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Inleiding tot Pearl Harbor - Geskiedenis

Inleiding tot Pearl Harbor - Geskiedenis

Marshall Ralph Doak Hoofapteker se Vloot van die Verenigde State

Op pad na Pearl Harbor

Die radiosendings tot 7 Desember

Ek het 'n goeie vriend in die radiohut gehad en ons het nogal gesels. Hy was wat ons 'n kort-timer soos ek noem. Ons was ongeveer 1 of 2 Desember besig. Elke dag gaan ek op en ontmoet my vriend in die radiohut. Dit was omtrent die 2de of 3de Desember dat hy gesê het: "Marshall, laat ek jou iets wys." Die radioboodskappe wat ons ontvang het baie inligting oor die Suid -Chinese See. Ons het Amerikaanse onderdele opgemerk en hulle was oral in die Stille Oseaan besig om die Japanse keiserlike vloot en die skeepvaart by te hou. Op hierdie spesifieke boodskap het die duikbote die breedtegraad en lengtegraad gegee. Daar was klaarblyklik drie of vier onderskrifte. Daar was drie groot groepe Japannese skepe wat uit 80, 90 of 100 skepe bestaan ​​het. Hierdie boodskappe het hulle almal gelys. Hulle het tenkwaens, troepetransport, vragmotors, vernietigers, begeleidingskepe en voorraadskepe van verskillende soorte gehad, en hulle het ons die breedte- en lengtegraadopskrifte van hierdie drie groepe gegee. Daarom het ons 'n kaart geneem en die koördinate nagegaan, en ons het uitgevind dat dit lyk asof een groep Malaya binnegaan. 'N Ander groep wou na die Nederlandse Indonesië gaan, en moontlik was die ander groep op pad na die Filippyne. Ek glo dit was op 3 Desember. Op 5 Desember het ek teruggegaan en ons het nuwe koördinate en kaarte gekry. Ons het gedink hulle gaan die volgende dag op 6 Desember slaan. Ek het die volgende dag opgegaan en my vriend was in skok. Hy het gesê: "Marshall, die radio is absoluut stil. Daar kom geen boodskap van die oorlogsdepartement nie." In daardie dae het alles uit die oorlogsdepartement gekom. Ek het gesê: 'Wel, hulle moet vandag slaan, waarom sou hulle nie aankondig nie?' Hy het gesê: 'Ek weet nie, maar daar kom niks deur nie.' Daardie aand is ons na algemene kwartiere geroep en die bevelvoerder het oor die sprekers aangekondig dat die Japannese pas Pearl Harbor gebombardeer het. Dit was regtig nie 'n verrassing nie. My gevolgtrekkings oor 7 Desember- Ons het alles geweet wat in die Suid-Chinese See gebeur uit die radioboodskappe en uitsendings op 4 en 5 Desember. Om dan geen radioboodskappe op die sesde van die oorlogsdepartement te hê nie, is skrikwekkend. Dit gee my hoendervleis om te dink oor wat hulle gedoen het. Om nie-neutraal te wees, begin in Oktober deur Engelse troepe in Roosevelt se private oorlog deur die geheime konvooi van die Task Force 14 te sleep. Roosevelt se embargo oor staal, olie en alle natuurlike hulpbronne teen Japan, en die verklaring van FDR dat ons Japan inisiatief in die Stille Oseaan moes neem, het ons laat glo dat dit die dag was waarop Japan in die Suidelike Stille Oseaan sou kom. Ek dink ek het 'n goeie saak dat ons geweet het wat gaan gebeur. Daar was 'n uur voordat die vliegtuie getref het, het die USS Ward 'n Japannese duikboot by die hekke van Pearl Harbor gesink. Later in die oorlog het ons uitgevind dat daar een of twee dae voor Decembe 7ih meer dieptekoste op subs gedaal is. Wat my steur, is dat die bevelvoerder op die Wyk wel by sy bevelvoerder en CINCPAC aangemeld het. Maar CINCPAC moes by Washington aanmeld voordat hulle op hul hoede kon wees en dit was oor 'n naweek. Die enigste skepe wat in Pearl Harbor oorgebly het, was verlate skepe. Dit was beskeie slagskepe uit die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Hulle het hokmaste gehad, hulle kon nie byhou met die taakspan nie. Byna almal van hierdie skepe het kurkinstallasie met hul grootkoppe gehad, en hulle het oral 1 tot 11/2 duim vlam op olie gebaseer op die hele skip. Die enigste ding van enige waarde was uit Pearl Harbor toe Japan myns insiens tref. Die draers en nuwe slagskepe, kruisers, ligte kruisers en vernietigers. Daar was een of twee vernietigers, ja, waarskynlik vir herstelwerk. Maar enigiets anders van waarde was daar buite. Die enigste ding wat oorgebly het, was Battleship Row en na my mening was dit verlate skepe. Dit was jammer dat ons 2300 mans verloor het op hierdie sogenaamde dag van infamy. Die embargo van Japan, die private oorlog van Roosevelt en die verklarings van Roosevelt gee my my eie ongelukkige gevolgtrekkings. Ons het 2300 kosbare lewens verloor wat ek nie dink ooit moes verlore gegaan het nie. Radioboodskappe is afdoende.



Gebeure wat gelei het tot die aanval op Pearl Harbor

N reeks van gebeure het gelei tot die aanval op Pearl Harbor. Oorlog tussen Japan en die Verenigde State was 'n moontlikheid waarvoor elke nasie se militêre magte sedert die twintigerjare beplan het, hoewel werklike spanning eers begin het toe die inval in 1931 in Mantsjoerije deur Japan plaasgevind het. In die volgende dekade brei Japan stadig na China uit, wat lei tot 'n oorlog tussen die twee in 1937. In 1940 val Japan die Franse Indochina binne in 'n poging om alle invoer na China te begin, insluitend oorlogsmateriaal wat uit die VSA gekoop is. State sal alle olie -uitvoer begin, wat die keiserlike Japannese vloot laat skat dat daar minder as twee jaar bunkerolie oor is en die bestaande planne om oliebronne in Nederlands -Indië in beslag te neem, ondersteun. Daar was 'n geruime tyd beplanning vir 'n aanval op die 'Southern Resource Area' om dit by te voeg tot die Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity-gebied wat Japan in die Stille Oseaan voorgestel het.

Die Filippynse eilande, destyds 'n Amerikaanse gebied, was ook 'n Japannese teiken. Die Japannese weermag het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat 'n inval in die Filippyne 'n Amerikaanse militêre reaksie sou veroorsaak. In plaas van die eilande in beslag te neem en te versterk, en te wag vir die onvermydelike Amerikaanse teenaanval, het Japan se militêre leiers eerder besluit op die voorkomende Pearl Harbor -aanval, wat volgens hulle die Amerikaanse magte wat nodig was vir die bevryding en herowering van die eilande, sou ontken.

