewerk om materiaal te toets wat uiteindelik besluit oor Uranium.

Die Japannese aanval op Pearl Harbor het die projek ekstra stukrag gegee met die skepping van The Manhattan Project, 'n onbeskryflike naam vir 'n projek wat die wêreld totaal en ewig sou verander. Om hierdie projek aan te pak, het hulle 'n briljante gedagte gehad dat die gedagte aan Julius Robert Oppenheimer behoort.

Oppenheimer se bydrae tot die verandering van die gesig van moderne oorlogvoering is ongeëwenaard, maar dit het hom ook een van die mees omstrede en verdelende karakters van die 20ste eeu gemaak. Nooit was 'n wetenskaplike nouer verbonde aan 'n wapensisteem as met die ontwikkeling van die bomme wat in 1945 op Hiroshima en Nagasaki gebruik is nie. Sy lof van 'The Father of the Atom bomb' was 'n vergiftigde kelk waarmee hy moeilik kon saamleef . Hy word aangehaal tydens die eerste atoombomontploffing by Trinity in New Mexico op 16 Julie 1945: 'Nou word ek die dood, die vernietiger van wêrelde.'

Oppenheimer is gebore uit 'n welgestelde Joodse emigrantfamilie en is opgevoed aan die Ethical Culture Society School. Hy was 'n briljante student wat die derde en vierde graad in een jaar voltooi het. Hy betree die universiteit van Harvard op 18 -jarige ouderdom en neem 'n kursus oor termodinamika wat Percy Bridgman geleer het, wat hom tot eksperimentele fisika lok.

Vroeg in sy akademiese loopbaan merk eweknieë in Oppenheimer op 'n al te skynbare selfvernietigende neiging. Hy het gereeld rook vasgemaak en sonder kos gegaan terwyl hy op probleme konsentreer. By 'n ander geleentheid, terwyl hy Parys saam met sy vriend Francis Ferguson besoek het, het Oppenheimer depressief gelyk. In 'n poging om hom op te beur, het Ferguson aan sy vriend gesê dat hy met sy vriendin trou. Oppenheimer het dadelik opgespring en Ferguson probeer wurg. Oppenheimer se depressie het hom so geteister dat hy eenkeer vir sy broer gesê het: 'Ek het fisika meer nodig as vriende.'

Die studie van teoretiese fisika het Oppenheimer verteer. In 1926 studeer hy by die wêreldbekende Max Born en ontmoet hy mense soos Werner Heisenberg, Pascual Jordan, Enrico Fermi en Edward Teller. Oppenheimer se lewe sou verander na 'n ligte geval van tuberkulose toe hy die Nobelpryswenner, die eksperimentele fisikus Ernest O Lawrence en sy baanbrekers in die siklotron ontmoet.

Beskuldigings van kommunisme

In die dertigerjare het hy die status quo uitgedaag en sy aktiwiteite is deur baie gesaghebbendes bevraagteken as nie-Amerikaans en selfs kommunisties. Sy vermeende bande met die kommunisme sou sy latere loopbaan teister met die klaring wat soms deur die owerheid geblokkeer word. Hy was ook gereeld onder toesig van die FBI wat Oppenheimer persone bygevoeg het wat tydens 'n nasionale noodgeval in die gevangenis sou bly.

President Roosevelt het op 9 Oktober 1941 befondsing vir atoombomnavorsing goedgekeur en Oppenheimer is gewerf om aan die program te werk om neutronberekeninge te bestudeer met die titel Koördineerder van Rapid Rupture. Deur die hele projek het die FBI hul toesig gehou, selfs nadat hy hom op gesinsuitstappies gevolg het.

Maar Oppenheimer se briljante verstand was nodig vir die Manhattan -projek, soveel so dat brigadier -generaal Leslie R Groves Junior, die direkteur van die Manhattan -projek, op 20 Julie 1943 geskryf het: 'In ooreenstemming met my mondelinge voorskrifte van 15 Julie, is dit wenslik dat klaring word onverwyld aan Julius Robert Oppenheimer uitgereik, ongeag die inligting wat u oor die heer Oppenheimer het. Hy is absoluut noodsaaklik vir die projek. '

Oppenheimer en Groves het besluit om die Manhattan -projek na Los Alamos in New Mexico te verskuif, wat ruimte en beveiliging bied as gevolg van die afgeleë ligging. Daar het Oppenheimer 'n groep van die top -natuurkundiges bymekaargemaak waarna hy die 'luminaries' genoem het. Die paar honderd personeel wat hom in 1943 by hom aangesluit het, het teen die einde van 1945 geleidelik gegroei tot ongeveer 6000.

Baie valse ontwikkelingspaaie het uiteindelik daartoe gelei dat met 'n implosietipe wapen met chemiese plofbare lense begin is. Hierdie toestel sal die sub-kritiese sfeer van uraan 235 in 'n kleiner en digter massa druk.

Op 16 Julie 1945 het die eerste kernontploffing by Alamogordo plaasgevind. Die naam wat Oppenheimer aan hierdie ligging gegee het, was Trinity, 'n naam van een van John Donne se Holy Sonnets. Die briljante oranje bal van brandende woede en die onmiskenbare sampioenwolk het Oppenheimer eenvoudig laat sê: 'Dit het gewerk'.

Na die oorlog

Die naoorlogse Robert Oppenheimer het aanvanklik 'n Amerikaanse held geword, selfs op die voorblaaie van Life en Time-tydskrifte, en het kortliks weer begin leer. Die FBI het egter nooit opgehou om die politieke aktiwiteite van Oppenheimer te ondersoek nie, maar het op sy foon getik en sy pos gelees. Op 7 Junie 1949 verskyn Robert Oppenheimer voor die House Un-American Activities Committee, waar hy erken dat hy in die 1930's assosiasies met die Kommunistiese Party gehad het.

Drie jaar later in November 1953 ontvang J Edgar Hoover 'n brief van William Liscum Borden, voormalige uitvoerende direkteur van die Gesamentlike Atoomenergiekomitee van die Kongres. Die brief bevat die mening van Borden dat, op grond van jare lange studie, van die beskikbare geklassifiseerde bewyse, waarskynlik dat Robert Oppenheimer 'n agent van die Sowjetunie is. ' ondersoek. Hy is uiteindelik skoongemaak, maar die skade is reeds aangerig aan sy reputasie.

Oppenheimer se laaste jare is by sy huis in St John op die Maagde -eilande deurgebring. In 1963 word Oppenheimer deels met die Enrico Fermi -toekenning bekroon, deels as 'n gebaar van politieke rehabilitasie deur die Amerikaanse regering. Die aanhaling lui: 'Vir bydraes tot die teoretiese fisika as 'n onderwyser en idee -ontwerper, en vir die leierskap van die Los Alamos -laboratorium en die atoomenergieprogram gedurende kritieke jare.'

In 1965 is keelkanker by hom gediagnoseer en is hy op 18 Februarie 1967 oorlede.

KWOTASIES

In 'n growwe sin, wat geen vulgariteit, geen humor, geen oordrywing heeltemal kan uitdoof nie, het die natuurkundiges sonde geken, en dit is 'n kennis wat hulle nie kan verloor nie.

