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Die Japanse oorlogsmisdaadverhoor begin

Die Japanse oorlogsmisdaadverhoor begin

In Tokio, Japan, begin die Internasionale Militêre Tribunale vir die Verre Ooste die saak aanhoor teen 28 Japannese weermag- en regeringsamptenare wat daarvan beskuldig word dat hulle oorlogsmisdade en misdade teen die mensdom tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gepleeg het.

Op 4 November 1948 eindig die verhoor met 25 van 28 Japannese beskuldigdes wat skuldig bevind is. Van die drie ander beskuldigdes is twee tydens die lang verhoor dood en een is as waansinnig verklaar. Op 12 November het die oorlogsmisdadigingstribunaal doodvonnisse opgelê op sewe van die mans, waaronder generaal Hideki Tojo, wat tydens die oorlog as premier van Japan gedien het, en ander skoolhoofde, soos Iwane Matsui, wat die verkragting van Nanking gereël het, en Heitaro Kimura , wat Geallieerde krygsgevangenes wreedaardig gemaak het. Sestien ander is tot lewenslange gevangenisstraf gevonnis, en twee tot minderjarige gevangenisstraf. Op 23 Desember 1948 is Tojo en die ses ander in Tokio tereggestel.

Anders as die Neurenberg -verhoor van Nazi -oorlogsmisdadigers, waar daar vier hoofaanklaers was, om Groot -Brittanje, Frankryk, die Verenigde State en die USSR te verteenwoordig, het die verhoor in Tokio slegs een hoofaanklaer - Amerikaner Joseph B. Keenan, 'n voormalige assistent van die Amerikaanse prokureur -generaal. Ander lande, veral China, het egter tot die verrigtinge bygedra, en die Australiese regter William Flood Webb was die voorsitter. Benewens die sentrale verhoor in Tokio, het verskeie tribunale wat buite Japan sit, ongeveer 5000 Japannese beoordeel aan oorlogsmisdade, waarvan meer as 900 tereggestel is. Sommige waarnemers het gedink dat keiser Hirohito verhoor moes word vir sy stilswyende goedkeuring van die Japanse beleid tydens die oorlog, maar hy is beskerm deur Amerikaanse owerhede wat hom as 'n simbool van Japannese eenheid en konserwatisme beskou het, beide gunstige eienskappe in die Amerikaanse oorlog na die oorlog.


Die verhoor van Peter von Hagenbach deur 'n ad hoc -tribunaal van die Heilige Romeinse Ryk in 1474, was die eerste 'internasionale' oorlogsmisdaadverhore en ook kommando -verantwoordelikheid. [1] [2] Hagenbach is tereggestel vir gruweldade wat tydens die besetting van Breisach gepleeg is, skuldig bevind en onthoof. [3] Aangesien hy skuldig bevind is aan misdade, is "hy as 'n ridder geag 'n plig om te voorkom", hoewel Hagenbach homself verdedig het deur aan te voer dat hy slegs opdragte van die hertog van Bourgondië, Charles the Bold, aan wie die Die Heilige Romeinse Ryk het Breisach gegee.

In 1865 is Henry Wirz, 'n Konfederale offisier, verantwoordelik gehou en gehang vir haglike omstandighede in die Andersonville -gevangenis, waar baie uniesoldate tydens die Amerikaanse burgeroorlog gesterf het.

Tydens die Tweede Boereoorlog het die Britse leër Breaker Morant, Peter Handcock, Alfred Taylor en verskeie ander offisiere in die hof geveg vir verskeie moorde op krygsgevangenes en baie burgerlike nie-stridendes in Noord-Transvaal. Sien krygsraad van Breaker Morant.

Na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog is 'n klein aantal Duitse personeel deur 'n Duitse hof in die Leipzig -oorlogsmisdade verhoor weens misdade wat na bewering tydens die oorlog gepleeg is.

Artikel 227 van die Verdrag van Versailles, die vredesverdrag tussen Duitsland en die geallieerde moondhede na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, “openbaar [red] William II van Hohenzollern, voorheen die Duitse keiser, in die openbaar vir 'n hoogste oortreding van die internasionale moraliteit en die heiligheid van verdrae . ” [4] Die voormalige Kaiser het egter na Nederland ontsnap, en ondanks die eis dat sy uitlewering gestel is, het die Nederlanders geweier om hom oor te gee, [5] en is hy nie tereggestel nie. Duitsland, as ondertekenaar van die verdrag, is dus in kennis gestel van wat in die geval van 'n daaropvolgende oorlog kan gebeur. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Proewe van misdade van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog Wysig

Na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog verwys die frase gewoonlik na die verhore van Duitse en Japannese leiers in howe wat deur die seëvierende geallieerde nasies ingestel is.

Die voormalige verhore is gehou in Neurenberg, Duitsland, onder die gesag van twee regsinstrumente. Die een, die Handves van Londen is op 8 Augustus 1945 deur verteenwoordigers van die Verenigde State, die Verenigde Koninkryk, Frankryk en die Sowjetunie in Londen onderteken, die ander, wet nr. 10, is op 20 Desember deur die Allied Control Council in Berlyn afgekondig , 1945.

Die Londense handves het voorsiening gemaak vir die oprigting van die Internasionale Militêre Tribunaal, bestaande uit een regter en een plaasvervanger -regter van elk van die ondertekenende lande, om oorlogsmisdadigers te verhoor. Ingevolge die Londense handves het die misdade teen beskuldigdes in drie kategorieë verdeel: misdade teen vrede, dit wil sê misdade wat die beplanning behels, begin en voer 'n oorlog van aggressie, dit wil sê oortredings van die wette en oorlogsgebruike as beliggaam in die Haagse konvensies en algemeen erken deur militêre magte van beskaafde nasies en misdade teen die mensdom, soos die uitwissing van rasse-, etniese en godsdienstige groepe en ander sulke gruweldade teen burgerlikes.

Op 8 Oktober 1945 was Anton Dostler die eerste Duitse generaal wat deur 'n Amerikaanse militêre tribunaal in die Royal Palace of Caserta in Caserta vir oorlogsmisdade verhoor is. Hy word daarvan beskuldig dat hy beveel het dat 15 gevange Amerikaanse soldate van Operasie Ginny II in Italië in Maart 1944 doodgemaak moet word. Die teregstelling van 15 Amerikaanse krygsgevangenes in Italië wat deur Dostler gelas is, was 'n implementering van Hitler se kommando -orde van 1942 wat die onmiddellike teregstelling van alle geallieerde kommando's vereis het, hetsy in behoorlike uniforms al dan nie, sonder verhoor as dit deur Duitse magte aangehou word. Die tribunaal het die verweer van Superior Orders verwerp en Dostler skuldig bevind aan oorlogsmisdade. Hy is ter dood veroordeel en op 1 Desember 1945 in Aversa deur 'n vuurpeloton tereggestel.

Die Dostler -saak het presedent geword vir die Neurenberg -verhore van Duitse generaals, amptenare en Nazi -leiers wat begin in November 1945 begin het dat die gebruik van Superior -bevele as 'n verweer nie die amptenare van die verantwoordelikheid onthef om onwettige bevele uit te voer en in die hof gestraf kan word nie. Hierdie beginsel is gekodifiseer in beginsel IV van die Neurenberg -beginsels, en soortgelyke beginsels is gevind in afdelings van die Universele Verklaring van Menseregte.

Die verhore vir die Japannese oorlogsmisdadigers is in Tokio, Japan, ingestel om die Kaïro -verklaring, die Potsdam -verklaring, die instrument van oorgawe en die Moskou -konferensie te implementeer. Die Potsdam -verklaring (Julie 1945) lui: 'streng geregtigheid sal geskied aan alle oorlogsmisdadigers, insluitend diegene wat wreedhede op ons gevangenes besoek het', hoewel dit nie spesifiek voorverhitte was nie. [7] Die opdrag vir die Tribunaal is uiteengesit in die IMTFE -handves wat op 19 Januarie 1946 uitgereik is. [8] Daar was groot meningsverskil tussen die Geallieerdes en binne hul administrasies oor wie om te probeer en hoe om dit te probeer hulle. Ondanks die gebrek aan konsensus, het generaal Douglas MacArthur, die opperbevelvoerder van die geallieerde magte, besluit om arrestasies te begin. Op 11 September, 'n week na die oorgawe, beveel hy die arrestasie van 39 verdagtes - die meeste van hulle lede van die Eerste Minister Hideki Tojo se oorlogskabinet. Tojo het probeer om selfmoord te pleeg, maar is met behulp van Amerikaanse dokters herleef. Hy is later onder meer skuldig bevind en opgehang.