Beplanning vir die aanval het vroeg in 1941 begin, deur admiraal Isoroku Yamamoto. Hy het uiteindelik toestemming van die Naval High Command verkry deur onder meer te dreig om te bedank. Die aanval is in die somer goedgekeur tydens 'n keiserlike konferensie en weer tydens 'n tweede konferensie in die herfs. Gelyktydig gedurende die jaar is vlieëniers opgelei en skepe voorberei op die uitvoering daarvan. Die bevoegdheid vir die aanval is tydens die tweede keiserlike konferensie verleen indien 'n diplomatieke uitslag van Japan nie bevredigend was nie. Na finale goedkeuring deur keiser Hirohito, is die bevel om aan te val begin Desember uitgereik.


ONTHOU DIE 12 DAE

Hoe het Twomey die boek van 416 bladsye saamgestel?

Twomey het gesê dat hy vanaf 2013 besoek afgelê het aan verskillende plekke, waaronder die Naval War College in Newport, RI, en die National Archives en die University of Maryland, albei in College Park, Md., Waar daar talle historiese dokumente oor Pearl Harbor was .

Hy het ook teruggekeer na Hawaii na die terrein self, wes van die hoofstad Honolulu, wat 'n belangrike basis vir die Amerikaanse Stille Oseaanvloot gebly het, sowel as na die USS Arizona Memorial, wat aandui waar die slagskip USS Arizona gesink is tydens die aanval.

'Mense moet 'n draai daar maak om te sien hoe dit was,' het Twomey gesê. 'Alhoewel daar baie geboue was wat daardie dag verwoes is, is daar nog 'n paar wat nog oorbly.'

Twomey het gesê dat hy die boek vroeër vanjaar voltooi het, maar dit is eers op 1 November vrygestel.

Hy het gesê dat hy wil hê dat lesers drie dinge uit die boek moet wegneem: baie van wat by Pearl Harbor gebeur het, was dat mense aannames maak oor hoe die Japannese die vloot van die Amerikaanse vloot sou aanval. geweld, en die weermag in Hawaii het destyds geneig om dinge op 'n baie goedaardige manier te interpreteer.

"Die mense in Hawaii het geweet dat vier groot Japannese lugrederye uit die radarverkeer verdwyn het, maar die aanname was dat hulle in die tuishawe was," het Twomey gesê. 'Dit blyk dat dit nie die geval was nie.'


Mislukte pogings tot Japannese diplomasie voor Pearl Harbor

Konoye se vredesvoorstel was by aankoms dood. Tydens die laaste kabinetsvergadering van Konoye het die minister van oorlog, generaal Hideki Tojo, die skande van Konoye se mislukking en die verdere gevaar van nog toegewings aan die roofsugtige Amerikaners opgesom. 'Die kern van die saak is die oplegging van ons terugtrekking uit Indochina en China. . . . As ons toegee aan die eise van Amerika, sal dit die vrugte van die [Tweede Sino-Japannese oorlog] vernietig. Manchukou [Mantsjoerije] word bedreig en ons beheer oor Korea word ondermyn. ” Op 16 Oktober is die kabinet ontslaan en Konoye is vervang deur Tojo, die toekomstige sondebok.

Na die oorlog, toe Konoye selfmoord gepoog het en Tojo, wat misluk het in sy selfmoordpoging, vir oorlogsmisdade opgehang is, het Amerikaners die Japannese geskiedenis herontdek. Konoye die vreedsame, so het die verhaal gegaan, is deur die militaris Tojo opsy geskuif. Konoye het in wanhoop opgegee toe Roosevelt geweier het om met hom te vergader of om die beste voorwaardes wat Konoye kon bied, te aanvaar sonder om 'n opstand by die huis uit te lok. Tojo het geen militaristiese oorname beplan nie. Hy was 'n redelik beskeie man, bekend om sy groot respek vir die keiser en meer bekend vir sy geheue vir detail as vir enige visie of glans. Sy bynaam was kamisori—Die skeermes — omdat hy vinniger besonderhede oor loopbane en promosies kon uitsorteer as die meeste van sy eweknieë. Sy ouers was nie edeles of hooggeplaaste samoerai nie, alhoewel sy pa deur pure ywer 'n luitenant-generaal geword het, en sy eie grade met respek middelmatig was. Tojo het alles te danke aan die keiserlike stelsel en die weermag. Sy belangrikste eienskappe was nederigheid en lojaliteit. Alhoewel hy drie seuns en vier dogters gehad het, het hy in sy eie sak gesteek om vriende in nood te help. Sy huis in die Tokio-woonbuurt Setagaya-ku was respekvol, maar gewoon, en sy vrou en kinders was ordentlike, aangename mense sonder pretensies. Tojo was die perfekte stuurman vir die staatsskip terwyl dit in 'n oorlog gevaar het wat hy nie kon wen nie - en die keiser het dit geweet.

Tojo self was so beskeie dat hy, toe hy na die paleis ontbied is, gedink het dat die keiser hom gaan bestraf en bereid was om homself te verneder. Toe hy gevra is om premier te word in die plek van Konoye, het hy eers probeer weier, maar uiteindelik toegeneem uit toewyding aan die keiser en die stelsel wat van hom 'n generaal gemaak het in plaas van 'n vakman of boer.

'Ek weet nie veel van Tojo as 'n man' nie, 'het die voormalige premier Koki Hirota,' die man in die gewone pak ', net ná die aanstelling van Tojo aan sy seuns Hiroo en Masao gesê. 'Dit lyk egter asof hy luister na wat die heerlike seël te sê het. . . . [B] y nou sou 'n suiwer boegbeeld net meer skade berokken. Die weermag sal self verantwoordelikheid moet neem. As hy in 'n posisie is waar hy geen ander keuse het as om die weermag in te stem om diplomatieke onderhandelinge te voer nie, sal Tojo waarskynlik niks te haastig doen nie. ”

Hierdie artikel oor Japannese diplomasie voor Pearl Harbor is deel van ons groter verskeidenheid plasings oor die Pearl Harbor -aanval. Vir meer inligting, klik hier vir ons uitgebreide gids vir Pearl Harbor.

U kan die boek ook koop deur op die knoppies aan die linkerkant te klik.


Voorloop na Pearl Harbor Trump's Bawl Game Ruth Silos en The White Ethnic Press

Foto deur Associated Press

Voordat ons hierdie rubriek begin, is 7 Desember Pearl Harbor -dag. Gewoonlik is daar iets anders in die nuus wat in die pad staan ​​voordat ek oor die geskiedenis skryf. Maar as museumdirekteur van die Filipino American National Historical Society Museum, het ek 'n ongewone stuk gekry terwyl ek oor die boek van wyle professor Dawn Mabalon praat, Klein Manila is in die hart, 'n boek van Stockton, die Filippynse Amerikaanse gemeenskap van Kalifornië. Ons weet dat daar 'n slegte geskiedenis op Hawaii is tussen Filippyne en die Japannese, maar ek het nie geweet in watter mate daar in Kalifornië bestaan ​​het nie. Ek het nog altyd gehoor dat Filippyne gereeld Japannese in die huwelik tree, en dat baie gesinne uit Kalifornië gevlug het toe hulle in die Midde -Weste skuiling gevind het toe die bevele vir die internering afgekom het. Ek het ook verhale gehoor van solidariteit tussen die verskillende Asiatiese groepe, en van Filippyns -Amerikaners wat die Japannese Amerikaners gehelp het om hul boerderye te behou. 7, 1941, skielik gebeur.