Daar is kinders wat in die strate speel wat sommige van my belangrikste probleme in die fisika kan oplos, omdat hulle 'n sensoriese waarneming het wat ek lank gelede verloor het

Die optimis dink dat dit die beste van alle moontlike wêrelde is. Die pessimis vrees dat dit waar is.

Geen mens moet aan ons universiteite ontsnap sonder om te weet hoe min hy weet nie.

As die glans van duisend sonne tegelyk in die lug sou bars, sou dit soos die prag van die magtige een wees. Nou het ek die dood geword, die vernietiger van wêrelde.


Die Manhattan -projek

Stephane Groueff: Ek wil van die begin af begin. My boek, ek is van plan om met die jaar 1942 te begin, want anders is daar geen beperking nie. 'N Paar maande voor die Manhattan -distrik en besluit om te gaan -

J. Robert Oppenheimer: Die besluit is eintlik op 6 Desember geneem om die saak ernstig op te neem.

Groueff: ’41?

Oppenheimer: Reg.

Groueff: Na Pearl Harbor?

Oppenheimer: Voor Pearl Harbor.

Groueff: Voor Pearl Harbor.

Oppenheimer: Natuurlik het die eerste ontdekking en die interpretasie daarvan vroeg in 1939 almal se belangstelling getrek. Ek het net vriendelik gepraat oor die kritieke vergaderings en sulke dinge. Maar ek was nie geïnteresseerd in splitsing nie. Ek het ander professionele belangstellings gehad. En ek is eers in September van 41 'daaraan toegedraai en dan deur 'n diskresie - 'n vooraanstaande Engelse besoeker het met Lawrence en my begin praat.

Groueff: Was u 'n professor in Berkeley?

Oppenheimer: Dit is reg. En duidelik was sy bron van vertroue die werk van [Rudolf] Peierls in Engeland. En hy het gesê dat dit verskriklik was dat ek en [Enrico] Fermi nie hierby betrokke was nie.

Groueff: Wie het dit gesê, die Engelsman?

Oppenheimer: Die Engelsman. En dit het Lawrence die idee gegee dat ek saam met hom na die akademie en komitee moet gaan wat hierdie probleme oorweeg. En ter voorbereiding daarvoor het ek daarna begin kyk, 'n paar redelike idees oor die moontlike omvang van kritieke massas, die gebruik van die sogenaamde sabotasie, waarskynlike samestelling, en dit bespreek, dink ek op 'n konserwatiewe, maar bevestigende manier by die vergadering .

Groueff: Dit was 'n vergadering waar?

Oppenheimer: In Schenectady, eintlik.

Groueff: Schenectady.

Oppenheimer: Miskien in Oktober. Ek het nie die datum nie.

Groueff: Dus kom u na hierdie ontmoeting met—?

Oppenheimer: Na die bespreking.

Groueff: Na die gesprek met Lawrence. Was dit [Mark] Oliphant?

Oppenheimer: U sal die naam moet verskaf, want ek sal nie.

Groueff: Goed.

Oppenheimer: En daarna het ek belanggestel. Lawrence het hierdie fantastiese elektromagnetiese metode gehad waarmee ek die doeltreffendheid daarvan met 'n baie groot faktor kon vergroot, wat wel gewerk het, maar dit was net 'n kwessie van hoe om magnetiese velde te ontwerp. En na Pearl Harbor was daar 'n vergadering met die oprigting van die Metallurgical Laboratory en ek het dit bygewoon.

Groueff: Dit was in Chicago.

Oppenheimer: Dit was in Chicago, waarskynlik die tweede van Januarie of die 26ste Desember - dit was net na Kersfees of Nuwejaar. U kan dit uitvind. En gedurende die lente het ek wel 'n boodskap van [Gregory] Breit gekry wat my gevra het of ek nie saam met hom wou werk nie. Maar om redes wat vir my bekend is, maar nie vir my duidelik is nie, het Compton gevoel dat hy by die Metallurgical Laboratory 'n groep moes hê wat die werklike probleme van die bom ondersoek en nie die reaktor nie. En ek dink hy wou hê dat Carl Anderson, 'n kosmiese straalfisikus van CalTech, in beheer daarvan sou wees, maar Anderson het geweier. Die projek was in 'n slegte toestand, daar is gedink dat dit sleg uitgevoer is, dat hulle nooit sou kom nie en dat daar meer nuttige dinge vir die oorlog was.

Ek het na Chicago gegaan en Compton het my gevra om dit te beheer, en die res is volgens my onlangs opgeneem.

Groueff: Dus, totdat u by die Metallurgical Lab aangesluit het, het u deeltyds gewerk-?

Oppenheimer: Eintlik werk ek glad nie amptelik nie.

Groueff: Jy het gehelp.

Oppenheimer: Ek het mense ontmoet en ek het 'n nuttige, nie baie opwindende, werk gedoen nie.

Groueff: Het u nie 'n spesifieke taak gehad om te voltooi soos Lawrence of Compton of die ander mense gehad het nie?

Oppenheimer: Nee. Alhoewel ek besef het dat daar 'n werk is, het ek nie gedink dit is myne nie, maar ek het nie besef dat dit myne was nie. Maar dit het verander in die lente van '42 en ek het eers uitgevind wat dit was en het gesien dat dit ly - dit is alles geskiedenis - van 'n vreeslike gebrek aan kommunikasie, wanopvattings van geheimhouding en van onvoldoende teoretiese leiding.

Groueff: Dus, sedert die begin, het u aan die probleme van kritieke massa en samestelling gewerk?

Oppenheimer: Dit het in die herfs van '41 begin.

Groueff: Ek sien. Nie soveel in die skeiding nie.

Oppenheimer: Nee, behalwe vir hulp om die projek in Kalifornië te doen.

Groueff: Ek sien.

Oppenheimer: En ek sou sê dat vandat die splitsing ontdek is en ons romanties gesels het oor wat ek die Mojave -eksperiment noem - dit was die verkeerde woestyn - tot die tyd toe ons dit weer in die herfs van 1941 opneem , Ek het gedink aan 'n heeltemal ander vraag. En daarna word dit goed opgeneem. Ek hoef nie te herhaal nie.

Groueff: Onthou jy die omstandighede van jou eerste ontmoeting met Groves?

Oppenheimer: Ja.

Groueff: Ek dink hy het gesê dit is op die trein.

Oppenheimer: Nee, die eerste ontmoeting met Groves was in die huis van die president van die Universiteit van Kalifornië. Dit is Sproul genoem en ons het daar geëet, dink ek. En na middagete het ek gesê: 'Hierdie ding sal nooit op die spoor kom nie, tensy daar 'n plek is waar mense met mekaar kan praat en saam kan werk aan die probleme van die bom. En dit kan by Oak Ridge wees, dit kan 'n woestyn in Kalifornië wees, maar êrens moet 'n plek wees waar mense vry is om te bespreek wat hulle weet en wat hulle nie weet nie en om uit te vind wat hulle kan. " En dit het 'n indruk op hom gemaak.

Die volgende keer was ons in Chicago en hy het my gevra om saam met hom te reis — waarskynlik Nichols.