Neurenberg -proewe Redigeer

Op 18 Oktober 1945 het die hoofaanklaers 'n klag teen die tribunaal ingedien waarin 24 individue aangekla word van 'n verskeidenheid misdade en gruweldade, insluitend die doelbewuste aanhitsing van aggressiewe oorloë, uitroeiing van rasse- en godsdienstige groepe, moord en mishandeling van krygsgevangenes, en die moord, mishandeling en deportasie van honderde duisende inwoners van lande wat tydens die oorlog deur Duitsland beset is.

Onder die beskuldigdes was die nasionalistiese sosialistiese leiers Hermann Göring en Rudolf Hess, die diplomaat Joachim von Ribbentrop, die ammunisiemaker Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, maarskalk Wilhelm Keitel, groot -admiraal Erich Raeder en 18 ander militêre leiers en burgerlike amptenare. Sewe organisasies wat deel uitmaak van die basiese struktuur van die Nazi -regering is ook as kriminele beskuldig. Hierdie organisasies het die SS (Schutzstaffel, Defence Corps), die Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei, Geheime staatspolisie), en die SA (Sturmabteilung, Stormtroepe), sowel as die algemene staf en die hoë bevel van die Duitse weermag.

Die verhoor het op 20 November 1945 begin. Baie van die getuienis wat die vervolging ingedien het, het bestaan ​​uit oorspronklike militêre, diplomatieke en ander regeringsdokumente wat in die hande van die Geallieerde magte geval het ná die ineenstorting van die Duitse regering.

Die uitspraak van die Internasionale Militêre Tribunaal is uitgespreek op 30 September en 1 Oktober 1946. Onder die belangrikste kenmerke van die besluit was die gevolgtrekking, in ooreenstemming met die Londense ooreenkoms, dat die beplanning of aanvang van 'n aggressiewe oorlog 'n misdaad is onder die beginsels van internasionale reg. Die tribunaal verwerp die bewering van die verweer dat sodanige dade nie voorheen as internasionale misdaad gedefinieer is nie en dat die veroordeling van die beskuldigdes dus die regverdigheidsbeginsel sal skend wat ex post facto -straf verbied. Soos met die Dostler -saak, het dit ook die bewering van 'n aantal verweerders verwerp dat hulle nie wettig verantwoordelik was vir hul dade nie, omdat hulle die dade uitgevoer het onder bevel van hoër gesag, en verklaar dat "die ware toets. . . is nie die bestaan ​​van die orde nie, maar of morele keuse (in die uitvoering daarvan) in werklikheid moontlik was."

Met betrekking tot oorlogsmisdade en misdade teen die mensdom het die tribunaal oorweldigende bewyse gevind van 'n stelselmatige heerskappy van geweld, brutaliteit en terrorisme deur die Duitse regering in die gebiede wat deur sy magte beset is. Miljoene mense is vermoor in Nazi -konsentrasiekampe, waarvan baie toegerus was met gaskamers vir die uitwissing van Jode, Sigeuners en lede van ander etniese of godsdienstige groepe. Ingevolge die slawe -arbeidsbeleid van die Duitse regering is ten minste 5 miljoen mense met geweld uit hul huise na Duitsland gedeporteer. Baie van hulle is dood as gevolg van onmenslike behandeling. Die tribunaal het ook bevind dat gruweldade op groot skaal en as amptelike beleid gepleeg is.

Van die sewe aangeklaagde organisasies het die tribunaal die Leierskorps van die party, die SS, die SD (Sicherheitsdienst, Sekuriteitsdiens), en die Gestapo.

In Mei 1993, tydens die Joegoslaviese oorloë na die massiewe oorlogsmisdade, en dade van "etniese suiwering" in die voormalige Joegoslavië deur Bosnies-Serviese magte, het die Verenigde Nasies die Internasionale Strafhof vir die Voormalige Joegoslavië gestig om oorlogsmisdadigers van almal te verhoor nasionaliteite. Die aangeklaagde misdade sluit in ernstige oortredings van die Geneefse konvensies, oorlogsmisdade, misdade teen die mensdom en volksmoord, dit was die eerste tribunaal waarin seksuele aanranding as 'n oorlogsmisdaad vervolg is. Die ICTY was die eerste internasionale oorlogsmisdadigingstribunaal sedert die Neurenberg -verhore. Uiteindelik is bykans 161 individue in die ICTY aangekla: 68% van die Serwiese etnisiteit. Kroaties-Serwiërs, Bosnies-Serwiërs, Serwiërs en Bosnies-Kroate-amptenare is skuldig bevind aan misdade teen die mensdom en Bosniërs-leiers van volksmoord.

In 1994 het die VN die Internasionale Strafhof vir Rwanda geopen ná die volksmoord van April tot Junie in daardie land van Hutu -onderdane.

Alhoewel die tribunale effektief was in die vervolging van individue, was dit 'n duur onderneming en het die behoefte aan 'n permanente tribunaal, wat uiteindelik die Internasionale Strafhof bekend was, blootgelê.


Japanse oorlogsmisdade - Wewak -verhoor

Plaas deur David Thompson & raquo 06 Mei 2003, 23:32

Plaas deur David Thompson & raquo 06 Mei 2003, 23:47

Plaas deur Dan W. & raquo 07 Mei 2003, 01:03

Ek onthou hoe ek gehoor het van die bemanning van die B-29 wat oor Japan neergeskiet is wat na 'n mediese fasiliteit geneem is vir 'n paar grusame mediese eksperimente. Die vlieënier se lewer is verwyder en gekook, en is deur 'n paar van die top Japannese koper in 'n nabygeleë krygsgevangenekamp geëet.

Uiters bisar gedrag, amper ongelooflik, dit kon gebeur het.

Plaas deur michael meulens & raquo 07 Mei 2003, 05:35

Daar was gevalle van kannibalisme deur Japannese soldate in Nieu -Guinee.

Daar was ook gevalle van kannibalisme deur gevangenes in konsentrasiekampe en deur Sowjet -krygsgevangenes.

Al hierdie gevalle van kannibalisme het dieselfde oorsaak gehad dat die persone wat hulle gepleeg het, honger ly.

Hulle het tot kannibalisme gegaan om dieselfde rede dat die oorlewendes van 'n vliegtuigongeluk in die Andes in die vroeë sewentigerjare die lyke van diegene wat doodgemaak is, geëet het om hul eie lewens te red.

Ek dink nie 'n redelike persoon sou 'n honger konsentrasiekampgevangene of 'n Sowjet -krygsgevangene in 'n Duitse kamp beoordeel omdat hy vleis geëet het uit die lyk van 'n medegevangene wat gesterf het nie.

Dit lyk my asof die doodsvonnis wat die Japannese offisier gegee het wat vleis geëet het uit die lyk van 'n Australiese soldaat wat in die geveg gedood is, onregverdig was. Daar word nie eers beweer dat die soldaat vermoor is om hom te eet nie. Ek is egter glad nie verbaas oor die vonnis op daardie tydstip nie; my landgenote is deur 'n wrede, op ras gebaseerde rassevooroordeel teenoor alle Asiërs, veral die Japannese, verteer.

Die bewerings dat die Japannese doelbewus Indiese gevangenes doodgemaak en geëet het, val in 'n ander kategorie, maar dit is onwaarskynlik dat dit waar is. Die feit dat die Japannese owerhede 'n straf opgelê het op luitenant Tazaki vir kannibalisme, toon dat hulle dit as 'n misdaad beskou het, ondanks die feit dat die straf minimaal was weens die uiterste hongerstoestande wat dit veroorsaak het.

Ek het opgemerk dat geen van die aangehaalde koerantberigte 'n poging aangewend het om die opspraakwekkende aanklagte van kannibalisme in verband te bring met die objektiewe situasie in Wewak waarin dit plaasgevind het nie, naamlik dat die Japannese garnisoen afgesny is en honger ly.

Die materiaal wat Dan Weakley geplaas het, klink soos 'n stedelike mite. Amerikaners van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het ongetwyfeld geglo dat die Japannese kannibalisme as deel van hul kultuur beoefen het. Dit is natuurlik heel moontlik dat mediese eksperimente met betrekking tot chemiese of biologiese oorlogvoering op krygsgevangenes uitgevoer is.

Plaas deur David Thompson & raquo 07 Mei 2003, 06:08

Dan en Michael - Die aanklagte wat by hierdie Wewak -verhoor betrokke is, is geensins 'n tipiese oorlogsmisdaad nie, in die Stille Oseaan se oorlogsteater of op enige ander plek. Hierdie artikels is hopelik die begin van meer materiaal wat oor die algemene onderwerp van oorlogsmisdade in die Verre Ooste geplaas kan word. Soos dit gebeur, was hierdie verhoor die vroegste een waarvoor ek 'n volledige koerantberig gehad het. (Die artikels was aan die kant van mikrofilmkopieë wat ek gemaak het van nuusberigte oor Europese oorlogsmisdade en medewerkerproewe).