"Ooit gesien as halfmens, minderwaardige woeste, was Chinese en Filipnas/os skielik bondgenote van Amerika, terwyl die Japannese Stockton-gemeenskap onmiddellik die teiken van rassistiese aanvalle van hul asiatiese bure sowel as blankes was," het Mabalon geskryf. van Filipnos wat ID -knoppies dra en beweer: 'I am FILIPINO' om nie as 'n Japannese Amerikaner te word nie. Mabalon het 'n onderhoud gevoer met Camila Carido wat vir haar gesê het dat sy internering ondersteun omdat dit 'n manier was om die Japannese veilig te hou. 'O, baie Filippyne was gewapen, gereed om die Japannese dood te maak,' het Carido gesê. 'Veral met die moord op die Filippyne.' Dit was 'n onbekende feit. Tien uur nadat Pearl Harbor aangeval is, het die Japannese die Filippyne binnegeval en beset. Dit was nie altyd 'n polities korrekte situasie nie. Met die verwydering van Japannese Amerikaners, het dit die Filippyne eintlik gehelp om hul status in die wedloop op die vasteland te herstruktureer, aangesien dit gesien word as 'n betroubare bondgenoot en nie as 'n bruin aap nie. Dit is 'n ander aspek van die dag van Pearl Harbor wat selde verskyn. Maar prof. Mabalon skets dit in haar 'Little Manila is in the Heart'. Dit laat ons besef dat die skep van eenheid onder Asiatiese Amerikaners in ons geskiedenis nooit maklik of outomaties was nie.

Kerm vir Trump
'N Filippynse Amerikaanse vriend, 'n vurige Republikein, het iets aanlyn geplaas oor kiesersbedrog en verkiesingsdiefstal. Hy is een van die 30 persent van die Asiatiese Amerikaners wat Trump -ondersteuners is, en hy was mal. Hy glo die verkiesing is gesteel en hy het bewyse! Inligting van 'n konserwatiewe webwerf. Ek het nie gelag nie. Ek het eenvoudig vir hom gesê om eers die bewyse te evalueer. En dan na die howe om te sien of enige eise wettig is. Tot dusver is byna al die regsgedinge uitgegooi. Maar ek was bereid om 'n stap verder te gaan. Gee al die twyfelagtige stemme aan Trump en kyk of dit hoegenaamd 'n verskil maak. Daar is nie genoeg stemme om die sewe miljoen stemgrens uit te maak nie. Daarom is dit tyd om die debat te beëindig. Ons is aan dieselfde kant. Selfs die sowat 71 miljoen wat gestem het vir die verlore posbekleër. Dit was geen olyftak nie. Net die feite. Maar my vriend strek nie terug nie, maar hy verkies om die president se woede te weerspieël en sy skelmspel te speel. Dit is sleg vir demokrasie. Dit wys slegs Trump se plan om ons land te verwoes, of hy nou in die amp is of nie.

Die rooi deel van The Blue State word blou
Daar is regtig geen logiese oproep vir 'n tweede termyn van Trump nie. Ek kon aan die stemming agterkom in wat ek die rooi deel van die blou staat noem, my woonbuurt in Kalifornië in die Big Ag Central Valley, waar hulle besluit het dat dit beter is vir hul kapitalistiese sin huise te laat groei in plaas van kos. Die plek was vroeër so konserwatief, maar dit verander. Vier jaar gelede was San Joaquin County skaars vir Hillary Clinton. Hierdie jaar was dit oorweldigend vir Biden, 56-42, 'n storting van gesonde verstand. Maar veertien punte? Krijg dit tot die nasionale voorstedelike neiging teen die chaos van Trump. Dit beteken nie dat dit 'n Demokratiese grondverskuiwing regdeur die kaartjie was nie. Die burgemeester van Stockton, Michael Tubbs, 'n Afro -Amerikaanse Stanford -student uit die middestad wat vanjaar in 'n HBO -dokumentêr verskyn, verloor met 'n dubbelsyfer vir 'n konserwatiewe Afro -Amerikaner in 'n teleurstelling vir progressiewe demokrate. Die ware vallei het opgedaag vir die stemming. Trump het hulle laat vaar. Maar daar is houvas. Die “maand” van die verkiesing is feitlik verby, maar op my gemaskerde hond wat ná Thanksgiving deur my woonbuurt loop, sien ek drie Trump -tekens wat in weerwil vertoon word. Hou vas vir die regte verkiesingsdiewe, wat die toorn van Trump sal ervaar, anders as Michael Flynn wat bloot 'n klomp gelieg het. Flynn word begenadig. Maar die verkiesingsboewe, wie hulle ook al mag wees, pas op! Trump kom vir jou. Dit is meer as 'n bietjie belaglik. Hoe kan ons hierdie vertrouenskloof oorkom? Op een of ander manier moet ons land op dieselfde bladsy kom. Ons het gedink dit kan die Grondwet wees. Maar dit moet regtig die plek wees waar ons ons daaglikse waarhede kry. Dit gaan nie maklik wees as elkeen staatmaak op sy eie spesifieke silo van inligting wat hulle gee wat hulle nodig het om deel te wees van hul affiniteitsgroep nie en niks meer nie.

Silo News en The White Ethnic Press
Soos altyd, kom ek tot u in volle silo. Die etnies-georiënteerde media was nog altyd afgetakel, 'n super vertikale, diep en smal, superbediende 'n andersins onderbediende nis soos Asiaties-Amerikaners, of 'n etniese subgroep soos Koreaans, Filipyns, Suid -Asië en so.Ons moet wees. Hoe gereeld verskyn ons verhale of gevoelens in die algemene winkels op 'n manier wat ons werklik gee wat ons nodig het? Sonder ons etniese media (koerante, TV, radio en webplasings soos hierdie) sou ons uitgesluit wees en sou mense ons nie hoor of sien nie. Die benoude benadering was nog altyd noodsaaklik en gepas; in die kern was dit bloot om stemme te gee. Ons moes gehoor word. Maar op een of ander manier is die metode gekaap. Die silo was nooit bedoel om die hulpmiddel van die meerderheid te wees nie - veral as dit gebruik word om 'n meer aanvaarbare vorm van wit oppergesag te verkoop. Op een of ander manier is dit wat gebeur het. Die blanke etniese pers is gebore. Terwyl ons praat van 'n vrye pers en 'n verskeidenheid idees, het ons al hierdie ander bronne 'n ander soort inligting versprei op grond van samesweringsteorieë en opinies. Breitbart en sy soort is almal in die nis. Nie goed genoeg vir die Washington Post of die New York Times. Maar die wit etniese pers spreek wel 'n meerderheid blanke gehoor aan. Deur dit te doen, word hulle deur baie mense ernstig opgeneem - totdat hulle as pure papawer verwerp word. Maar as hulle nie verwerp word nie, word dit die enigste bron van nuus vir 'n groot aantal mense. Dit is meer problematies as hoofstroomorganisasies vertikaal is en nie alles horisontaal benader nie. Voeg sosiale media by met hul algoritmes wat u slegs die nuus gee wat u wil hê, en nie die nuus wat u benodig nie, en skielik is u inligtingsdieet giftig. U eet te veel gemorskos en niks van die 'goed vir u' dinge is eerlik en geloofwaardig nie. Dit is nou die stand van die medialandskap. Alles bederf. Waarheid? Dit gaan alles oor geloof. Glo jy? In hierdie opsig is die silo’s meer soos katedrale, en die waarheid word as sodanig uitgedeel. Voed dit u 'waarheid'? Groot. En wat van die eenvoudige waarheid wat gebaseer is op bewyse en werklikheid?