Groueff: Marshall waarskynlik.

Oppenheimer: Marshall, ja, op die 20ste eeu Beperk. En ek het dit vir 'n sekere afstand gedoen, en op daardie tydstip het ons ooreengekom dat ons 'n laboratorium sou probeer oprig.

Groueff: Maar was dit toe dat u aangesê is om—?

Oppenheimer: Ek is deur Compton aangestel, maar dit was 'n verantwoordelikheid sonder om iets daaraan te doen.

Groueff: Maar die besluit dat u die hele projek van die montering van die bom en dit alles aan die kant van die wapen moet hê, was -?

Oppenheimer: Dit was waarskynlik ietwat later. My argument was nie dat ek die hoof moet wees nie, maar dat dit moet bestaan.

Groueff: Ek sien.

Oppenheimer: Groves sou dit beter weet, maar daar was waarskynlik 'n lang tydperk van besluiteloosheid oor wie die beste persoon sou wees. Ek weet dat my vriend Ed McMillan oorweeg is, wat toe waarskynlik nie heeltemal reg was nie. Hy is nou die direkteur van die Lawrence Laboratory. Ek dink dat dit na 'n sekere mate van onsekerheid en wankeling formeel bevestig is in die eerste dae van 1943. Maar dit is alles 'n rekord, ek het dit net nie.

'N Brief is deur Groves en Conant aan my gestuur om die laboratorium te vestig en ek as die direkteur daarvan, en dit word gepubliseer in—

Groueff: Ek het dit gesien. Maar u keuse is waarskynlik tussen Compton aan die een kant en Groves gemaak?

Oppenheimer: Wel, in die natuur is ek nie 'n kenner daarvan nie.

Groueff: En so van daar af?

Oppenheimer: Wel, in '42 in die herfs is dinge so gevorderd dat ons eintlik 'n plek begin soek het. En ek en McMillan het saam met een van Groves se offisiere gegaan en Groves het by ons aangesluit en hy hou van die Los Alamos -perseel, wat ek hom gewys het, en dit was beslis beter as die een wat die beampte gevind het. Of dit goed was of nie, weet ek nie. Die werk aan die Los Alamos -projek het dus in die herfs van '42 begin, en ek was betrokke by die ontwerp van laboratoriums, huise. Al die huise het balkonne en kaggels.

Groueff: Dit was u groot bydrae [lag]?

Oppenheimer: Dit was my groot bydrae [lag]. En ek dink die werklike bevestiging van my verantwoordelikheid het moontlik baie vroeg in '43 gekom, ek is nie heeltemal seker nie, na baie gesprekke, want ek het die hele tyd mense gewerf, en ek het altyd die idee ontdek om te gaan in uniform was heeltemal onwelkom. Die brief van Groves en Conant bied 'n soort kompromie aan, wat eintlik nooit uitgevoer is nie. Dit is altyd baie moeilik om te onthou dat dinge wat moeilik gemaak is en lank geneem het om terug te dink, heeltemal duidelik is.

Groueff: Ja.

Oppenheimer: En ons verhuis, ek en my gesin, in die middel van Maart '43 en gaan na die ondertekening van die eerste wetenskaplikes in Mei.

Groueff: Dit het destyds 'n bietjie bestaan ​​-?

Oppenheimer: Ons het eintlik ingetrek in een van die onderwysershuise wat daar in die ou skool was. Die nuwe huise was nog nie voltooi nie, die laboratorium was nie voltooi nie, maar dit was moontlik om 'n hoofkwartier te vestig.

Groueff: En u het geweet dat die omgewing - u die seunsskool daar vantevore geken het uit u kinderjare?

Oppenheimer: Wel, nee. Sedert '21, dink ek, was ek na New Mexico en sedert '29 het ons 'n plaas in die Sangre de Cristo gehad, wat ons nog het. Dit is ongeveer drie duisend meter hoog. En dit is vyf-en-vyftig myl langs 'n baie rowwe en vreeslike roete van daar na Los Alamos, so ons het perd daaroor gery. So ek was daar maar -

Groueff: En het dit gehelp met die keuse van die webwerf?

Oppenheimer: Dit het my laat weet dat dit bestaan, omtrent alles. Dit was net die ander plek, wat diep in die canyon was, in werklikheid, selfs vir ons aanvanklike planne, onvoldoende ruimte was. Dit sou heeltemal onmoontlik gewees het om die dinge te doen wat ons moes doen. Maar ek het ook gevoel dat as u mense gaan vra om beperk te wees, u dit nie onder in 'n canyon moet plaas nie. U moet dit bo -op 'n mes sit. Ek dink dit was selfs belangriker as die tegniese besonderhede.

Groueff: Dit blyk dus die goeie webwerf te wees, die ideale plek vir die projek.

Oppenheimer: Ek kan nie sê dat dit baie baie nadele gehad het nie. Maar dit was nie 'n plek waar u afgesluit voel omdat u oor die hele vallei kyk nie.

Groueff: Ek het besoek.

Oppenheimer: En ons het nie genoeg water gehad wat 'n ewige probleem was nie. Die probleem om dinge aan te skaf was baie erger as wat dit nodig was as gevolg van sekuriteit en omdat daar eintlik geen vervoer was nie. Sodat ek nie sal sê dat dit die ideale webwerf was nie, maar dit was goed genoeg.

Groueff: Dit was aantrekliker as Oak Ridge of Hanford. Baie mooi plek, ek was mal daar.

Oppenheimer: En ek sal Emilio Segre aanhaal, met wie u moontlik gepraat het, toe hy die eerste keer in April 433 daar aangekom het. Hy het by hierdie gebou gestaan ​​wat nog steeds daar is, Fuller Lodge genoem, 'n soort hotel. En daardie tyd was daar niks voor nie en kyk u uit oor die woestyn en na die Sangre de Cristo, bedek met sneeu. Dit was uiters mooi. En Segre het gesê: 'Ons gaan hierdie siening haat.' [Lag]

Groueff: Maar eintlik het hulle dit geniet en ek verstaan ​​later dat sommige van hulle op ski was en dat u te perd gaan.

Oppenheimer: Ons het perde in die land gehad en in Junie het ek en Robert Wilson, my vrou, dit gaan haal. En ek en my vrou, ons het 'n perd gehou en die ander vir ander gegee.

Groueff: En het u hulle by Los Alamos gehou?

Oppenheimer: Reg. Daar was 'n taamlik vreemde idee dat geheimhouding bewaar kan word deur 'n paar arm soldate op perde om die heining te laat ry. Dit het nie veel goed gedoen nie [lag].

Groueff: Maar hoe het u die kern van u span daar gevorm, die heel eerste manne wat u gewerf het? Het u persoonlik gereis?

Oppenheimer: Ja.

Groueff: Van universiteit tot universiteit?