Net soos Dan, het ek gelees van 'n paar gevalle (minder as 5) waarin Japannese offisiere toegegaan het op ontspannings kannibalisme en nie noodwendig na die praktyk gedryf is nie. Kolonel Masanobu Tsuji, IJA, en sommige van sy mede -offisiere het byvoorbeeld na bewering op die lewer van 'n uitgevoerde geallieerde vlieënier geëet - die voorval word vertel op: http://www.danford.net/tsuji.htm

Vir myself glo ek nie dat hierdie voorvalle meer verteenwoordig as die afwykende gedrag van 'n baie, baie klein aantal afwykende misdadigers nie.

Plaas deur michael meulens & raquo 11 Mei 2003, 07:13

Ek lees die artikel oor kolonel Masanobu Tsuji waarna die skakel verskaf is.

(Ek het baie jare gelede Tsuji se boek oor die val van Singapoer gelees).

Dit blyk dat die kannibalisme -verhaal aan 'n groep oorlogskorrespondente vertel is wat nie eintlik die makabere fees bygewoon het nie. Dit is duidelik dat hulle die verhaal deurgegee het, wat gelei het tot die naoorlogse ondersoek van Tsuji.

Maar of die voorval van kannibalisme werklik plaasgevind het, is 'n kwessie van veronderstelling. Dit was moontlik 'n verhaal wat uitgevind is deur een van die vyande van Tsuji, waarvan hy blykbaar baie in die Japannese weermag gehad het. volgens die artikel. Of anders was dit miskien 'n makabere grap van Tsuji self, dit lyk asof hy die soort persoon was wat dit sou geniet om sulke verhale oor homself te vertel.

Wat ook al die geval was, die artikel sê nie beslis dat die kannibalisme -verhaal waar was nie, en laat dit "na bewering" staan. Daar blyk beslis geen definitiewe bewys te wees nie.

Plaas deur David Thompson & raquo 11 Mei 2003, 07:25

Michael - Die oorlogskorrespondentweergawe was nie die enigste weergawe van die Tsuji -ontspannings kannibalisme nie. Soos u reg opgemerk het, het die oorlogskorrespondente nie die aandete gehaal nie. Hulle verhaal is noodwendig tweedehands. Die weergawe van die oorlogskorrespondent word egter voorafgegaan in die gekoppelde verhaal (op http://www.danford.net/tsuji.htm) deur hierdie aanhaling:

"Dieselfde verhaal is vertel deur 'n Japannese weermagoffisier, majoor Mitsuo Abe van die 49ste afdeling, wat volgens hom eintlik by die makabere maaltyd was, die vlieënier was 'n Amerikaanse luitenant genaamd Parker. In hierdie weergawe was die banket spontaan. Parker is neergeskiet in 'n aanval, ondervra deur Abe en Tsuji, en weier om nuttige inligting te gee. vir wraak en vir die praktiese oorweging dat daar skaars genoeg vervoer was vir die Japannese personeel, sonder om die Amerikaner saam te neem. Die twee beamptes wou vermoedelik dat hy tereggestel word. . "Dit was toe en daar, in hierdie weergawe, dat die vlieënier se lewer ingebring is."

Vir wat dit tot hierdie bespreking kan bydra, is die ander voorvalle waarvan ek gehoor het:

Blykbaar het Amerikaanse militêre tribunale in Truk en Guam Japannese beamptes skuldig bevind aan kannibalisme. Die Truk -veroordelings word genoem by:

Die Guam -skuldigbevinding en 'n ander saak van dieselfde karakter, onbekende plek, word beskryf as:

Luitenant -generaal Joshio Tachibana, die Keiserlike Japannese weermag en 11 ander Japannese militêre personeel is in Augustus 1944 in Chichi Jima op die Bonin -eilande verhoor vir die onthoofding van twee Amerikaanse vlieëniers. [5] Hulle is op bevel van Tachibana onthoof. Een van die uitgevoerde vlieëniers, 'n derdeklas -radioman van die Amerikaanse vloot, is ontleed en sy 'vlees en ingewande' deur Japannese militêre personeel geëet. Die VSA verhoor ook vise -admiraal Mori en 'n majoor Matoba vir moord in die dood van vyf Amerikaanse vlieëniers, in Februarie 1945. Majoor Matoba het erken dat hy kannibalisme was. Militêre en internasionale reg het egter geen bepalings vir straf vir kannibalisme op sigself nie. Hulle is beskuldig van moord en 'voorkoming van eerbare begrafnis'.

Hierdie proewe word genoem by:

Die Chichi Jima -voorval word vermoedelik ook in Sherrod, Robert Lee, genoem. 1952. Geskiedenis van Marine Corps Aviation in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Combat Forces Press.

Die B-29 lewende eetverhaal waarna Dan verwys, was deel van die aanklagte in 'n oorlogsmisdaadverhoor wat 'n Amerikaanse militêre tribunaal te Yokohama begin het op 11 Maart 1948. Alhoewel hierdie klagte blykbaar van die hand gewys is, was daar veroordelings die viviseksiemoorde op verskeie lede van die bemanning van die spesifieke B-29. Daar is meer inligting hieroor by:

Daar is 'n foto van die webwerf af wat die lede van die lugbemanning toon, waarvan sommige dood is en waarvan ten minste een die oorlog oorleef het.

Tans is daar eise teen die Japannese regering, waarvan sommige kannibalisme behels wat inheems is aan inheemse slagoffers, waarvoor die inwoners van die voormalige Japanse Stille Oseaan -eilande Trustgebiede herstel vra. Hierdie eise word genoem by:

Laastens is daar 'n dokumentêre film wat ek nog nie gesien het nie, 'Japanese Devils' waarin 14 voormalige Japannese soldate ondervra word en waarvan ten minste een nog 'n kannibaalverhaal vertel. Ek weet nie wat die omstandighede van die voorval of voorvalle was nie. Hierdie film word genoem by:


Amerikaanse ervaring

Generaal Macarthur en ander senior weermagoffisiere, by sy aankoms by die Atsugi -lughawe, naby Tokio, Japan, 30 Augustus 1945. Amerikaanse nasionale argief.

Die beroepsbeampte het historikus Richard B. Finn opgemerk, "Die Tweede Wêreldoorlog was die eerste groot konflik in die geskiedenis waarin die oorwinnaars verhoor en gestraf is teen duisende mense in die verslane nasies vir 'misdade teen vrede' en 'misdade teen die mensdom, 'twee nuwe en breed gedefinieerde kategorieë internasionale misdaad.' Vir die meeste mense herinner dit aan die verhore van Nazi -oorlogsmisdadigers in Neurenberg. Maar 'n ewe moeilike, fassinerende en omstrede stel proewe het in Tokio plaasgevind onder die wakende oog van opperbevelhebber Douglas MacArthur.

Die Tokio -verhore was nie die enigste forum vir die straf van Japannese oorlogsmisdadigers nie, net die mees sigbare. In werklikheid het die Asiatiese lande wat deur die Japannese oorlogsmasjien gevang is, veel meer Japannees probeer - na raming vyfduisend, wat tot 900 tereggestel het en meer as die helfte tot lewenslange tronkstraf gevonnis het. Maar met Japan onder die beheer van die Amerikaners, val die mees prominente Japannese oorlogsleiers onder MacArthur se jurisdiksie.

Die Potsdam -verklaring van Julie 1945 het 'n beroep op verhore en suiwering gedoen van diegene wat die Japannese 'mislei en mislei' het tot oorlog. Dit was die eenvoudige deel, daar was groot meningsverskil, onder die Geallieerdes en in die VSA, oor wie om te probeer en hoe om dit te probeer. Ondanks die gebrek aan konsensus, verloor MacArthur geen tyd nie en beveel die arrestasie van nege en dertig verdagtes-die meeste van hulle lede van generaal Tojo se oorlogskabinet-op 11 September, net meer as 'n week na die oorgawe. Miskien het Tojo probeer om selfmoord te pleeg, maar is met die hulp van Amerikaanse dokters herleef om hom selfs die ontsnappingsmiddel te ontken.

Op 6 Oktober het MacArthur 'n opdrag ontvang, spoedig goedgekeur deur die ander geallieerde moondhede, wat hom die bevoegdheid gegee het om met die groot verhore voort te gaan en hom basiese riglyne vir hul optrede gegee het. Soos hulle in Duitsland gedoen het, het die Geallieerdes drie breë kategorieë opgestel. 'Klas A' -aanklagte wat beweer dat' misdade teen vrede 'ingedien sou word teen Japan se voorste leiers wat die oorlog beplan en gelei het. Klas B- en C -aanklagte, wat op Japannese van enige rang geëis kan word, het onderskeidelik "konvensionele oorlogsmisdade" en "misdade teen die mensdom" gedek. Begin November het die opperbevelvoerder die mag gekry om ander leiers uit die oorlog uit die openbare lewe te verwyder. Weereens het MacArthur vinnig beweeg: teen 8 Desember het hy 'n internasionale vervolgingsafdeling opgestel onder die voormalige Amerikaanse assistent-prokureur-generaal Joseph Keenan, wat begin het met die insameling van bewyse en voorbereiding vir die hoë profiel Klas A-verhore.