Dit is 'n joernalistieke probleem, 'n diskoersprobleem en ook 'n gehoorprobleem. Dit lyk asof mense ongeduldig is om die 'goedere' te kry. Vermaak word verkies. Dis lekker populisme. Dit was die voormalige Top 40 Rush Limbaugh se geheim. Trump, die reality show -gasheer, het pas sy pad gevolg. Geen wonder dat Trump 'n verpligting gevoel het om Limbaugh 'n presidensiële medalje van vryheid te gee nie, die laaste staat van die Unie. Rush het die staat van politieke retoriek ingelui. Hy het Trump, nóg 'n leser of 'n bedagsame man, die manier gewys om politiek en vernietigend te wees. Trump het dus in 2016 gehardloop, en as hy verloor, wat de hel, wou hy tog nie wen nie. Maar toe wen hy. Dit het demokrasie se probleem geword. Die waarheid is dat hy eerder gholf wil speel. Dit is waar Trump Amerika verlaat, blootgestel omdat hy nie so wonderlik en nie so slim is nie. Net baie selfsugtig en selfsugtig. Soos hy. Ons stry onder mekaar, twyfel oor die integriteit van die regering en ons verkiesing. Met 71 miljoen stemme is Trump meer ontwrigtend as enige vreemde vyand. Hy laat ons baie erger af as wat hy ons gevind het.

Ten minste moet die Trump -biblioteek 'n draai maak. 'N Klomp TV -toestelle is op die kabel ingestel. Een kanaal. En nie 'n boek in die gewrig nie.


Die regeringsamptenare het by die aksie aangesluit en gevra dat hulle onmiddellik begrawe moet word, en beweer dat Japannese Amerikaners strategiese posisies in Kalifornië binnegedring het. Onder die president en ander amptenare is bewyse gebring dat die Japannese Amerikaners buitengewoon lojaal aan die Verenigde State was en dat daar geen bewys van die teendeel kon wees nie (Uchida, 1982). Boonop was hulle nog steeds gemotiveerd om die Japannese aan te hou. Dit sal voor die hand liggend lyk om die internering in Hawaii te begin waar die Japanners 'n volle derde van die inwoners beset het en die skuld vir die sameswering in die aanval op Pearl Harbor gekry het.

Om ongeïdentifiseerde redes het die regeringsamptenare Hawaii egter oor die hoof gesien en hul aandag op die Weskus gevestig, wat hul sê dat hulle die Japannese Amerikaners uit die militêre behoeftes beperk het, ongeldig maak. Hulle het ook nie Duitsers of Italianers beperk nie, alhoewel hulle baie groter was, daarom het hulle 'n groot moontlike bedreiging vir die land ontvang. In hierdie voorbeelde is die skrywer effektief in die uitbeelding van die invloed van rassediskriminasie. Sy beklemtoon die verkeerde optrede van die Amerikaners teen haar rasse.

Volgens Robert Shaffer (2000) het 'n Baptiste -predikant en voormalige sendeling in Japan in 1943 voorspel oor die genesing van Japannese Amerikaners tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog dat toekomstige historici hierdie migrasie, hierdie skending van burgerskapregte, as een van die swartste punte sal opneem oor die Amerikaanse geskiedenis as die tyd dat demokrasie die naaste aan die verwoesting gekom het. Die regeringsamptenare in die Verenigde State het om verskoning gevra vir sy optrede in die oorlog, wat as 'n presidensiële kommissie oor nadenke tot 'n gevolgtrekking gekom het by die Amerikaanse samelewing en vreemdelinge van Japannese afstammelinge.


Inhoud

Die spanning tussen Japan en die prominente Westerse lande (die Verenigde State, Frankryk, die Verenigde Koninkryk en Nederland) het aansienlik toegeneem tydens die toenemend militaristiese vroeë bewind van keiser Hirohito. Japanse nasionaliste en militêre leiers het die regeringsbeleid toenemend beïnvloed en 'n groter mede-welvaartsfeer in Oos-Asië bevorder as deel van Japan se beweerde 'goddelike reg' om Asië onder Hirohito se bewind te verenig. [a]

Gedurende die dertigerjare het die toenemend ekspansionistiese beleid van Japan dit in 'n hernieude konflik met sy bure, Rusland en China, gebring (Japan het die Eerste Sino-Japannese Oorlog met China in 1894–1995 en die Russies-Japannese Oorlog met Rusland in 1904–05 Japan se imperialistiese ambisies het 'n bydrae gelewer om albei konflikte te versnel). In Maart 1933 onttrek Japan hom uit die Volkebond in reaksie op internasionale veroordeling van sy verowering van Mantsjoerije en die daaropvolgende vestiging van die Manchukuo -marionetregering daar. [4] Op 15 Januarie 1936 het Japan onttrek aan die Tweede London Naval Disarmament Conference omdat die Verenigde State en die Verenigde Koninkryk geweier het om die Japannese vloot gelykheid met hulle te gee. [5] 'n Tweede oorlog tussen Japan en China begin met die Marco Polo -brugvoorval in Julie 1937.

Japan se aanval op China in 1937 is deur die VSA en deur verskeie lede van die Volkebond veroordeel, waaronder Brittanje, Frankryk, Australië en Nederland. Japanse gruweldade tydens die konflik, soos die berugte Nanking -slagting in Desember, het die betrekkinge met die res van die wêreld verder bemoeilik. Die VSA, [b] Brittanje, [c] Frankryk [d] en Nederland [e] het elk kolonies in Oos- en Suidoos -Asië besit. Japan se nuwe militêre mag en bereidwilligheid om dit te gebruik, bedreig hierdie Westerse ekonomiese en territoriale belange in Asië.

Vanaf 1938 het die VSA 'n opeenvolging van toenemend beperkende handelsbeperkings met Japan aangeneem. Dit sluit in die beëindiging van sy kommersiële verdrag van 1911 met Japan in 1939, verder verskerp deur die Wet op Uitvoerbeheer van 1940. Hierdie pogings kon Japan nie weerhou om sy oorlog in China voort te sit nie, of om die drieparty -verdrag in 1940 met Nazi -Duitsland en Fascistiese Italië te onderteken, amptelik die asmoondhede vorm.