Oppenheimer: Ek het in die eerste plek gegaan na diegene wat aan die probleem gewerk het, of aan die rand van die program. Ons het in die somer van '42 'n ontmoeting by Berkeley gehad met ses of sewe goeie teoretiese natuurkundiges. En die meeste van hulle was dit met my eens dat hulle 'n werkplek nodig het. En een van hulle wou nie kom nie, maar die ander een wou. Daar was 'n sentrum in Stanford, daar was 'n sentrum in Minnesota, daar was 'n sentrum in Princeton, daar was 'n sentrum in Cornell en 'n paar ander, maar ek probeer nie volledig wees nie. En ek het gaan kuier en gesien wie wil hulle kom nooi.

Groueff: Sonder om te weet waar die webwerf is?

Oppenheimer: Nee, op daardie stadium was die webwerf aanvanklik waarskynlik vaag en later minder vaag. Dit was altyd die probleem van hoeveel 'n mens kan sê. Ek onthou natuurlik dat ek Princeton besoek het om 'n groep mense bymekaar te maak. En toe begin ek met mense praat by die Stralingslaboratorium en die mense wat aan nabyheidsversekerings en ander projekte werk, met leiding oor wie gespaar kan word. En [ek het met] 'n paar mense van die Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago gepraat, sommige van die bestralingslaboratorium in Berkeley. Dit was dus nie triviaal om mense te oortuig dat dit werklik is nie, maar dit was nie heeltemal gek om te weet waar om te begin nie, sien u.

Groueff: U het toe begin by mense wat 'n verband met die projek gehad het, soos Chicago?

Oppenheimer: Regtig, alhoewel ek baie gou na die MIT Radiation Laboratory, die Radar Center, gegaan het om 'n paar goeie wetenskaplikes soos Breit en [Luis] Alvarez en [Kenneth] Bainbridge te kry.

Groueff: Dit is nog 'n fantastiese ding. Dit lyk vir my asof daar in oorlogstyd met soveel belangrike projekte met die hoogste prioriteit gedink moet word dat al die wetenskaplikes, of ten minste die goeies, die gewildste so hoog sal wees dat as u met 'n nuwe projek begin, om bymekaar te kom -

Oppenheimer: Onthou, dit was '43 'en die krisis van radar- en nabyheidsversekerings was verby.

Groueff: Ek sien. En ook die Chicago -groep -

Oppenheimer: Daar was baie interessant hierin, sodat mense dit wou doen as hulle kon. Sommige, nie almal nie.

Groueff: Maar u het dit gebou, sodat dit nie tegelyk gebou is nie, maar bietjie vir bietjie.

Oppenheimer: Nee, ek dink ons ​​bevolking het elke vier maande verdubbel.

Groueff: Verdubbel?

Oppenheimer: Dus, aangesien ons 'n paar jaar daar was, was dit 'n redelik vinnige groei.

Groueff: Kan u my 'n paar name gee van die heel eerste mense wat saam met u na Los Alamos gekom het?

Oppenheimer: Ja. John Manley, Robert Wilson, John Williams, [Joseph] Kennedy, [Hans] Bethe baie vroeg, [Robert] Serber, [Emil John] Konopinski. Ek kon aangaan.

Groueff: Dus het u met hulle begin, en elkeen van hulle het meer voorstelle vir werwing?

Oppenheimer: Wel, die werwing was in die eerste plek vir min of meer my kommer. Robert Wilson was baie vroeg daar en het byvoorbeeld [Richard] Dick Feynman saamgebring. Hy was briljant.

Groueff: Ja, hy is baie kleurvol en het my baie kleurryke verhale oor Pasadena gegee.

Oppenheimer: Wel, hy was destyds in Princeton.

Groueff: Hy moes 'n kind gewees het.

Oppenheimer: Hy was.

Groueff: Toe ek hom nou sien, lyk hy soos 'n jong man - 'n baie aantreklike tipe akteur.

Oppenheimer: Ja. Wel, hy was toe nie so jonk en aantreklik nie, maar hy was - wel, dit is alles goed opgeteken en daar is geen sin om tyd te mors nie.

Groueff: What I want to emphasize in this book is the difficulties and the obstacles in technical or scientific or technological areas and how were they overcome. Now of course, in your part of the work, some of the details are classified.

Oppenheimer: Yeah, I do not know what is classified. This makes it difficult for me.

Groueff: I mean the specification, of course, would be appreciated. I do not intend to do anything and to write anything technical but I would like to find examples that I can give as extraordinary difficult tasks or something which bordered the impossible, which at the first sight, seemed impossible—let’s say like in gas diffusion, to find this kind of barrier or a seal or pump was so difficult that there are moments when probably the whole project, or this part, would fail. For instance, I found examples about the coating of the slugs, which was a fantastic technological part. Or for instance, the nickel plating of the diffusers and things like that. Now, which were in Los Alamos?

Oppenheimer: Have you read the technical history of Los Alamos?

Groueff: The history?

Oppenheimer: Technical history.

Groueff: Is that the one in two volumes by—?

Oppenheimer: Hawkins.

Groueff: Hawkins, yes.

Oppenheimer: That is a good place to find this out.

Groueff: Yes that is enough for my purposes but I would like to hear your opinion if I have to single out, let’s say, three, four, five problems, like say the problems of the new metallurgy of known metals or the tamper problem or the initiator or implosion?

Oppenheimer: Well, I think the set of problems connected with implosion was the most difficult and it required very new experimental techniques. And it was not a branch of physics which anyone was very familiar with.

Groueff: It did not exist before then?

Oppenheimer: No, no. And this was, both from a theoretical, from an observational, and from a practical point of view, quite an adventure and it was still a very reasonable opinion that one of the many things that were needed to make it work was not completely in order on July 16. The doubts which then existed were not of a metaphysical quality [laugh]. I think that was the main thing we had always had this in mind as a possibly more effective and more sensible way to assemble a bomb. But as you undoubtedly know, we were forced to it in the case of plutonium.

Groueff: The gun method you could not use.

Oppenheimer: Dit is 'n baie stumpfsinnig [dull] method anyway. And I think that at the time, when the laboratory had a sense of agonia was when we knew we had to do this and did not know whether we could. And the initial hopes we had, we never were able to prove out in a way which was convincing observationally and therefore retreated to a method which we could prove out and which worked but which was not the ideal one. But now we get very close to things of which I am sure the Russians know everything but I am not sure I am supposed to tell you.

Groueff: Was the principle of implosion known before in Europe?

Oppenheimer: Geen.

Groueff: What was the contribution for that of [Seth] Neddermeyer, a young scientist?

Oppenheimer: Well he did suggest it. He had been working on explosives, but he missed two of the essential points. The first is that under conditions of a good implosion, one would not be dealing with the assembly of solids but with fluid dynamics. And the second was that one would not be dealing with the materials of constant density but materials which could be compressed. Neither of these were in Neddermeyer’s mind. He just said, “Why, if you want to get things together quickly, don’t you send them in from all sides at once?”

Groueff: So the general idea?

Oppenheimer: The general idea and I would think in developing the point [John] Von Neumann played a quite decisive part because he had worked on the shaped charge problems.

Groueff: He did not work on the implosion.

Oppenheimer: Yes, sure, he did.

Groueff: But not in the whole project.

Oppenheimer: He was not responsible he was a consultant but he certainly had very useful ideas.

Groueff: So you had people who worked on the explosives or the tamper part of it or the initiator or the decompression?