Op 19 Januarie 1946 kondig MacArthur die oprigting van die Internasionale Militêre Tribunaal vir die Verre Ooste aan (IMFTE) aan, en kies 'n paar weke later sy elf regters uit name wat die regerings in die Allied Far Eastern Commission aan hom voorgelê het. Hy het Keenan ook die hoofaanklaer en die Australiese sir William Webb die president van die tribunaal genoem. Agt-en-twintig hooggeplaaste politieke en militêre leiers is op 55 aanklagte van “misdade teen vrede, konvensionele oorlogsmisdade en misdade teen die mensdom” aangekla.

Die Tokio -proewe het op 3 Mei 1946 begin en het twee en 'n half jaar geduur. Alhoewel die verbetering van die oorhaastige Manila -verhore, wat ook deur MacArthur gereël is en gelei het tot die teregstellings van generaals Yamashita en Homma, is die Tokio -verhore gekritiseer as nog 'n voorbeeld van 'geregtigheid van oorwinnaars'. Een van die meer gesaghebbende studies veroordeel hulle ten sterkste: "Ons het gevind dat die grondslag daarvan in die volkereg wankelrig was. Ons het gesien dat die proses ernstig gebrekkig was. Ons het die uitspraak se ontoereikendheid as geskiedenis ondersoek."

Op 4 November 1948 kondig Webb aan dat al die beskuldigdes skuldig bevind is. Sewe is ter dood veroordeel, sestien lewenslange gevangenisstraf, twee tot mindere terme, twee is dood tydens die verhore en een is as kranksinnig bevind. Nadat MacArthur hul besluite nagegaan het, het hy sy spyt uitgespreek, maar die werk van die tribunaal geprys en die uitsprake bekragtig. Alhoewel MacArthur die plig vir my 'heeltemal afstootlik' noem, is 'geen menslike besluit onfeilbaar nie, maar ek kan my nie voorstel dat daar 'n geregtelike proses is om 'n groter beskerming te bewerkstellig om geregtigheid te ontwikkel nie.'

Op 23 Desember 1948 word generaal Tojo en ses ander in die Sugamo -gevangenis gehang. MacArthur, wat bang was om die Japannese mense in die verleentheid te bring en te verset, het die wense van president Truman getwis en fotografie van enige aard belet, en het in plaas daarvan vier lede van die Geallieerde Raad ingebring om as amptelike getuies op te tree.


Onbedekte rekords toon dat Japannese oorlogsmisdadigers met laer posisie onskuld voor die teregstelling beweer het

Baie Japannese oorlogsmisdadigers wat ná die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in 'n Amerikaanse militêre tribunaal in die Filippyne skuldig bevind is, het beweer dat hulle onskuldig is en kritiek op hul doodsvonnisse uitgespreek in hul laaste woorde, volgens afskrifte van Amerikaanse militêre rekords wat onlangs in Japan gevind is.

Die rekords wat insig gee oor hoe klas-B en klas-C Japannese oorlogsmisdadigers op hul vonnisse gereageer het, is op 'n mikrofiche by die National Archives of Japan ontdek deur Kenji Nagata, 'n professor in strafreg aan die Kansai Universiteit. Die oorspronklikes word in die Amerikaanse nasionale argief bewaar.

In die rekords word besonderhede van 58 Japannese soldate onthul wat ter dood veroordeel is in die tribunale van Manila wat in Desember 1945 begin het. Hulle is tussen April en Desember die volgende jaar tereggestel.

Die 58 soldate is skuldig bevind aan konvensionele oorlogsmisdade of misdade teen die mensdom, waaronder moord op gevangenes en burgerlikes. Van hulle het 19 soldate hul laaste woorde laat opneem.

Die verslae, wat in Engels geskryf is, het getoon dat 13 van die 19 hulle verhore en vonnisse in die gesig gestaar het of hul onskuld beweer het.

Ek, as 'n laaggeplaaste offisier, behoort nie so 'n vonnis te verdien nie, ” het een gesê, terwyl 'n ander die Amerikaanse weermag gevra het om die getuienis redelik gewig te gee, en gesê dat dit 'n groter gewig op die Filippyne is. 8221 en sommige gevangenes gevonnis wat werklik onskuldig is. ”

'N Afsonderlike individu het gesê:' Ek is nie skuldig nie, want ek het niemand doodgemaak nie. Ek het slegs die Japannese weermag te perd op die pad gelei. ”

Vyf van die 19 het waardering uitgespreek vir hul behandeling tydens aanhouding.

Ek spreek my dank uit teenoor die Amerikaanse weermag en veral die offisiere en wagte tydens my verblyf in 'n kamp in die Filippyne, het een gesê.

Benewens klas-A-oorlogsmisdadigers wat skuldig bevind is aan misdade teen vrede, was daar volgens die Japannese regering ongeveer 5 700 klas-B- en klas-C-misdadigers. Baie was laaggeplaaste offisiere, onderoffisiere of wagte.

In 'n tyd van verkeerde inligting en te veel inligting, is kwaliteit joernalistiek belangriker as ooit.
Deur in te teken, kan u ons help om die storie reg te stel.


7. Jesselton -opstand

Britse North Borneo Company

Jesselton -opstand was 'n multietniese opstand op die besette eiland Borneo in Oktober 1943. Die opstand is gelei deur 'n guerrillamag wat hoofsaaklik bestaan ​​het uit inheemse Suluk -mense en etniese Chinese. Die rebelle was hoofsaaklik gewapen met spiese en Indonesiese swaarde wat parang genoem word, met min of geen vuurwapens nie.

Die Japannese keiserlike wagte het daarin geslaag om die opstand te verpletter, waarna hulle 'n volksmoordveldtog teen die Suluk -bevolking geloods het, as 'n straf vir deelname aan die opstand.

Die berugte Kempeitai, wie se metodes van marteling en ondervraging baie ooreenstem met die Duitse Gestapo, het die stelselmatige slagting van die Suluks uitgevoer terwyl hy die oorblyfsels van die Chinese guerrillas agtervolg het.

Hulle bajonet en onthoof die Suluks en verbrand hul dorpe tot die punt dat die inheemse mense byna heeltemal uitgewis is. Ongeveer 3 000-4 000 van die Suluks is uitgeroei.

Die Tokio oorlogsmisdade verhoor ” indeks beskryf Japannese gruweldade as 'n oënskynlik stelselmatige poging om die Suluk -wedloop tussen Februarie en Junie 1944 ” uit te wis.


Homma is gebore op die Sado -eiland, in die See van Japan, by die Niigata -prefektuur. Hy studeer in die 14de klas van die Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1907 en in die 27ste klas van die Army Staff College in 1915. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Homma het 'n diepe respek vir en 'n mate van begrip vir die Weste, nadat hy agt jaar as militêre attaché in die Verenigde Koninkryk was. In 1917 was hy verbonde aan die East Lancashire Regiment, en in 1918 het hy by die Britse ekspedisiemag in Frankryk gedien, met die militêre kruis. [2]

Van 1930 tot 1932 is Homma weer as 'n militêre attaché na die Verenigde Koninkryk gestuur, waar sy vaardigheid in die Engelse taal nuttig was. Hy is ook aangestel om deel te wees van die Japannese afvaardiging na die ontwapeningskonferensie in Genève in 1932 en het van 1932 tot 1933 by die persafdeling van die weermagbediening gedien. 1933 tot 1935, en is bevorder tot bevelvoerder van die IJA 32ste Infanterie Brigade van 1935 tot 1936. [3]