Japan sou voordeel trek uit Hitler se oorlog in Europa om sy eie ambisies in die Verre Ooste te bevorder. Die drieparty -verdrag het hulp gewaarborg as 'n ondertekenaar aangeval word deur 'n land wat nie reeds in konflik met die ondertekenaar was nie, bedoel dit implisiet die VSA Deur by die pakt aan te sluit, verkry Japan geopolitieke mag en stuur die onmiskenbare boodskap dat enige Amerikaanse militêre ingryping oorlog teen beide kan veroorsaak haar oewers [ aanhaling nodig ] —Met Duitsland en Italië in die Atlantiese Oseaan, en met Japan in die Stille Oseaan. Die Roosevelt -administrasie sou nie ontmoedig word nie. Die geloof in die Amerikaanse lewenswyse sou in gevaar wees as Europa en die Verre Ooste onder militêre diktatuur val, [ aanhaling nodig ] het hy hom daartoe verbind om die Britte en Chinese te help deur geld en materiaal te leen, en het hy volgehoue ​​hulp verleen om hul voortbestaan ​​te verseker. So het die Verenigde State stadig oorgegaan van 'n neutrale mag tot 'n oorlogsvoorbereiding. [6]

In die middel van 1940 het Roosevelt die Amerikaanse Stille Oseaan-vloot na Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, verskuif om Japan af te skrik. [7] Op 8 Oktober 1940 het admiraal James O. Richardson, hoofkommandant van die Stille Oseaan -vloot, 'n konfrontasie met Roosevelt ontlok deur sy vroeëre argumente aan die hoof van vlootoperasies, admiraal Harold R. Stark en die sekretaris van die vloot Frank Knox te herhaal dat Pearl Harbor was die verkeerde plek vir sy skepe. Roosevelt het geglo dat die verskuiwing van die vloot na Hawaii 'n "beperkende invloed" op Japan sal uitoefen. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Richardson het die president gevra of die Verenigde State oorlog toe gaan. Roosevelt se siening was:

Ten minste so vroeg as 8 Oktober 1940 ,. sake so 'n toestand bereik het dat die Verenigde State in 'n oorlog met Japan betrokke sou raak. . 'dat as die Japannese Thailand aanval, of die Kra -skiereiland, of Nederlands -Indië, ons nie die oorlog sou betree nie, dat as hulle selfs die Filippyne sou aanval, hy twyfel of ons die oorlog sou betree, maar dat hulle (die Japannese) dit nie kon doen nie vermy altyd foute en dat namate die oorlog voortduur en die gebied van operasies vroeër of later uitgebrei het, sou hulle 'n fout maak en ons sou die oorlog betree. ' . . [8] [9]

Japan se verhuising van 1940 na Indochina wat deur Vichy beheer word, het die spanning verder verhoog. Saam met Japan se oorlog met China, onttrekking aan die Volkebond, alliansie met Duitsland en Italië en toenemende militarisering, het die stap daartoe gelei dat die Verenigde State sy maatreëls om Japan ekonomies te beperk, verskerp. Die Verenigde State het skrootmetaalversendings na Japan geblokkeer en die Panamakanaal vir Japannese gestuur gesluit. [10] Dit het veral die ekonomie van Japan erg getref omdat 74,1% van Japan se afval yster in 1938 uit die Verenigde State gekom het. 93% van Japan se koper in 1939 kom ook uit die Verenigde State. [11] Begin 1941 verhuis Japan na die suide van Indochina, [12] en bedreig daardeur die Britse Malaya, Noord -Borneo en Brunei.

Japan en die VSA het in die loop van 1941 onderhandel in 'n poging om die betrekkinge te verbeter. Tydens hierdie onderhandelinge het Japan die onttrekking uit die grootste deel van China en Indochina oorweeg na die opstel van vredesvoorwaardes met die Chinese. Japan sou ook 'n onafhanklike interpretasie van die drieparty -ooreenkoms aanneem en sal nie diskrimineer in die handel nie, mits alle ander lande dit beantwoord. Generaal Tojo, destyds Japanse minister van oorlog, het egter kompromieë in China verwerp. [13] In reaksie op die besetting van die belangrikste vliegvelde in Indochina (24 Julie) na 'n ooreenkoms tussen Japan en Vichy Frankryk, het die VSA op 26 Julie 1941 Japannese bates laat vries en op 1 Augustus 'n embargo op olie- en petroluitvoer na Japan ingestel . [14] [15] [16] Die olie -embargo was 'n besonder sterk reaksie omdat olie die belangrikste invoer van Japan was, en meer as 80% van Japan se olie destyds uit die Verenigde State gekom het. [17]

Japanse oorlogsbeplanners het lank na die suide gekyk, veral na Brunei vir olie en Malaya vir rubber en blik. In die herfs van 1940 versoek Japan 3,15 miljoen vate olie uit Nederlands -Indië, maar ontvang 'n teenaanbod van slegs 1,35 miljoen. [18] Die vloot was seker dat enige poging om hierdie gebied te gryp die VSA in die oorlog sou bring, [19] [ bladsy benodig ] maar die volledige Amerikaanse olie -embargo verminder die Japannese opsies tot twee: neem Suidoos -Asië in beslag voordat sy bestaande voorraad strategiese materiaal uitgeput is, of onderwerping aan Amerikaanse eise. [20] Boonop sou enige suidelike operasie kwesbaar wees vir aanvalle vanaf die Filippyne, destyds 'n Amerikaanse gemenebes, sodat oorlog met die VSA in elk geval nodig was. [21]

Nadat die embargo's en die bate gevries het, het die Japannese ambassadeur in Washington, Kichisaburō Nomura en die Amerikaanse minister van buitelandse sake, Cordell Hull, verskeie vergaderings gehou om die Japanse-Amerikaanse betrekkinge op te los. Daar kon om drie belangrike redes nie oor 'n oplossing ooreengekom word nie:

  1. Japan het sy alliansie met Duitsland en Italië vereer deur middel van die Tripartite Pact.
  2. Japan wou ekonomiese beheer en verantwoordelikheid vir Suidoos-Asië hê (soos voorgestel in die Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere).
  3. Japan het geweier om die vasteland van China te verlaat (sonder die marionetstaat Manchukuo [verduideliking nodig] ). [22]

In hul finale voorstel op 20 November het Japan aangebied om sy magte uit die suide van Indochina terug te trek en geen aanvalle in Suidoos -Asië te loods nie, mits die VSA, Brittanje en Nederland ophou om China te help en hul sanksies teen Japan op te hef. [13] Die Amerikaanse teenvoorstel van 26 November (die Hull-nota) vereis dat Japan onvoorwaardelik die hele China moet ontruim en nie-aggressie-ooreenkomste met die Stille Oseaan-magte moet sluit.

'N Deel van die Japannese plan vir die aanval was onder meer die onderbreking van onderhandelinge met die Verenigde State 30 minute voordat die aanval begin het. Diplomate van die Japanse ambassade in Washington, waaronder die Japannese ambassadeur, admiraal Kichisaburō Nomura en spesiale verteenwoordiger Saburō Kurusu, het uitgebreide gesprekke gevoer met die staatsdepartement oor die Amerikaanse reaksies op die Japannese verhuising in die Franse Indochina in die somer.

In die dae voor die aanval is 'n lang boodskap van 14 dele gestuur na die ambassade van die ministerie van buitelandse sake in Tokio (geënkripteer met die tipe 97-kopermasjien, in 'n kode met die naam PERS deur Amerikaanse kriptanaliste), met instruksies om dit aan die minister van buitelandse sake, Cordell Hull, om 7:00 Desember 1941 om 13:00 in Washington te lewer. sowel as die versuim van Tokio om die belangrike noodsaaklikheid van die tydsberekening te beklemtoon, het die ambassadepersoneel eers 'n paar uur na die aanval die boodskap aan sekretaris Hull oorgedra.