Oppenheimer: Well we had people, first of all, who tried to get the nuclear physics straight because this was not known.

Groueff: The theoretical department?

Oppenheimer: No, no, the experimental department. When we went to Los Alamos, it was not known how many neutrons were emitted when nuclear had fission with fast neutrons. And of course, without knowing that, you did not know if it would work or not. It was not known whether there were any time delays and if so, how long they were. Without that you could not have an explosive. So our first experiments were directed towards these fundamental questions of feasibility.

Groueff: From a number of questions as far as neutrons go, were they developed in laboratories only about slow neutrons?

Oppenheimer: Right, and very incompletely because no one had studied the problem of time delay.

Groueff: Chicago people did not work on fast neutrons?

Oppenheimer: Well, they never asked that question. Then there was, of course, a large and in the end, unavailing effort to purify plutonium so it could be slowly assembled. And a whole division of the laboratory worked on that and then found out that it was not relevant, unusable, and started working on other things.

Groueff: So it is correct if I assume and what I want to point out in the chapters about Los Alamos was entirely new scientists had to be—

Oppenheimer: The technologists.

Groueff: or technologists but also even some fundamental—

Oppenheimer: Eksperimente. Yes, plutonium turned out not to be a cozy metal and one could actually take advantage of its peculiar properties and we did. But they were very hard to get straight in adequate amounts.

For a year, Chicago and Los Alamos got different densities from plutonium. Since the densities closely connected to the critical size, this was not trivial.

Groueff: I talked to some of your—

Oppenheimer: Have you talked to Cyril Smith?

Groueff: I was given his name and I intend to talk to him.

Oppenheimer: Oh, he would be very good.

Groueff: I talked to one of his men, [Robert] Bacher, and generally, people from lab. I saw [Raemer] Schreiber and [John] Manley and [Charles] Critchfield—each one gave me a piece. But from all those pieces, I think that what impressed me very much is being fantastically difficult or new without precedent, were the problems of implosion, which involves several things.

Oppenheimer: Well, and of course, the determination of critical mass, which we started when we had only a few hundred grams of uranium-235 and in which we had to become expert because it was serious. The detailed experimental study of the dynamics of implosions—this was very hard. And the initiator was nontrivial just because it had to be quiet—and really quiet—and then suddenly burst. This was nontrivial and the implosion was technologically nontrivial just on the small scale to make a thing, which was non-neutron emitting to a very high degree and then suddenly made the necessary burst. There are better initiators now but this caused people a lot of trouble.

And plutonium was a terrible test from beginning to end and never stayed quiet: it gets hot, it is radioactive, you cannot touch it, you have to coat it, and the coating always peels. It is just a terrible substance and it is one reason why—

Groueff: And the length changes with different temperatures.

Oppenheimer: Yes, and different impurities. So it has never been used for peaceful atomic power because you cannot buy anyone to pay any attention to it [laugh]. And we had to do it for other reasons.

Groueff: So plutonium is much more difficult than uranium 235?

Oppenheimer: O ja.

Groueff: Which also was unknown.

Oppenheimer: Yes, but which is, from a chemical point of view, so like uranium-238. The radioactivity is very minor. It does not warm up, it does not have many different allotropic forms. It is perfect permeable—you can look it up in a book. Plutonium we could not look at it the same way. And problems understanding the process of the explosion in order to get some rough idea of how big to make the bomb were very difficult theoretical problems and not really solved because we did not know how big the explosion would be.

And of understanding the partition of energy in different media after the bomb had detonated—these were all novel problems, not fundamental. There was not a single fundamental problem involved but all novel, technological problems involving quite unusual equipment because we were working with microseconds for the implosion and nanoseconds for the explosion.

Groueff: What is a microsecond?

Oppenheimer: Ten to the minus nine. And there was no electronic equipment to do that. We had to invent it.

Groueff: That is a fantastic aspect to the project everything went on single-handedly from the theoretical, experimental, and even that mathematical prediction.

Oppenheimer: Technological, yes.

Groueff: So in other words, your people working on plutonium characteristics could not have a sample to work with.

Oppenheimer: Not for a long time.

Groueff: They had to wait.

Oppenheimer: Well, they turned out to be a remarkable lot with very little [to work with].

Groueff: Sometimes by luck, I understand, or even sometimes with the wrong assumption, I was given some examples about the chemists doing the right job on the wrong assumption—I think it was about chemistry of plutonium, assuming for certain things that plutonium would behave like uranium. And the whole thing worked, but for different reasons.

Oppenheimer: Reg. I think this may be a Chicago invention because we came a little later.

Groueff: The [Glenn] Seaborg group.

Oppenheimer: You must remember that all the time we were monitoring radiation, measuring spontaneous fission, trying to find out the nature of the territory we were in, and also exploring radical things, many of which would never have worked, some of which have worked since but which were beyond our assured means at the time. So for a long time, Los Alamos continued essentially doing the things which we had decided were too dangerous, too unsure to do during war. Not all of them worked but most of them did.

Groueff: These are fantastic examples.

Oppenheimer: Well there were a lot of very bright people.

Groueff: I’m going back in to see Dr. Bacher, he was one of the important ones, one of the top people.

Oppenheimer: And so was Cyril Smith.

Groueff: Smith, yeah, he is at MIT.

Oppenheimer: Now the chemist, Kennedy, died.

Groueff: He was a very young man, no?

Oppenheimer: He was a very young man, a six-foot-three Texan. But a man who was very close to him was Arthur Wahl, who was at Washington University. Who was at Brookhaven and who had a lot to do with the initiator and many other things.

Groueff: Dodson.

Oppenheimer: Dodson. He is head of the Chemistry Division at Brookhaven. I think [Bruno] Rossi played a very large part. And in fact, the group leaders are all listed and it is worth to talking to all of them if they are still available. Some of them are English and that might be a little more complicated.

Groueff: I intend to see Bethe and Cyril Smith and Bainbridge.

Oppenheimer: Bacher?

Groueff: Bacher, I saw him in Pasadena. Feynman I saw—he gave me very interesting things.

Oppenheimer: So there is no point in my giving you these lists because they are published. But actually, every group—and they vary from time to time in what they were doing—had something important to do and any one of them is worth talking to. The man who did the circuitry for these very short-time scales is Willy Higinbotham, who was at Brookhaven. Now by today’s standards it is not much but it was a lot then.

Groueff: Reg. And each group had a story, which is worthwhile?

Oppenheimer: Most groups, I would say. They were loosely organized in divisions and the divisions represented in the governing body. And I would not like to tell you who had the hardest problem.

Groueff: But how much didn’t you know about the other projects? You and your main group leaders, did you know about Hanford or about Oak Ridge?

Oppenheimer: Well, I had to know how it was going because I had to know about the flow of material. I happen to know pretty much about Hanford and essentially everything about the electromagnetic method. I learned more or less by accident about the thermal diffusion method and asked Groves to look into it. And I actually do not, to this day, know how to make a barrier. I do not care. But I had to know the scheduling.

Groueff: But you did not go to Oak Ridge?