In 1937 word Homma aangestel as hulpverlener van prins Chichibu, 'n broer van die keiser. Saam met hom het hy 'n diplomatieke toer na Wes -Europa onderneem, wat in Duitsland geëindig het. Daar woon hy die byeenkoms van Neurenberg by en ontmoet Adolf Hitler, met wie die prins die betrekkinge probeer versterk het, na aanleiding van die Anti-Komintern-verdrag van 1936. Daarna dien hy as die bevelvoerder van die Taiwanese leër van die keiserlike gewapende magte en skryf die liriek van die militêre lied "Taiwan Army". Yamaguchi Yoshiko ("Lee Shiang Lan" in Chinees) is genooi om die liedjie te sing om die Taiwanese moraal te versterk. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Met die aanvang van die Tweede Sino-Japannese Oorlog, is Homma aangestel as bevelvoerder van die IJA 27th Division in China van 1938 tot 1940 en het hy die blokkade van die buitelandse toegewings in Tientsin gelei, waar hy die onderhandelinge met die Britte gelei het. [4] Na die val van Nanjing verklaar hy in die openbaar dat "tensy vrede onmiddellik bereik word, dit rampspoedig sal wees". [5] Homma is uit sy pos by die voorste linies verwyder en is weer aangestel om van 1940 tot 1941 die opperbevelhebber van die Taiwan Army District te word. Hy word in Julie 1938 tot luitenant -generaal bevorder. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Met die aanvang van die Stille Oseaan-oorlog, is Homma aangewys as bevelvoerder van die IJA 14th Army van 43,110 man en die taak om die Filippyne binne te val. Hy het sy troepe beveel om die Filippyne nie as vyande te behandel nie, maar as vriende en hul gebruike en godsdiens te respekteer. In 'n geval het Homma op sy benadering tot Manila sy kolomme gestop en die mans beveel om formasies op te ruim en strenger te maak, in die oortuiging dat onversorgde soldate meer geneig is om te plunder en te verkrag. [6]

Sy benadering tot Filippynse burgers het hom die vyandskap besorg van sy meerdere, generaal graaf Hisaichi Terauchi, bevelvoerder van die suidelike leër, wat nadelige berigte oor Homma na Tokio gestuur het vanaf sy hoofkwartier in Saigon. Daar was ook 'n groeiende ondergrawing binne die bevel van Homma deur 'n klein groepie ondergeskiktes, onder die invloed van kolonel Masanobu Tsuji. In Homma's name, they sent out secret orders against his policies, including ordering the execution of Filipino Chief Justice José Abad Santos and attempted execution of former Speaker of the House of Representatives Manuel Roxas, which Homma found out about in time to stop. [7]

Homma failed to give credence to the possibility that a retreat into the Bataan Peninsula by Filipino-American forces might succeed in upsetting the Japanese timetable. By the time he recognized his mistake, his best infantry division had been replaced by a poorly trained reserve brigade, greatly weakening his assault force. Rather than waste his men in furious frontal assaults, he tried to outmaneuver the American forces. This brought criticism from superiors who believed he had been "contaminated" by Western ideas about conserving the lives of his men. [ This quote needs a citation ]

Worried about the stalled offensive in Luzon, Hirohito pressed Army Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama twice in January 1942 to increase troop strength and launch a quick knockout on Bataan. [8] Following these orders, Sugiyama put pressure on Homma to renew his attacks. The resulting Battle of Bataan, commencing in January 1942, was one of the most intense in the campaign. Following Japanese victory in April, at least 60,000 Allied prisoners of war were marched 60 miles (100 km) to a prisoner-of-war camp. Due to ill treatment and abuse from Japanese soldiers, at least 5,500 Allied soldiers died during the march. Homma became known as the Beast of Bataan among Allied soldiers. [9] : 34

Despite Japanese victory in the Battle of Bataan, the deteriorating relationship between Homma and Sugiyama led to the removal of Homma from command shortly after the fall of Corregidor, and he was thereafter commander of the 14th Army in name only. Die New York Times erroneously reported prior to the fall of Bataan that Homma was replaced by General Yamashita, and that Homma had committed suicide. [10]

The Imperial General Headquarters regarded Homma as not aggressive enough in war (resulting in the high cost and long delay in securing the American and Filipino forces' surrender), and too lenient with the Filipino people in peace, and he was subsequently forced into retirement in August 1943. [11] Homma retired from the military and lived in semi-seclusion in Japan until the end of the war. [ aanhaling nodig ]

After the surrender of Japan, in mid-September 1945, the American occupation authorities arrested Homma and extradited him to the Philippines where he was tried by an American tribunal on 48 counts of violating international rules of war relating to the atrocities committed by troops under his command during the Bataan Death March. [12]

Homma was arraigned on December 19, 1945, and the trial was held at the High Commissioner's Residence, Manila, between January 3 and February 11, 1946. [13] A team of six lawyers, none of whom had experience in criminal law, [9] : 31 were appointed to defend Homma.

The prosecution called witnesses and filed depositions attesting to the abuse and poor conditions encountered by the Allied soldiers during the march. In particular, James Baldassarre, a survivor of the march, testified to the killings of two Allied officers by the Japanese, and Homma's apathy to the illness and suffering of the Allied prisoners of war. [9]

During his defence, Homma claimed that he was so preoccupied with the plans for the Corregidor assault that he had forgotten about the prisoners' treatment, believing that his officers were properly handling the matter. He claimed that he did not learn of the atrocity until after the war, even though his headquarters were only 500 feet (150 m) from the route of the march, [12] stating in court, "I came to know for the first time in the court of [the] atrocities, and I am ashamed of myself should these atrocities have happened." [9] Robert Pelz, a member of Homma's defence team, noted in his diary, "I truly believe [Homma] had no idea of the things that occurred." [9]

Historian Kevin C. Murphy argues that while it is not clear whether Homma ordered the atrocities that occurred during the march, Homma's lack of administrative expertise and his inability to adequately delegate authority and control his men helped to enable the atrocities. [14] After American–Filipino forces surrendered the Bataan Peninsula, Homma turned the logistics of handling the estimated 25,000 prisoners to Major-General Yoshitake Kawane. Homma publicly stated that the POWs would be treated fairly. A plan was formulated, approved by Homma, to transport and march the prisoners to Camp O'Donnell. However, the plan was severely flawed, as the American and Filipino POWs were starving, were weak with malaria, and numbered not 25,000 but 76,000 men, far more than any Japanese plan had anticipated. [15]

On February 11, 1946, Homma was convicted of all counts and sentenced "to be shot to death with musketry", [16] which is considered to be more honorable than a sentence of death by hanging. [9] Homma's wife visited Douglas MacArthur to urge a careful review of her husband's case. [9] MacArthur affirmed the tribunal's sentence, and Homma was executed by firing squad by American forces on April 3, 1946, in Los Baños, Laguna a few kilometers from the former Internment Camp at the University of the Philippines Los Baños. [12] [17]

There have been various claims and charges that Homma's trial was unfair or biased and that his trial and execution served primarily to avenge Homma's defeat of General MacArthur's forces.

Associate Justice Frank Murphy, in dissent of denial of a hearing by the U.S. Supreme Court on a rule of evidence, stated,

Either we conduct such a trial as this in the noble spirit and atmosphere of our Constitution or we abandon all pretense to justice, let the ages slip away and descend to the level of revengeful blood purges. [18]

Homma's chief defense counsel, John H. Skeen Jr., stated that it was a "highly irregular trial, conducted in an atmosphere that left no doubt as to what the ultimate outcome would be". [19]

General Arthur Trudeau, a member of the five-member tribunal that condemned Homma, said in a 1971 interview,

There's no question but that some men who were either weak or wounded were shot or bayoneted on this Death March. The question is how many echelons of command up is a person responsible to the point where you should condemn him for murder or crime, and that is what General Homma was accused of . We need to cogitate about our wisdom in condemning General Homma to death. I must admit I was not much in favor of it. In fact, I opposed it but I could only oppose it to a point that allowed him to be shot as a soldier and not hanged . I thought he was an outstanding soldier. [20]

General Douglas MacArthur had a differing conclusion and wrote in his review of the case:

If this defendant does not deserve his judicial fate, none in jurisdictional history ever did. There can be no greater, more heinous or more dangerous crime than the mass destruction, under guise of military authority or military necessity, of helpless men incapable of further contribution to war effort. A failure of law process to punish such acts of criminal enormity would threaten the very fabric of world society. [21]


Hoofstuk 3

By R.J. Rummel

From the invasion of China in 1937 to the end of World War II, the Japanese military regime murdered near 3,000,000 to over 10,000,000 people, most probably almost 6,000,000 Chinese, Indonesians, Koreans, Filipinos, and Indochinese, among others, including Western prisoners of war. This democide was due to a morally bankrupt political and military strategy, military expediency and custom, and national culture (such as the view that those enemy soldiers who surrender while still able to resist were criminals).

Table 3.1 presents the sources, estimates, and calculations on Japanese democide in World War II. There is one major omission, however. Democide in China during the Sino-Japanese War that begun in 1937, and merged with WWII in December 1941, is excluded. This democide has been separately calculated in Rummel (1994), and only the total derived there is given in the table (line 386) in calculating the overall democide.

The first part of the table (lines 2 to 42) calculates the number of Japanese that died in Japanese wars, 1937 to 1945. This amounted to 1,771,000 to 3,187,000 Japanese, most likely 2,521,000 (line 42). Of this number, 672,000 probably were civilians (line 32), virtually all killed in American air raids (including the two atomic bombs).