Die Verenigde State het die veertiende deel ontsyfer voordat die Japannese dit reggekry het, en lank voordat die ambassade -personeel 'n skoon getikte kopie saamgestel het. Die laaste deel, met die instruksies vir die afleweringstyd, is Saterdagaand gedekodeer, maar dit is eers die volgende oggend uitgevoer (volgens Henry Clausen [ aanhaling nodig ] ).

Ambassadeur Nomura het 'n afspraak gevra om Hull om 13:00 te sien, maar het later gevra dat dit tot 1:45 uitgestel word, aangesien die ambassadeur nie heeltemal gereed was nie. Nomura en Kurusu arriveer om 14:05 en word om 02:20 deur Hull ontvang. Nomura het om verskoning gevra vir die vertraging in die aanbieding van die boodskap. After Hull had read several pages, he asked Nomura whether the document was presented under instructions of the Japanese government the Ambassador replied it was. After reading the full document, Hull turned to the ambassador and said:

I must say that in all my conversations with you. during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them. [23]

Japanese records, admitted into evidence during congressional hearings on the attack after the war, established that Japan had not even written a declaration of war until hearing news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration was finally delivered to U.S. ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo about ten hours after the completion of the attack. Grew was allowed to transmit it to the United States, where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).

Oorlog Edit

In July 1941, IJN headquarters informed Emperor Hirohito its reserve bunker oil would be exhausted within two years if a new source was not found. In August 1941, Japanese prime minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a summit with President Roosevelt to discuss differences. Roosevelt replied Japan must leave China before a summit meeting could be held. [ aanhaling nodig ] On September 6, 1941, at the second Imperial Conference concerning attacks on the Western colonies in Asia and Hawaii, Japanese leaders met to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters. The summit occurred one day after the emperor had reprimanded General Hajime Sugiyama, chief of the IJA General Staff, about the lack of success in China and the speculated low chances of victory against the United States, the British Empire and their allies. [24]

Prime Minister Konoe argued for more negotiations and possible concessions to avert war. However, military leaders such as Sugiyama, Minister of War General Hideki Tōjō, and chief of the IJN General Staff Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano asserted time had run out and that additional negotiations would be pointless. [ aanhaling nodig ] They urged swift military actions against all American and European colonies in Southeast Asia and Hawaii. Tōjō argued that yielding to the American demand to withdraw troops would wipe out all the gains of the Second Sino-Japanese War, depress Army morale, endanger Manchukuo and jeopardize control of Korea hence, doing nothing was the same as defeat and a loss of face.

On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, who was also the choice of the army and navy, as his successor. Hirohito chose Hideki Tōjō instead, worried (as he told Konoe) about having the Imperial House being held responsible for a war against Western powers. [25]

On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a complete plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito. [26] At the Imperial Conference on November 5, Hirohito approved the plan for a war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, scheduled to start at the beginning of December if an acceptable diplomatic settlement were not achieved before then. [27] Over the following weeks, Tōjō's military regime offered a final deal to the United States. They offered to leave only Indochina, but in return for large American economic aid. [ aanhaling nodig ] On November 26, the so-called Hull Memorandum (or Hull Note) rejected the offer and demanded that, in addition to leaving Indochina, the Japanese must leave China (without Manchoukuo) and agree to an Open Door Policy in the Far East. [28]

On November 30, 1941, Prince Takamatsu warned his brother, Hirohito, the navy felt the Empire could not fight more than two years against the United States and wished to avoid war. After consulting with Kōichi Kido (who advised him to take his time until he was convinced) and Tōjō, the Emperor called Shigetarō Shimada and Nagano, who reassured him that war would be successful. [29] On December 1, Hirohito finally approved a "war against United States, Great Britain and Holland" during another Imperial Conference, to commence with a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at its main forward base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. [27]

Intelligence gathering Edit

On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially requested additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura. [30]

Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor. [31] Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.

In June 1941, German and Italian consulates were closed, and there were suggestions Japan's should be closed, as well. They were not, because they continued to provide valuable information (via MAGIC) and neither President Franklin D. Roosevelt nor Secretary of State Cordell Hull wanted trouble in the Pacific. [32] Had they been closed, however, it is possible Naval General Staff, which had opposed the attack from the outset, would have called it off, since up-to-date information on the location of the Pacific Fleet, on which Yamamoto's plan depended, would no longer have been available. [33]

Beplanning Redigeer

Expecting war, and seeing an opportunity in the forward basing of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, the Japanese began planning in early 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning and organizing a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch colonies to the south occupied much of the Japanese Navy's time and attention. The plans for the Pearl Harbor attack arose out of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would be inevitably drawn into war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore. [34]

The intent of a preventive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific, thus removing it from influencing operations against American, British, and Dutch colonies. Successful attacks on colonies were judged to depend on successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet. Planning [f] had long anticipated a battle in Japanese home waters after the U.S. fleet traveled across the Pacific, under attack by submarines and other forces all the way. The U.S. fleet would be defeated in a "decisive battle", as Russia's Baltic Fleet had been in 1905. A surprise attack posed a twofold difficulty compared to longstanding expectations. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters made using conventional aerial torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii's distance meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered by forces from the continental U.S.

Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British action in the Battle of Taranto, in which 21 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled half the Regia Marina (Italian Navy). Admiral Yamamoto even dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time necessary to establish a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Admiral Togo's surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. Yamamoto's emphasis on destroying the American battleships was in keeping with the Mahanian doctrine shared by all major navies during this period, including the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy. [36]

In a letter dated January 7, 1941, Yamamoto finally delivered a rough outline of his plan to Koshiro Oikawa, then Navy Minister, from whom he also requested to be made Commander in Chief of the air fleet to attack Pearl Harbor. A few weeks later, in yet another letter, Yamamoto requested Admiral Takijiro Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, study the technical feasibility of an attack against the American base. Onishi gathered as many facts as possible about Pearl Harbor.

After first consulting with Kosei Maeda, an expert on aerial torpedo warfare, and being told the harbor's shallow waters rendered such an attack almost impossible, Onishi summoned Commander Minoru Genda. After studying the original proposal put forth by Yamamoto, Genda agreed: "[T]he plan is difficult but not impossible". [37] Yamamoto gave the bulk of the planning to Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, who was very worried about the area's air defenses. Yamamoto encouraged Kusaka by telling him, "Pearl Harbor is my idea and I need your support." [38] Genda emphasized the attack should be carried out early in the morning and in total secrecy, employing an aircraft carrier force and several types of bombing. [37]

Although attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchor would achieve surprise, it also carried two distinct disadvantages. The targeted ships would be sunk or damaged in very shallow water, meaning it would be quite likely that they could be salvaged and possibly returned to duty (as six of the eight battleships eventually were). Also, most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor afterward. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto and Genda pressed ahead.