Oppenheimer: I went to Oak Ridge. I went more than once to Berkeley. I went to Washington. I think I never went to Hanford, it was not necessary, but I went to Chicago quite often, which was the headquarters.

Groueff: So this compartmentalization they talk about—

Oppenheimer: Was not relevant in my case.

Groueff: Yes, for most of the top people, it did not apply.

Oppenheimer: Well, I am sure there are things I did not know about counterintelligence operations.

Groueff: The military side.

Oppenheimer: Well, about the truly military side, we had to know. But about the military intelligence side, we did not know too much. About the barrier problems, it would have been easy to find out but it never bothered me because I understood that finally it was coming out all right, that is really all I needed to know. But I needed to know production schedules and I needed to know them in great detail because we could not schedule the work at the laboratory in any other way. A few milligrams of uranium-233, a few grams of plutonium made all the difference in the world to us, and we could not make them.

Groueff: How long did you continue to believe that the Germans were working on the same thing? Was it until D-Day that all of you—

Oppenheimer: Well, it is different from person to person. I think probably [Eugene] Wigner believed it until there were no Germans left. I was never quite as frantic about this. I think I understood a deep destruction the National Socialist business had made in the German scientific scene. I was more worried about the campaign in Africa and the campaign in Russia when I went to New Mexico than I was about the Germans making a bomb. I thought they might very well be winning the war.

Groueff: By conventional weapons.

Oppenheimer: If you called it conventional.

Groueff: But you assume that they were at least working on it?

Oppenheimer: Ja. In fact, we talked at length with [Niels] Bohr to see what he knew about it. But what he knew was very reassuring.

Groueff: So Bohr knew more, right, that they were behind.

Oppenheimer: They were not doing this. They were doing something else and we wondered if they saw some way with slow neutrons to make something. But you cannot, of course, and we just worked on it long enough to reassure ourselves.

Groueff: Now one question that I can get from other people is what would be a typical working day for you at Los Alamos? That is one where did you live?

Oppenheimer: We lived about a third of a mile from the laboratory. I would try to get to the laboratory on normal days about eight or something like that and take our son, who was around, to the nursery school on the way.

Groueff: You would walk them to school?

Oppenheimer: We would just walk there and I would usually break for a little while between twelve and one because there was nowhere to eat, no food. And I would come home and then get back and I worked until six. And perhaps two or three times a week or four times a week, I would go back in the evening.

Groueff: After dinner?

Oppenheimer: After dinner. And we often found it possible to go off on our horses Saturday or Sunday, usually not both days. And of course, not in the dead of winter. My wife did a little skiing. Once every two or three months, we would spend Saturday night in Santa Fe and feel somewhat more human. And then I went to Washington occasionally.

Groueff: Now what is your opinion now that there is twenty years’ difference? My opinion being that this is probably one of the greatest performances or achievements of this system.

Oppenheimer: Well, I am not the man to answer that question. I do not know what it took to produce the hundred thousand airplanes that Roosevelt asked for but it was certainly not trivial.

Groueff: But as far as a scientific or technological effort?

Oppenheimer: Well, it was certainly sui generis—it was the first thing of just that kind.

Groueff: We do not in history have many examples of such intense and condensed in time.

Oppenheimer: No, it was certainly something novel.

Groueff: Enormous.

Oppenheimer: Novel.

Groueff: Novel. I would like to ask you several things but when I sit down and write, if I can ask you some [other things].


Sudoplatov&rsquos Credibility Questioned

Some historians state that it was impossible for Oppenheimer to have deliberately recruited Klaus Fuchs to Los Alamos. However, Aleksandr Feklisov, who was Fuchs&rsquos case officer, wrote that &ldquoby the end of 1943 Robert Oppenheimer, the leader of the work on the creation of the American atomic bomb, who highly appreciated the theoretical works of Fuchs, asked to include Fuchs as part of the British scientific mission coming to the U.S.A. to assist the project.&rdquo[19]

Other critics of Sudoplatov state that he was an old, incoherent man who made several mistakes in his interviews. For example, Sudoplatov stated that attitudes in Denmark toward Russians were especially warm immediately after World War II because Denmark had been liberated by the Red Army. Obviously, Denmark was liberated by the British and not the Russians.[20]

The American Physical Society also held a press conference in which five experts denounced Sudoplatov&rsquos statements about Oppenheimer &ldquoas wildly inaccurate and probably fictitious.&rdquo The organization&rsquos 40-member council expressed &ldquoprofound dismay&rdquo at the accusations &ldquomade by a man who has characterized himself as a master of deception and deceit.&rdquo[21]

However, the Schecters found documentary evidence to verify Sudoplatov&rsquos story. As stated in The Venona Secrets:[22]

Sudoplatov had been jailed in 1953 by the Soviet government because of his close association with the then-discredited Lavrenti Beria. In 1968 he was released and tried in succeeding years to get a Communist Party hearing to rehabilitate him and restore him to the good graces of the Soviet leadership. In 1982, for example, he sent an appeal to Yuri Andropov and the Politburo outlining his career and asking for rehabilitation. In this secret document, Sudoplatov boasted that he had &ldquorendered considerable help to our scientists by giving them the latest materials on atom bomb research, obtained from such sources as the famous nuclear physicists R. Oppenheimer, E. Fermi, K. Fuchs, and others.&rdquo It would have made no sense for Sudoplatov to lie to Andropov, the former head of the KGB and dictator of the Soviet Union, who would have easily found him out.

Until Sudoplatov&rsquos testimony, even Venona could not prove that Oppenheimer had collaborated with Soviet intelligence the only conclusion had to have been a Scotch verdict&mdashunproved&mdashor, as the NSA commented, &ldquotroubling.&rdquo But with Sudoplatov&rsquos information we can say for certain that Oppenheimer did in fact knowingly supply classified information on the atom bomb to the Soviet Union.


Peter Oppenheimer

Peter Oppenheimer is a carpenter, and the son of J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Vroeë lewe

Peter was born in 1941 in California, and moved with his parents to Los Alamos when his father became the Director of the Manhattan Project. Most of his childhood was spent in Princeton, New Jersey during the period that his father was the Director of the Institute for Advanced Study.

By all accounts, Peter, like his Uncle, Frank Oppenheimer, had an engineer’s dexterity with his hands, even as a child. In spite of this, he never excelled in school. Due in part to crippling shyness and sensitivity, Peter often avoided social interaction as a child, which made his education challenging. His parents sent him to George School, an elite Quaker boarding school in Newtown, Pennsylvania, but his grades were subpar and he was unable to graduate, finishing instead at the public Princeton High School.

Another challenge that Peter Oppenheimer faced while growing up was his father’s security clearance hearing, which took place just before Peter started high school. After a schoolmate jeeringly told him that his father was a communist, he wrote an angry message on a chalkboard in his room. It read: “The American Government is unfair to accuse Certain People that I know of being unfair to them. Since this is true, I think that Certain People, and may I say, only Certain People in the U.S. Government, should go to HELL.”