The first democide I consider is against prisoners of war and interned civilians (lines 45 to 93). Most of these figures are official, and were presented at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. 1 No figure for French POWs deaths in Indochina were available in the sources. I then estimated this from the total garrison (line 52) and the percent of POWs killed for other nations (line 53).

The overall number of POWs and internees killed was about 138,000 (line 93). Since this is largely based on official figures released shortly after the war, I give no high and low. For nations releasing figures on both the total number of POWs captured and the number dying in Japanese captivity, the POW death rate averaged nearly 29 percent.

The table next lists estimates of the total Asian forced laborers who died from Japanese maltreatment. The most notorious case of indifference to the health and welfare of prisoners and forced laborers was the building of the Burma-Thailand railroad in 1942 to 1943. Estimates of those killed, including POWs, are given (lines 97 to 104) in the table. I already included these POW deaths under the POW total (line 93). As for Asian forced laborers working on the railroad, 30,000 to 100,000 died, probably 60,000 (line 105).

I also list forced labor deaths for specific countries, beginning with Indonesia (Dutch East Indies, at the time). How many Indonesian forced laborers were actually conscripted by the Japanese is unknown. Estimates run as high as 1,500,000 (line 110a) even more speculative is the death toll. This varies in the sources from 200,000 to 1,430,000 deaths, with perhaps the most likely figure being 300,000 (the figure "accepted" by the United Nations--line 114).

Information on Korean deaths under Japanese occupation is difficult to uncover (Korea was not invited to participate in the War Crimes Trial). We do know that 5,400,000 Koreans were conscripted for labor beginning in 1939 (line 119), but how many died can only be roughly estimated. Apparently Koreans were better treated than were laborers from other countries, but still their work hours, food and medical care were such that large numbers died (even Japanese coolies forced to work in other countries were so maltreated that many died). This is clear from the 60,000 Korean laborers that died in Japan out of the near 670,000 that were brought there in the years 1939 to 1945 (line 119a). To estimate what the total Korean death toll might be, I give the forced labor death rates for Koreans and Chinese in Japan and forced laborers from or in Indonesia (lines 119b-121). With these as the upper bounds, my reading of Korean history for this period suggests a possible range in the Korean death rate of 5 to 15 percent, with a mid-estimate of 7 percent. These should be conservative rates, given that near 9 percent died in Japan where work conditions can be assumed better than in Korea or Manchuria and that the rates are much less than half those for China and Indonesia. Even at these low rates, however, the forced labor toll for Korea comes to 270,000 to 810,000 dead in seven years.

Data is equally sparse for Manchuria. From diverse sources it is clear that Japan conscripted over a 1,000,000 forced laborers from Manchuria, which is thereby made the low (line 126) but how many died is unknown. I use the same approach here as for Korea, assuming the death rate for Manchurian laborers to be closer to that for the Chinese forced to labor in Japan (line 127). This gives (line 128) a probably conservative range of 100,000 to 200,000 Manchurian dead over seven years.

For the Burma-Thailand railroad, and for Indonesia, Korea, and Manchuria, 600,000 to 1,610,000 Asian forced laborers died (line 131). Note that this is probably very conservative, even were some of the estimates too high for a few of the countries included. No figures, even a basis for rough estimates, are available in the sources for Malaysia, Indochina, and Burma (except for those dying while working on the Burma-Thailand railroad). Yet, based on Japanese behavior in other countries, many forced laborers from these countries also must have died elsewhere.

The table next presents estimates on Japanese massacres and atrocities in occupied countries and territories. I make two listings of these. The first (lines 134-217) is of those countries or territories for which no total or subtotal is available or can be calculated the second (lines 228-289) is of countries and places for which a country total can be determined. Considering now the first list, in most cases the existence of a massacre was alleged, without any estimate of the number killed being given. Where such estimates were available, they add up to 8,089 killed (line 223), or an average slightly over 1,300 per incident.

A problem is how to handle the forty-three massacres for which there is a question mark (line 221). For the six massacres in this list for which there are estimates, the average is 1,348 killed. In China, where many more reports of the number massacred were available, the average killed for all the low estimates was 800. 2 Moreover, the average killed in massacres in Indonesia (lines 253-284) for which figures are given is a low of 820 (line 286). Taking the three averages into account (1,348, 800, and 820), I assume an average of 800 for the 43 question marks (line 220). This average times the number of question marks gives a low of 42,000 killed a high of 85,000 if doubled. These figures are surely conservative, since they do not take into account the many massacres that undoubtedly occurred, but were not reported in the sources. Consider that in the Philippines alone, where after the war American military teams made a special effort to investigate all Japanese massacres, about 90,000 civilians were reported killed (lines 339 and 340).

Turning to the next list, there is enough information given about the countries or territories included here for me to a country-by-country estimate of those killed. The first territory tabulated is Indochina (lines 229-240). From information (line 244) that 5.5 percent of the European population died we can estimate for the French population (lines 242-243) at that time that at least 1,320 were killed.

Similarly, from the Indochinese (Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians) population (lines 247 and 248) and a report that 2.5 percent died, we get a high estimate of 575,000 dead (line 250). This is a very large number, and appears to grossly exaggerated the total massacred (and is thus made a high). Many may have died from other causes, such as local famines, for which the Japanese were not wholly responsible. In the Philippines, where the Japanese were especially prone to massacre inhabitants due to the pervasive guerrilla war being waged against them, the democide rate high was almost 14 murdered per thousand by the Japanese (line 348) for China a high of near 30 per thousand of the population in occupied territory probably were similarly killed 3 both these figures are close to the twenty-five per thousand calculated above for Indochina. Were the Chinese annual democide rate (annual, not total, since the total is for 1937 to 1945) used to estimate the number of Indochinese murdered, the toll would be 68,000 to 312,000 (line 250a) were the Philippine rate used, the toll would be 159,000 to 318,000 (line 250b).

From information available in the sources, there appears no special reason to believe that the Japanese treated Indochinese with greater brutality than they did the Chinese or Filipinos indeed, overall, they may have been much better treated than Filipinos. Accordingly, I assume the low based on the Chinese democide (21 percent that of the Philippines) is that for Indochina I base the high on the native population dead (line 250) and I calculate the mid-value as the average between this and the Chinese and Filipino bases. This gives (line 250c) a range of 68,000 to 575,000 Indochinese killed, with a most probable estimate of 207,000, considerably under 2.5 percent of the population.

I treat Indonesia next (lines 253-284). Numerous massacres were reported in Indonesia, and those for which estimates of the number of people killed are available total 13,100 to 15,290 dead (line 285). 4 This surely must be far below the actual number killed, were all the massacres and atrocities known. Considering the average killed for the sixteen recorded massacres, I recalculated the total using the average for the twelve cases with question marks (line 286a). Based on this and the sources, I then estimated the minimum dead in massacres and atrocities as 75,000 (line 286b). Is this a reasonable estimate?

Given the population of Indonesia (line 289), this estimate can be checked by calculating an overall toll based on the Japanese democide in China and the Philippines (lines 292 and 293). Moreover, we have the one estimate that a total of 4,000,000 Indonesians died in the war from all causes (line 296). Finally, adding the forced labor and massacre deaths (line 297) gives a total that can be compared with these above figures. Clearly, juxtaposed to lines 292 to 296, the total seems well in line and I thus take the estimate of massacre and atrocity deaths (line 286b) as reasonable.

The next territory to consider is Malaya (lines 301-311). The Chinese living in Malaya particularly suffered from the Japanese occupation, at least 37,000 of them being executed (lines 301, 302, 304). In order to get some overall figures, estimates based on the China and Philippine democide rates are given (line 318 and 319). Also included with these bases is a high of 100,000 killed given by Malayan officials. Noting this high and that the few available figures already total 38,000 killed (line 312), I consolidated these figures into a range of 55,000 to 100,000 killed, with a mid-estimate of 83,000.

Manchuria, that follows (lines 326-329), is considered separately from China. It had already been taken over and administered as a Japanese colony (in effect) prior to the Sino-Japanese War. Very little information is available in the sources on massacres and atrocities in the territory during the war, although the Tokyo War Crimes Trials and Japanese behavior elsewhere suggest that many such took place.

As to Okinawa (line 333), we know about how many Okinawan civilians lost their lives during the American invasion of the Island, and some of these intentionally were killed by Japanese troops or ordered to commit suicide, but the democide is unknown and cannot even be guessed.

On the Philippines (lines 336 to 342), better estimates than for any other territory are available. After the Japanese defeat on the Islands, special American units tried to document the massacres committed by Japanese forces and secret police. Still, different and inconsistent figures are given (lines 336-340), taking into account the number of American civilians (line 336) and American and Filipino POWs (lines 73, and 78-82) captured and killed. Most likely this is due to the difficulty of estimating the toll of many recorded and unrecorded massacres and atrocities. In any case, a minimum of 90,000 Filipino civilians killed seems solid. No high is readily suggested, so I invoke the procedure of doubling the low and taking the mid-value as a third higher than the low (line 343). For the high and mid-value, these are prudent procedures.