By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operasie Z, after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Tōgō at Tsushima. [ aanhaling nodig ] Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest near Kagoshima City on Kyūshū. Genda chose it because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew flew over the 5,000 ft (1,500 m) mountain behind Kagoshima and dove into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to 25 ft (7.6 m) at the piers. Bombardiers released torpedoes at a breakwater some 300 yd (270 m) away. [39]

However, even this low-altitude approach would not overcome the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japanese weapons engineers created and tested modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91 torpedo, which inflicted most of the ship damage during the eventual attack. [ aanhaling nodig ] Japanese weapons technicians also produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release shackles to 14- and 16-inch (356- and 406-mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the lightly armored decks of the old battleships.

Concept of a Japanese invasion of Hawaii Edit

At several stages during 1941, Japan's military leaders discussed the possibility of launching an invasion to seize the Hawaiian Islands this would provide Japan with a strategic base to shield its new empire, deny the United States any bases beyond the West Coast and further isolate Australia and New Zealand.

Genda, who saw Hawaii as vital for American operations against Japan after war began, believed Japan must follow any attack on Pearl Harbor with an invasion of Hawaii or risk losing the war. He viewed Hawaii as a base to threaten the west coast of North America, and perhaps as a negotiating tool for ending the war. He believed, following a successful air attack, 10,000-15,000 men could capture Hawaii, and saw the operation as a precursor or alternative to a Japanese invasion of the Philippines. In September 1941, Commander Yasuji Watanabe of the Combined Fleet staff estimated two divisions (30,000 men) and 80 ships, in addition to the carrier strike force, could capture the islands. He identified two possible landing sites, near Haleiwa and Kaneohe Bay, and proposed both be used in an operation that would require up to four weeks with Japanese air superiority. [40]

Although this idea gained some support, it was soon dismissed for several reasons:

  • Japan's ground forces, logistics, and resources were already fully committed, not only to the Second Sino-Japanese War but also for offensives in Southeast Asia that were planned to occur almost simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack.
  • The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) insisted it needed to focus on operations in China and Southeast Asia, and refused to provide substantial support elsewhere. Because of a lack of cooperation between the services, the IJN never discussed the Hawaiian invasion proposal with the IJA. [40][g]
  • Most of the senior officers of the Combined Fleet, in particular Admiral Nagano, believed an invasion of Hawaii was too risky. [h][40]

With an invasion ruled out, it was agreed a massive carrier-based three wave airstrike against Pearl Harbor to destroy the Pacific Fleet would be sufficient. Japanese planners knew that Hawaii, with its strategic location in the Central Pacific, would serve as a critical base from which the United States could extend its military power against Japan. However, the confidence of Japan's leaders that the conflict would be over quickly and that the United States would choose to negotiate a compromise, rather than fight a long, bloody war, overrode this concern. [i] [41] [42] [43]

Watanabe's superior, Captain Kameto Kuroshima, who believed the invasion plan unrealistic, after the war called his rejection of it the "biggest mistake" of his life. [40]

On November 26, 1941, the day the Hull note (which the Japanese leaders saw as an unproductive and old proposal) was received, the carrier force under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (already assembled in Hitokappu Wan) sortied for Hawaii under strict radio silence.

In 1941, Japan was one of the few countries capable of carrier aviation. [44] The Kido Butai, the Combined Fleet's main carrier force of six aircraft carriers (at the time, the most powerful carrier force with the greatest concentration of air power in the history of naval warfare), [45] embarked 359 airplanes, [j] organized as the First Air Fleet. The carriers Akagi (vlag), Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, and the newest, Shōkaku en Zuikaku, had 135 Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 fighters (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), 171 Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bombers (Allied codename "Kate"), and 108 Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bombers (Allied codename "Val") aboard. Two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, nine destroyers, and three fleet submarines provided escort and screening. In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines, which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or soon after the attack. It also had eight oilers for underway fueling. [46]

Execute order Edit

On December 1, 1941, after the striking force was en route, Chief of Staff Nagano gave a verbal directive to the commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, informing him:

Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands early in December. Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders. [47] [The Kido Butai will] proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day. [47]

Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Phase Operations".

Finally, Order number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 by Nagano, instructed Yamamoto to crush hostile naval and air forces in Asia, the Pacific and Hawaii, promptly seize the main U.S., British, and Dutch bases in East Asia and "capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions". [47]

On the home leg, the force was ordered to be alert for tracking and counterattacks by the Americans, and to return to the friendly base in the Marshall Islands, rather than the Home Islands. [48]

In 1924, General William L. Mitchell produced a 324-page report warning that future wars (including with Japan) would include a new role for aircraft against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but his warnings were ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor in a written analysis shortly after taking office. American commanders had been warned that tests had demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo attacks were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated this. In a 1932 fleet problem, a surprise airstrike led by Admiral Harry E. Yarnell had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage, a finding corroborated in a 1938 exercise by Admiral Ernest King. [49] In October 1941, Lord Louis Mountbatten visited Pearl Harbor. While lecturing American naval officers on Royal Navy tactics against the Germans, an officer asked when and how the United States would enter the war. Mountbatten pointed to Pearl Harbor on a map of the Pacific and said "right here", citing Japan's surprise attack on Port Arthur, and the British attack on Taranto. In Washington he warned Stark about how unprepared the base was against a bomber attack Stark replied, "I'm afraid that putting some of your recommendations into effect is going to make your visit out there very expensive for the U.S. Navy". [50]

By 1941, U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval cipher traffic, though nothing actually carrying significant information about Japanese military plans in 1940-41. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, some of which can be accounted for by lack of resources and manpower. [51] [ bladsy benodig ] At best, the information available to decision makers in Washington was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed, and was almost entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was thus, incompletely understood. Nothing in it pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, [k] and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was not a possible attack target. Only one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December), in a low level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl it was not decrypted until 8 December. [52] While the Japanese Diplomatic codes (Purple code) could be read, the current version (JN-25C) of the Japanese Vloot code (JN-25) which had replaced JN-25B on 4 December 1941 could not be read until May 1942.

U.S. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, good information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. At the time, no reports specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned [53] war with Japan was expected in the very near future, and it was preferred Japan make the first hostile act. [54] It was felt war would most probably start with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines, [55] Indochina, Thailand, or the Russian Far East Pearl Harbor was never mentioned as a potential target. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only that war with Japan was expected in the near future and all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack might have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps resulted in less death and damage. On the other hand, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack alert status would have required), [l] or killed (in their obsolete aircraft) by more experienced Japanese aviators. When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (bv., no torpedo nets in the harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks (not ready to fly at a moment's warning), and so on.

Nevertheless, because it was believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged to inconvenience ordinary operations. As a result of limited numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack (they improved considerably, with far fewer remaining planes, [ aanhaling nodig ] after the attack). The Navy had 33 PBYs in the islands, but only three on patrol at the time of the attack. [57] Hawaii was low on the priority list for the B-17s finally becoming available for the Pacific, largely because General MacArthur in the Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be made available to the Pacific (where they were intended as a deterrent). The British, who had contracted for them, even agreed to accept fewer to facilitate this buildup. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy were both on training status rather than operational alert. [ aanhaling nodig ]

There was also confusion about the Army's readiness status as General Short had changed local alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on private property) [ aanhaling nodig ]. Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields to lessen the risk of sabotage, not in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with Short's interpretation of the war warnings.