Relationships with His Parents

Peter’s anxiety was not alleviated by his parents. In particular, he and his mother were seldom on good terms. Robert Oppenheimer’s secretary, Verna Hobson, posited that “Robert thought that in their highly charged, passionate falling in love, that Peter had come too soon, and Kitty resented him for that.” Hobson was something of a surrogate mother to Peter, given the troubled relationship between he and Kitty. There are accounts of Kitty putting immense pressure on Peter, on issues ranging from his weight to his grades. Hobson observed that “she used to make Peter’s life just miserable.”

By most accounts, Peter was very much loved by his father. Unfortunately, it seemed that Robert Oppenheimer simply did not have the social awareness to properly help his son’s development. When Pat Sherr, a family friend since the Manhattan Project, suggested that he see a child psychologist to help with his anxiety, Robert bristled at the idea. His reluctance was rooted in his own frustrating experiences with psychotherapy, but it established a pattern that Sherr described as a father who “could not have a son who needed help.”

For his part, Peter has given mixed accounts. He once told historian Priscilla McMillan that “my father’s tragedy was not that he lost his clearance, but my mother’s slow descent into alcoholism. Cut that word slow.” However, his children only recall him saying good things about his parents. In fact, Peter has been so positive about his parents that his children are often taken aback by media portrayals of Kitty Oppenheimer as cruel and unrelenting.

Return to New Mexico

After an ostensibly unhappy childhood in Princeton, Peter went west soon after high school. He spent some time with his uncle, Frank Oppenheimer, at his ranch in Colorado. He was in intermittent contact with his parents throughout the 1960s. Soon after Robert Oppenheimer died in 1967, he permanently moved to rural northern New Mexico, living at the Perro Caliente ranch in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains that Robert purchased decades earlier. He works as a carpenter, and now has three adult children, Dorothy, Charlie, and Ella. He lives contently in seclusion.


Melba Phillips: Leader in Science and Conscience Part One

Indiana native Melba Newell Phillips pioneered new physics theories, studied under the famous J. Robert Oppenheimer, worked passionately to improve science education, and advocated for women’s place at the forefront of science research. After the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Japan at the end of World War II, Phillips and other scientists organized to prevent future nuclear wars. She took a great hit to her career during the Cold War as she stood up for the freedom to dissent in the oppressive atmosphere of McCarthyism. Colleagues and students have noted her “intellectual honesty, self-criticism, and style,” and called her “a role model for principle and perseverance.”

Phillips was born February 1, 1907 in Hazleton, Gibson County. Volgens Women in Physics, Phillips graduated from high school at 15, earned a B.S. from Oakland City College in Indiana, taught for one year at her former high school, and went on to graduate school. In 1928, she earned a master’s degree in physics from Battle Creek College in Michigan and stayed there to teach for two years. In 1929 she attended summer sessions on quantum mechanics at the University of Michigan under Edward U. Condon. When she sought Condon’s help on a physics problem, her solution, rather than his, ended up being the correct one. This led to a lifelong friendship and Condon recommended Phillips for further graduate study at the University of California, Berkley. Here she pursued graduate research under Oppenheimer and earned her Ph.D. in 1933. Within a few years she was known throughout the physics world because of her contribution to the field via the Oppenheimer-Phillips effect.

J. Robert Oppenheimer, photograph, in Ray Monk, Inside the Centre: The Life of J. Robert Oppenheimer (2014)

The 1935 Oppenheimer-Phillips Effect explained “what was at the time unexpected behavior of accelerated deuterons (nuclei of deuterium, or ‘heavy hydrogen’ atoms) in reactions with other nuclei,” according to a University of Chicago press release. When Oppenheimer died in 1967, his New York Times obituary noted his and Phillips’s discovery as a “basic contribution to quantum theory.” Manhattan Project scientist and professor emeritus of chemistry at the State University of New York, Stony Brook Francis Bonner explained in the release that normally such an accomplishment, now considered “one of the classics of early nuclear physics, “would have meant a faculty appointment. However, Phillips received no such appointment, perhaps due in part to the Great Depression, but also likely because of her gender.

Instead, Phillips left Berkley to teach briefly at Bryn Mawr College (PA), the Institute for Advanced Study (NJ), and the Connecticut College for Women. On February 16, 1936, the New York Times reported that she was one of six women to receive research fellowships for the 1936-1937 academic year as announced by the American Association of University Women. The announcement read: “Melba Phillips, research fellow at Bryn Mawr, received the Margaret E. Maltby fellowship of $1,500 for research on problems of the application of quantum mechanics to nuclear physics.”

New York Times, February 16, 1936, N6, ProQuest Historical New York Times

In October of 1937 Phillips served as a delegate to the fall conference of the association at Harvard, where the discussion centered around the prejudices against women scientists that halted not only their careers, but scientific progress more generally. According to a 1937 New York Times article, Dr. Cecelia Gaposchkin, a Harvard astronomer, detailed the “bitter disappointments and discouragements” that faced women professionals in the field of science. Certainly, Phillips related, as her career moved forward slowly despite her achievements in physics.

Pupin Physics Laboratory, Columbia University, “Short History of Columbia Physics,” accessed http://physics.columbia.edu/about-us/short-history-columbia-physics

Finally, in 1938, she received a permanent teaching position at Brooklyn College. In 1944, she also began research at the Columbia University Radiation Laboratory. Phillips was highly regarded as a teacher and Bonner noted she became “a major figure in science education” who “stimulated many students who went on from there to very stellar careers.”

Meanwhile, the U.S. officially entered World War II with the December 7, 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor. No previous war had been so dependent on the role of science and technology. From coding machines to microwave radar to advances in rocket technology, scientists were in demand by the war effort.

In July 1945, the Manhattan Project scientists successfully detonated an atomic bomb in the desert of Los Alamos, New Mexico. In August 1945, the U.S. dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, forcing the country to surrender and effectively ending World War II. Over 135,000 people were killed in Hiroshima and 64,000 in Nagasaki. Many thousands more died from fires, radiation, and illness. While a horrified public debated whether the bomb saved further causalities by ending the war or whether it was fundamentally immoral, scientists also dealt with remorse and responsibility.

Leslie Jones, 𔄙st Atomic Bomb Test,” photograph, Boston Public Library

Henry Stimson, Secretary of War in the Truman administration, stated, “this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice.” Oppenheimer, however, reflected, “If atomic bombs are to be added as new weapons to the arsenals of a warring world, or to the arsenals of nations preparing for war, then the time will come when mankind will curse the names of Los Alamos and of Hiroshima.” More bluntly, Oppenheimer told Truman, “Mr. President, I feel I have blood on my hands.” Many physicists retreated to academia, but some became politically active, especially in regard to preventing further destruction through scientific invention.

Representing the Association of New York Scientists, Phillips and leading Manhattan Project scientists helped organize the first Federation of American Scientists meeting in Washington, D.C. in 1945. The goal of the Federation was to prevent further nuclear war. That same year Phillips served as an officer in the American Association of Scientific Workers, an organization working to involve scientists in government and politics, to educate the public in the science, and to stand against the misapplication of science by industry and government. On August 16, 1945 the New York Times reported that Phillips and the other officers of the Association signed a letter to President Truman giving “eight recommendations to help prevent the use of atomic bombs in future warfare and to facilitate the application of atomic energy to peacetime uses.”