No information is available in the sources on Philippine forced labor, yet judging from Japanese occupation behavior elsewhere, perhaps tens, if not hundreds of thousands of such laborers must have been conscripted, many probably dying. I assume these numbers to be absorbed into the democide's high and mid-values, while presuming that the low involves no forced labor deaths at all. All this gives a most probable democide rate of two to three Filipinos per thousand per year (line 349).

Next to consider is Saipan (line 352), where an unknown number of Japanese civilians were killed by Japanese troops or ordered too commit suicide. No basis for estimating these numbers is given in the sources.

Estimates of democide in Singapore's follows (lines 355-361). The best figure is of 150,000 Asians killed by the Japanese secret police (line 356) and this is made the low. I make the high twice the low, and the mid-value a third higher. If anything, this procedure may underestimate the real total. The low excludes at least 5,000 Chinese rounded up by the Japanese Army and killed in February, 1942 (line 359) and other Army massacres undoubtedly occurred, some of which are listed in the table (lines 355, 357, 358, and 360). And no forced labor deaths are included (although some may have been picked up by the Asian toll on the Burma-Thailand railroad--line 105).

Finally, there were 590 American civilian victims (line 365).

Adding together all these massacre and atrocity figures (line 369) gives a total of 413,000 to 841,000 killed.

Here and there in the sources are hints of local Japanese caused famines in one territory or another, but only for India and Indochina are estimates of famine deaths given. That for India is blamed on Japanese policies in Burma that upset the rice supply, but there is not enough information to assume that these policies were pursued with a reckless or knowing disregard of a famine that might be produced. For Indochina, when the food supply was disrupted by US air raids and a naval blockade, the Japanese knowingly diverted to their forces rice needed by the inhabitants for survival. Without more information, however, how much of this famine to blame on the Japanese is a guess. Accordingly, a low of 25 percent responsibility is estimated (line 378), which seems prudent enough.

From all the assumptions, consolidations and calculations made, the overall Japanese democide in World War II can now be estimated (lines 381-384), and Japanese democide in China included (line 386). This gives a total democide of 3,056,000 to 10,595,000 with a likely mid-total of 5,964,000 people killed.

How credible is this range and most probable democide? To assess this, the total population controlled by Japanese forces is first calculated (line 400), and after comparing this to one such figure (line 401) given in the sources, a range of population figures is consolidated (line 402). These population figures are then used to calculate the death toll using the Chinese and Filipino democide rates as the basis (lines 405 and 406). Since totals are now being compared, these bases are calculated for the full 1937 to 1945 period. The total democide figures are reproduced below the two resulting ranges (line 409) for comparison. As can be seen, the overall democide total for Japan is close to that one would get estimating it from Japan's democide in China or the Philippines. This implies that the total democide figures are not inconsistent from one territory or country to another, but that there was a pattern of Japanese democide throughout that is captured by these results. This pattern is there regardless of the many assumptions, estimates, and calculations involved, and even taking into account that in some cases a China and Philippine bases was used to estimate a country or territory's massacres and atrocities (most forced labor and all POW deaths were determined independently). And this relative consistency lends credibility to the democide totals.

With these totals I calculated (lines 412 and 413) the overall and annual democide rate (for the occupied population, at its greatest extent). As can be seen, nearly one out of every one-hundred people controlled by Japan was murdered, or almost three per thousand people per year.


The Tokyo Tribunal, War Responsibility and the Japanese People

Approaching the 60th anniversary of the opening of the Tokyo Tribunal in 2006, public opinion was divided over Prime Minister Koizumi&rsquos visits to Yasukuni Shrine. One reason for opposition to the visit was that Tokyo Tribunal Class A war criminals are enshrined there.

On August 15 1985, then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, despite strong domestic and international criticism, carried out an official visit to Yasukuni. The government later acknowledged during parliamentary questioning that it had accepted the verdict of the Tokyo Tribunal through the San Francisco Peace Treaty. As a result, Prime Minister Nakasone refrained from further visits to the shrine from the following year. Though aware of these historical developments, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has persisted in visiting Yasukuni Shrine since his assumption of office in 2001. In 2005, he again visited the shrine in the face of strong criticism in Japan and abroad. Conservative newspapers like the Sankei Shinbun take the view that &ldquovisiting the shrine is not a Treaty violation.&rdquo This argument, however, is not in the least compelling [1]

In public opinion surveys, while opposition to Prime Minister Koizumi&rsquos Yasukuni Shrine visits is marginally greater, the numbers of those who voice support are not insignificant. This is, I believe, a reflection of popular attitudes toward the Tokyo Tribunal. This article will focus on the problem of &lsquoThe Tokyo Tribunal and the contrition of Japanese people at that time.&rsquo

Tojo Hideki&rsquos disgraceful behaviour

The Tokyo Tribunal was convened on May 3 1946. After the testimony, counter-testimony, rebuttal, counter-rebuttal, and closing statements of both the prosecutor and the defense, the trial was concluded on April 16 1948 and the court adjourned. The court then reconvened on November 4 1948, the reading of the verdict concluded on November 12, and sentences were handed down.

With the convening of the Tokyo Tribunal, the Allied Powers and especially the U.S. Government and GHQ (SCAP) had a particularly strong interest in the reaction of the Japanese people to the Tokyo Tribunal and their sense of war responsibility. For the Japanese, the initial shock came with the first war arrest warrants by the Occupation Forces on September 11, 1945. When the U.S. forces sought to execute these warrants, former Prime Minister Tojo Hideki unsuccessfully attempted to take his own life. The sensation caused by the attempted suicide of the man who had been responsible for issuing the admonition in the Senjinkun (Imperial Japanese Army Field Service Code) to &ldquolive without the humiliation of being taken prisoner and die without leaving a blemish on your name&rdquo was immense.


Tojo Hideki awaits sentencing, Movember 24, 1948.

The Home Affairs Ministry compiled a report on popular reactions from each region, but recorded the overall situation as follows: &ldquoRegarding General Tojo&rsquos decision to commit suicide, those completely sympathetic to the timing, method, and attitude shown in the suicide are exceedingly rare, and most people are thoroughly critical and reproving. The main reactions are as follows:

1. The entire population has had their expectations completely betrayed because they believed that General Tojo had refrained from taking his life till now in order to be able to stand before the allied tribunal as the person bearing highest responsibility for the war and proudly uphold the justice of the Japanese cause.

2. If Tojo was going to attempt suicide, he should have done it directly after the Imperial declaration of the end of the war.

3. Hurriedly attempting to shoot himself with a pistol when the American troops arrived is not the mark of a soldier. If he had died then and there, well and good, but to survive was truly humiliating. Then to let himself go and to blather away saying things that did not need to be said - well, we can only hope he will not cause the country harm &hellip&rdquo

America&rsquos exoneration of the Emperor

Elsewhere a September 13 report from police headquarters commented that &ldquothere is concern that the emperor might be affected.&rdquo With Tojo&rsquos failed suicide attempt, anxiety began to surface that the search for those with war responsibility would reach the Showa Emperor. The arrest of war criminals continued after this and there was tacit consent or support amongst the people. Because the Occupation forces were letting various truths about the war be known through the press, the understanding amongst the population that they had been &lsquodeceived&rsquo by military leaders and bureaucrats intensified and disaffection with these groups increased.

The Showa Emperor was the exception. A radical movement to pursue the Emperor as a war criminal developed among the core group of the newly re-established Communist Party, while from a different perspective, other groups, primarily intellectuals, began to favor the idea that the emperor ought to abdicate to accept a certain measure of war responsibility. The fact remains, however, that public opinion at the time supported the protection of the Emperor. An important factor here may have been the American anti-Japanese propaganda during the latter years of the Asia Pacific War. The U.S. tried to drive a wedge between the military, which it attacked, and the Emperor and the people, which it did not attack. This continued as part of Occupation strategy and the political myth that &lsquothe Emperor and the people were fooled by the military&rsquo permeated deeply throughout the population. As a result, popular acceptance of criticism of military leaders and of the responsibility of leaders revealed at the Tokyo Tribunal gradually strengthened and coalesced around the exclusion of the Emperor from war responsibility.

Hirohito remade in a civilian image and guarded by U.S. forces, September 1945.