Chester Nimitz said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach, he would have sortied to meet them. With the three American aircraft carriers (Onderneming, Lexington, en Saratoga) absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (as many as twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately raised. [58]


Timeline: Critical events that led up to 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor

Seventy-eight years after the attack, here is a look back at the timeline of events that led up to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.

HONOLULU - When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, killing 2,400 Americans and injuring an additional 1,200, it became one of the worst attacks ever carried out on American soil.

“Since the War of 1812, no foreign power had carried out so devastating an attack on American soil, and virtually all Americans reacted to this one with shock, disbelief, and outrage,” wrote University of Maryland historian Gary Gerstle.

On the 79th anniversary, here is a look back at the timeline of events that led up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Julie: At the lead of Prince Fumimaro Kanoe, Japan invades North China.

Julie: In an attempt to halt Japanese military expansion in Asia, the U.S. imposes trade sanctions and then an embargo on oil, which reduced Japan&aposs oil imports by 90 percent. This effectively crippled Japan&aposs ability to push on in offensive war efforts in the long term.
September: The U.S. cracks the Japanese code and begins decoding all diplomatic messages.

Januarie: Japanese officers begin discussing a possible attack on Pearl Harbor.
Jan. 27: After learning of Japanese plans to carry out a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew wires Washington with the information, but no one believes him. Senior U.S. military experts believe any potential attack would be carried out in Asia.
November: Japan sends Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura to Washington as a special envoy to discuss potential diplomatic solutions with the U.S.
Nov. 16: Japanese submarines depart for Pearl Harbor in preparation of a possible attack.
Nov. 26: A final attempt at diplomacy on the part of the Japanese is rejected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Japanese aircraft carriers and escorts depart for Pearl Harbor in response.
Nov. 27: President Franklin D. Roosevelt issues a war warning for the Pacific, which is largely ignored in Hawaii.
Dec. 6: U.S. intelligence decodes a crucial message pointing to the next morning as a deadline for an undetermined Japanese action. The message is delivered to Washington high command more than four hours ahead of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the message is not forwarded to U.S. commanders in Honolulu.
Dec. 7, 7:02 a.m. local time: Two U.S. radar operators identify large groups of aircraft in flight toward the island of Oahu from the north. Because they were expecting a flight of B-17s from the U.S. any moment, they do not sound an alarm.
Dec. 7, 7:55 a.m. local time: A swarm of Japanese warplanes descends on Honolulu, attacking ships in Pearl Harbor, as well as air stations at Hickam, Wheeler, Ford Island, Kaneohe and Ewa Field. The attack lasts for two hours and 20 minutes.

When the attack is finally over, 18 ships and more than 300 aircraft have been destroyed or damaged. More than 2,400 Americans were killed, and an additional 1,200 wounded.

The U.S.S. California is hit during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (Photo credit: U.S. Navy via Library of Congress)

Dec. 8: President Roosevelt addresses Congress, and his address is broadcast via radio to the American public. Roosevelt asks Congress for a declaration of war against Japan, which Congress approves.

Speech by Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress on Dec. 8, 1941.

This story was reported from Los Angeles. 

Editor’s note: A version of this article was published on Dec. 5, 2019.


5 Tips for Getting the Most Out of Your Visit to Pearl Harbor

PHOTO: USS Arizona Memorial Pearl Harbor Hawaii (Photo via pinggr / iStock / Getty Images Plus)

Pearl Harbor is one of Oahu’s most visited attractions.

With a mix of free and pay-for museums, ships, and activities, there are many ways to explore and experience its history.

Here are five tips for getting the most out of your visit.

Travel Light & Plan Ahead

Bags and purses larger than a wristlet are not allowed inside the Pearl Harbor historical sites (this includes camera bags). There is a bag check at the front gate where you can store them ($5 per bag), but it’s best to avoid it altogether, as the line at the bag check can get quite long during busy times. You don’t need to bring much to enjoy the day – just your wallet and camera – and we recommend traveling light to avoid the hustle.

When scheduling your visit to Pearl Harbor, you should reserve an Arizona Memorial ticket in advance. It includes a short movie and a boat ride out to see the Memorial. This movie and boat ride will be attached to a specific time. Show up at least an hour before your ticket slot so you have enough time to visit a few museums beforehand.

Visit the Road to War and Attack Museums Before the Video and Boat Tour

Two free museums – the Road to War and the Attack Museums – set the historical stage in the years leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Even if you know your history well, taking an hour to go through these museums will give you a detailed explanation of what was happening at the time. The Road to War Museum explains how the aftermath of World War I affected the United States’ willingness to get involved in World War II, and what the U.S. thought of the Japanese capabilities leading up to the attack. The Attack Museum provides moving, detailed descriptions of what happened on December 7, 1941.

Don’t Pass Up the Audio Tour

You can browse the Pearl Harbor historical site on your own, but if you want to deepen your experience, spring for the audio tour. It’s only $7.50, and it will bring the historical site to life. Not only does it narrate the Road to War and Attack Museums, but it also brings you to significant points throughout the historical area, explaining other memorials and points of interest that lack signage.

Lighten the Load By Visiting the Bowfin and Missouri

Pearl Harbor can be a moving place, one that brings about great sadness. It’s advised that you work in a few lighter, less-intense activities along the way. You can get a neat glimpse of life on a sub by touring the Bowfin Submarine, which allows you to go below deck and walk through the living quarters.

A visit to the U.S.S. Missouri is also a great idea, as it provides closure to the whole Pearl Harbor experience. World War II ended when the Japanese surrendered on board the Missouri. You can tour the entire ship and also visit the exact spot where the surrender took place.

Eat at Restaurant 604

In a perfect world, you would arrive at Pearl Harbor in the morning to explore the museums, visit the Arizona Memorial mid-morning, and then finish up with the Bowfin and Missouri by early afternoon (visiting in the morning is nice because it’s cooler, and most attractions are outside and/or open air). In this scenario, you would finish up around lunchtime.

Since the hot dog carts at Pearl Harbor leave something to be desired, we recommend you make a short walk next door and eat at Restaurant 604. With a view overlooking Pearl Harbor, it’s a nice end to the experience, where you can reflect on your visit and enjoy local fish plates or Kalua pork.


What can we learn from Pearl Harbor today?

It’s wise, in management, to allow your subordinates to be creative and come up with their own solutions. But it’s not wise to then consciously remain ignorant of the choices they’ve made.

A second thing, which is particularly true of what happened with Admiral Kimmel, is that you shouldn’t let your desires color new facts. Kimmel just wouldn’t switch from what he gesoek to do to what he moet be doing.

Finally, if you’ve commissioned someone to do a report on something and they come back and forecast the future, don’t forget it! One of the most remarkable things about Pearl Harbor is that the nature and scope of the attack were exactly forecast only a few months before it happened by an admiral and a general.

The admiral was on Oahu in the days before the attack. But no one went to him and said, “You know the scenario you talked about where aircraft carriers might sneak up on our island? That may be happening right now because we cannot find the location of most of the Japanese aircraft carriers.” No one said that. He was ignorant–until the bombs started falling.


Kyk die video: Pearl Harbor: The Last Word - Could Pearl Harbor Have Been Prevented? History (November 2021).