By the end of the 1940s, Melba Phillips’s accomplishments in physics and science education were well-known throughout the academic physics community. However, by the early 1950s, she was accused of being affiliated with communist subversives and fired from her university positions. What happened to this Hoosier physics pioneer?

Find out with Part Two, Melba Phillips: Leader in Science and Conscience.


Education from Europe:

In 1924, Oppenheimer got an education that he had been acknowledged at Christ’s College, Cambridge. He kept in touch with Ernest Rutherford, mentioning authorization to work at the Cavendish Laboratory. Bridgman gave Oppenheimer a proposal, which surrendered that Oppenheimer’s awkwardness in the lab make it obvious his specialty was not trial yet rather hypothetical material science. Rutherford had not interested however, Oppenheimer went to Cambridge in the expectation of handling another offer. J. J. Thomson eventually acknowledged him on the condition that he complete an essential lab course. He built up a hostile relationship with his coach, Patrick Blackett, who was a couple of years his senior.

While on an extended get-away, as reviewed by his companion Francis Fergusson. Oppenheimer once admitted that he had left an apple drenched with poisonous synthetic compounds around Blackett’s work area. While Fergusson’s record is the main nitty-gritty adaptation of this function, the college specialists who considered setting him waiting on the post-trial process, a destiny forestalled by his folks effectively campaigning, the authorities alarmed Oppenheimer’s folks [1] .

The Life of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Imagined Through His Collisions With Others

Body Structure of J. Henry:

Oppenheimer was a tall, flimsy cigar smoker, who regularly cannot eat during times of extraordinary idea and focus. A considerable lot of his companions depicted him as having pointless propensities. An upsetting function happens when he got away from his investigations in Cambridge to get together with Fergusson in Paris. Fergusson saw Oppenheimer was not well. To help occupy him from his downturn, Fergusson disclosed to Oppenheimer that he (Fergusson) wed his better half, Frances Keeley. Oppenheimer didn’t take the news well. He hopped on Fergusson and attempted to choke him. Even though Fergusson handily battled off the assault, the scene persuaded him regarding Oppenheimer’s profound mental inconveniences. For a mind-blowing duration, times of depression tormented Oppenheimer, and he once told his sibling, “I need material science more than friends”.

In 1926, Oppenheimer left Cambridge for the University of Göttingen to concentrate under Max Born. Göttingen was one of the world’s driving communities for hypothetical material science. Oppenheimer made companions who went on to extraordinary achievements, including Werner Heisenberg, Pascual Jordan, Wolfgang Pauli, Paul Dirac, Enrico Fermi, and Edward Teller. He has been known for excessively eager in conversation, now and then, to the point of assuming control over course sessions. This aggravated a portion of Born’s different understudies so much that Maria Goeppert gave Born an appeal marked with no one else and others undermining a blacklist of the class except if he made Oppenheimer calm down. Brought into the world forgot about it around his work area where Oppenheimer could understand it, and it was interesting without a word being said [1] .

‘Robert Oppenheimer’ by Ray Monk and ‘An Atomic Love Story’ by Shirley Stravinsky and Patricia Klaus

PHD From the University of Bonn:

He gained his Doctor of Philosophy degree in March 1927 at age 23, regulated by Bonn. After the oral test, James Franck, the educator managing, allegedly stated, “I’m happy that is finished, he had about to address me”. Oppenheimer distributed over 12 papers at Göttingen, including many significant commitments to the new field of quantum mechanics. He and Born distributed a well-known paper on the Born Oppenheimer estimate, which isolates atomic movement from electronic movement in the numerical treatment of particles, permitting atomic movement to cannot improve computations. It remains his most referred to work [1] .


Inhoud

The study of Sanskrit in the Western world began in the 17th century. [1] Some of Bhartṛhari's poems were translated into Portuguese in 1651. [1] In 1779 a legal code known as vivādārṇavasetu was translated by Nathaniel Brassey Halhed from a Persian translation, and published as A Code of Gentoo Laws. In 1785 Charles Wilkins published an English translation of the Bhagavad Gita, which was the first time a Sanskrit book had been translated directly into a European language. [2]

In 1786 Sir William Jones, who had founded The Asiatic Society [3] two years earlier, delivered the third annual discourse [4] in his often-cited "philologer" passage, he noted similarities between Sanskrit, Ancient Greek and Latin—an event which is often cited as the beginning of comparative linguistics, Indo-European studies, and Sanskrit philology. [5]

The Sanscrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure more perfect than the Grieks, more copious than the Latyn, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists there is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both the Gothic en die Kelties, though blended with a very different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanscrit en die ou Persian might be added to the same family.

This common source of the Indo-European languages eventually came to be known as Proto-Indo-European, following the work of Franz Bopp and others.

In 1789 Jones published a translation of Kālidāsa's The Recognition of Sakuntala. The translation captured the admiration of many, notably Goethe, who expressed his admiration for the Sanskrit play Shakuntala: [6] [7]

Wouldst thou the young year's blossoms and the fruits of its decline
And all by which the soul is charmed, enraptured, feasted, fed,
Wouldst thou the earth and heaven itself in one sole name combine?
I name thee, O Sakuntala! and all at once is said.

Goethe went on to borrow a device from the play for his Faust, Part One. [8]

In the introduction to The World as Will and Representation, written in 1818, Arthur Schopenhauer stated that "the access to [the Vedas], opened to us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the influence of the Sanscrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century". [9]

The Irish poet William Butler Yeats was also inspired by Sanskrit literature. [10] However, the discovery of the world of Sanskrit literature moved beyond German and British scholars and intellectuals — Henry David Thoreau was a sympathetic reader of the Bhagavad Gita [11] — and even beyond the humanities. Ralph Waldo Emerson was also influenced by Sanskrit literature. In the early days of the Periodic Table, scientists referred to as yet undiscovered elements with the use of Sanskrit numerical prefixes (see Mendeleev's predicted elements). J. Robert Oppenheimer in 1933 met the Indologist Arthur W. Ryder at Berkeley and learned Sanskrit. He read the Bhagavad Gita in the original language. [12] Later he cited it as one of the most influential books to shape his philosophy of life, [13] and his quotation from the Bhagavad Gita "Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." in reference to the Trinity test is well known. [14]

The nineteenth century was a golden age of Western Sanskrit scholarship, and many of the giants of the field (Whitney, Macdonnell, Monier-Williams, Grassmann) knew each other personally. Perhaps the most commonly known example of Sanskrit in the West was also the last gasp of its vogue. T. S. Eliot, a student of Indian Philosophy and of Sanskrit under Lanman, ended The Waste Land with Sanskrit: "Shantih Shantih Shantih".

Sanskrit is taught in many South Asia Studies and/or Linguistics departments in Western universities. In addition to this, it is also used during worship in Hindu temples in the West, being the Hindu liturgical language, and Sanskrit revival attempts are underway amongst expatriate Hindu populations. Similarly, Sanskrit study is also popular amongst the many Western practitioners of Yoga, who find the language useful in understanding the Yoga Sutra.


Kyk die video: Роберт Оппенгеймер. Отец атомной бомбы (Desember 2021).