Nonetheless, the popular view of &lsquothe responsibility of the leaders&rsquo was mostly passive, overshadowed by a consciousness that the people were in fact victims. Virtually no sense of responsibility for attacks against the peoples of Asia was evident, nor was there any movement to pursue in a positive way questions of war responsibility. This may be seen as the origin of the failure of many people to accept war responsibility or to adopt as their own the task of &lsquoovercoming the past.&rsquo

Through the Tokyo Tribunal, people became aware of and were shocked by the brutal actions of the military such as the Nanking Massacre and similar matters revealed by the prosecution. But as proceedings became drawn out, interest diminished and the spectacle even arose of &lsquoTojo popularity&rsquo (Tojo ninki). This was due to the fact that while many defendants were only interested in self-vindication, Tojo resolutely defended the policies of the Japanese government during the war and stood up to Prosecutor Keenan.

This strategy, however, also met with a degree of failure. Tojo&rsquos testimony on New Years Eve 1947 hinted at the Emperor&rsquos war responsibility. This worried Prosecutor Keenan and those close to the Imperial Court who had decided that the Emperor should be immune from responsibility. Ultimately, however, through behind-the-scenes manoeuvring, Tojo revised his comments early the following year, and this was the only point during the Tribunal when the actions of the Emperor surfaced.

Conscientious criticism blocked

The U.S. authorities were paying attention to the reactions of the Japanese people, and the report &ldquoJapanese reactions to the Class A War Crimes Tribunal&rdquo prepared in August 1948 by the Far Eastern Section of the State Department&rsquos Bureau of Investigation analysed it in this way: &ldquoThe attitude of many Japanese towards the trial is acquiescence to it as something that was bound to happen because Japan lost the war.

Rather than focusing on the war responsibility of the defendants resulting from their war crimes, criticism is concentrated on their responsibility for leading the nation into defeat and bringing shame and misery. That is, rather than responsibility for waging the war, the people are problematizing their leaders&rsquo responsibility for losing it.&rdquo The report continued: &ldquoThe coolness of the Japanese people towards the trial, if that can be considered their true sentiment, is also related to the fact that the Emperor&rsquos war responsibility is not being questioned. Moreover, even if there is deep opposition to the abdication of the Emperor, at the very least the people consider the Emperor morally responsible for the war.&rdquo

The report went on to affirm that, &ldquoFor a time after the end of the war, the Japanese people clearly demanded that the war responsibility of former leaders who lead their country into a tragic war be exposed. The Japanese people publicly censured the militarists and their supporters, and on occasion, even the role played by the Emperor during the war became the subject of wide-ranging debate. At present, however, the demand to clarify war responsibility is slowly being replaced by the belief that national unity is indispensable for the rapid reconstruction of the country&rdquo [2]

The same report suggests that as the Cold War between East and West intensified, the U.S. halted the war crimes tribunal and began to emphasize economic development over the pursuit of Japanese war responsibility. Japanese popular responses also began to shift in this direction. But it should not be forgotten that this report was based on an analysis of newspaper bulletins at a time when GHQ was censoring all publications. It should also be kept in mind that GHQ in principle forbade criticism of the Tokyo Tribunal whether from the left or right, and that public opinion was moulded by the censors to suit GHQ. The materials in the Prange Collection at the University of Maryland, (which holds Japanese newspapers, publications, and films produced during the Occupation) reveal that most rightwing criticism of the Tokyo Tribunal was censored. Conversely, the pioneer human rights activist and lawyer Fuse Tatsuji and others at their symposium reported in Jiyu konwakai (Talk on Freedom) called for appointment of a Japanese prosecutor and pointed out the Emperor&rsquos war responsibility.
Chofumi Tsura, a journalist and historian who attended that symposium, commented that &ldquoit is absurd that the Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan and Korea is not being tried at the Tokyo Tribunal.&rdquo He commented not only on the war responsibility of the Emperor but also on the war responsibility of the Japanese people themselves. His article about the symposium was completely deleted by the censors. The Occupation forces did not permit even the kind of speech that might be considered by today&rsquos standards legitimate criticism. The case of Jiyu konwakai is but one example among many.

The shameful behaviour of the Japanese

Six years after the conclusion of the Tokyo Tribunal in August 1955, the Japanese government surveyed 3000 men and women on &ldquoThe attitude of people towards war responsibility&rdquo (64.7% response rate). During the interval between the Tokyo Tribunal and the survey, the &lsquoreverse course&rsquo had occurred, the Korean War began, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty was ratified, but it is clear from the survey that subjective self-awareness surrounding the Tokyo Tribunal had grown more warped and degenerate. To the question &ldquoPolitical and military leaders during the war were punished by the victor nation through a military court: do you think it natural for this to happen after having started a war? Do you think it inevitable considering Japan lost the war?&rdquo 19% responded that they thought it was &lsquonatural,&rsquo 66% answered that they thought it &lsquoinevitable,&rsquo and 15% said that it was &lsquounclear.&rsquo Furthermore, to the question &ldquoEven if Japan lost, do you think that the Tokyo Tribunal was an abysmal way to resolve matters?&rdquo 63% of people answered that they thought is was &ldquoutterly appalling&rdquo (hidosugiru) while only 31% answered &ldquoI don&rsquot think so&rdquo [3]

The mitigation of the sentences of war criminals and the agitations for parole symbolized the popular reaction to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. After the Peace Treaty went into effect, &lsquoSugamo Prison&rsquo had its name changed to Sugamo Detention Centre. Utsumi Aiko from Keisen University points out that &ldquothe parole-for-war-criminals movement was driven by two groups: those from outside who had &lsquoa sense of pity&rsquo for the prisoners and the war criminals themselves who called for their own release as part of an anti-war peace movement. The movement that arose out of &lsquoa sense of pity&rsquo demanded &lsquojust set them free (tonikaku shakuho o) regardless of how it is done&rsquo. The situation heated up to such an extent that expressions like &lsquoif you are Japanese, sign!&rsquo became a catch phrase.&rdquo


Sugamo Prison, 1947

More than ten million people supported the 1952 campaign petitioning for the release of war criminals. In the face of this surge of public opinion, the government commented that &ldquopublic sentiment in our country is that the war criminals are not criminals. Rather, they gather great sympathy as victims of the war, and the number of people concerned about the war crimes tribunal system itself is steadily increasing.&rdquo Not only that, but visits to Sugamo to express support for the inmates by entertainers including dancing troupes, rakugo storytellers, and manzai comics, as well as &lsquoSugamo visitations&rsquo (Sugamo mode) by prefectural friendship societies, boomed. &ldquoThe cold stare directed at war criminals transformed into a sympathetic gaze on them as war victims they even began to be referred to as war heroes &hellip and little by little the sense of war responsibility eroded&rdquo [4]

This trend amounted to forgetting about Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in which Japan accepted the verdicts of the Tokyo Tribunal and the B and C level tribunals.

Four Japanese officers await trial for war crimes at Labuan Island, December 1945.

Yasukuni Shrine visits became the symbol of this loss of memory, not only for the people but also for the government. We cannot talk of great gaps in post-war history without understanding this forgetfulness. The popular attitude towards the Tokyo Tribunal that tried the A-class war crimes was from beginning to end lacking in subjective self-consciousness, and even today provides grounds for the criticism of the people of Asia about Japan&rsquos &lsquoinability to deal with the past.&rsquo

Awaya Kentaro is Professor at Rikkyo University and the author of numerous works on the Tokyo Trials and wartime Japan. This article was published in Shukan Kinyobi on December 23, 2005. Posted at Japan Focus February 2, 2006.

Timothy Amos recently completed his PhD thesis Ambiguous Bodies: Writings on the Japanese Outcaste at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University. He is a visiting fellow in the Division of Pacific and Asian History. [email protected]

[1] Awaya Kentaro, Tokyo Saibanron. Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1989.

[2] Quoted in Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no sensokan. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995.

[3] Cabinet and Prime Minister&rsquos Office Deliberative Council, Sengo junen no kaiko to tenbo: kokumin no seijiteki iken, 1956 Quoted in Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no sensokan.


1. Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign

In 1942 the American Air Force was planning to construct clandestine airstrips on Chinese territory that wasn’t under full control of Japan. These airstrips were to serve as a landing pad for US bombers after bombing missions on Japanese mainland conducted from the USS Hornet aircraft carrier during the Doolittle raid.

Because the raid had to be launched earlier than planned, and because the Japanese Army was already in the process of locating and destroying the Chinese airbases, most of the aircraft ran out of fuel and crash-landed in the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangxi.

Surviving airmen parachuted and hid among the Chinese civilians who provided them shelter. Out of 64 that managed to bail out, eight were captured and executed almost immediately by the Japanese. In the search for the remaining US airmen, the Japanese conducted a thorough search, executing, pillaging and burning entire villages as an act of retribution for aiding the Americans.

The result was a devastating trail of 250,000 dead Chinese civilians. The Commander-in-Chief at the time was Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, the man behind the Changjiao Massacre.

After the war, in 1948, he was sentenced to life in prison but was paroled only six years later, in 1954. Until his death in 1962, he was a respected public figure and a head of the charitable organization “Kaikosha”, established to aid the Japanese war veterans.